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I 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, cyber crime has focused intensely on people to bypass existing sophisticated 
security controls; phishing is one of the most common forms of such attack. This research 
highlights the problem of e-mail phishing. A lot of previous research demonstrated the danger 
of phishing and its considerable consequences. Since users’ behaviour is unpredictable, there 
is no reliable technological protective solution (e.g. spam filters, anti-viruses) to diminish the 
risk arising from inappropriate user decisions. 
Therefore, this research attempts to reduce the risk of e-mail phishing through awareness and 
education.  It underlines the problem of e-mail phishing in the State of Qatar, one of world’s 
fastest developing countries and seeks to provide a solution to enhance people’s awareness of 
e-mail phishing by developing an effective awareness and educational framework. The 
framework consists of valuable recommendations for the Qatar government, citizens and 
organisations responsible for ensuring information security along with an educational agenda 
to train them how to identify and avoid phishing attempts. The educational agenda supports 
users in making better trust decisions to avoid phishing that could complement any technical 
solutions. It comprises a collection of training methods: conceptual, embedded, e-learning 
and learning programmes which include a television show and a learning session with a 
variety of teaching components such as a game, quizzes, posters, cartoons and a presentation.  
The components were tested by trial in two Qatari schools and evaluated by experts and a 
representative sample of Qatari citizens.  
Furthermore, the research proves the existence and extent of the e-mail phishing problem in 
Qatar in comparison with the UK where people were found to be less vulnerable and more 
aware. It was discovered that Qatar is an attractive place for phishers and that a lack of 
awareness and e-law made Qatar more vulnerable to the phishing. The research identifies the 
factors which make Qatari citizens susceptible to e-mail phishing attacks such as cultural, 
country-specific factors, interests and beliefs, religion effect and personal characteristics and 
this identified the need for enhancing Qatari’s level of awareness on phishing threat.   
Since literature on phishing in Qatar is sparse, empirical and non-empirical studies involved a 
variety of surveys, interviews and experiments. 
The research successfully achieved its aim and objectives and is now being considered by the 
Qatari Government.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
This chapter will guide the reader to the motivation for this research by presenting the 
research problem domain. In addition, it provides an introduction to the thesis and the 
research topic along with a general background on phishing. It leads to an identification 
of the research scope, target group, hypotheses, research questions, aim and objectives, 
contribution to knowledge and thesis structure.  
 
1.1   Background 
Nowadays, since the Internet has become ubiquitous, increasing numbers of people of 
all ages are getting into this massive, multifaceted  electronic medium and users are 
currently estimated to number 1.8 billion (Internet World Stats, 2009a). The Internet is 
no longer simply a means of gathering and sharing information, serving economic needs 
and providing education and entertainment, but is now an indispensable part of the daily 
life of people in their public and private affairs, assisting them in crucial day-to-day 
decisions, often with financial links. As a result, thieves have quickly found that the 
Internet offers them a superior environment in which to carry out their attacks on a still 
vulnerable society and this has led to the appearance of electronic fraud, the so-called 
e-fraud. However, with the massive development in security and countermeasures, 
e-fraud fraudsters have found difficulties in perpetrating their attacks.  Therefore, those 
thieves have thought of ways of bypassing the sophisticated security controls and 
measures by shifting their focus on people to commit their crimes. Since thieves believe 
that people are the weakest link in the security chain of any organisation, no matter how 
sophisticated its security controls, cyber criminals are currently moving to exploit 
people in committing their offences (Symantec, 2006). Thieves have always known that 
the best way around any security system is to manipulate a human being into giving 
them what they want, and this is what people in the IT field refer to as ‘social 
engineering’ (Gartner, 2002a), to be described later.  
 
Hence, several kinds of attack against people have emerged, of which phishing is a 
paradigm. It is a type of social engineering attack and takes the form of an online 
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identity theft which targets people to gather personal and confidential information such 
as username and password to commit a crime in the name of the true owner which could 
cause the victim negative consequences  (Bielski, 2004; Litan, 2004).  However, with 
the development of new communication channels, phishers have found new means to 
carry out their attacks. Consequently, different categories of phishing have been 
discovered such as Vishing, SMishing, Pharming, Google phishing, Wi-phishing, 
Phishing scam and Spear phishing (described in detail in Section 2.3).  
 
Although 1997 was the first occasion when the media demonstrated phishing and its 
threat (Ollmann, 2004), phishing attacks have subsequently increased dramatically. The 
majority of researchers have considered phishing as a formidable attack facing online 
consumers (Herzberg, 2008; APWG, 2006; Consumer Reports, 2006; Gartner, 2005; 
Pruitt, 2005). Accordingly, this has provided the motivation to focus on phishing as a 
research area (for more details, see the research problem domain in Section 1.2). 
 
Since e-mail is one of the most frequently used means for communication through 
outside networks, it has become the most targeted by attackers using phishing. 
Consequently, this research focuses on online identity theft through e-mail phishing and 
the lack of awareness on the part of users of the danger of this attack. The research 
spotlights the problem of e-mail phishing in the state of Qatar as an example of a 
developing country, since it was discovered that Qatar presents a fertile ground for 
phishers to commit their crimes (described in detail in Chapter 4). It seeks to reduce the 
e-mail phishing hazard in Qatar by developing an e-mail phishing awareness and 
educational framework consisting of a set of recommendations and an educational 
agenda. This research will add considerable inputs to knowledge as it sheds light on 
Qatar society, which is largely ignored in the literature, and identifies the factors 
affecting people’s responses to e-mail phishing, including the cultural and country-
specific factors, the awareness of Qatari citizens of the e-mail phishing threat compared 
to British citizens and the susceptibility of Qatari people to e-mail phishing. 
 
The general research structure is shown in Figure 1.1. The thesis starts with an 
introduction to the thesis, followed by an in-depth literature review in the areas of 
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phishing, education and training. This perspective of previous research on e-mail 
phishing provides the pillars of e-mail knowledge for understanding the nature of e-mail 
phishing and the previous methods applied as a defence against it, with an emphasis on 
the methods of education and training which could be adopted. The research 
methodology is built on these pillars of knowledge, including a review of literature to 
illustrate the factors which make Qatar an attractive place for phishers, surveys and 
interviews in Qatar and the UK to illustrate the phishing problem, together with 
experiments, comprised of penetration tests (Weissman, 1994 and 1995) and 
experimental studies in Qatar to identify the factors which make Qatari citizens 
susceptible to phishing. Consequently, the findings are built on the research results, 
covering all aspects of the research and finally achieving the overall contribution of the 
research which is to define an e-mail phishing awareness framework to help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar. The framework involves formulating effective 
recommendations and an e-mail phishing educational framework for target groups (the 
thesis structure is described in detail in Section 1.9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Research structure 
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1.2  Problem Domain 
Even with a very secure information system, vulnerability to phishing could be the 
weakest link for any organisation (APWG, 2006; Ollmann, 2004). It is an attack that is 
hard to defend against, even with the latest technology in information security. That is 
because phishing does not attack devices; it attacks the human users who are harder to 
protect. Since the number of organisations having an online presence has increased, 
phishers have a greater opportunity to make their attacks on an ever greater number of 
online consumers (Emigh, 2005). 
 
The susceptibility to phishing is increased since organisations have moved into mobile 
systems that allow users to access their organisational networks remotely from 
whereever they choose. With the existence of mobile systems, organisational networks 
could be breached by an unauthorised party via the users through their Internet-enabled 
services and electronic communication such as e-mail. The opportunity to send spam 
e-mails has facilitated the performance of phishers who can  thus send a huge number of 
phishing e-mails at minimal risk. These are usually sent from hacked mail servers and 
are considered as unwanted e-mail (Honeynet Project and Research Alliance, 2005; 
Bellovin, 2004). 
 
Much research has demonstrated the danger of phishing and the major consequences of 
such attack (APWG, 2006; Dhamija et al., 2006; Emigh, 2005; Gartner, 2005; Tsai, 
2005; Goldsborough, 2004; Ollmann, 2004). According to Herzberg (2008), phishing 
has been considered as the most threatening of the attacks faced by online consumers. It 
has been increasing since it is relatively cheap to launch, whilst the outcome losses 
could be considerable for victims who were successfully deceived (Consumer Reports, 
2006). In late 2003 and the beginning of 2004, phishing intimidation was recognised as 
it broadened across the Internet (Microsoft, 2006) and it has been considered to be one 
of the most widespread of Internet threats (Pruitt, 2005). 
 
A survey in May 2004 to May 2005 by Gartner (2005) has found a prevalence of 
phishing e-mails and around 73 million online USA adults reported that throughout the 
year they may have received 50 or more phishing e-mails. About 1.2 million online 
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USA consumers reported that they had been tricked by phishing e-mails; the total 
impact of their losses to the phishers was about $929 million (Gartner, 2005). Even 
more, other research reported that the amount of phishing attacks had reached endemic 
proportions (APWG, 2006). According to a survey carried out from July 2005 to June 
2006 by the CERT Coordination Centre (2006), 31 per cent of organisations stated that 
they had been attacked by phishing where phishers posed online as employees 
pretending to be a member of the company and asked for disclosure of the victim's 
personal data. 
 
Symantec, the world’s leading organisation in providing security solutions, detected 1.3 
billion phishing e-mails in the first six months of 2006, where 54 per cent of e-mails 
were considered as spam, an increase over the previous six months when spam records 
reached 50 per cent. Symantec has commented that some e-mails targeting different 
users were used several times in different phishing attempts but nevertheless each 
e-mail was different in content and structure and in the way the phishers tried to deceive 
the receivers into providing their private information (Symantec, 2006). According to 
the Phishing Activity Trends Report by the E-mail Phishing Working Group (APWG, 
2006), in August 2006 the number of phishing sites had increased and it reported the 
presence of 10,091 active ones, an increase of 192 per cent on the same month in the 
preceding year. The fraudulent websites were active for a short time, 4.8 days on 
average. In addition, the 26,150 unique phishing messages in August 2006 represented a 
190 per cent increase compared to the previous August (APWG, 2006).    
 
Today, cyber attacks tend to be carried out by professional attackers with a specific 
targeted aim, it is no longer a hobby nor a form of cyber destruction (Gartner, 2006b).  
The study by Gartner demonstrates that replying to e-mail phishing is now more likely 
to have negative consequences such as stolen money, information or even identity 
(Bielski, 2004; Litan, 2004). Those who have fallen prey to a phishing attack can suffer 
considerable losses as a consequence. The victims usually have to spend a huge amount 
of time and money to recover from identity theft-related damages such as recovering 
their reputation, good name, credit report and other damage that might occur from the 
attack (FTC, 2006, 2005; Emigh, 2005). Victims spent around 297 million hours to 
recover from the damage caused by identity theft attack, according to a study by the 
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2005 (FTC, 2006). Research by Kondakci (2009) 
defines a cost model to estimate the impact caused by Internet malware by identifying 
the growth and prospective loss caused by the attack. Infection time, it was found, could 
be reduced by effective recovery techniques through enhancing user awareness or the 
protection of the system through providing advanced technological solutions and an 
efficient security policy.  
 
The researcher has classified the impact of phishing as tangible such as financial, loss of 
information and damage of computer, and intangible such as negative reputation, 
discomfort and anger, as follows: 
 
1. Tangible impact 
Phishers' aspirations have changed from being a mischievous trick requiring technical 
expertise into a means of gaining financial income by gathering valuable information 
for committing identity theft or other forms of fraud (Symantec, 2006).  However, 
financial gain is not always the intention of the phisher; sometimes the major 
consequence of the phishing attack is the loss of confidential information disclosed to 
the phisher. The attack could cause an indirect financial loss to the victim if the illegally 
gained information is sold on the black market, for example for identity theft rings, chat 
channels and online brokering forums (Emigh, 2005; Hubbard, 2005). According to a 
Gartner (2005) report, during 2005 online information theft attacks on USA online 
consumers reached $2.7 billion of losses, of which more than $2.39 billion were from 
stolen account information and around $397 million from attackers’ using the stolen 
information to create new accounts, acquire credit or even create a new fake identity in 
the victim’s name (Litan, 2006). 
 
2. Intangible impact 
With the amount of information gained from the victim, the attacker could impersonate 
that person and such actions could result in a bad reputation and a bad credit report 
leading perhaps to denial of loan requests or accommodation. The consequences from 
the attack are not always tangible as there might be a psychological impact: the victim 
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might experience negative emotions such as feelings of anger, anxiety, annoyance, 
disgrace and violation (FTC, 2005, 2006). Furthermore, phishing could weaken trust of 
the online environment (Milletary, 2006; Pandit, 2006; ActivCard, 2004; Litan, 2004) 
which could result in altered online shopping behaviour and a fear of entering personal 
data online (Gartner, 2005; ActivCard, 2004). The vice-president of VISA has stated 
that clients recognise the extreme danger of the online environment and that could limit 
online expenditure (Radcliff, 2005b).  
 
The phishing threat concerns online consumers, which was proven in various studies. 
According to a survey by Cyota (2005), cited by Butler (2007), a fraud prevention 
service provider, because of the phishing threat, more than 50 per cent of Internet 
consumers are anxious about making e-commerce transactions and 70 per cent have 
commented that they were uncertain how to react to an e-mail claiming to come from a 
bank. Another study by Symantec (2006) demonstrates that worries of phishing had led 
almost one-third of the respondents to avoid online banking (Radcliff, 2005b). 
 
Although phishing is considered a problem, in most research done so far there was a 
shortage of information about the phishing problem in Qatar. However, the researcher 
has assumed that the problem does exist in Qatar similar to other countries, especially 
since there is a massive development in Qatar in all sectors, including the economy and 
education, in which telecommunications play an ever increasing role, which makes 
Qatar an attractive place for e-criminals and especially phishers to commit their crimes. 
An initial objective of this research was to discover the existence and magnitude of the 
problem in Qatar, the awareness of Qataris of its implications and their vulnerability.  
 
1.3  Research Scope and Limitation 
This research focuses on a type of social engineering attack known as 'phishing'. Since 
e-mail is one of the most frequent communication channels through which users 
communicate, the research is narrowed to focus on online identity theft through e-mail 
which is called ‘e-mail phishing’ and this includes spear phishing e-mails. The time 
constraint of a PhD means it is not possible to cover all the possible phishing techniques 
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currently employed, such as Vishing, SMishing, Pharming, Google phishing and Wi-
phishing.  
 
Although the technical solutions are essential to defend against e-mail phishing, this 
research focuses only on awareness and education as a superior solution to reduce the 
risk of e-mail phishing. The research underlines the problem of e-mail phishing in the 
State of Qatar, used as an example of a developing country, and seeks to understand the 
factors which make e-mail phishing successful in such a society and to propose a 
solution to enhance Qatari citizen’s awareness of e-mail phishing through an effective 
awareness and educational framework. The choice Qatar as a focus was due to the 
convenience of access. The lack of data on the phishing topic in Qatar makes it original 
and interesting to investigate, as it is assumed that the problem exists in the region. It 
would also be interesting to compare results with those similar investigations in the UK.  
 
1.4  Target Group 
One of the intended groups to benefit from this research is e-mail research scholars. The 
research will provide a contribution for scholars’ research on e-mail phishing and 
awareness. It addresses the aspects which make people vulnerable to the phishing threat 
and offers a valuable e-mail phishing awareness and educational framework to reduce 
the risk of e-mail phishing. It also provides an empirical study of the e-mail phishing 
threat in the state of Qatar which has not been covered before in the literature.  
 
E-mail users who may be the potential victims of e-mail phishing would benefit from 
this research. However, since all types of phishing are a major threat facing all 
individuals, awareness of e-mail phishing could be valuable for everyone, even those 
who do not have an e-mail account. The proposed solution will provide sufficient 
knowledge and awareness required for all individuals to protect themselves against any 
form of phishing attack.  
 
Moreover, the findings of this research are intended to be of potential significance to a 
variety of groups such as:  
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1. Qatar government: The research focuses on identifying the extent of the phishing 
problem in Qatar and the importance of resolving the problem. A list of 
recommendations is provided for the government with the main focus on an 
effective educational framework to provide awareness as a mean of reducing this 
threat. Moreover, other governments could benefit from the research outcome, the 
framework proposed and the recommendations made in this research would be 
applicable elsewhere with certain variations, taking into account the cultural and 
country-specific factors.   
2. Organisation officials responsible for ensuring information security in Qatar: The 
research meets the needs of this group by defining a list of recommendations for 
them to facilitate their solving of the phishing problem. It also provides an effective 
e-mail phishing educational framework through which, if applied appropriately, 
employees would gain sufficient awareness of e-mail phishing and would 
consequently reduce the risk of the organisation being attacked by e-mail phishing.  
3. Qatari citizens: The research provides a list of valuable recommendations for Qatari 
citizens to help them to protect themselves against phishing threats. In addition, the 
proposed solution is designed to reduce the overall e-mail phishing danger in the 
state of Qatar through an effective educational framework applied for Qatari 
citizens. The proposed solution would also be beneficial for other nations, allowing 
for any cultural differences. 
 
In addition, the research identifies the factors which make Qataris vulnerable to 
phishing threat, including cultural, country-specific factors and others. This is a 
valuable outcome for all target groups which could be further studied. Although the 
discovered factors might be alike for other nations with certain variations, this 
would give clues as to what makes people in general susceptible to phishing and 
therefore makes phishing successful, and if those factors were eliminated it would 
help to reduce the phishing threat. Also, discovering those factors would help in 
developing effective anti-phishing solutions, whether technical or non-technical.  
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1.5   Research Questions  
From the above, the following research questions emerge for this study:  
1. Is e-mail phishing common in Qatar? 
2. What is the extent of e-mail phishing in Qatar?  
3. What are the factors which make Qatari citizens vulnerable to e-mail phishing 
attacks? 
4. Are there any cultural, national or country-specific factors that might assist in the 
development and diffusion of e-mail phishing in Qatar society? 
5. Are there any cultural, national or country-specific aspects that might be associated 
with people’s responses to phishing e-mails in Qatar society?   
6. Are Qatari people vulnerable to e-mail phishing in reality? 
7. Are they aware of the e-mail phishing threat, how to recognise it and how to avoid 
it? 
8. Are there any differences or similarities between Qatar and other developed 
countries, such as the UK, in awareness of the e-mail phishing threat?  
9. Can the proposed e-mail phishing awareness and educational framework help in 
reducing the risk of e-mail phishing attack in Qatar?  
 
1.6   Research Aim and Objectives 
Experience of e-mail use indicates that e-mail phishing is growing at a massive rate and 
there appears to be a lack of awareness of its threat. This research focuses on awareness 
as an effective method to eliminate the threat of e-mail phishing. 
The research aim is therefore: 
 
To reduce the e-mail phishing hazard in the State of Qatar through developing an 
effective e-mail phishing awareness and educational framework.  
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There are a number of objectives to be met in order to achieve the research aim, as 
follows: 
1. To review literature on previous work in the research area to see what has already 
been done to identify the extent of the phishing problem in general and in Qatar in 
particular, and to identify what actions have been taken to defend against phishing 
internationally and in Qatar in particular.  
2. To confirm the existence of an e-mail phishing problem in Qatar. 
3. To determine the factors which make Qatar an attractive place for phishers. 
4. To compare the awareness of Qatari citizens of the e-mail phishing threat with that 
of citizens of a developed nation, such as the UK.  
5. To investigate the susceptibility of Qatari people to e-mail phishing and the effects 
of cultural, country-specific, and other factors on the development and diffusion of 
e-mail phishing in Qatar society. 
6. To define, from the results of all above objectives, the need for enhancing awareness 
and the need to provide an effective e-mail phishing awareness and educational 
framework. 
7. To develop an e-mail phishing awareness framework to reduce the risk of e-mail 
phishing in Qatar which consists of a set of recommendations and proposed 
educational framework. 
8. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in reducing the risk of 
e-mail phishing in Qatar. 
 
1.7   Research Issues 
From the above aim and objectives, a number of research issues have been raised for 
this research to investigate further: 
 
 An e-mail phishing problem exists in Qatar.   
 There are many aspects which make the State of Qatar a fertile ground for phishers 
to commit their crimes.     
 Qatari citizens are less aware of e-mail phishing threat compared to British citizens. 
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 There are many factors which make Qatari citizens vulnerable to the e-mail phishing 
threat and lack of awareness is one of the main factors. 
 Making people aware of phishing should take account of their background, and 
cultural and country-specific factors.  
 Qatari citizens are vulnerable to e-mail phishing attacks and most are not able to 
recognise such threat.   
 The e-mail phishing threat can be reduced in Qatar by promoting an effective e-mail 
phishing awareness framework and educating people about e-mail phishing. 
 
1.8  Research Contribution to Knowledge 
The research attempts to add considerable inputs to knowledge by shedding light on 
Qatar society by discovering the extent of the e-mail phishing problem in such a society 
and defining the culture, country/region-specific and other factors which help in the 
development and diffusion of the problem. The research is considered original since it 
tackles a subject largely ignored in the literature: that is, the issue of e-mail phishing in 
the State of Qatar. It begins by profiling case studies of the State of Qatar, examining 
the awareness of the Qatari citizens of e-mail phishing and their susceptibility to falling 
prey to e-mail phishing attacks. It concludes by reporting on the factors which make 
e-mail phishing successful in Qatar and proposes a solution in an effective educational 
framework which aims to reduce the threat of e-mail phishing in Qatar society.  
 
The framework involves valuable recommendations and an educational outline that is 
suitable and attractive for all groups of people, from children to mature adults. It is 
believed that this will assist not only Qatar, but also any other country with similar 
characteristics. The research also outlines the cultural and other aspects associated with 
awareness and people’s responses to phishing e-mails, the vulnerability of Qataris to fall 
prey to phishing attacks, their ability to distinguish such attacks and the eagerness and 
readiness of Qatari citizens to enhance their awareness on this topic. In addition, the UK 
was used for comparison in the case study (see Section 3.3.1 for more information about 
the case study).  
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1.9  Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of ten chapters and an outline is shown in Figure 1.2. Chapter 1 
(Introduction) provides a general introduction for the thesis which is a preface to the 
research topic ‘e-mail phishing’. Also, it describes the key area of research by 
illustrating the problem domain, aims and objectives, research scope, contribution to 
knowledge, along with research questions, hypotheses and thesis structure.  
 
Chapter 2 (the Literature review) starts with demonstrating the history of fraud and its 
development into e-fraud, online identity theft and social engineering, along with an 
introduction to phishing in general. Subsequently, the review involves previous research 
in the field of phishing. It identifies previous research on understanding the threat of 
e-mail phishing along with the existing technical and non-technical methods developed 
to defend against this attack. It concentrates on the literature on phishing awareness and 
education and the literature on education in general to illustrate the need of this research 
and to define the scope and vision of the research solution.  
 
Chapter 3 (Research methodology) describes the direction of the research path from the 
justification of research philosophy, approach, and strategy to the decision of the data 
collection methods used in the research to fulfill the research aim and objectives. 
Chapter 4 (Qatar in the eyes of phishers) gives an overview of Qatar and the UK. It 
presents an analysis of the literature and of interviews to highlight the aspects which 
make the State of Qatar a fertile ground for phishers to commit their crimes compared to 
other developed countries such as the UK.  
 
Chapter 5 (Surveying awareness of phishing) presents an analysis of the survey 
questionnaires and interviews with participants to draw a profile of the awareness of 
Qatari citizens compared to British citizens. It concludes by defining some of the factors 
which make e-mail phishing successful in Qatar and gives an indication of the ideal 
awareness scheme to respond to this attack. 
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Figure 1.2: Thesis outline 
 
Next, Chapter 6 (Penetration tests and laboratory experiment) describes the e-mail 
phishing penetration testing and experimental tests made in Qatar to study people’s 
recognition and responses to e-mail phishing both in reality and in an experimental 
environment. There were two reality studies, one in a Qatari organisation and the other a 
spear phishing test on a sample of Qatari citizens. The chapter concludes with 
identifying the factors which make Qatari citizens vulnerable to the phishing threat.   
 
Chapter 7 gathers the outcomes of the previous chapters to define a list of effective 
recommendations to help in reducing the phishing threat in Qatar. The 
Chapter 8: An educational programme for phishing awareness 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
Chapter 4: Qatar in the eyes of phishers 
Chapter 6: Penetration tests and laboratory experiment 
 
Chapter 9: Evaluation of the educational framework 
Chapter 3: Research methodology 
Chapter 5: Surveying awareness of phishing 
Chapter 7: Findings and recommendations 
 
Chapter 10: Conclusion & future work 
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recommendations are directed to all target groups: Qatari government, citizens and 
organisation officials responsible for ensuring information security. 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 demonstrate in detail the development of the proposed e-mail phishing 
educational framework, starting with the planning and designing of the effective 
proposed e-mail phishing awareness programme as part of the framework in Chapter 8, 
and gathering together the whole of the framework in Chapter 9 with an evaluation of 
its effectiveness in enhancing awareness and reducing the phishing problem in Qatar.  
 
Ultimately, Chapter 10 (Conclusion and future work) presents a summary of the whole 
research outcome, including its limitations, and proposing recommendations for further 
studies. 
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Chapter 2   Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews previous research in the field of phishing and e-mail phishing in 
particular. It begins by providing background knowledge for the reader on the topic, 
starting from the terms „social engineering‟ and „identity theft‟ and moving on to 
phishing and types of attacks. Furthermore, it illustrates the mechanisms of e-mail 
phishing and how to spot them. Also it reviews anti-phishing solutions and what makes 
people susceptible to phishing and considers some literature on the culture of the State 
of Qatar since this is the geographical area of the study in this research.  
 
2.1  Social Engineering 
Social engineering is a broad concept which can relate to different fields: social science, 
politics and computer science, and often has negative connotations. According to the 
Oxford Dictionary (2005), social engineering is the “attempt to change society and to 
deal with social problems according to particular political beliefs”. For Mifflin (2000), 
it is the practical application of sociological principles to particular social problems. Its 
counterpart in the political arena, political engineering, deals with the designing of 
political institutions in a society. It also refers to efforts to influence popular attitudes 
and social behaviour on a large scale, whether by governments or private groups 
(Popper, 1971). However, social engineering in computer science is going to be the 
main concern in this thesis where it becomes the technique of manipulating people into 
performing prejudicial actions or divulging confidential information (Mitnick, 2002).  
Social engineering thus applies techniques to deceive users into giving information or 
access to someone who should not receive it. According to Mitnick (2002), it is usually 
used against a limited number of targets selected with great care and in most cases the 
perpetrator never comes face to face with the victim, whereas the majority of technical 
attacks such as script kiddies, viruses, Trojans and other broad attacks are done without 
having a clear aim. Social engineering attackers, however, always have a clear aim, 
which is to acquire information or gain unauthorised access to a computer system. 
Kajava & Siponen (1997) state that social engineering is a technique in which an 
unauthorised person manages to pose as an insider or an authority to successfully get 
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access to information or resources. Hasle et al. (2005) add that a hacker can use social 
engineering to access other valuable data to benefit the hacker in further attacks. 
Perhaps the best definition was given by Kevin Mitnick in an interview by Tanneeru 
(2005): 
 “Social engineering is using manipulation, influence and deception to get a person, a 
trusted insider within an organization, to comply with a request, and the request is 
usually to release information or to perform some sort of action item that benefits that 
attacker. It could be something as simple as talking over the telephone to something as 
complex as getting a target to visit a Web site, which exploits a technical flaw and 
allows the hacker to take over the computer.” 
 
Social engineering was recognised by Mitnick (2002) who managed to gain access to 
several high security government systems, not by using highly technical attacks, but by 
using a „con man‟s‟ approach to obtaining information and gain access. He points out 
that it is much easier to trick someone into giving a password for a system than to spend 
the effort to hack into the system. He claims it was the single most effective method in 
his arsenal. He used the telephone and well planned tricks to gather bits of information 
and then pieced them together to finally reach the intended goal (Mitnick, 2002). Years 
ago, social engineering was still not considered as a real threat, but recently it has 
become a concern discussed widely in books, journals, and academic research because it 
has in fact proved to be a formidable threat as it can penetrate secure information 
systems.  
 
From the work of Popper (1971), Kajava & Siponen (1997), Mifflin(200), 
Mitnick(2002) and Hasle et al (2005), it can be concluded that social engineering relies 
mainly on social skills, which is an art that not everyone has. It does not require huge 
technical knowledge; it can be done with just a little effort or trickery applied to fool 
people to attain the attacker‟s entire goal. For example, a hacker who spends several 
hours trying to decrypt a message would save a great deal of time by calling an 
employee posing as an authoritative person and asking for the information. Encouraged 
social engineers will be willing to gain information in any way possible by using 
different techniques to trick people to get what they want.  They usually build up 
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information gathered from one person to another to finally reach their goal. For 
example, a phone book may lead to a phone call and information thus gathered may lead 
to another phone call and so on. 
 
There are many techniques that can be used by social engineers to deceive people into 
giving away access or confidential information. They can be categorised as human- 
based and computer-based attacks. Computer-based social engineering relies on 
technology to trick the individual into supplying information which will allow the 
hacker to gain further access into the network. The simplest and most popular means of 
social engineering are still human-based.  However, social engineers sometimes employ 
both human and computer-based attacks to achieve their goal. The basic techniques can 
use established trust, authority, helpfulness, knowledge of internal processes, 
technology, easily attainable information or any combination of them (Butler, 2007; 
Hasle et al. 2005; Kajava and Siponen, 1997). Harl (1997) gives some of the basic 
techniques, including pretending to be an employee, exchanging of favours, convincing 
the target that the request is normal, assuring the target that he or she will not be held 
responsible for what he or she is doing and plain old friendliness. In reality, the social 
engineering attacker might take different avenues to launch his or her attack, which 
might be a phone call, physical access, e-mail, Trojan programs, instant messages, chat 
rooms, bulletin boards or even meeting in public places (Hasle et al. 2005).  
 
Social engineering uses several techniques in its application such as pretexting, a Trojan 
horse, shoulder surfing, dumpster diving, road apples, quid pro quo (i.e. something for 
something), phishing and some other types. These techniques are explained below 
(Butler, 2007): 
 Pretexting usually uses the telephone to gain access to information; the attacker 
uses a scenario based on knowledge of some valid information to gather more 
confidential information such as account details, credit card number and date of 
birth.  
 A Trojan horse uses the victim‟s interest or greed to deliver malware which 
appears to be safe (e.g. an attachment, anti-virus software, screen saver, etc.), 
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but actually it performs malicious actions (e.g. tracks keystrokes, uploads, 
address book, etc.) to gain the required information. 
 In dumpster diving, the attacker searches waste bins to gain the required 
information from un-shredded and useful sources such as phone lists and bank 
details.  
 For a road apple attack, the attacker relies on physical media (e.g. CD, floppy, 
USB Flash Drive, etc.) usually labeled to arouse curiosity such as “Salary 
Survey” or “Confidential Staff Information”, but it actually contains an auto run 
feature which loads a Trojan or virus when the victims insert it into the PC.  
 Quid pro quo means „something for something‟ (e.g. gift in exchange for 
information, pretending to be a help desk, etc.). 
 In shoulder surfing, attackers use their presence in public places to attain the 
required information from observing and „sniffing‟ people in public places such 
as airports, coffee shops, public Wi-Fi areas in hotels and other public places.  
 Finally, phishing is a method of fraudulently obtaining confidential and private 
information, usually by someone who appears to be a legitimate person, and it 
comes in different forms: by phone, e-mail, etc. The following section provides 
a detailed explanation of phishing attack and its categories.    
 
2.2 Phishing 
Research has indicated that phishing is a common form of identity theft or stealing a 
person‟s „good name‟ (Emigh, 2005; Ollmann, 2004).  There is a strong relationship 
between the two as phishing is an attack aiming to gather personal information such as a 
username and password which is considered as an identity theft, the phisher could then 
use the information to claim to be the victim and hence could cause the real victim 
negative consequences by usurping his or her name (Bielski, 2004; Litan, 2004). 
Identity theft can be carried out online or offline. It was considered as one of the five 
increasingly common security risks in the USA in 2006, which are: targeted threats, 
identity theft, spyware, social engineering and viruses (Gartner, 2006a). The records 
show an escalation in the number of victims of identity theft in the USA, amounting to 
10 million adults linked with huge losses of approximately $15 billion (Gartner, 2005). 
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Hence this led to the Executive Order of President George W. Bush which established 
the Identity Theft Task Force to develop an inclusive approach to combat identity theft 
(FTC, 2006; White House, 2006). 
 
In August 2005, the term „phishing‟ was added to the Oxford Advanced Learner‟s 
Dictionary (2005). Nowadays, the definition of phishing has expanded. Different 
researchers have described phishing differently; some consider it to stand for „password 
harvesting fishing‟ (Honeynet Project and Research Alliance, 2005). The Anti-phishing 
work group (APWG) defines phishing as spoof e-mails designed to commit fraud by 
attracting receivers and tricking them to enter a phishing website to reveal their personal 
information and attributes such as usernames, passwords, social security numbers, credit 
card numbers and other personal details such as dates of birth and maternal maiden 
names (Emigh, 2005; Ollmann, 2004; APWG, 2006). It is essentially a technique of 
obtaining private information fraudulently and thereafter obtaining money illegally, 
which is the main aim of phishers (Vegter, 2005).  
 
It can be concluded from the literature that phishing aims to bypass technology-based 
security mechanisms by manipulating people and thus tends to be faster and easier than 
other technical attacks. Accordingly, the majority of researchers have shown that there 
is an increase in the number of recent successful phishing attacks with considerable 
consequences for victims (Aburrous et al., 2009; Butler, 2007; Dodge et al., 2007; 
APWG, 2006; Dhamija et al., 2006; Abad, 2005; Butler 2005; Dhamija and Tygar, 
2005; Bielski, 2004).  Phishing is a complex phenomenon; there are different types of 
attack and some are explained below.  
 
2.3 Types of Phishing 
With the development of new communication channels, attackers attempt to carry out 
their attacks using them. Examination of the literature shows phishing can be 
categorised by the communication channel used and vishing, SMishing, pharming, 
google phishing, wi-phishing and scams are examples. These are as follows: 
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 Pharming 
Pharmers attempt to redirect the URL to a forged site which looks similar to the 
legitimate one. Once the user gets into the forged site, pharmers can capture the login 
information the user has provided.  
In essence, pharmers direct the user to another bogus website instead of a requested 
legitimate website; this is done by inserting „wicked‟ code into a PC or DNS (Domain 
Name System) server on the Internet. Pharmers either change the host file on a user‟s 
computer or poison the DNS server by exploiting a weaknesses in the DNS software 
and getting it to accept incorrect information (APWG, 2006; Fox, 2005; Hubbard, 2005; 
Pandit, 2006; Radcliff, 2005b). 
 Google phishing 
Attackers have used the Google search engine to assist their attacks by using it to drive 
users to their fake website. As phishers do not aim to make any legitimate sales, they 
will design a fake website which will usually attract online users by claiming to sell a 
product or provide a service at incredibly low prices. In order to carry out the 
transaction, users have to enter their private details. Once the information is submitted, 
an error message will usually be displayed, informing the user of a problem which has 
occurred which results in an unsuccessful transaction. However, the phisher has already 
gained the disclosed information (Corrons, 2005; Radcliff, 2005b). With Google 
phishing, phishers do not have to contact the potential victims; the online users 
themselves will search for the phishing site by using the search engine which might 
direct them to a list of websites, some of which are illegitimate (Radcliff, 2005b). 
 Wi-phishing 
Phishers may use wireless technology and Bluetooth facilities to carry out their crime. 
This could be done by setting up a wi-fi network in public places that looks like the 
legitimate networks at designated hotspots in order to trick the user of a wireless 
broadband connection. Wi-phishing could thus harvest the user‟s personal information 
(Der Hovanesian, 2005; Radcliff, 2005b). 
 Vishing  
Vishing is a criminal attack over the telephone system to gain access to private 
information from the users of the system; it abuses user trust in landline telephone 
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services. Banking clients were targeted by vishing and the first reported incident was in 
April 2006 (Patterson, 2006; Sausner, 2006). The attackers sent out an e-mail message 
in bulk, alerting the user to a security risk and asking the potential victim to phone the 
bank‟s call centre to resolve the matter. Once the victims called the number given in the 
e-mail, they were asked to verify bank details, such as bank account numbers and PINs 
through an automated system set up by the phisher (Patterson, 2006; Sausner, 2006). 
 SMiShing  
This phishing technique attacks cell phone users; it was identified in September 2006 
(Hickey, 2006). The attacker uses the technology of the cellular short message service 
(SMS) to steal the victim‟s identity. Phishers capture the required information by 
sending a misleading SMS to victims asking them to disclose it. The deceptive SMS 
may refer the victim to visit a fraudulent web site to disclose the information; 
sometimes the victim is encouraged to download a program that is actually a Trojan 
horse which allows the hacker to have control of the victim‟s cellular phone (Hickey, 
2006). 
 Phishing scams  
This is a type of phishing which targets Internet users, where phishers send a deceptive 
e-mail to the user, posing as a trusted and legitimate entity, but attempting to trick the 
victim to reveal sensitive information or private information such as username, 
password and account number. Misleading phishing scams attacks are one of the most 
successful and common methods of identity theft (Emigh, 2005; Ollmann, 2004). 
Popular companies such as PayPal or eBay are frequent targets. For example, e-mails 
apparently from eBay will claim that the user‟s account will be cancelled unless the user 
updates the credit card information in a website which looks identical to the legitimate 
organisation‟s site, but which is relatively simple to create by mimicking the HTML 
code. By using the details, phishers will consequently be able to commit identity theft 
and possibly carry out a financial fraud (Abad, 2005). However, phishing e-mail 
messages often include misspellings and poor use of grammar, threats and 
exaggerations which may help to detect them since phishers are often not native English 
speakers and lack expertise in the English language (Butler, 2007; Dhamija et al., 2006; 
Abad, 2005; Butler, 2005; Emigh, 2005; ActivCard, 2004).  
 
                 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
23 
 Spear phishing  
Usually phishing scams are designed to steal information from individuals in general, 
whereas, in spear phishing scams, the target is highly specific individuals or groups. 
Instead of sending a huge volume of e-mails to large numbers of people, a spear 
phishing attack is usually to gain access to a specific organisation's system (Microsoft, 
2006). Spear phishing can be carried out by email or telephone, the phishers appearing 
as legitimate to the victims. The attack uses authority to commit the crime by 
impersonating a communication from HR (Human Resources), the manager or any 
other authoritative figure. It might require the victims to give their user names or 
passwords or it might contain malicious software such as a Trojan horse or virus (Der 
Hovanesian, 2005; Pandit, 2006; Radcliff, 2005a, 2005b). 
 
However, this research will not cover all the possible phishing techniques currently 
employed due to the time and resource constraints of the research. It will focus only on 
e-mail phishing because it is a relatively more common attack with e-mail being 
considered as a common communication channel used today. E-mail phishing involves 
phishing through e-mail (i.e. phishing scams and spear phishing scams). 
 
2.4  Vulnerability to Phishing    
Many studies have shown that phishing can be successful in misleading victims 
(Dhamija et al., 2006; Gartner, 2005; Goldsborough, 2004; Ollmann, 2004; Tsai, 2005), 
though Gartner (2005) shows only a small percentage of victims (between 3 to 5 per 
cent) provide phishers with their personal and confidential information. Attackers find 
phishing a valuable and successful operation because, even though most receivers have 
no previous transactions with the organisation named in the phishing e-mail, they can 
still fall prey to the attack. Furthermore, if many e-mails are sent, there will inevitably 
be a few receivers for whom the named organisation is valid and so they are more likely 
to become victims of the attack (Sophos, 2005).  
 
There is a shortage of literature on understanding users‟ vulnerability to phishing from 
their behaviour (Downs et al., 2007).  Jagatic et al. (2006) and Robila and Ragucci 
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(2006) state that user's susceptibility to phishing attacks would increase when phishing 
attacks include user perspective information (e.g. name and date of birth). Forte (2009) 
concludes that people are more vulnerable to phishing e-mails that appear to be from 
organisations or other sources with which they have a relationship and they are less 
likely to query their genuineness. Creating a phishing website requires simple IT skills, 
using simple web design programs to replicate the original one. Phishers can then 
upload the site either in a web space with a similar name to the original or in the 
existing site itself by using known vulnerabilities in web applications. However, in the 
former case, the country‟s local authority might not allow a domain to be registered 
with a name similar to that of an institute such as a bank, so phishers usually choose 
service providers in Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia, where there are few or no 
controls involved in the opening of a new domain (Forte, 2009). The success of attack 
relies on slow reaction time by the authorities so that the crime is carried out before the 
web site is blocked. The second approach requires precise skills in vulnerability testing 
which can be possible with the availability of the application source code (Forte, 2009).  
 
Downs et al. (2006) investigated why people are vulnerable to phishing based on 
interviews with 20 non-computer experts. The research concludes that people are 
susceptible to phishing due to a lack of connection between knowledge of the risk and 
strategies of phishing prevention or the supposed vulnerabilities. It also concludes that 
even knowledgeable participants were not well protected against phishing.  Tout and 
Hafner (2009) agree, stating that vulnerability to phishing has two main elements: lack 
of user knowledge in distinguishing phishing e-mails and the simplicity of conducting 
phishing and deception as a legitimate entity. 
 
Wardman et al. (2009) identified a technological method for investigating frequent 
vulnerabilities in websites which could be exploited by phishers to help Webmasters 
and their hosting companies to protect their servers from possible associated risks. 
However, details of the method are not available and the method is still being 
developed, so further evaluation is required to prove the effectiveness of such a method. 
Forte (2009) shows that there are many factors which affect the success of a phishing 
attack, including the reliability of the legitimate site being attacked, the content of the 
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e-mail message and the final user‟s critical analysis capability and IT skills. Also, he 
proposes the need to enhance people‟s protection knowledge after illustrating the 
susceptibility of people to phishing attacks. He concluded that people are likely to be 
vulnerable to phishing e-mails which appear to be sent from their banks because they 
are less likely to question their genuineness. He adds that people are more persuaded by 
phishers who exploit their social engineering ability. Some phishers use in-session 
attacks, taking advantage of tabbed browsing where the phisher can trick the user by 
opening pop-up windows with fraudulent sites while the user is logged in to the online 
banking site and by informing the user that the session has expired and that they need to 
log in again (Forte, 2009).  
 
Phishers are continuously improving and developing new phishing techniques to 
conceal their attacks (Honeynet Project and Research Alliance, 2005; APWG, 2006), 
leading to a dramatic increase in the complexity of the attacks (APWG, 2006; 
Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz, 2006). They are improving and inventing new ways and 
tricks to avoid the anti-phishing measures (i.e. anti-phishing software or anti-spam 
filters) (Symantec, 2006). For example, one method is to avoid specific words in the 
e-mail message that the anti-phishing measures will normally search for to identify the 
phishing e-mails (Symantec, 2006).  
 
2.4.1 Clever tricks used by phishers 
E-mail phishing has three aspects: the sender „phisher‟, the receiver „victim‟ and the 
e-mail message which may lead to a deceptive web site where the receiver can be lured 
to reveal private information. Phishers cleverly use these aspects and applies technical 
and social engineering tricks to persuade and trick victims to disclose their confidential 
information. The following illustrates how this is done:   
 
2.4.1.1  Sender ‘phisher’ 
Phishers establish a valid e-mail account either by creating an e-mail address from the 
web or an ad hoc account which is more persuasive, since the phisher may add the name 
of the defrauded target into the account name (Forte, 2009) where then phishers 
masquerade as figures of authority in possession of confidential information by getting 
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them to believe the validity of the e-mail (Honeynet Project and Research Alliance, 
2005). 
 
2.4.1.2  Receiver ‘victim’ 
To deliver the phishing e-mails, phishers need to have a valid e-mail addresses. Creating 
a mailing list could be easily done by either searching for valid e-mail addresses from 
the Internet, purchasing valid e-mail addresses on the cyber black market or using 
programs to extract e-mail addresses from searches within websites known as „crawlers‟ 
(Forte, 2009; Bielski, 2004). Therefore Forte (2009) discourages users from providing 
explicit references to their mailbox in discussion forums. Nagy and Pecho (2009) 
discuss the risk of exploitation of social network sites by phishers because of 
irresponsible user behaviour and the openness of such sites, stating the requirement for 
enhancing users‟ security awareness and pointing to people‟s willingness to reveal their 
profiles.  Once the e-mail addresses are identified, phishers usually use spam tools to 
send the e-mail to numerous victims (Bielski, 2004). 
 
2.4.1.3  E-mail message 
As mentioned earlier, phishers design the e-mail message carefully so that it appears to 
be from a legitimate source in order to trick the receiver into divulging confidential 
information (Bielski, 2004). Phishers usually fool receivers into disclosing their 
personal data either in the replica of a login page in the e-mail message, the message 
directs the receiver to a fraudulent web site to reveal the information or even direct the 
victim to communicate through an online or an offline communication such as e-mail, 
SMS or phone (Emigh, 2005). 
 
Phishers may play on people‟s emotions, exploiting their goodwill to commit their 
crime such as by calling for donations and help. They can employ intelligent visual 
tricks to deceive the victim (Dhamija et al., 2006) and make it difficult to identify 
phishing. Usually the message appears to be innocent, such as a request from Client 
Support for the user to update their records or to resolve a problem in his or her account 
and it generally conveys a sense of urgency such as requesting the victim to provide the 
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private information immediately. For example, the phishers may warn the receiver that a 
late response would result in a penalty such as closure of the account or loss of an 
oportunity. In addition, phishers may use the sense of surprise such as informing the 
receiver about winning a prize and then requesting some private information (Dhamija 
et al., 2006). 
 
Well known online brands are the main targets of phishers using deceptive websites. 
Research by APWG (2006) in August 2006 shows that 148 brands were forged by 
phishing and 92.6 per cent of them were financial services businesses. Phishers attempt 
to convince the victim that the fake website is a legitimate one by different means, such 
as hiding the address in an embedded hyperlink, using URL links similar to the URL of 
the original website and cloaking the URL by showing part of it in the address bar and 
hiding other parts to conceal the real destination host (APWG, 2006).  
 
In adtiiton, several researchers have stated that phishers also exploit the users‟ faith in 
the security indicators to deceive users by applying visual tricks to appear to users as 
trusted security indicators (Herzberg, 2008; Dhamija et al., 2006;  Herzberg and Jbara, 
2004). Phishers can fake the security padlock icon by including it as an image in the 
content of the site. This means, therefore, that the appearance of a lock icon does not 
necessarily mean that the website is secured (Herzberg, 2008). In addition, phishers can 
employ visual tricks to deceive the user in some browsers by removing the location bar 
and replacing it with a fake location bar to prevent users from seeing the URL, one of 
the main security indicators (Felten et al., 1997; Ye et al., 2002; 2005). Most users will 
not detect changes in the address bar as it happens rapidly (Herzberg, 2008). Also, there 
might be a chance that the fake site might hold a high assurance security certificate 
(Franco, 2005). They are able to establish a fraudulent site with SSL certificate that is 
faked through the use of the vulnerability in the MD5 hashing algorithm which is a 
widely used cryptographic function (Sotirov et al., 2008; Stray, 2008). According to 
US-CERT of the U.S Department of Homeland Security, MD5 is considered as 
cryptographically broken (US-CERT, 2008) and a move to the more robust Secure Hash 
Algorithm (the SHA) is therefore suggested (NIST, 2008). 
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Many phishing sites are hosted at any single IP address for only a short period. In 
August 2006, APWG (2006) reported that phishing sites were active for an average of 
4.5 days and a maximum of 31 days. Since the hosting time is significant for a phisher‟s 
profit cycle, phishers aim to increase their hosting life-time by using fast-flux service 
networks which is a DNS (Domain Name System) technique used to hide phishing and 
malware delivery sites by allowing their sites to change rapidly (Konte, 2009; ICANN 
SSAC, 2008). 
 
2.4.2 Behaviour of users 
Larkin (2009) concludes that people are not able to protect themselves against hackers 
from stealing their confidential information. However, he states that identifying the theft 
earlier can help in recovering the possible damage which could occur to victims, for 
example by stopping a transaction.  
 
Although phishing e-mails offer little or no meaning of trust, users will still trust them 
(Downs et al., 2006; Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz, 2006). Kumaraguru et al. (2007) point 
out the users‟ susceptibility to phishing in the sensitive trust decisions made during their 
online interaction.  Psychologists claim that stress could cause people to make incorrect 
decisions (Keinan, 1987) since they depend on patterns (i.e. what the e-mail looks like) 
instead of related details (Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Robila et al., 2006; Sheng et al., 
2007). 
 
Generally, users are more vulnerable to phishing attacks if they do not employ 
appropriate security practices (Butler, 2007). The Honeynet Project and Research 
Alliance (2005) concluded that home users or small businesses are more targeted by 
phishers because they are expected to have less security practice in place. According to 
the Internet Security Threat Report, home users were subject to 86 per cent of all 
targeted attacks between January and June 2006 (Symantec, 2006).  
 
Many studies have discussed the gullibility of people and to what extent people will 
disclose their private information. A study by the UK Treasury Department inspectors 
shows that one-third of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employees gave away their 
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login and password to auditors who called, pretending to be computer technicians 
(Dalrymple, 2006). Other studies have provided a certain shock value, such as reported 
in two highly publicised books. Chocolate for passwords by Wagner (2004) shows more 
than 70% of the subjects would reveal their password in exchange for a piece of 
chocolate and 79% would give away information that could be used to steal their 
identities. The Paris Hilton Hack confirms this, where Krebs (2005) writes about 
hackers who tricked employees to reveal secret information.  
 
Consumers are unaware of the phishing threat and of the risk of revealing their private 
information. In the 2005, Infosecurity Europe event, research indicated that nine out of 
ten individuals are susceptible to identity theft when 180 out of 200 people asked to 
disclose their personal details responded without question (Clarkson, 2005).  
Butler (2007) states that human behaviour is difficult to predict. Therefore it is essential 
to study user behaviour regarding phishing attacks to assist in the development of an 
effective solution to combat them.  Therefore, laboratory and real experiments were 
carried out to assess the user‟s ability to differentiate phishing attempts.  Generally, 
most published experiments to assess the user ability to distinguish phishing websites 
employing different attack methods show a high rate of user failure (more than 50%) 
(Herzberg, 2008).   
 
Downs et al. (2007) discuss the need to gain knowledge of user behaviour associated 
with phishing to provide an effective anti-phishing tool. From a laboratory experiment 
based on a survey role play with 232 computer users, they investigated the aspects 
associated with making users susceptible to phishing attacks. Their conclusion was that 
users who have knowledge and experience in recognising the web environment, 
including the ability to inspect and differentiate phishing URLs from legitimate ones, 
are less vulnerable to fall victims to phishing, and will not give false positive responses 
to legitimate e-mails. Their findings supposed that the severity of the consequences of 
phishing is likely to increase false positives.  
 
Moreover, some researchers conclude that the ability to distinguish legitimate sites was 
found to be complicated. Many participants tend to ignore the passive security 
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indicators and warnings presented by anti-phishing toolbars and depend on the website 
content to distinguish phishing attempts (Wu et al., 2006; Downs et al., 2007). Users 
were found to be unfamiliar with phishing attacks and security warnings; some did not 
detect them or ignored warning signals even though they understood them (Wu et al., 
2006). Some research explored user ignorance of toolbar warnings even if they were 
precise (Wu et al., 2006; Downs et al., 2007). 
 
Research at Harvard University in 2006 showed that lack of awareness of phishing 
threats and lack of attention to security warnings were the main causes of successful 
phishing attacks (Dhamija et al., 2006). In the Harvard study, 22 participants were asked 
to spot the fake phishing websites in the 20 sites given. The result shows that failure to 
distinguish fake websites happened about 40% of the time and more than 90% of the 
participants were deceived by effective and devious fake web sites. In addition, the 
study concluded that 23% of participants ignored all security indications in the web 
browser (Dhamija et al., 2006).  
 
The majority of web browsers (e.g. Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer) provide 
warnings for known black-listed phishing sites and support the basic security indicators, 
which are as follows (Herzberg, 2008): 
 The URL of the current page and classification of the protocol used to enter the site 
indicates whether it is an unprotected web page (the URL begins with http) or 
protected with SSL/TLS (the URL begins with https).   
 In SSL/TLS-protected pages, a padlock icon should be shown either on the status 
area or near the location bar. 
 The security certificate of the website is shown by double-clicking on the padlock 
icon.  
Both the SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and the TLS (Transport Layer Security) are 
sophisticated public-key cryptographic protocols which provide secure connection 
between the client and server. These protocols provide a flexible encryption method 
available at the time of the secure transaction. They do not necessitate preconfigured 
secret keys between the client and server before the connection is initiated, which makes 
them suitable for Web-based secure services. Therefore, the SSL and TLS are applied in 
most web pages that contain sensitive traffic such as login web pages (Herzberg, 2008). 
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The SSL/TLS protocols are supported by most web browsers and servers (Dierks and 
Rescorla, 2006; Rescorla, 2000). The use of SLL/TLS will protect the transfer of 
confidential traffic against „man-in-the-middle‟ attackers who attempt to get access to 
the traffic between the victim and the legitimate site to make them believe that they are 
connected and communicating with the legitimate site while they are actually connected 
to the attacker (Herzberg, 2008). 
 
However, several experiments and studies show that most users do not recognise or 
understand properly the basic security indicators since they are not very visible in 
current popular browsers (Herzberg, 2009; Dhamija et al., 2006;  Herzberg and Jbara, 
2004) and Herzberg (2008) also proves that the basic indicators do not offer adequate 
security. Moreover, research shows that most users are not familiar with the trust 
certificate authorities such as VeriSign and GeoTrust (Herzberg and Jbara, 2004).   
 
In addition to the user‟s failure to notice the basic security indicators, they are also 
confused since many sensitive websites do not employ SSL/TLS or they encrypt only 
the password to reduce the overhead network traffic of SSL/TLS in both the handshake 
phase and the data transfer phase (Apostolopoulos et al., 1999).  Some sites show a 
padlock even in an unprotected login page, giving an unfounded trust in the padlock 
image itself (Herzberg, 2008; 2009).  
 
Although many login pages are secured using SSL/TLS, those that use SSL/TLS only to 
protect the submitted password after submission are vulnerable to a „man-in-the-middle‟ 
attack where the submitted information would be held by the attacker instead of 
transferring it securely to the legitimate server (Herzberg, 2008; 2009).  Since the 
attacker could use visual tricks to deceive the victim by designing a login webpage 
which looks almost identical to the legitimate one, it would be difficult for users to 
distinguish these sorts of fake websites. This would require users to examine the HTML 
code of the web pages as the normal browser interface could not distinguish it 
(Herzberg, 2008). However, it is not feasible to expect users to examine the HTML 
code. Some legitimate websites fail by not invoking a genuine secure connection in 
their webpages, but including an image of a padlock displayed in the page itself. The 
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Chase.com home page was an example of such a common sensitive login page with a 
padlock displayed in an unprotected webpage (Herzberg, 2008), however, this has 
recently been corrected. This leads to confusion for users as there is no difference 
between the original site and the phishing one especially that phishers could fake the 
security indicators to trick users (Herzberg, 2008; Dhamija et al., 2006;  Herzberg and 
Jbara, 2004).  
 
There is some confusion over the reliability of experimental results from tests carried 
out in real life compared with those in the laboratory. Whitten and Tygar (1999) claim 
that the majority of experiments published are carried out in lab conditions and the 
result of such experiments might not be reliable since participants will act in a different 
way during the experiment compared to real life. On the other hand, Downs et al. (2007) 
disagree and claim that a laboratory experiment based on a survey role play exercise 
shows a consistent means to assess behavioural response to phishing. They argue that 
there were no signs of behavioural difference between the lab experiment and real-
world test.  Herzberg (2008) and Schechter et al. (2007) state that some people may be 
more cautious in real life as their security preparedness increases when using their real 
account and because of the possible real consequences faced when falling victim to 
phishing. Other participants might be more cautious in a lab environment as the exercise 
is carried out with the awareness of participants who would therefore concentrate more 
in identifying the indicators than they would in real life.  Consequently, Herzberg 
(2008) suggests carrying out real life experiments or what is called „penetration tests‟ 
rather than lab experiments to have a better understanding of participant behaviour 
during day-to-day online activity.  
 
However, the reported phishing laboratory studies do not present a large population of 
e-mail users since the authors found difficulties in motivating a large number of people 
to participate. Also, a relatively small number of e-mails was inspected in the 
experiment; for example Downs et al. (2007) applied only 5 e-mails in their laboratory 
experiment. Large field studies can be more effective but they are less controlled than 
lab studies with less information available on participants‟ demographics. Examples of 
such field studies are given by Jagatic et al. (2006), Ferguson (2005) and New York 
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State (2005). Some researchers who studied user vulnerability, found that there is no 
relationship between people‟s demographics (e.g. age, sex, previous experience, number 
of hours spent at the computer) and their vulnerability to phishing (Donovan et al., 
1999; Dhamija and Tygar, 2005; Dhamija et al., 2006)  Conversely, Downs et al. (2007) 
found that there is a relation between users‟ susceptibility to phishing and the 
knowledge and experience they gain on phishing, leading to enhanced awareness. Aston 
(2009) discovered that, in particular, older males were the common victims; also, 
education on online scams was found to have a major effect on susceptiblity to fall 
victim to such attacks. Nevertheless, the examination process was based only on 
“money mule” incidents where scammers steal money from victims and transfer it from 
one country to another to avoid tracking. It would be valuable to broaden the 
examination to online attacks and phishing in particular. Aston‟s paper does not 
illustrate why older males are common victims, therefore, there is a need for further 
investigation to see whether this is true.  
 
2.4.3 Summary of Vulnerabilities 
This section demonstrates the clever technical and social engineering tricks used by 
phishers and from this it can be concluded that technical solutions alone cannot be 
relied on to protect the user and that it would take a high level of user awareness to 
detect all these tricks. In addition, the behaviour of users shows a high susceptibility to 
phishing because of lack of awareness on phishing tricks, their consequences, and how 
to protect against phishing, and people are unable to recognise the security indicators to 
watch out for and they are gullable even when they do. There is a lot of research which 
discusses people‟s vulnerability to phishing based on reality or laboratory experiments 
which assess people‟s ability to recognise phishing attempts from legitimate e-mails. 
Most experiments concluded with a few findings concerning people‟s ability to 
recognise phishing sites but they do not identify the possible factors which make people 
susceptible to phishing. There might be factors such as cultural, country-specific and 
personal factors which none of the studies has investigated. Therefore, this suggests 
there is a need for research that focuses on studying user vulnerability to e-mail 
phishing from a broader angle, covering all of the associated factors affecting users‟ 
response to phishing by applying both reality and laboratory tests with a representative 
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sample of e-mail users. Investigating what makes people susceptible to e-mail phishing 
will assist in defining a solution to the phishing problem. 
 
Since there is little published material on whether there is relation between 
susceptibility to phishing and the demography of users, further investigation on this 
matter is required.  There are a number of indications that awareness and education is a 
key method in reducing people‟s susceptibility to phishing. However, this also needs 
further investigation. 
 
2.5  Anti-Phishing Solutions 
 
Phishing is a complex phenomenon, therefore there is no single solution to impede 
phishing (Emigh, 2005; Ollmann, 2004). The risk of phishing may be reduced in the 
long-term through applying suitable technology and educating the consumer of the 
phishing threat (Emigh, 2005). Many solutions have been proposed to reduce the risk of 
phishing, some are technical solutions and others are non-technical, based on best 
practices, awareness and education. Since e-mail phishing attacks are no longer a purely 
technical activity, technical controls alone are no longer enough to defend against them. 
A holistic view of security is required which integrates technology and people aspects.  
 
2.5.1  Technical Solutions 
There are many technical solutions which detect and alert users to an attack such as 
anti-virus software (e.g. McAfee, Symantec and AVG anti-virus), spam filters and 
phishing detection tools. Phishing sites are detected by using either URL filtering or by 
checking the URL with the reported blacklisted phishing URLs. However, it is not easy 
to manage such a blacklist with an increasing number of incidents, for example phishing 
reports have increased by 167% from July 2005 to July 2007 (APWG, 2007). Another 
possibility is to use a heuristics-based approach which uses algorithms to discriminate 
phishing sites based on users‟ experience and other heuristics. Although many 
researchers (Kumar, 2005; Tally et al., 2004; Van der Merwe, 2005) have investigated 
such a method, heuristics are found to be unreliable for detection in practice, since the 
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methods are based on defining the likehood of a site being a phishing site, which Zhang 
et al. (2007) shows might be underestimated.  
 
Hara et al. (2009) discuss phishing detection, including the blacklist and the heuristics-
based approach, based on visual similarity among phishing sites and legitimate ones and 
keywords used in the Website. This research points out the weakness of such solutions 
as they can be bypassed when the process is recognised. The approach achieves an 80% 
detection rate (Hara et al., 2009). Chen et al. (2009) and Xin et al. (2009) provide a 
novel and more accurate algorithm for phishing web site detection based on the image 
of the suspicious websites. Other research has defined some algorithms based on a 
broad investigation of phishing schemes. This shows a detection rate of 80% and an 
accuracy of 99%, pointing to some risks of phishing being missed by the algorithm and, 
therefore, there is still a reliance on users taking the right decisions (Yu et al., 2009).  
 
An interesting and ongoing research approach is based on machine-learning which 
involves advanced detection that enables a computer to learn by itself from the user‟s 
behaviour (Pan and Ding, 2006; Fette et al., 2007; Basnet et al., 2008). Miyamoto et al. 
(2009) provide an assessment of nine machine learning-based methods for phishing site 
detection for improving accuracy. Liping et al. (2009) identify the intelligence of 
phishers to bypass the available anti-phishing solutions and propose a reliable 
categoriser to distinguish phishing e-mails using hybrid features and a machine-learning 
algorithm. Other research by Awang (2009) introduces Trusted Computing (TC) to 
improve protection by using the transitive properties of trust. With such a solution the 
computer will be consistently forced to behave in expected ways (Mitchell, 2005).  
 
However, there are many problems associated with TC, such as privacy, the threat of 
unwanted surveillance and legal concerns including copyright, anti-trust law and data 
privacy law (Anderson, 1993). Aburrous et al. (2009) propose a clever, flexible and 
effective real-time phishing-detecting e-banking based on fuzzy logic and data mining 
algorithms. However, none of these algorithms are 100% effective. 
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Several researchers have recognised and examined the use of fast flux in malicious sites 
and producers have proposed a flux-detection mechanism (Honeynet Project, 2007; 
Konte et al., 2009; Nazario and Holz, 2008; Holz et al., 2008; Caglayan et al,. 2009). 
McGrath et al. (2009) show the possibility of defending against phishing sites by using 
fast flux to determine several short-lived IP addresses. Research by Caglayan et al. 
(2009) studied fast flux service networks (FFSNs) in real time over a short window of 
minutes using active and passive DNS monitoring and this has provided an effective 
detection process instead of observing fast flux over a long period as usually done in 
previous research. Other researchers, such as Zhang et al. (2009), investigated phishing 
groups by means of data mining techniques to explore the image attachments of spam 
e-mails by extracting the visual features from spam images and using an unsupervised 
clustering algorithm to group similar spam images visually into clusters (Chen and 
Zhang et al., 2009). Furthermore, Liping et al. (2009) provide a novel scheme to cluster 
phishing e-mails automatically to identify the origin of phishing attacks in order to trace 
the phishers. However, although the scheme shows effective results, there is still scope 
for development.  
 
There are many available research projects which work on producing effective solutions 
to combat the phishing threat. Pal and Atighetchi (2009) introduced the PhishBouncer 
project with the Symantec Research Lab (SRL) to defend against phishing by 
investigating the mechanisms to intercept and inspect http and https traffic to 
distinguish and block phishing sites. The method shows its effectiveness in opening 
issues for possible server exploitation. However, this research will not help to overcome 
other types of phishing.  
 
The Honeypot project is another example of a commonly used anti-phishing tool for fast 
detection and blocking of phishing e-mails based on analysis of collected phishing 
e-mails and phishers' activities. Shujun and Schmitz (2009) focus on examining users' 
behaviour while interacting with an e-banking system to help in defending against 
phishing attacks such as pharming and malware. This research has detected phishing to 
some extent, however, more evaluation is required to measure its effectiveness in 
protecting against phishing in other institutions. In addition, Botnet, which involves a 
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number of computers which have been set up to forward phishing, spam or viruses to 
other computers on the Internet, has been an attractive research topic related to cyber-
crime deterrence including phishing, which applies various detection techniques ( Feily 
et al., 2009). 
The majority of research focuses on protecting users from disclosing their passwords to 
phishing sites by use of various phishing detection tools. However, Knickerbocker et al. 
(2009) proposed the Humboldt system which aims to interrupt phishers by submitting 
poisonous fake data into phishing web sites totally different from the actual data. The 
system has efficiently disrupted the phishing process with practically little overhead. 
 
According to Herzberg (2008; 2009), since basic security indicators are not effective as 
they depends on users noticing and understanding them, enhanced indicators are needed 
to assist users to detect phishing sites. Therefore, many researchers have focussed on 
developing an enhanced toolbar for the Mozilla web browser, called TrustBar, to aid 
users in better recognition of phishing sites (Ye et al., 2002;  Dhamija and Tygar, 2005;  
Herzberg and Gbara, 2004). The TrustBar is a toolbar providing three enhanced 
indicators: The Certificate derived indicator, SSL/TLS indicator and the User 
customised indicator, aiming to improve security and identification for the browser (see 
Figure 2.1). The Internet Explorer browser (version 7), PassPet and WebWallet (Wu, 
2006; Wu et al., 2006; Yee and Sitaker, 2006) are other available similar tools. 
However, such tools still rely on the user‟s ability to make the correct trust decision 
from the presented indicators which are made useable and clear with the enhanced 
toolbar (Sheng et al., 2007).  
 
Figure 2.1: Security indicators in Mozilla Firefox trust bar (Herzberg, 2008) 
 
The three enhanced indicators are explained below (Herzberg, 2008): 
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1. SSL/TLS indicator 
This provides the user with a clear visual indication of whether the website is secured. 
For a secured site, the padlock would be displayed in the trustbar while unsecurred sites 
would have a crossed-out padlock. 
2. Certificate-derived indicator 
This shows the names and/or logos of the organisation and issuer as recognised from the 
SSL/TLS certificate. Some certificates would display the domain in the organisation field. This 
is usually because most issued SSL certificates are based on only the validation of the domain 
name, which is not secure against poison DNS or „man-in-the-middle‟ attackers since it is 
carried out by sending packets to IP addresses of the domain listed in the DNS. It is, therefore, 
important to recognise and inspect the certificate authority carefully.  
3. User-customised indicators 
User-customised indicators help users to defend against phishing sites which require 
inputting of private information such as passwords. These indicators are unique to each 
user and are either randomly selected from the system or chosen by the user. It could be 
an image, a photograph or just a couple of words.  The identifier would be displayed on 
the web page (Gasparini and Gotlieb, 2003) to avoid phishing attacks, as attackers 
would not know the unique identifier chosen by the user or even provided by the 
legitimate website. Even if the attacker tries to impersonate the user, the site would 
require an authentication before sending the identifiers, e.g. using cookies or the IP 
address. However, users need to select a unique identifier which is not easily predictable 
by attackers.  
An example of such a user-customised indicator is the Yahoo sign-in seal which assists 
users to distinguish a genuine Yahoo login page, as shown in Figure 2.2. Even if a 
phisher knows or guesses the user‟s ID or other personal information, they cannot 
discover the user‟s sign-in seal since the sign-in seal is correlated to the user‟s computer 
and not to the user‟s ID. When a user finds that there is no sign-in seal or the seal has 
changed (e.g. change in colour, photo and text), they know it is a phishing site. 
Nevertheless, many browser-based tools are not fully reliable in detecting phishing sites 
(O‟Brien, 2005; Downs et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2007). 
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Figure 2.2: Yahoo sign-in seal 
 
2.5.1.1 Summary of Technological Solutions 
In conclusion, there are many commercial technological solutions available to fight 
against phishing. However, it remains an arms‟ race, with phishers using complicated 
techniques. Even e-mail-based automated detection tools have limitations (Fette and 
Tomasic, 2006). A study by Zhang et al. (2007) examined 10 anti-phishing tools: only 
one identified 90% of detections but it also inaccurately distinguished 42%.  
 
With phishing being complicated and continuously developing, available anti-phishing 
tools do not have the ability to protect against all types of phishing attacks (Zhang et al., 
2007). Although available technological solutions assist in reducing the risk of phishing, 
they still do not provide an accurate detection of phishing attacks (Dodge, 2006; Dodge 
et al., 2007). Downs et al. (2007) explore the fact that anti-phishing tools would never 
give full protection against false detections either for phishing or legitimate e-mails, 
which are described as false negative and false positive, respectively; therefore users 
should make their decisions based on their knowledge of phishing and how to protect 
against it. Since users‟ behaviour is unpredictable, there is no current technological 
protective solution that can diminish the risk associated with user behaviour (Dodge et 
al., 2007). Ultimately, all anti-phishing solutions require knowledge of users‟ 
behavioural response to phishing to develop an effective solution, whether through best-
practices or anti-phishing tools or education. Therefore, understanding what makes 
Sign-in seal 
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people fall prey to phishing would have a direct implication for all anti-phishing 
solutions, particularly awareness and education (Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 
2007). This shows the importance and the need for further research to investigate user 
vulnerability to the phishing threat since it assists in developing effective anti-phishing 
solutions and enhancing their performance. 
 
2.5.2  Non-technical (Awareness) Solutions 
Although protecting the infrastructure by security controls and technologies will reduce 
the effect of phishing, protection at the user level needs to be the main defence against 
phishing since users are the most vulnerable (Ollmann, 2004; Downs et al., 2007). 
Many researchers, especially those who study vulnerability to phishing, conclude there 
is a need to enhance user awareness on the phishing threat to improve users‟ protection 
level against phishing attacks (Dhamija et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2006; Downs et al., 
2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Herzberg, 2009). Forte (2009) concludes that it is hard 
to implement technological countermeasures to avoid phishing due to the nature of such 
attacks where they aim to work directly on the users to attain their goal. Therefore, it is 
crucial to make users aware of the need to verify the legitimacy of e-mails and phone 
calls received. There is much literature which discusses phishing awareness; some 
propose recommendations, advice or what is called “best practices” for users to follow 
and some focus on putting these best practices and advice into useful and effective 
educational material to train users on how to defend against phishing attacks. These are 
described in detail in the following sections.  
 
2.5.2.1  Recommendations and Best Practices 
Some research provides useful recommendations on best practices and countermeasures 
to avoid phishing.  Winder (2009) mainly advises leaving suspicious sites as soon as 
possible and reporting the incident to the responsible organisation which should be 
ready to help in reducing the impact of being phished. Forte (2009) analyses the 
procedures of a phishing attack, especially in creating the phishing site, and presents 
some countermeasures to avoid being attacked. Tally et al. (2006) and Tally (2009) 
focus on developing a real-time phishing data collection, validation, broadcasting and a 
global archival system to assist in investigating the scope and characteristics of phishing 
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attacks and the potential victims. This project, called „Phisherman‟, recommended and 
showed the value of having a single database of phishing incidents to help 
organisations, researchers and law enforcement organisations to study phishing 
techniques and find solutions for avoiding them. However, it is hard to persuade all 
organisations to be involved in such projects, especially banks, where the records of 
incidents are confidential. Most organisations keep their records private. Furthermore 
studying phishing incidents is difficult, requiring extensive in-depth analysis to 
understand phishers‟ tactics. Wu et al. (2006) propose the need for educating users on 
best practices to avoid phishing.  
 
Butler (2007) aims to educate the Internet consumer on the threat of phishing by 
proposing a framework of anti-phishing measures. He provides an effective review of 
phishing techniques and proposes useful proactive measures to prevent phishing and 
some remedial actions to reduce the possible negative consequences which might be 
suffered from successful phishing attacks. He also identifies the need for proper anti-
phishing education and measures to help to protect online users from the e-mail 
phishing threat.  Overall, however, the proposed pieces of advice in most research has 
been found to be sparse and obvious to the user, and some publications merely repeat 
previous literature and articles available on the Internet. 
 
2.5.2.1.1  Recommendations on How to Spot Phishing 
Literature which proposes best practices and recommendations defines many clues and 
offers advice for users to enhance their ability to combat phishing. The following is a 
summary of best practices gathered from the literature which demonstrates how to avoid 
e-mail phishing attempts.  
 
1. Users should look out for the following email features:              
 Usually, legitimate institutions will not seek to acquire confidential information by 
e-mail because it is relatively insecure (ActivCard, 2004; Butler, 2007; Dhamija et 
al, 2006).  
 An e-mail message addressed to “Dear valued customer” is likely to be a phishing 
e-mail because the message was sent without addressing the receiver and usually 
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private e-mails requiring confidential information address the consumer by name 
(Emigh, 2005; Dhamija et al, 2006).  
 Reading the e-mail message carefully is very important; discovery of grammatical 
or spelling mistakes in the message is usually an indication that the e-mail is not 
official because it would be checked for language correctness (ActivCard, 2004; 
Dhamija et al, 2006). 
 Phishing emails often appeal to a user‟s better nature and moral obligation to launch 
an attack. For example, in the case of a natural disaster such as an earthquake, 
phishers will exploit people‟s kindness by calling for donations. This could be done 
by setting up a bogus website claiming to be raising funds for disaster relief. 
Examples of such phishing were noticed after the following disasters: the London 
terrorist bombings in July 2005 (Technology News Daily, 2005), the tsunami 
disaster in the Pacific in December 2004 (Vecchiatto, 2005) and the hurricane 
Katrina disaster which hit the south-eastern coast of the USA in August 2005 
(American Red Cross, 2005). Research has projected that about 50% of funds raised 
yearly for donations and disaster relief are actually going to phishing fraudsters 
(Vecchiatto, 2005).  
 Another emotion used by phishers is the sense of surprise, when a too-good-to-be-
true offer is made for bargains and the possibility of winning a superior reward. For 
example, in 2006, for the FIFA World Cup, a phishing e-mail offered cheaper online 
tickets for this worldwide event (SurfControl, n.d.). Unfortunately, too-good-to-be-
true offers are normally precisely what the name implies. 
 Phishing emails can employ urgency and intimidation to get victims to respond 
faster without thinking. An example of such a phishing scheme are e-mails 
requesting a tax refund, 105 of which, originating from 27 different countries, have 
been identified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the US government agency 
responsible for tax gathering and enforcement. The e-mails claimed to be from the 
IRS and requested the taxpayers to provide their bank account information in order 
to pay their taxes urgently or a penalty action would be applied (Dalrymple, 2006;  
Lank, 2006).  
2. Users should look out for the following deceptive website links 
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 Phishers try to hide the address of the fake website in an embedded hyperlink which 
makes it difficult for victims to distinguish the actual address (Ollmann, 2004). The 
true address can be seen in the browser location bar or by a pop up message when 
hovering over the link. 
 Since many users do not know the actual structure of domain names and will not 
notice the URL, they are more likely to fall prey to phishing websites. Most 
phishing web sites use incorrect domain names with a name that does not relate to 
the organisation that is supposed to be the legitimate site.   (Herzberg, 2008).  
 Sometimes the fake URLs contain numeric IP addresses. The Anti-Phishing 
Working Group (APWG) reported that 36% of phishing attacks contained only the 
IP address in the URL instead of a host name (APWG, 2006).  
 Other advanced phishers use similar looking URLs to make it difficult for users to 
distinguish the fake URL at a first glance. This is called a homograph attack 
(Gabrilovich and Gontmakher, 2002). These phishers deliberately attempt to make 
the illegitimate host name similar to the legitimate host using similar characters in 
the URL, with only slight changes, thus adding, excluding or swapping letters. The 
study by APWG (2006) shows that 48% of phishing URLs have similarities with 
legitimate URLs. Many fake URLs are similar to well known websites such as 
paypa1.com (with the letter „L‟ replaced by the digit „1‟) created to look like 
Paypal.com (Bellovin, 2004), likewise the Microsoft web site www.microsoft.com 
has been faked as www.microsift.com, www.micosoft.com or www.verify-
microsoft.com (Microsoft, 2006).  
 Some phishers use „cloaked‟ links to hide the genuine destination of a link. As the 
address bar can display only a finite URL length, phishers use this feature to conceal 
the true destination host. Phishers use long URLs with the active part placed at the 
end of the URL to conceal it from the victim (Sophos, 2005).   
 Other tricks would be the use of a 'cloaked' link by inserting the extension of the 
URL after the @ symbol. When the URL contains the @ symbol, victims have to 
disregard the characters before the @ symbol and consider only the characters 
succeeding it (APWG, 2006). For example, the URL 
www.microsoft.com@phishing.com will not take you to microsoft.com, it will take 
you to the website phishing.com. 
3. Users should look out for the following security indicators for legitimate sites 
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 If a URL starts with „https‟ it means it is protected with SSL/TLS technology 
(Herzberg and Jbara, 2004) 
 A locked padlock icon shown either on the status area or near the location bar shows 
a secure site. The security certificate of the website is shown by double-clicking on 
the padlock icon. It is important to ensure that the certificate is trustworthy and 
assigned for the site and that it is still valid (Herzberg and Jbara, 2004).   
 Researchers warn users to pay attention to security alerts such as the ones presented 
by the browser, operating system and phishing filters (Herzberg and Jbara, 2004).  
 
Generally, the advice is that users should not to respond to suspicious emails or website 
links and if they have done so, they must react immediately by reporting the incident, 
cancelling their credit card if their card details has been stolen, changing the information 
revealed and taking other actions to remedy the possible consequences of falling victim 
to phishing (Butler, 2007).  
Some researchers state that although there is small amount of information available for 
users on how to spot phishing (Robila and Ragucci, 2006; Emigh, 2005; Merwe et al. 
2005) it only involves advice to help identify phishing without embedding education 
into the approach. 
 
2.5.2.2  Education and Training 
Phishing education can be considered to be a promotion of information security 
awareness. An information security culture has been found to influence behaviour of 
users (Steyn, 2007).  Anti-phishing education has been a main concern of many 
institutions, including government and private. APWG (2005) and Microsoft (2006) 
have established phishing awareness sites to help reduce the risk of human incorrect 
trust decisions on phishing attempts. Most researchers point out the importance and 
effectiveness of education at the user level to deter phishing (Butler, 2005; Emigh, 
2005; Milletary, 2006; Consumer Reports, 2006; Symantec, 2006; Microsoft, 2006; 
Jagatic et al., 2006; Xin and Qinyu, 2007). Additionally, in May 2006, the Executive 
Order issued by President Bush stated the US Federal Government‟s desire to educate 
the public about the threats of identity theft and on how to protect their personal data 
(White House, 2006). Online consumers have to be aware of the threats and risks of 
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identity theft through phishing and should also know how to secure their information 
from phishers by applying security practices and measures appropriately. They should 
have the capability to recognise phishing attacks and know how to react to them 
properly and what to do when they have fallen prey to them. Phishers‟ capabilities are 
rising and they are becoming more sophisticated due to the available techniques used to 
trick online consumers, hence online consumers have to continuously update their 
security practices and their awareness of phishing threats (Clarkson, 2005; Milletary, 
2006).  
 
However, Merwe et al. (2005) claim that education is not discussed in the literature as 
much as the research into technical prevention and intrusion. Although some security 
and usability experts state that educating users about security is an inefficient approach 
to defence (Evers, 2007), other research (Gorling, 2006; Kumaraguru et al., 2007) 
declares the effectiveness of well designed security education in enhancing knowledge.  
Even though there are many available anti-phishing education and training 
opportunities, they are often ignored by users (Whitten and Tygar, 1999; Kumaraguru et 
al., 2007). Therefore, there is a need for designing education that will attract users and 
enhance their knowledge on phishing.  
 
A study by Anton et al.(2004) explores that education on this matter would make users 
feel more threatened and inhibited from carrying out online activities instead of 
increasing their protection level (Anandpara et al., 2007). Other researchers 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2007) claim that teaching users the ability to identify phishing 
attempts could be done without the need for them to recognise complex security 
concepts. Downs et al., 2007 propose the need for education that will enhance people‟s 
knowledge on phishing rather than warning and intimidating them with the associated 
risks (Downs et al., 2007). This suggests education should made simple, understandable 
and not threatening.  
Literature on learning argues that real problem solving activity is required to gain an 
enhanced learning  (Barron et al., 1998; Brown, Collins & Duguid, 1989; Evensen & 
Hmelo, 2000; Naidu, 2004; Schank & Cleary, 1995; McLellan, 1996). Therefore, more 
effort should be made in terms of practical training to solve the problem of phishing. 
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Educational and training material about phishing can be presented in learning sessions, 
distance learning (e-learning), embedded training, regular learning messages or even 
through the media. There are several researchers (e.g. Kawakami et al., 2010; 
Anandpara et al., 2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 2007) who have studied 
and implemented phishing awareness through those learning methods by developing 
different tools such as posters and games, taking account of learning principles. 
Relevant principles of learning are reviewed in Table 2.1: 
  
Table 2.1: Learning principles 
Learning 
principles 
Explanation 
Learning-by-
doing 
This is the fundamental aspect of Adaptive Control of Thought-
Rational (ACT-R) theory.  It is based on the theory that knowledge 
is enhanced through practice and experience (Schank et al., 1994; 
Anderson, 1993).  
Immediate 
feedback 
 
Researchers address the importance and the effectiveness of 
providing instant feedback throughout the learning process in 
enhancing users‟ learning skills (Schmidt and Bjork, 1992). 
Contiguity 
 
Mayer (2001) supports the effectiveness of computer aided 
instruction; words and graphics should be presented alongside the 
instruction. 
Personalisation  
 
This implies using a conversational style rather than a formal style 
of presenting learning material. Clark and Richard (2002) and 
Mayer (2001) proved that it enhances learning since people are 
motivated to understand and learn better in informal conversational 
learning. 
Story-based 
agents 
Agents are characters which assist the user during learning. It was 
shown by Moreno et al. (2001) that their use enhances learning 
effectively, especially when offered in a story framework (Mayer, 
2001). 
Learning material that is story-based, using either cartoon or real-
life characters to make the learning attractive and interesting, was 
found to provide more effective learning than a non-story-based 
condition (Moreno et al., 2001; Maldonado et al., 2005). People 
learn from stories since managing events in a consequential frame 
makes them easy to be understood and remembered (Klein, 1999; 
Mayer, 2001). 
Reflection 
 
In applying the reflection principle, it was shown that learning 
opportunity increases when learners are made to stop and think 
about the new knowledge gained (Donovan et al., 1999).  
Conceptual and 
procedural 
 
Conceptual and procedural knowledge are knowledge types which 
both influence learning effectively (Johnson and Koedinger, 2002). 
Conceptual is the concept knowledge taught to learners to 
understand the concepts, whereas procedural is knowledge gained 
from procedures and steps proposed. However, both are important 
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to consider when developing educational material.   
Motivation  Whitten and Bjor (1977) recommend users to take their time in 
reading the learning material in order to learn better, this will make 
it more rewarding. They also suggest actual rewards such as 
certificates or even money will motivate learners. Motivation was 
identified as an important factor in the learning phase and 
Kumaraguru et al. (2007) proved that embedded training users 
were more inspired than users of regular learning messages. 
Knowledge 
retention 
In learning principles, many researchers consider knowledge 
retention (Rubin and Wenzel, 1996) which reflects the ability of 
learners to retain the conceptual and procedural knowledge gained 
from the learning material after a lapse of time. Merrienboer et al. 
(1997), Kumaraguru et al. (2007) and Sheng et al. (2007) show that 
those users who were taught how to recognise phishing attempts 
were better able to remember and distinguish phishing after the 
training. Few researchers address the retention of knowledge, but 
Kumaraguru et al. (2007) and Alnajim and Munro (2009) have 
shown that users involved in embedded training are more able to 
retain the knowledge they have gained from regular phishing alert 
messages, seven days after training. 
 
Different anti-phishing training methods and tools, including web-based learning and 
contextual and embedded training, would assist in enhancing the user‟s ability to 
recognise phishing (eBay, 2006; FTC, 2006; Sheng et al., 2007). The methods are as 
follows: 
 
1.  Contextual training 
This is an experiment based training which, in the context of phishing, would aim to 
assess users‟ susceptibility to phishing according to their ability to distinguish phishing 
attempts. Some researchers who have carried out such training have shown that, at the 
end of the test, any educational materials given to participants improves their 
knowledge on the phishing threat (Jagatic et al., 2006; Ferguson, 2005; New York State, 
2005). Kumaraguru et al. (2007) applied contextual training with 30 participants and 
conclude that, after reading the training messages, participants‟ protection level and 
ability to distinguish phishing messages did increased considerably. 
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2.  Learning programmes 
In learning programmes a broad range of learning material is used and is either 
distributed to a small population through session training programmes or widely 
distributed to the public through the media. Some research is based on learning sessions 
where there was a direct interaction between the trainer and the learners (Sheng et al., 
2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2007).    
   
Many researchers have stressed the role of the media in manipulating people‟s attitude 
and behaviour and in increasing public awareness in many subjects, which is likely to 
lead to citizen action (Hedberg et al., 1995; Goddard and Saunders, 2001; Andrews, 
McLeese and Currant, 1995: 929-930; Burrows, D., 1988, Krugman, 1996; Levy, 1999). 
However, some researchers argue that the media could be successful in raising public 
knowledge and awareness of any topic, but they are unlikely to alter public behaviour 
(Windahl et al., 1992: 102; Rice and Atkin, 1989; Rogers and Storey, 1987; Media 
Awareness Network, 2005; Spitzer, 1993; Wilson and Wilson, 2001; Wimmer and 
Dominick, 1991). Lumsdaine (1963), Mielke (1968) and Clark (1994) claim that the 
media is not efficient for learning. However, some researchers suggest that learning 
depend on how the issues are presented in the media rather than the media itself (Clark 
& Solomon, 1986; Kulik, 1985) 
 
3.  Learning through game playing 
Sheng et al. (2007) presented the development of an online game to teach users how to 
spot phishing attacks. The game was very effective in enhancing identification of 
phishing attacks for 60% of the participants in the learning session. Sheng et al., (2007) 
claim that in comparison with existing online materials, the game was a better way of 
raising awareness.  
Zhang et al. (2007) presented an impressive game which gives users clues on how to 
recognise phishing from URLs and uses a search engine to prove the legitimacy of the 
site because the legitimate one will usually be the top result of the search. However, the 
game does not train users on all ways to spot phishing messages, relying only on 
enhancing users‟ ability to recognise phishing from the URL. The evaluation of the 
game depends only on the scores of users in playing the game (Sheng et al., 2007).  
Sheng et al. (2007) used learning principles to design the game which proposes the need 
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for involving training tactics which are goal-oriented, appropriate, interactive and 
challenging for providing efficient training (Quinn, 2005). 
A lot of literature is available on the effectiveness of games for teaching conceptual and 
procedural knowledge (Anderson et al., 1993; Johnson and Koedinger, 2002; Gee, 
2003). Some research in learning principles has found that an interactive teaching 
environment, such as in games, is one of the most effective training techniques and is 
extremely inspiring for users, especially if it follows educational game design principles 
(Gee, 2003; Quinn, 2005; Repenning and Lewis, 2005).    
 
4. Laboratory tests 
Other research by Robila and Ragucci (2006) shows an increased level of awareness 
and better recognition of phishing attacks for users who took a laboratory-based survey 
experiment to assess a user‟s ability to make correct decisions on whether e-mails in the 
test were genuine or fraudulent. The experiment was held in a learning session on a 
computing courses and results from test scores and discussions show 82% of phishing 
e-mails were recognised correctly but, in contrast, more than 50% of attacks for those 
phishing e-mails using a social engineering perspective were successful 
However, legitimate e-mails are relatively less detectable than phishing attempts 
(Brandt, 2005) and research by Horgan (2005) shows only 52% correct detections of 
legitimate e-mails.  This might lead users to categorise all the e-mails in the lab test as 
phishing (Brandt, 2005).  According to Anandpara et al. (2007), existing online training 
materials make people more cautious about phishing such that they wrongly identify 
legitimate e-mails as phishing. Kumaraguru et al., (2007) state that existing online 
training on phishing tends to give rules but it does not effectively educate users on 
means of detecting phishing attempts.   
 
5.  Embedded training 
Research in education shows that training is effective when it is related to real world 
testing (Anderson and Simon, 1996). Embedded training is an example of such training 
which teaches users how to recognise phishing in their daily interaction (Kirkley et al., 
2003). 
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There are numerous researchers who have used embedded training where penetration 
tests were applied to study users‟ vulnerability to phishing attacks and to teach users to 
learn from their mistakes (Jagatic et al., 2006; Ferguson, 2005; New York State, 2005). 
Those studies have shown the effectiveness of the training in raising the user‟s defence 
level against phishing compared to the information booklets or standard security notices 
usually sent to client organisations (Kumaraguru et al., 2007). Several organisations 
have applied this embedded training method. For example, Loughborough University is 
one where a phishing e-mail was sent to students requesting their username and 
password, but once opened, a message appears to alert students to the threat of phishing 
and informing them that the University would never request student login details 
through e-mail (see Figure 2.3).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Loughborough University embedded training 
 
Kumaraguru et al. (2007) applied embedded training with the main concern to make 
users motivated to use the training materials to increase their defence against e-mail 
phishing. The following learning principles were applied in the anti-phishing embedded 
training: learning-by-doing, immediate feedback, contiguity, personalisation and using a 
story-based poster shown automatically for users who fail to identify phishing. Results 
show that users‟ knowledge of phishing detection was enhanced more by embedded 
training than regular security notice messages.  
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Wombat
 TM 
Security Technologies (2009) describes the evaluation of PhishGuru
TM
. This 
embedded training is based on sending simulated phishing e-mails to assess users‟ 
abilities to recognise phishing attempts and to provide an educational anti-phishing 
scenario-based cartoon poster for the ones who fail the test.  The research concluded 
that participants who fell prey to the phishing and received anti-phishing training were 
50% less likely to fall prey to phishing in future than those who did not receive the 
training. People are more likely to remember information when it is understandable and 
interactive. Their paper claims that embedded training gave users the ability to 
recognise phishing even 28 days after training. Users provided with a second training 
were 50% less likely to fall prey to phishing than those trained just once. Wombat
 TM 
Security Technologies (2009) claims this shows that repeated training is effective, 
though there is a need to take into account the motivating of users and avoiding feelings 
of unexcitement as these may have a negative influence.  
 
6.  Distance learning (e-learning) 
There is a growing amount of literature on e-learning technologies (Dede, 1996; 
Kearsley, 2005; Khan, 1997; Edelson, Gordin, & Pea, 1999; Edelson & O'Neill, 1994). 
With the continuous development on information security threats and, in particular, 
phishing, an educational system must as well developed to cope with those changes. 
This suggests the need for flexible and scalable learning, as it is claimed that e-learning 
provides. According to some research E-Learning has been found to reduce overall cost 
and the learning time by 40% to 60% compared to traditional learning methods (Web-
based Training Cookbook, 1997, p. 108; Zenger and Uehlein, 2001). Willems (2005) 
claims that distance education provides flexible access to educational materials and 
allows learners and teachers to engage in an synchronous and asynchronous interaction 
in different places, times, and at different speeds (Gomez, Gordin & Carlson, 1995; 
Gordin, Polman & Pea, 1994; Pea, 1994). More than 30 studies claim that interactive 
technologies could reduce learning time requirements by a half (Miller, 1990). Research 
by Horton (2000), shows that virtual classrooms have decreased costs by 80% and also 
raised student satisfaction by 30% and knowledge retention by 25%. According to 
Fletcher (1990) Technology Based Training saves 35-45% of time compared to that of 
the traditional classroom whilst attaining the same or improved learning retention.   
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Andrew Sadler, vice president of strategy and alliances for IBM‟s Mindspan Solutions 
claim that the life of the knowledge is decreasing with the rapid development of 
technology, especially in the field of information technology were the its measured in 
months (Schultz, 2002). However, in most learning, the life of the knowledge lasts less 
than 6 months for Internet-based technologies because of the rapid development in the 
subject area compared to other subjects where it lasts between 8 and 36 months (Kapp, 
2001: 270). Therefore, this should be considered while developing educational material 
to make it rememberable and up to date. Potentially, e-learning could provide a 
continuable and updateable learning facility with less effort and resources.  
 
Also e-learning shows an increased retention by 25-60% percent compared to traditional 
learning (J.D. Fletcher, 1991: 33-42). Masatoshi et al. (2010) illustrates the 
effectiveness of animated e-learning anti-phishing education in enhancing learners‟ 
skills in combating the phishing threat. There are many available online tutorials on 
phishing, such as by Computing & Information Services (CIS, 2009), eBay (eBay, 
2006), Microsoft (Microsoft, 2006) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 2006). 
However, Kumaraguru et al. (2007) state the need for simple and understandable 
material presented in the e-learning site to provide effective learning, especially if there 
is an absence of personal interaction. 
 
2.5.3 Summary of Non-technological Solutions 
It can be concluded from the literature on non technical solutions that effective 
education is needed. The advice given in most research publication has been found to be 
sparse and obvious to the user, and some publications merely repeat previous literature 
and articles available on the Internet. Many researchers point out the importance and the 
effectiveness of improving user awareness on phishing threats in reducing the risk of 
phishing, especially since technological solutions have proved unreliable in providing 
full protection as phishing has become more and more complex.  
 
Therefore, the research in this thesis concentrates on enhancing the user‟s trust decision 
through an effective awareness and educational framework which integrates best 
practices or recommendations for parties who play a role in dealing with the phishing 
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problem with education and training on e-mail phishing. The research is built on 
previous studies with further investigation on users‟ vulnerability to phishing. The 
findings are used to understand phishing and to propose an effective awareness 
framework that is based on the learning principles described in this chapter.  
 
2.6   The Contribution of the Literature Review 
Phishing causes immense losses, from $1.2 billion in the US in the period May 2004 to 
May 2005 (Kerstein, 2005) and up to £504 million in the UK in the year leading up to 
March 2005 (Richardson, 2005). Attacks have also been reported in other non-English 
speaking countries (Sunday Morning Herald, 2004) and researchers suggest the 
development of the phishing trend will continue in the future (APWG, 2006; Korea 
Internet Security Centre, 2006). According to AVIRA (2010), North America and 
Europe has the highest phishing incidence, with 45% of all phishing in these regions. In 
the rest of the world, there is less presence of phishing and under 10% of incidents 
occurred in Eurasia, Asia and the Middle East regions.  However, the number of attacks 
in those regions were not clearly identified. In particular, Qatar is one of the countries 
where the incidence of phishing is unknown.  
 
There is a lot of literature available on phishing, as identified earlier, and some studies 
review its threat in particular parts of the world, for example Spain (Uusitalo et al., 
2009), Italy (Leone, 2006) and Malaysia (Gan et al., 2008).  However, there is a lack of 
published literature on the phishing problem in the State of Qatar and in that part of the 
world.  
 
Qatar has a conservative culture and this may affect on people‟s vulnerability to 
phishing, but this is not explicitly covered in the literature. Most literature, guide books 
magazines, articles, website blogs and forums discuss Qatar culture in terms of customs, 
traditions, what people wear and eat, arts and hand crafts, Islamic culture and some 
authors propose „do or don‟t‟ living guides (Bush, 2003.; QatarVisitor, 2000, Explorer 
Publishing, 2009a and 2009b; Chaddock, 2007; Chaddock, 2008; Ossian, 2005; Usa, 
2005;  Orr, 2008; Nasr, 2009).  They refer to day-to-day activity, tradition and a few 
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attitudes but they do not describe people‟s behaviour with IT. There is very little 
reported research on Qatar culture with regard to Qataris‟ behaviours, beliefs, interests 
and characteristics. This makes the research reported in this thesis original since it 
covers the factors which make Qataris vulnerable to phishing which are not presented in 
the literature.  
 
One of the reasons Qatar was chosen to be the case study was because of the lack of 
literature on the phishing problem in Qatar and, in particular, on e-mail phishing. This 
literature review has thus shown that the aims and objectives are valid because of a lack 
of literature and confirms that some form of research is needed. Objective 1 in Chapter 
1 is therefore fulfilled.    
 
2.7   Summary    
The literature reviewed shows that social engineering is a formidable attack that is hard 
to defend against, even with the highest security solutions since it targets human 
weaknesses to attain its goal.  Phishing is shown to be one of its techniques which is 
becoming more complex with the development of telecommunications, and many 
different phishing types are appearing. This suggests a wide range of research projects 
on social engineering and phishing is possible. However, to keep the research within 
manageable proportions, this research focuses only on investigating e-mail phishing 
attacks. This chapter identifies previous research on vulnerability to the phishing threat 
along with the technical and non-technical methods developed to defend against this 
attack, with a particular emphasis on awareness and education as a proposed solution.  
 
From the literature, or rather the lack of it, it can be concluded that there is a little 
knowledge in understanding people‟s susceptibility to phishing and the mechanisms 
behind phishing which make it successful and, therefore, further investigation is 
required through reality and laboratory tests which measure users‟ ability to distinguish 
phishing attempts. In addition, the literature suggests that awareness is important to 
reduce the risk of phishing but there is little to say how this can be implemented. There 
                 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
55 
is, therefore, a need for further research to increase understanding of how to make 
people aware of phishing and how to defend against it.  
 
Some literature was found on technological solutions presenting tools to detect and 
prevent phishing, of which there are many available, using different techniques. 
However, no technological solution was 100% effective and the increasingly 
sophisticated phishing methods keep circumventing the technological defences. The 
non-technological solutions offer recommendations, advice, awareness and education, 
all of which will assist users in making correct trust decisions. Although tools are 
effective as one level of defence, users‟ trust decisions have been shown to be essential 
as a second line of defence to distinguish phishing attacks that may bypass the tools. It 
can be concluded that making the technolgical tools more effective and making users 
more aware would both be productive areas for further research. However, for this 
research the scope has been chosen to concentrate on promoting the awareness of 
phishing as a means of defence against attack, with a particular emphasis on the 
implementation of an awareness programme in Qatar.  
 
Therefore, this research seeks to provide a solution to the e-mail phishing problem in 
Qatar based on non-technical solutions by first discovering the extent of the problem 
and the factors which make people vulnerable to phishing. Then it proposes some 
effective recommendations for different sectors and provides a complementary e-mail 
phishing educational awareness framework to enhance their knowledge on phishing and 
teach them how to distinguish and react to phishing attacks.  
 
The next chapter describes in detail the research methodology. It specifies the research 
philosophy, approach, strategy and data collection methods used in this research for 
achieving the overall research contribution and filling the knowledge gap in the 
literature. 
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Chapter 3  Research Methodology 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the research philosophy, approach and strategy, 
and follows this with a detailed description of the data collection methods available to a 
researcher and the justification of the appropriate one for the testing of the research 
hypotheses and achievement of the objectives. 
 
3.1  Research Philosophy 
It is important to identify the philosophy of the research since it will simplify for the 
researcher the choice of the appropriate research strategy and data collection methods, 
and verify how data are gathered and analysed (Crossan, 2003). Information systems 
(IS) cover all aspects of circulation of information throughout an organisation 
(Themistocleous 2002; Walsham 1993; Galliers 1992; Orlikowski and Bardoudi 1991). 
In IS research, the philosophy tends to transfer from epistemology (what is known to be 
true) (Myers, 1997) into doxology (what is believed to be true) (Galliers, 1992: 29). 
Positivist and anti-positivist (also called interpretivist) are the two main research 
philosophies recognised in IS research (Galliers, 1992: 29; Orlikowski and 
Baroudi,1991). 
 
3.1.1  Positivism 
Since the late 1970s, an approach based on positivism has been common in most IS 
research (Dickson and DeSanctis, 1990, cited in Jackson, 2001).  Many researchers have 
illustrated positivism as the key for IS research (Themistocleous 2002; Walsham 1995; 
Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 1994; Galliers 1992). This was supported by 
Orlikowski and Bardoudi (1991) who stated that about 70% of research in the leading 
US IS journals uses a positivist approach. 
The positivist approach usually aspires to objective authenticity to enhance the 
perception of phenomena by independent observation, experience or testing of theories 
by the researchers (Myers, 1997; Galliers, 1992). Although this approach is mainly 
timeless, many scientists and philosophers have adopted it. It is commonly used in 
natural science research (e.g. mathematics, physics, etc.). Orlikowski and Baroudi 
(1991) describe as positivist an approach which involves hypothesis, measurements, 
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tests, deductions, verifications and suggestions, along with an approved analysis process 
(Crossan, 2003; Conford and Smithson, 1996; Popper, 1959). However, Hirschheim 
(1985) and Conford and Smithson (1996) have queried whether a positivist approach is 
appropriate for social sciences research into matters such as human behaviour. 
 
3.1.2  Interpretivism 
Interpretivism is the reverse of positivism in research. Thus Webber (2004) and Stahl 
(2005) have considered that observers are not independent and interpretivism 
distinguishes people‟s comprehension as being associated with their experience and 
culture (Pather and Remenyi, 2004).  Interpretivism used to be the regular philosophy 
until the late 1970s (Vreede, 1995, cited in Jackson, 2001).  It aims to prove or 
understand a phenomenon and how it is influenced by context (Myers, 1997) through 
the use of social constructs such as perceptions, human logic and joint meanings and by 
gathering data from field research in a subjective manner (Pather and Remenyi, 2004; 
Myers, 1997; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Walsham, 1993; Galliers, 1992), therefore 
the dependent and independent variables usually can not be predefined (Kaplan and 
Maxwell, 1994).  
 
3.1.3  Choice of Philosophy 
Benbasat et al. (1987) demonstrated the importance of both philosophies without 
preferring either approach. Others suggest use of a combination approach for IS 
research to develop research quality (Arnott and Pervan, 2005; Howcroft and Trauth, 
2005; Breu and Peppard, 2001; Remenyi and Williams, 1996; Kaplan and Duchon, 
1988; Bjørn-Andersen, 1985; Kuhn, 1960).     
It is obvious that the interpretivist is the appropriate philosophy for the present research 
on reducing the risk of e-mail phishing through awareness by an empirical study in the 
State of Qatar, since this choice allows the researcher to understand the research topic in 
a subjective manner through empirical studies (Irani et al., 1999). While the researcher 
aims to understand the phenomenon of e-mail phishing in Qatar with the objective of 
developing an effective awareness framework, she also attempts to discover if the 
phenomenon is influenced by complex and interrelated factors that require discovery 
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(i.e. cultural and country-specific contexts) by entering field data and employing social 
actions such as interviews and surveys. Positivism supposes that the facts are predefined 
and independent of the researcher (Themistocleous, 2002), whereas interpretivism 
usually focuses on balanced considerations emerging from the circumstances (Myers, 
1997). Since this research is not a type of natural science research where it seeks to 
provide proof of theories or mathematical models, interpretivism was the best choice 
because it studies human behaviour in relation to electronic technology, in particular 
e-mail phishing attacks, with an intention to reduce this phenomenon through awareness 
and education. This research can therefore be categorised as computer science research 
applied in a social context.   
 
3.2  Research Approach 
Empirical and non-empirical are the main two research approaches. The non-empirical 
approach is based on reviewing existing literature in a subject area and then using it as a 
reference for the research.   
Hussey and Hussey (1997) have illustrated the importance of the empirical approach for 
investigative, expressive, logical or prognostic research. This approach is based on 
observations in fieldwork (Easterby-Smith, 1991) using different techniques: 
qualitative/quantitative, deductive/inductive and subjective/objective. 
3.2.1  Qualitative/ Quantitative 
The choice of the appropriate method of qualitative, quantitative or a mix of both is 
discussed in various literature (e.g. Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Darke et al., 1998; 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Myers, 1997; Cavaye, 1996; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Myers (1997) describes quantitative methods as having originated in scientific research 
to investigate natural phenomena through gathering and analysing numerical data 
collected from fieldwork from, for example, surveys, experiments and laboratory tests. 
In contrast, qualitative methods are usually used in social science research to examine 
social phenomena through case studies, action research, ethnography, interviews and 
questionnaires. Furthermore, Hussey and Hussey (1997) have described qualitative 
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research as a subjective approach involving investigation and observations to study 
social and human behaviours. 
3.2.2  Deductive/ Inductive 
Many researchers have described deductive and inductive research (e.g. Perry, 2001; 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Cavaye, 1996). Deductive is defined as „top-down‟, moving 
from the general to the particular. It starts from studying a theory and defining 
hypotheses and examines them through observations, which enables the researcher to 
confirm or not the original theory (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). In contrast, the inductive 
approach works the other way round, from the particular to the general (i.e. from precise 
observations, to defining tentative hypotheses and developing theories or conclusions) 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997:13). Cavaye (1996: 236) and Perry (2001: 307) have 
illustrated the possibility of using both approaches in the same research. 
3.2.3  Subjective/ Objective 
In subjective research, the researcher has to be involved in the implementation of the 
fieldwork and has control on the outcome, whereas in objective research, the researcher 
is independent of the fieldwork. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991: 27) state that 
interpretivism is usually subjective; it requires the researcher to contribute in fieldwork 
and identify any influences that may have an effect on research findings.   
 
3.2.4  Choice of Approach 
In this research, both the non-empirical and empirical approaches are used. The 
non-empirical approach forms its foundation and involves a review of previous 
literature on the research and related topics and it defines the empirical research 
activities. 
Creswell (2003) states, “The study may begin with a quantitative method in which 
theories or concepts are tested, to be followed by a qualitative method involving 
detailed exploration of a few cases or individuals”. In this research, both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods are used since the research involves the study of the 
phenomena of e-mail phishing in Qatar, focusing on investigating people and cultural 
contexts through numerical data and observations gathered by different data collection 
methods including experiments, surveys and interviews (Myers, 1997). Research by 
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Creswell (2003) has illustrated the importance of quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
Therefore, both kinds of analysis will be the best approach to analysing the data 
gathered from this research.  
Furthermore, a combination of both deductive and inductive approaches is used in this 
research since the research aim is to develop an e-mail phishing awareness framework 
and then evaluate it. Perry (2001: 307) states that some research begins from theory 
construction and then examines the theory.   
Since an interpretivist position is adopted in this research, a subjective approach is 
selected as the appropriate choice to attain the research aim of applying empirical 
studies in Qatar with personal involvement in the fieldwork. 
 
3.3  Research Strategy 
The research strategy presents a general plan for answering the defined research 
questions (Saunders, 2000) and achieving the objectives of the research. Creswell 
(2003) suggests the use of multiple methods to develop the conclusion of the research 
and has referred to “sequential procedures, in which the researcher seeks to elaborate on 
or expand the findings of one method with another method”. 
Many researchers (e.g. Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Saunders, 2000; Darke et al., 1998; 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Powell, 1997; Cavaye, 1996; Remenyi and Williams, 1996; 
Alavi, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Galliers, 1992) have expressed various 
research strategies that could be deployed, as follows: 
Experiment: a traditional form of research usually applied in natural science or social 
science. 
Survey: associated with a deductive approach based on collection of a large amount of 
data gathered from a sample of population based on questionnaires and interviews 
carefully defined. 
Grounded theory: based on data gathered from a sequence of observations. 
Ethnography: based on observing patterns of human activity and societies through the 
use of different methods (e.g. observation, interview and questionnaire) in which case 
the researcher makes deductions from participants' visions. 
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Action research: based on field experiment where the researcher attempts to solve the 
phenomena by shared partnerships having control over variables. 
Modelling: involves the improvement of specific models. 
Operational research: recognises activities and their relationships based on operational 
effectiveness. 
Case study: usually used to investigate social phenomena and provides an in-depth 
understanding of the area of research. 
Yin (1989) also demonstrated different strategies for empirical studies that may deploy 
experiments, surveys, archival analysis, history and case studies. 
 
3.3.1  Choice of Strategy 
Referring to the research objectives as outlined in Chapter 1, the appropriate research 
strategy for this thesis is based on a case study of the phenomena of e-mail phishing in 
Qatar with some comparison with the UK. 
Many authors have clarified case studies as empirical work deployed in reality 
perspectives to investigate a phenomenon (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001; Perry, 2001; 
Gillham, 2000; Welman and Kruger, 1999; Darke et al., 1998; Myers, 1997; Tellis, 
1997; Cavaye, 1996; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). In addition, Yin (1994) states that a case 
study aims to investigate a phenomenon in a reality context. 
Stake (1995) referred to a case study as “the study of the particularity and complexity of 
a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances”. Many 
researchers (e.g. Alavi and Carlson 1992; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) describe the 
case study as the common qualitative method deployed. 
According to Yin (1994), there are different types of case studies, each used to answer 
different research questions, for example exploratory, descriptive and explanatory used 
to answer what, how and why, respectively. This research begins with exploratory, 
followed by explanatory and then descriptive case studies, since the research addresses 
three main questions: 
1. What is the extent of e-mail phishing in Qatar?  
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2. What are the factors which make such threat successful in Qatar?  
3. How can an effective awareness framework be developed to enhance Qataris' 
awareness on e-mail phishing with the aim of reducing the risk of phishing? 
Furthermore, Jensen and Rodgers (2001: 237-239) define different categories of case 
studies: 
Snapshot: A comprehensive study of one research area at one point in time. 
Longitudinal: Quantitative and/or qualitative investigation of one research study at 
multiple time points. 
Pre-post: The study of one research entity at two time points delineated by some critical 
event. 
Patchwork: Defines a comprehensive vision of the research since several case studies 
are used for one research project (e.g. snapshot, longitudinal and/or pre-post). 
Comparative: Uses various case studies for different research to provide a comparison. 
In this research, patchwork case studies are used in which both snapshot and pre-post 
case studies are used to develop the framework and evaluate its effectiveness, 
respectively. Since the case studies could employ several data collection methods, 
including direct or indirect observations, interviews and the study of documentations 
and records (Yin, 1989), in this research, the case study is comprised of various data 
collection methods explained in the section below. 
Although the case study is the main strategy applied in this research, there are some 
others used to assist in achieving the research objectives, as shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Additional strategies used for each objective 
Objectives Strategies used 
Objective 1: To review literature on 
previous work in the research area. 
Literature review 
Objective 2:  To confirm the existence 
of an e-mail phishing problem in Qatar. 
Objective 3: To determine the factors 
which make Qatar an attractive place 
for phishers. 
Objective 4: To compare the awareness 
of Qatari citizens of the e-mail phishing 
threat with that of citizens of a 
developed nation such as the UK. 
Survey strategy, including interviews and 
questionnaires 
Objective 5: To investigate the 
susceptibility of Qatari people to e-mail 
phishing and the effects of cultural and 
other country-specific factors on the 
development and diffusion of e-mail 
phishing in Qatar society. 
 
Experiments were found the appropriate 
method to achieve this objective, along 
with ethnography. Although it is beyond 
the scope of this research to involve in-
depth psychology, it is noticeable that there 
are some elements of ethnography required 
in this research for investigating people's 
awareness and responses to phishing. 
Objective 6: To define, from the results 
of all above objectives, the need for 
enhancing awareness and the need to 
provide an effective e-mail phishing 
awareness and educational framework. 
 
Objective 7: To develop an e-mail 
phishing awareness framework to 
reduce the risk of e-mail phishing in 
Qatar which consist of a set of 
recommendations and a proposed 
educational framework. 
Grounded theory is applied to gather and 
analyse the outcome of all previous 
methods (surveys and experiments) to 
identify the need for, and develop an 
effective e-mail phishing awareness 
framework and establishing a set of 
recommendations for Qatar government, 
citizens and officials responsible for 
ensuring information security. 
Objective 8: To evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed 
framework in reducing the risk of 
e-mail phishing in Qatar. 
Action research was used to develop and 
evaluate the e-mail phishing educational 
framework as it involved cooperation 
(Rapoport, 1970) with organisations in 
Qatar to bringing the framework into action 
in reality. 
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3.4  Data Collection Methods 
Establishing a comprehensible research methodology is an important phase in any 
research, as stated by several researchers. According to Bouma (1996), the research 
design and methods should be carefully planned in order to achieve the research aims 
and objectives. In addition, Yin (1994) has defined the research design as “the logical 
sequence that connects the empirical data to a study‟s initial research questions and, 
ultimately, to its conclusion”. 
However, this research begins with a qualitative method applied through interviews, a 
quantitative method through questionnaires and, finally, a combination of both in 
experiments, together with a case study, which define and evaluate the effectiveness of 
the proposed e-mail phishing awareness framework. The research approach commences 
by defining theoretical concepts, research aims, objectives and methodology through an 
in-depth literature review, notwithstanding that the review continues throughout the 
research process. Afterwards, there is a review of literature on Qatar with some on the 
UK. The research stages are depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Research stages 
 
Subsequently, the research method proceeds with a qualitative interview, a quantitative 
questionnaire tool to study a defined concept on a focused sample, and a quantitative 
and qualitative experiment instrument for the reality and experimental study of the 
ability of a sample of Qatari citizens to recognise phishing e-mails and the factors that 
might make Qataris vulnerable to the phishing threat.  The research contribution is then 
achieved by applying grounded theory to develop an effective awareness and 
educational framework (see Figure 3.1). 
Following the information gathering phase, data analysis is used to discover the factors 
which make Qatar citizens susceptible to e-mail phishing, leading to creation of the 
proposed awareness and educational framework which addresses the discovered factors 
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with the intention of diminishing the threat of e-mail phishing in Qatar culture (see 
Figure 3.1).  
The research methodology is defined to fulfil the objectives of the research; an 
explanation of each method used is now given below. 
 
3.4.1  Literature Review  
The research process begins with a general literature search focused on key concepts 
from the following areas: social engineering, phishing, vulnerability to phishing, anti-
phishing solutions, education and training (described in Chapter 2). 
The initial findings from the general literature help to define and refine the research‟s 
aims, scope and the research questions (described in Chapter 1). This drives the research 
to focus on reducing the e-mail phishing problem in the State of Qatar through 
awareness and education. Hence, an in-depth literature search is required in the areas of 
e-mail fraud, e-mail phishing and other related topics on awareness and education to 
provide an overview of previous research in this field and to discover a proposed 
solution which will make a contribution to knowledge towards reducing the risk of 
e-mail phishing in Qatar.   
The research methods illustrated in Figure 3.1 show the literature review as a 
continuous process that assists in reaching major research milestones and contributes 
through the research phases, starting from the research proposal to develop and evaluate 
an awareness and educational framework. 
 
3.4.2  Review of Literature on Qatar and UK 
Before resolving any situation, it is crucial to prove first that the situation does exist and 
demonstrate the importance of finding the best solution. Case studies are considered a 
common data collection method (Myers, 2002). According to Gall et al. (1996), 
“…researchers generally do case studies for one of three purposes: to produce detailed 
descriptions of the phenomenon, to develop possible explanations of it, or to evaluate 
the phenomenon”. Hence, the research commences with proving that e-mail phishing is 
a real potential threat facing online consumers in Qatar society, with Qatar being chosen 
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as a case study as it is a rapidly developing country that has not been researched in this 
respect. 
Therefore, an investigative literature review of Qatar was an important step. The review 
aimed to discover the extent of the e-mail phishing problem in Qatar society, compared 
to other developed nations such as the UK, and possible aspects which make the State 
of Qatar a fertile ground for phishers to commit their crimes (described in detail in 
Chapter 4).  However, there were no sources or literature available which specifically 
consider the phishing threat in Qatar whereas there was literature covering the issue in 
other nations such as the UK and USA. Hence, some of the sources used in analysing 
this topic in Qatar are based on the author‟s own analysis and interviews in the region. 
 
3.4.3   Survey 
In parallel to the review of literature on Qatar and the UK, surveys were carried out. 
E-mail, face-to-face semi-structured and structured interviews, and household drop-off 
and pick-up and online questionnaires were the main data collection strategies used 
throughout the survey phase (Trochim, 2002) (described in Chapter 5). In essence, the 
literature review has led up to the development of a survey questionnaire and interview 
instrument. 
The questionnaires completed by Qatari e-mail users are used to draw a profile of 
people‟s knowledge and awareness of e-mail phishing and their vision of the best 
method to defend against this attack. Similarly, the questionnaire in the UK allowed 
comparison of the awareness level of Qatari e-mail users with that of users in a 
developed nation.   
Interviews with the Qatari public, domain experts in online fraud, awareness and 
education have aimed to provide a better understanding of the e-mail phishing threat 
and the best method of defence against it, with a focus on effective awareness and 
education. It also elaborates on the potential threat of e-mail phishing, and the cultural 
and country-specific factors and other aspects which make phishing successful in Qatar. 
Afterwards, a qualitative and quantitative analysis was used to analyse the data gathered 
from interviews and questionnaires, respectively. Furthermore, a comparison of the 
outcome of the survey in both countries was provided. 
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3.4.3.1  Questionnaire 
The questionnaire aims to profile Qatari citizens‟ awareness of e-mail phishing and their 
vision of defence against such attack compared to that of citizens of other developed 
nations such as the UK. Questionnaire participants were randomly selected from British 
and Qatari citizens according to a defined criterion, which is e-mail users aged over 12. 
Household drop-off and pick-up and online types of questionnaire were used. These 
were carefully designed and passed through first-review and pilot-test to provide an 
effective design.  English and Arabic versions of the questionnaire were designed with 
simple language and straightforward questions. A covering letter was attached to each 
questionnaire to provide an explanation for respondents of the questionnaire aim and 
target group. The questionnaires were distributed by hand or through e-mail, for 
household drop-off and pick-up and online questionnaires, respectively. All of the 
responses gathered in the paper based questionnaire were combined with those from the 
online questionnaire in order to have a single electronic source with the feature of 
automated results and filtering. Finally, 2000 responses were gathered, 1000 in Qatar 
and the rest in the UK. Afterwards, the responses were analysed quantitatively 
according to statistical analysis of the results and qualitatively according to the 
participants‟ interviews (see Chapter 5)    
3.4.3.2   Interview 
The qualitative research interview aspires to illustrate and understand the meaning of 
the topic in the life world of the subjects (Kvale, 1996). Interviews are mainly useful for 
understanding the background behind a participant‟s experiences where the interviewer 
searches for in-depth information around the topic (McNamara, 1999). 
In this research, structured and semi-structured interviews were chosen. Both are 
common forms of interviewing technique. In structured interviews the interviewer is 
tied to a set of questions to ask which makes the evaluation process easier for the 
interviewer (Campion, 1994; Hollowitz and Wilson, 1993). However, a semi-structured 
interview is more flexible and aims to turn the interview into a conversation and to 
assist interviewers to tailor their questions to the interview context and to what the 
interviewee says (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002; Kumar, 1996).  An interview protocol with 
a set of questions was defined initially to facilitate the interview process. Although a 
basic group of topics and questions was established for all interviews, questions were 
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however put differently to some interviewees, depending on their backgrounds (Lindlof 
and Taylor, 2002: 195; Foddy, 1993). 
Most interviews were face-to-face and some were e-mailed, depending on the choice of 
the interviewees. Most were in English but some were in Arabic, especially with the 
Qatari citizens who found difficulty with the English language; however, this choice 
was mainly a decision of the interviewees. Notes were the method of recording 
interview data. The process of the interviews progressed from planning, preparing and 
interviewing into transcribing, analysing and discussing findings, as follows 
(McNamara, 1999):  
1. Planning: plan the interviews, e.g. interview type, technique, set major topics to 
discuss, etc. 
2. Preparing interviews, e.g. contact interviewees for interview approval, gather 
information about the interviewees or their organisation, prepare the interview 
questions, etc. 
3. Interviewing: conduct interviews  
4. Transcribing: prepare interview materials for analysis 
5. Analysing and discussing findings: apply qualitative analysis and discuss findings  
Generally, interviews were held with domain experts and a number of participants who 
represented a sample of the Qatari public. Some interviews were in parallel with the 
questionnaire phase with some of the questionnaire respondents, some followed the 
questionnaire data collection and analysis and some after the implementation of the 
experiments and the e-mail phishing framework (see Figure 3.1). The questionnaire 
analysis and literature review of Qatar and the UK suggested questions needing further 
investigation. Therefore, investigations were made in available literature and because of 
deficiencies in the literature; interviews were used to support and elaborate the study. 
Interviews were held with a wide range of Qatar society to gather a full and 
representative range of views, but interviews also took place with domain experts in the 
government and private sector organisations from Qatar, UK and Swiss in the field of 
e-crime, information security, judicial, information security awareness, education, Qatar 
culture and Islamic studies (see Figure 3.2).  
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Domain experts were chosen from government and private organisations according to 
their respective experience in online fraud and, in particular, e-mail phishing and/or 
awareness and education. Key staff were chosen for interview according to their job 
titles and responsibilities. Only those who make strategic decisions on e-crime or 
awareness were interviewed. The ultimate aim of the interviews with domain experts 
was to review the extent of e-mail phishing, cultural and possible effects associated with 
people‟s responses to phishing, organisational strategy, and people‟s perceptions on 
protecting themselves and/or their customers from e-mail phishing attacks, in particular 
the processes deployed for creating awareness among their employees and customers 
and for educating them about such threats. In addition, some domain experts were 
involved in the planning and designing of experiments and the e-mail phishing 
awareness framework proposed by the researcher.  
In addition, interviews were held with participants in the questionnaire, experiments, 
e-mail phishing awareness programme to assist in the evaluation process. Those 
participants were chosen usually randomly according to predefined criteria assigned by 
the researcher depending on the needs of each data collection method and  according to 
the convenience and willingness of participants to be interviewed. They were 
interviewed to have a better understanding of their responses, to discover the ability of 
Qataris to detect phishing e-mails, to discover the factors which make Qataris 
susceptible to phishing attempts and to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
framework. Mostly face-to-face semi-structured interviews were held but where this 
was not convenient for the participants there were a few structured e-mailed interviews. 
The interviews were then analysed qualitatively. 
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 Figure 3.2: Interview plan 
 
3.4.4  Penetration Tests and Laboratory Experiment     
A lot of research has used experimental tests to assess user ability to distinguish 
phishing websites and e-mails (i.e. measuring participants‟ detection rates against 
phishing rates) employing different attack methods and different enhanced indicators 
(Jackson et al., 2007; Dhamija et al., 2006; Herzberg and Jbara, 2004; Gabrilovich and 
Gontmakher, 2002)   
Consequently, in order understand participant behaviour in response to phishing and 
their ability to recognise phishing e-mails, both lab experiment and real life experiments 
(penetration testing) were carried out in order to see how Qatari people would behave in 
reality compared to a lab environment (described in Chapter 6). The evaluation of 
participants‟ responses was according to their feedback, their scores and through semi-
structured interviews with the participants. The data gathered from experiments in Qatar 
Participants 
 During questionnaire (20 interviewees: 10 from Qatar and 10 from UK) 
 Post-experiments (60 interviewees from Qatar) 
 Evaluation for proposed recommendations (30 interviewees from Qatar) 
 Post- e-mail phishing awareness programme (30 interviewees from Qatar) 
 
 Private sector 
Qatar 
Institute of Administrative Development 
Qatar Telecommunication (Q-Tel) 
 Doha Bank 
Abdullah Abdulghani and Brothers, leading 
automobile company 
Al-Jazeera children‟s tv channel 
UK 
First Base Technologies, specialised in 
information security and testing services 
HandShaikh Ltd, provides cross-cultural 
seminars and consultancy for business 
with Arabs 
Swiss 
InfoGuard Company, specialised in 
information security 
 
 
 
     
 
Government sector 
Qatar 
Ministry of Interior (MOI)  
Ministry of Public Prosecution 
Ministry of Education and Higher Education 
Ministry of Endowments and Islamic 
Affairs 
Qatar Computer Emergency Response Team 
(Q-CERT) 
High Judicial Council 
Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage 
UK 
Qatar Cultural attaché (London) 
Bradford University 
Loughborough University 
       
 
     
 
Domain Expertise  
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were analysed with quantitative and qualitative methodologies to identify the factors 
which make Qatari citizens susceptible to this kind of attack.  
 
3.4.5  Findings 
 
This phase demonstrates a conclusion of all the above data collection methods (see 
Figure 3.1). Grounded theory is applied to analyse and observe the outcome of all 
previous phases which identifies the need for establishing an effective e-mail phishing 
awareness framework for the state of Qatar as a super solution to reducing such threat 
(see Chapter 7).  
 
3.4.6  Development and Evaluation of the Framework 
 
From the analysis of the data gathered, a comprehensive awareness framework was 
developed which involves a set of recommendations for the Qatar government, 
organisation officials responsible for ensuring information security and Qatari citizens, 
along with an educational framework aimed at reducing the e-mail phishing threat in 
Qatar. 
The opinion of experts in the field and of a sample of Qatari citizens is used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the proposed recommendations in reducing the e-mail phishing 
threat in Qatar. In addition, the researcher has carried out trials of a phishing awareness 
programme involving different training methods in Qatar to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the educational framey (described in Chapter 7, 8 and 9).  
 
3.5  Data Sampling Method 
 
The sampling process involves selecting a sample of the population to further 
investigate the phenomena. Because of the constraints of time and resources, it is 
impractical to examine the entire population, so this research uses sampling. Therefore, 
a sample frame was selected to represent the population. Probability and non-
probability sampling are the common types of sampling. Sekaran (1992) has classified 
sampling methods as shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Data sampling method 
Probability sampling 
Simple 
random 
sampling 
Sample selected at random, each member of population equally likely to be 
selected. 
 
Complex 
probability 
sampling 
 
Common types:  
Systematic sampling: Begins with selecting random element of population 
from 1 to n and then every nth element will be chosen to be in the sample. 
Stratified random sampling: The population is divided into groups known as 
strata e.g. geographical areas, age-groups, genders. Random selection is made 
within each stratum, the size of each sample being proportional to size of the 
total population of stratum from which it is taken.  
 
Cluster sampling: The population is grouped into clusters according to 
different characteristics of the community, such as interests or jobs.  A sample 
taken from each cluster (e.g. 6 people selected to represent each job type under 
investigation) 
 
Area sampling: A sample is randomly selected based on dividing the region of 
the investigation into geographical units, such as counties and cities. This is a 
special case of either stratified random sampling or cluster sampling. 
 
Double sampling: Offers another chance for further investigation where a sub-
sample is required to further investigate results defined from main sample  
Non-probability sampling 
Convenience 
sampling 
Samples chosen from population based on the elements' convenience to 
contribute to investigation.  
 
Purposive 
sampling 
 
Samples selected carefully from the population according to the information, a 
sample could offer or to defined criteria. Two main types: 
 
Judgment sampling: The decision on an appropriate sample is made from the 
population according to judgment on the best sample able to supply the 
required information. 
 
Quota sampling: Samples are selected from different groups and backgrounds 
(e.g. age, gender, education) of population based on convenience. However, 
samples must be representative of population.  
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3.5.1  Choice of Sampling Method   
 
This research uses a combination of both probability and non-probability sampling 
methods to ensure the choice of appropriate samples for the investigation that represent 
the population and would contribute effectively in the research. Sampling methods used 
in this research are listed in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Choice of sampling method 
Sampling 
method 
chosen 
Where applied 
Probability sampling 
Simple 
random 
sampling 
Questionnaire: Participants selected randomly but according to specific 
criterion 'Qatari or British e-mail users aged above 12'  
Non-probability sampling 
Convenience 
sampling 
Reality and experimental studies: Due to sensitivity of such studies, samples 
were chosen according to the researcher's convenience (i.e. family 
members).  
 
Evaluate framework: To ensure the effectiveness of the defined phishing 
awareness framework in enhancing the level of protection against phishing, 
samples of populations were chosen according to convenience to participate. 
For instance, this was used to evaluate of proposed recommendations and 
awareness programme. 
 
Purposive 
sampling  
 
Interviews: Both types of purposive sampling, judgement and quota 
sampling were applied in identifying appropriate interviewees able to 
provide valuable information to the research. However, some interviewees 
were selected according to convenience, such as interviews with the 
questionnaire participants. 
 
3.6   Summary 
 
This chapter describes the research methodology applied in this research, starting from 
the adoption of the appropriate philosophy, research approach and strategy. 
Subsequently, a detailed description of the chosen data collection methods is presented, 
namely literature review, surveys, experiment, grounded theory and development of an 
effective e-mail phishing awareness framework. A summary of choices is shown in 
Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: Choice of research methodology 
 
In addition, the chapter describes how the research is based on an investigative case 
study of e-mail phishing in Qatar with a comparison with the UK. In that case study, 
different strategies are applied to achieve the research objectives (see Table 3.1). 
Furthermore, the choice of sampling methods was identified for each data collection 
method applied in this research (see Table 3.3).   
In the next chapter (Chapter 4: Qatar in the eyes of phishers), the literature and 
interviews held are examined to identify the existence of the e-mail phishing problem in 
Qatar and the factors which make Qatar an attractive place for phishers to commit their 
crimes. 
Research philosophy 
Interpretivism 
 
Research approach (mixed method) 
Empirical and non-empirical 
Qualitative and quantitative 
Inductive and deductive 
 Subjective 
Research strategy or design 
Case studies, Surveys, Experiments, Grounded 
theory and Ethnography and Action research 
 
Data collection 
 methods 
Literature review 
Interviews, 
Questionnaires 
and Experiments 
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Chapter 4  Qatar in the Eyes of Phishers 
 
This chapter is based on an investigative literature review of the State of Qatar. 
Information and publications gathered from literature were reviewed and analysed. In 
addition, interviews supplemented the review in the State of Qatar which clarifies the 
aspects which make Qatar a fertile ground for phishers to commit their crimes. 
 
4.1  Overview of Qatar 
 
Qatar is an independent country situated in the middle of the Western coast of the 
Arabian Gulf. It is on a peninsula with a total area of 11850 sq km, including a number 
of islands and islets, all together about 5% of the size of the UK. It had a population of 
about 1.4 million in 2008 (QSA, 2008). The country gained independence from the UK 
of which it had been a Protectorate since about 1914 on 3 September 1971. Doha is the 
capital, the official language is Arabic and English is commonly used as a second 
language. Since the mid-1800s, Qatar has been ruled by the Al-Thani family (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2007a).  
 
Qatar is part of the Gulf State formed on 25 May 1981 by the leaders of the State of 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of 
Oman and State of Kuwait. This is a cooperative framework joining the six states to 
effect coordination, integration and inter-connection among the Members in all fields in 
order to achieve unity through The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 
afterwards referred to as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or simply the Gulf State 
(GCC-SG, 2005).  
 
According to the GCC (2000), many factors assisted in creating homogeneous 
characteristics for cooperation such as historical, religious, social, cultural and 
geographical factors.   
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Qatar had in the past existed as a poor British protectorate with pearling and fishing as 
its main source of income and had faced difficulties in the 1920s when its pearling 
industry tailed off because of the innovation of the Japanese cultured pearl, which had 
an effect on the Qatar economy.  Now, it has been transformed into an independent state 
with significant deposits of oil and natural gas (CIA, 2008a).  
 
The State of Qatar with its relatively limited population and finance reached two rapid 
turning points in all fields, including political, economic, educational, media, social, 
infrastructural and other sectors. The first was after the discovery of oil at the beginning 
of the 1940s and the second was when His Highness The Amir, Shaikh Hamad Bin 
Khalifa Al-Thani, assumed power in 1995 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007a).   
According to Amiri Diwan (2009), Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani stated that, 
“We are on the threshold of a new epoch overlooking the 21st century where we aspire 
to attain the status befitting us.”  
 
4.2  Why Qatar is Attractive to Phishers 
There are many factors which makes Qatar an attractive ground for phishers as shown 
below. 
 
4.2.1  Economic Development 
Today, Qatari citizens have a high standard of living equal to that of developed 
countries, mainly because of the oil and natural gas revenues, with estimated gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 11.2% in 2008 compared to the UK‟s 0.7%, and 
which, therefore, led Qatar to have the second-highest GDP per capita income in the 
world in 2008, reaching  $103,500 compared to the UK which reached $36,600, and 
according to the World Factbook of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) (2009), 
Qatar compared to the UK has a lead growth in GDP, investment and industrial produce 
(see Table 4.1).  Qatar, it has the highest GDP in tha Arab world, according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007). 
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In addition, in 2008 Qatar was ranked as the third country in the growth of industrial 
production with growth rate of 12.6% compared to the UK with a negative growth rate 
of -0.1%  (see Table 4.1) (CIA, 2008a, b). This is due to a massive increase in Qatar‟s 
industrial production which includes manufacturing, mining and construction.  
 
Also in 2008, it was ranked as the third country in the world in investment, with 41.4% 
of investment compared to the UK‟s 16.7%. It also had the least percentage of 
unemployment with 0.60%, compared to the UK‟s 5.5% (see Table 4.1) (CIA, 2008a, 
b). 
 
Table 4.1: GDP, growth rate, investment and unemployemnt of Qatar and UK 
(2008 est.) Qatar United Kingdom 
GDP - per capita (PPP) $103,500     Rank 2 $36,600      Rank 31 
GDP - real growth rate 11.2 %      Rank 5  0.7 %       Rank 196 
Industrial production  growth rate 12.6 %      Rank 3 -0.1 %      Rank 152 
Investment (gross fixed) 41.4 %      Rank 3 16.7 %     Rank 136 
Unemployment rate 0.6 %        Rank 3 5.5 %       Rank 66 
  
In 2008, the markets were down and most of the world‟s leading economies, the United 
States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan, faced a decline in their economies. 
For the first time in decades, the fastest growing economy has been a country almost 
unheard of by many in the western world, which is the State of Qatar with 13.4% GDP 
growth, whereas Great Britain was expected to be one of the slowest growing 
economies in the world as predicted by The Economist in 2009 (The Economist, 2008; 
Roman, 2009) (see Figure 4.1).   
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Figure 4.1: GDP growth forecast for 2009 (The Economist, 2008) 
 
The Saudi American Bank (Samba) Financial Group stated, “Qatar's strong economic 
performance is being fuelled mainly by growth in the country‟s liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) exports”, and the spokesman commented that in 2009 Qatar expected to be the 
world‟s fastest-growing economy, even in spite of the global financial crisis, because of 
the increased exports of liquefied natural gas (Sambidge, 2009a). Also, the Bank of 
America, Merrill Lynch, has said that this inflation may come down in 2010 to 7%, but 
the country will, however, persist in its growth (Sambidge, 2009b).  
Many have commented on the survival of Qatar through the global financial crisis. 
Addressing the 3rd International Conference on Information and Communication 
Technologies and Development (ICTD) 2009 in Doha, Braga, the director of economic 
policy, said that Qatar is one of the few countries which continues to grow despite the 
global financial crisis. He added that the ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) industry in Qatar is well placed, which has assisted in tackling the crisis 
(Sambidge, 2009c).  
 
However, according to the Urban Planning and Development Authority (2006), the 
development in Qatar is still in progress; currently the Authority is managing the basis 
of the Master Plan for the State of Qatar which will guide its physical development to 
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the year 2025 in all aspects, including transportation, infrastructure, construction and 
environmental protection.  
On the other hand, Britain prepares itself for decades of severity because it faces the 
sharpest quarterly drop in the British economy since 1979 with a decline of 1.9% in 
GDP experienced in the first quarter of 2009, which exceeded economists‟ expectations, 
and is expected to drop still further by a total of 3.5% by the end of 2009. In 2009, the 
British economy will decline by 4.1%, followed in 2010 by a further decline of 0.4%.  
This economic drop has had a major effect in increasing the number of unemployed in 
the UK, which in February 2009 reached its highest level of 2.1 million since Labour 
came to power in 1997. However, there might be a forecast of a blooming in the British 
economy as the Chancellor said that there would be a growth of GDP of 1.25% in 2010 
and 3.5% in 2011 (Monaghan, 2009).  
 
In conclusion, the development of the economy in Qatar has leapt considerably in a 
short time, leading Qatar to become the fastest growing economy in the world ahead of 
the world‟s leading economies such as China and the UK. This rapid and considerable 
growth has attracted phishers to commit their crimes in Qatar since it provides a fertile 
ground for them to make their attacks where there is an enormous amount of money to 
steal, which is the ultimate aim for most phishers. Commonly speaking, where there is 
money, there is also crime.  
 
4.2.2  Growth of Internet Users 
The origins of the Internet and the World Wide Web can be found with the development 
of large communication networks by scientists in the USA in the early 1960s for use by 
the military. The first international network nodes were set up in England and Norway 
in 1973 (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2007). The World Wide Web was launched on 
the Internet at large in 1991 where countries with established Internet connections, such 
as the USA and UK could make immediate use of it (W3C, 2010). The arrival of 
Internet technology in the State of Qatar was significantly later, in 1996, and it was the 
last country in the Gulf to establish the Internet (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Year of Internet access for UK and Gulf States (Kalathil and Boas, 2003) 
 
Country Internet First Access 
UK 
Kuwait 
UAE 
Saudi Arabia 
Bahrain 
Qatar 
1973 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
In 2008, approximately  0.4 million people in Qatar logged on to the Internet for various 
reasons, some for gaining information, others for online shopping or electronic services 
and so on (CIA, 2008a). The UK growth rate in Internet users in the period 2000 - 2009 
was about 203%, which is not extremely large, whereas a very rapid rate of 
development in Qatar has led to a huge boost in its users and a growth of 1,353% was 
estimated from 2000 to 2009. Compared to its neighbouring countries in the GCC, 
Qatar comes next to Saudi Arabia in the growth of Internet usage; according to Internet 
World Stats (2009b), Qatar has a significant rate of Internet usage even though it was 
the last country in the GCC to access the Internet (see Table 4.3). 
 
 Table 4.3: Growth of Internet use in GCC and UK (Internet World Stats, 2009b)  
GCC and 
UK 
Growth of Internet 
Use (2000-2009) 
Bahrain 907% 
Kuwait 567% 
Oman 417% 
Saudi Arabia 3,750% 
UAE 298% 
Qatar 1,353% 
UK 203% 
 
This rapid growth in number of Internet users was due to many factors, as discussed in 
the next section. 
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4.2.2.1   Telecommunications’ Development  
 
Since Qatar is an important connecting link in the world telecommunications network, 
there have been huge developments in the telecommunications‟ field, postal services 
and transportation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007b; INTELSAT, 2010). This has led 
this sector to being independent and effective and therefore the Ministry of 
Communications and Transport was dissolved and three Emiri decrees were issued to 
set up the Civil Aviation Authority, Customs and Ports Authority and Postal Services 
Authority (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007b).  
 
Later, the Supreme Council for Information and Communication Technology (SCICT, 
ictQATAR) was established in August 2004 under the chairmanship of His Highness 
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the Heir Apparent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2007b). IctQATAR aspires to create an advanced knowledge-based society, developing 
and leading the national strategic vision relating to ICT initiatives in government, 
business, education, health, cyber security, market development and knowledge 
management (ICT Qatar, 2009a).  
 
Also, Qatar Telecom (Q-Tel), since its establishment in 1987, has played a major role in 
the improvement of telecommunications in Qatar. Examples of main services supplied 
by Q-Tel were the establishment of the GSM network, Internet access, e-commerce and 
the launch of the fibre optics cable between Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2007b).  
Consequently, the telecommunications sector improved dramatically and the number of 
subscribers in telecommunication channels has increased noticeably. According to the 
CIA (2009), in 2007 the number of mobile telephone subscribers reached 1.264 million 
and fixed line reached 237,400.  
According to the Global Information Technology Report 2008-2009 (ICT Qatar, 2009f) 
Qatar has reached the top 30 in ICT with an enormous development experienced in 
governmental readiness and usage of ICT. 
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4.2.2.2   Education Development  
 
An issue that has prompted the diffusion of the Internet in Qatar is the massive 
development in the education sector. According to H.H. Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al 
Missned (2009), the Government of Qatar‟s declared policy is to consider education as 
the main foundation for development and that the quality of the individual as an asset is 
the most important element in the development process.  
Education has been transformed dramatically since the establishment of official 
education in 1952.  A comprehensive educational policy has improved it, based on the 
solid principles of the development of curricula and educational systems, continually 
seeking to benefit from the modern achievements, techniques and new educational 
experience, along with adherence to the heritage of the Islamic nation. 
 
The Government launched an initiative to develop public education in the State of Qatar 
under the slogan “Education for a New Era”, aiming to prepare Qatari citizens to keep 
pace with the requirements of economic and social development in Qatar and global 
changes through development of educational curricula (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2007c).  
The government has focused on educational development and numerous educational 
projects were applied to make Qatar a centre of excellence in higher education and 
research (H.H. Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, 2009). A huge investment was 
made in education and  it was estimated in 2005 that 3.3% of GDP had been spent in the 
education sector (CIA,2009a).  
H.H. Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, the consort of H.H. the Emir of Qatar, 
has many roles within Qatar in regard to education. Her Highness considers human 
beings as one of the most important elements for the development of the State of Qatar 
(H.H. Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, 2009). As a result, Qatar has achieved a 
noticeable increase in the number of students at all educational levels. This was 
accompanied by an increase in education inputs, such as schools, teachers and curricula. 
(QSA, 2008). 
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As a consequence of the educational development, the literacy rate in Qatar has 
improved.  Among the GCC countries, as estimated in 2008, Qatar has the highest 
literacy rate at 93% (UNDP, 2009) (Table 4.4). In contrast, in 2003, it was estimated that 
the UK had a very high literacy rate of 99% (CIA, 2008b). There is a huge educational 
development and the literacy rate in Qatar has become relatively high, but it is still 
below the minimum average of 95% in the developed nations (AME info, 2004). 
 
Table 4.4: Adult (age 15 and older) literacy rates in GCC countries and UK (UNDP, 2009) 
 
Country Literacy Rate % 
Bahrain 89% 
Kuwait 95% 
Oman 84% 
Saudi Arabia 85% 
UAE 90% 
Qatar 93% 
UK   99% 
 
In conclusion, the educational development has not only enhanced people‟s literacy but 
also their computer literacy, since ICT is one of the major subjects taught in schools and 
this, therefore, has led to an increased amount of Internet usage among students of 
young ages. While it is heartening to see that there is a huge evolution in education to 
build knowledgeable pupils in all sectors including ICT, this has raised the question of 
whether those young people are aware of Internet threats and, in particular, phishing.   
 
4.2.2.3   Growth of Computer Literacy  
Most of the organisations in Qatar are connected to the Internet since it is essential to 
their work. Therefore, computer skill has become a crucial requirement for most jobs.  
 Research by ictQatar has indicated that the Internet has become an essential element of 
daily operation for most (over 90%) businesses in Qatar. Khalid Al Mansouri, 
Executive Director of Qtel‟s Business Solutions, said, “Broadband technology provides 
the communications backbone for many of Qatar‟s key companies, enabling them to 
access international markets, and helping to increase the level of contact with 
customers, suppliers and stakeholders” (Qtel, 2009d). Therefore, the government has 
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attempted to enhance the computer literacy of Qatari citizens as it has become a crucial 
need for people to cope with the country‟s global and national development.  
To enhance the computer literacy level for Qataris, computer skills and ICDL 
(International Computer Driving Licence) programmes were adopted for students and 
employees in Qatar (ICDL GCC Foundation, 2009). Since there was a huge demand for 
the ICDL programmes in the Gulf region, the ECDL (European Computer Driving 
Licence) Foundation has set up the ICDL GCC Foundation to execute the programmes 
in the Gulf Region with the help of certified bodies and the chief educational 
organisations in the region (ICDL GCC Foundation, 2009).  
In conclusion, this growth has led in enhancing the usage of computers and Internet 
both at work and at home. However, this fast growth of computer literacy may have the 
consequence that a high percentage of the population have insufficient experience and 
knowledge of computing, and especially the threat of e-crimes. 
 
4.2.2.4   Low Price of Internet Connection 
In 2004, the Qatar government granted the Qatari Telecommunications Company 
„Qtel‟ a 15-year monopoly on wire line and mobile telephone and cable television 
services and Internet service provision (Arabic Network for Human Rights 
Information, 2004). However, in June 2008, Vodafone Group Plc, won Qatar‟s second 
mobile networks‟ and services‟ licence. This has brought another company into the 
Qatar telecommunication market (AME Info, 2008; ICT Qatar, 2099b).  
Vodafone in Qatar currently provides only a mobile network. Fixed lines and Internet 
are not yet not offered but delivery is expected in the near future (Vodafone, 2009). 
Therefore, in this research, only Internet services offered by Q-Tel were evaluated to 
identify whether there is any difficulty in Internet access. The broadband and dial-up 
services were inspected in respect of Internet price, speed and features and the prices 
are converted into GBP sterling. 
 
While Q-tel‟s vision is to reach the top 20 telecommunications companies in the world 
by 2020 (Qtel, 2009a), it has paid attention to improving its services and satisfying its 
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customers by providing superior and relatively low-cost services, especially after the 
entry of a big competitor to the market. The adoption of fostered competition in the 
telecommunications sector in Qatar has assisted in raising the products and services 
offered by telecommunication companies. Such an example was in April 2009, when Q-
Tel Business users benefited from Free Internet Broadband Business ADSL Speed 
Upgrade (Qtel, 2009d).       
 
The evaluation concluded that Qtel ADSL has high-speed Internet access, which 
provides downloads and streaming up to 2 Mbps. It offers a broadband speed of up to 8 
Mbps with relatively cheap monthly subscription ranging from 200 to 600QR (about 33 
to 99 GBP) with superior features and free installation fees for a one-year contract 
(Qtel, 2009b). In conclusion, the reduction of Internet access prices in Qatar has 
facilitated public access to the Internet. 
 
4.2.2.5  Availability of Free Internet Access 
To encourage Internet access in Qatar, ictQATAR and the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Agriculture initiated in March 2007 Qatar‟s free wireless Internet access at 
public parks, known as „ipark‟. The launch of the ipark was a continuation of the 
efforts that the government is exerting for building up a modern society. The Minister 
of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture commented that the launch of the ipark project 
was required for the establishment of a modern society where all citizens are of 
concerned (ICT Qatar, 2009c).  
Thus, the availability of free Internet access for the public has assisted in increasing the 
number of Internet users in Qatar. 
 
4.2.2.6   Transformation to E-businesses  
The GCC countries have considered e-commerce as a major concern that must be 
enhanced and paid attention to, as it has a huge impact on GCC commerce (GCC 
Secretariat General, 2001). The Ministerial Council of the Commercial Cooperation 
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Committee held in November 2005 discussed topics related to e-commerce such as the 
establishment of the GCC E-commerce Organisation and to issues like consumer 
protection against commercial limitation and cheating (GCC Secretariat-General, 2006).  
As a result, today, Qatari citizens can accomplish their transactions and services through 
the Internet as e-services and e-commerce have been developed in the region. 
According to the newsletter of the Qatar Science and Technology Park, on-line services 
are leading to on-line shopping in Qatar. Shadi Eideh, senior manager of e-channels at 
the Qatar National Bank (QNB), oversees the development of electronic services in 
Qatar, especially in the banking sectors, where e-services have become essential due to 
the development of Qatar‟s economy and customers‟ demand. Currently, the banks 
provide e-services such as Internet banking and e-payment to utilities (QSTP, 2007).  
Other organisations also provide e-services such as the Qatar share market, Qatar 
Airlines and hotels. Also, government institutes have devoted significant effort to 
provide e-services, for example e-education, e-health and e-government (ICT Qatar, 
2009d). Use of e-services has increased and a good example is the Qatar e-government 
service called Hukoomi, where a considerable increase in the number of transactions 
was noticed throughout 2008 when it reached QR 428 million compared to QR 237 
million, QR 79 million, QR 9 million for 2007, 2006 and 2005, respectively. Moreover, 
since its establishment in September 2000, the total revenues of e-government reached 
QR 930 million in 2005 (ICT Qatar, 2009e). 
However, e-commerce in Qatar is still in a very initial stage.  Khaled Tawfik, Enterprise 
Development Manager at the Supreme Council of Information and Communication 
Technology (ictQatar), has stated that e-commerce in Qatar is „starting to scratch the 
surface‟ (QSTP, 2007) and added that e-commerce uptake will involve all organisations 
in raising the level of computer literacy and access in Qatar. This is being carried out by 
many institutes, such as QNB and iHorizons, which have initiated programmes to 
enhance computer literacy for their clients, as well as ictQatar which is committed to IT 
literacy and the ipark project to promote Internet access.  
M. Takriti, Chief Executive Officer of iHorizons, explained the small size of the 
e-commerce sector in the region by the core dependence on outside vendors. He added 
that recent improvement in Qatar‟s education system, along with the enhancement of 
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computer literacy, will assist in boosting e-commerce in Qatar.  Nevertheless, experts 
who expected a boost of interest in e-commerce with the persisting development of the 
economy in Qatar, have pointed out the need to raise public awareness of the benefits of 
e-commerce (Ashrafi et al., 2007; QSTP, 2007). 
The level of B2C (business to customer) and B2B (business to business) e-commerce 
activity in Qatar was determined by a statistical study carried out as part of a GCC 
e-commerce study. The results show that the total B2C trade has improved and reached 
US $54 million in 2005 compared to US $27 million in 2002.  
On the other hand, the study has estimated that the current total of B2B e-commerce, in 
which the automotive industry, the oil industry and the IT industry accounted for the 
bulk of the online transactions, reached US $342 millions in 2005 (Ministry of Industry 
& Commerce, Kingdom of Bahrain, 2002). The level of B2B trade values in the GCC 
countries are shown in Table 4.5. 
Thus this rapid transformation led to the growth in the number of Internet users 
shopping, using services and communicating online with organisations and institutes. 
However, this raises the same question again as to whether customers have the 
experience to be aware and ready for this rapid transformation and how they should 
protect themselves from phishing attempts.  
 
Table 4.5: B2C and B2B trade values in Qatar (2005) 
 
 
Estimated B2C value (USD millions) Qatar 
2002 $27m 
2005 $54m 
Estimated B2B value(USD millions) Qatar 
GDP 2001 $34150m 
B2B E-Commerce % 1% 
B2B EC Value $342m 
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4.2.3  The Lack of Electronic Law  
The legal framework in Qatar has passed through development phases in which the 
judiciary is an independent body. Previously, the judicial system was divided into two 
court systems: the civil, commercial and criminal courts and the Sharia courts which 
manage Islamic laws. Then, in October 2004, the new judiciary law was established 
where the previous two court systems merged into one and the Court of Cassation was 
established (Qatar Law Forum, 2009; Embassy of Qatar in Washington DC, 2005). 
Although the law in Qatar has been developed accordingly over several years, there is 
still no specific e-commerce law or e-law in Qatar.  
 
Experts have indicated that continuous development of Qatar‟s economy will assist in 
enhancing e-commerce use and therefore there will inevitability be the establishment of 
an effective e-law. According to M. Takriti, Chief Executive Officer of iHorizons, some 
issues related to electronic law are: “How courts enforce contracts signed online via e-
mail; whether e-mails are legally binding in online transactions; stealing e-commerce 
sites (also known as “phishing”); what kinds of e-commerce are allowed and what are 
not; and how taxation is determined among countries that have different taxation codes, 
particularly in the Arab world.” (QSTP, 2007). Currently, ictQatar is concerned in 
establishing a law relating to e-commerce (e-law) which addresses all the challenges 
raised by e-commerce, including electronic transactions, digital signatures, electronic 
payments, data encryption, privacy and data protection, software protection, piracy and 
e-government (QSTP, 2007).   
 
Furthermore, the GCC countries are planning for development of a western-based 
e-commerce law to protect the rights of online consumers.  The governments of Bahrain 
and Kuwait are currently considering developing e-commerce law (Ministry of Industry 
& Commerce, Kingdom of Bahrain, 2002). However, in January 2006, UAE was the 
first Arab country to issue an e-law to legalise e-commerce and protect online 
consumers (Elsidafy, 2009). 
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The lack of e-law has assisted in motivating phishers to commit their crimes without 
fear of punishment, as there is no protection for Internet users. In this research 
interviews were held with legal experts in this field to discover how e-crimes are 
currently processed and the difficulties they face in the absence of any e-law. 
 
4.2.4  Effect of Qatar Culture     
One result of the rapid development and transformation in the State of Qatar in all 
sectors has been an imbalance in the population composition as Qatar has become an 
attractive place for a large numbers of foreign workers. They are attracted by the 
massive investment and jobs are available with no income tax and free services to the 
population. This has led to a growth in population from 369,000 in 1986 to 1.4 million 
in 2008 (QSA, 2008) (see Table 4.6), of whom, however, approximately 350,000 were 
believed to be Qatari citizens (United States Department of State, 2005). As a result, 
Qatar has become a multi-ethnic country with people of Arab, Indian, Pakistani, Iranian 
and other nationalities (CIA, 2008a).   
 
Table 4.6: Population of Qatar (QSA, 2008) 
 
Year Population 
1986 369079 
1997 522023 
2004 744029 
2008 1448446 
 
However, Qatar was able to maintain its heritage despite the enormous development in 
all areas and the influx of a large number of different communities. Because of the 
interest of the State of Qatar to preserve the heritage of its civilisation, the Ministry of 
Culture and the Arts was established on October 1998 to preserve the national legacy of 
heritage and archaeology (Ministry of Culture, Art and Heritage, 2008).  
Qatar is a relatively conservative country where Islam is the main religion and 77.5% of 
the population are Muslims (CIA, 2008a; QSA, 2008; U.S. Department of State 
Diploma in Action, 2007). Customs, traditions and the Islamic religion are thus part of 
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the Qatari culture where Islam has a major influence on people‟s behaviour and 
responses in their daily life. 
 
Despite all these changes in the Qatari society, the State of Qatar continues to maintain 
its culture, customs and characteristics. The author has experienced that Qataris, in 
general, are trustful, helpful and generous. This suggests there may be cultural factors 
which might affect the responses of Qatari citizens to e-mail phishing. Further 
investigations on this subject were carried out which showed that there are cultural 
factors that affect victims‟ responses to phishing which make them an easy prey for 
phishers.  
 
4.3  Interviews 
To further investigate the problems of e-mail phishing in Qatar, as there is a lack of 
literature on e-mail phishing in Qatar, interviews were held with thirteen domain experts 
in online fraud, awareness and education from both governmental and private sectors. 
The experts were drawn from various ministries and organisations as follows: 
1. Head of Computer Crime at the Ministry of Interior in Qatar 
2. Head of Public Relations in the Ministry of Interior in Qatar 
3. A senior employee of an international bank based in Qatar. 
4 and 5. Senior employees of Qatar Telecommunications (Q-Tel) 
6, 7 & 8. Members of the Qatar Computer Emergency Response Team (Q-CERT) 
9. A representative of the Ministry of Public Prosecution in Qatar 
10. A member of the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs in Qatar. 
11. A representative from the Ministry of Education and Higher Education in Qatar 
12. A computer lecturer with the Institute of Administrative Development 
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13. The Chief of Operations, First Base Technologies, an e-crime consultancy company 
in the UK 
 
The interviews aimed to identify the extent of e-mail phishing in Qatar, the problems of 
dealing with phishing in Qatar, the vulnerability of Qataris to phishing, including the 
effects of the national culture, and the legal situation regarding phishing in Qatar. Semi 
structured interviews were held with each of the thirteen interviewees. Questions on the 
above topics were asked depending on the interviewee‟s area of expertise but in each 
case they were given the freedom to expand on their answers and give further 
comments. The interviews were held in December 2009 with each interview being of 
twenty minutes to two hours in duration, except for the interview with the Chief of 
Operations of First Base Technologies which was conducted via e-mail. Full details of 
the interviews are given in Appendix B. The findings of the interviews are given in the 
following sections. 
 
4.3.1  Extent of E-mail Phishing  
According to the interviews with experts in the fields of e-crimes, education, awareness 
and Islamic studies, all of them had found that e-mail phishing has spiked recently and 
become of more concern. Although none had a definite statistical record of phishing 
attacks, they did think they were less successful since their organisations applied a 
strategy to defend against phishing involving a multi-layer defence of technological 
solutions, policies and awareness. 
 
Nevertheless, the Head of Prosecution, Ministry of Public Prosecution, had noted that 
since this phenomenon began to appear from 2004, it has risen and criminals‟ intentions 
have extended from stealing victims‟ money and personal/confidential information to 
exploiting and blackmailing victims for political and terrorist ends. Interviews with the 
Officer of the Computer Crimes Unit, a Manager of the PR Department in the Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) and Q-cert employees have pointed out that most attacks were 
targeting financial sectors such as banks.   
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For the Manager of an ISP and the network engineer in Qtel, the attacks were fewer, 
about 4 cases per month, and phishing by phone, websites, e-mails and SMS were the 
most common attacks they had encountered. They stated that they had met a couple of 
incidents in Qatar where an attacker had mimicked banks, hacked into a website server 
and hosted his/her own phishing site. 
Furthermore, the Manager of Operation Risk at the Doha Bank pointed out that the first 
phishing attack they suffered was on March 2008 and since then they had experienced 
an average of two per month. However, he added, that had stopped in November 2008 
due to implementation of some security measures. 
 
Almost all of the interviewees believe that the rapid development which Qatar has 
experienced in the last few years in all fields - economic, politics, telecommunication 
and others - makes Qatar vulnerable to cyber crimes. In particular, development in the 
economy and ICT has encouraged the existence and the development of the phishing 
problem in Qatar. They believe Qatar is attractive for phishers with the availability of a 
lot of money and with online users who are novices to the Internet and most likely do 
not know the risks associated with it. However, some commented that this does not 
mean the country has to stop developing.  
 
4.3.2  Vulnerability to Phishing  
The majority of interviewees believed that people are still not sufficiently aware of 
phishing, they still get fooled by the simple attacks and therefore more effort has to be 
made to enhance awareness on how to protect themselves against such attack, how to 
recognise it and how to react. The interviewees at Q-CERT stressed that it is hard to 
measure security awareness. 
 
Also, the Head of Prosecution noted that the modernisation of Qatar is new for people 
and most are not well practised in this new development, especially in technology, 
which then leads to huge vulnerabilities. The experts believe that the society needs time 
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to absorb such huge developments in the country and by the time people get used to 
such changes they will be more aware, since the government and institutions in Qatar 
are trying to defend against such attacks by making people aware and enhancing the 
security measures.  
 
All of the interviewees noted that Qatari culture has an effect on people‟s responses to 
phishing attacks, since Qataris are living in a conservative society with a collection of 
traditions, customs and religious beliefs which have become part of their culture. 
Furthermore, most Qataris are religious and follow Islamic beliefs in being moral, doing 
good, treating people nicely, trusting them and helping them when required. Therefore 
when phishers use factors which play upon their kindness, goodness, trust, morals, 
emotions and religion then Qataris tend to believe them.  Also, Qataris in general are 
generous, trustful and helpful, so this would be used by phishers to fool them. In 
addition, the interviewees said that phishers will usually study the culture of Qatar 
before committing their attacks and because Qatar is a trusted environment, people feel 
they are safe.  
 
Some of the interviewees mentioned that there are no specific criteria for victims of 
phishing, nearly all categories can fall prey and can be vulnerable, regardless of their 
backgrounds, and even experts in security could fail victims, especially if the phishing 
convinces them by engaging their interests. Also, they added that phishers try to trick 
victims by using clever techniques to bypass the spam filters.   
 
4.3.3  Problems Faced with Phishing Incidents 
The officer in the Computer Crime Unit in the MOI and the Head of Prosecution stated 
that there is no clearly assigned e-law in Qatar. However, in Penalties Law No.11 of 
2004, there is a small section about computer crimes on pages 142-147 (Ministry of 
Public Prosecution, 2004). However, it does not cover all types of fraud existing today, 
only general topics such as viruses, misuse of data or computers and unauthorised 
access. It does not even criminalise e-mail phishing attacks, it only criminalises viruses 
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which are distributed through floppy disk and CDs. Therefore, when phishing cases go 
to the court, there is not actually an explicit law to make phishing punishable because 
the law is quite old and was not planned very well. Furthermore, the experts stated that 
phishers are taking advantage of the lack of e-law in Qatar and, therefore, the 
establishment of a special law on cyber crime would be essential to reduce e-crimes in 
Qatar and, in particular, phishing, while noting the need to modify it frequently to cope 
with the fast development in technology. Currently, Q-CERT is in the process of 
developing a new specialist law on e-crimes in collaboration with all relevant bodies 
seeking access to a comprehensive law to cover all aspects to suit current and future 
developments. The law covers almost all issues associated with Internet usage including 
topics such as misuse of devices, cyber crime, computer-related fraud and others.  The 
Q-CERT experts noted that, although Qatar has delayed in the establishing of its e-claw, 
it has learned from others‟ mistakes and experience in e-law. The majority of 
interviewees believed that the new law will protect victims and help to support decision, 
noting the common Qatari saying, “When there‟s no punishment, people get awful ill-
mannered”. 
The officer in the MOI noted that some banks do not report phishing incidents since 
they think it might affect their reputations even though they were asked to report any 
incident to the Qatar Central Bank (QCB) to take further action. Also, they face 
difficulties in the investigation of phishing crimes, especially in proving the good faith 
of the accusers, since phishers usually try to take advantage of victims in Qatar without 
their knowledge (e.g. by getting their PCs infected, stealing their identity or 
impersonating them for committing their crime).  
Also, the Head of Prosecution had mentioned that many victims do not report phishing 
incidents to avoid embarrassment and being ridiculed but also most were unaware of the 
right actions to take at the crisis time. Moreover, they face a problem in tracing 
phishers, since usually the stolen money is integrally transferred abroad in a mesh, 
which makes it difficult to catch the phisher, especially when the investigation leads to 
countries such as China, Nigeria and Russia, where cooperation is ineffective in 
tracking those attacks. The interviews at the Doha Bank and Q-CERT have shown that 
there are some phishing attacks committed inside Qatar, especially in iparks since there 
is no control over the users.  
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Qtel has experienced some difficulties in blocking websites outside Qatar from the web 
host as some refuse since it affects their business and reputation, therefore Q-CERT will 
be required to communicate with the equivalent computer emergency response team in 
the country concerned to request the blocking of the phishing site. However, in some 
countries such as Nigeria, there is no equivalent institute, so it would be hard to block 
and, in that case, Qtel can only block their clients from viewing the site in Qatar. 
Q-CERT noted that even if sites are blocked, phishers will launch again with a new site.  
 
4.3.4  Cooperation Between Organisations 
Victims usually report phishing incidents to their organisations, banks, 
telecommunication service provider or Q-CERT, which then report them to the 
Computer Crime Unit in the MOI for investigation and action, then the case is referred 
to the Ministry of Public Prosecution to proceed with the case (see Figure 4.2). The 
ministry will refer to Qtel in some cases where there is a need to block a certain website 
or IP. Similarly, there is cooperation between Q-CERT and Qtel in this matter since 
Q-CERT is registered with the APWG (AntiPhishing Working Group) and computer 
emergency response institutes around the world. Q-CERT has also directed the „Honey 
Pot project‟ in Qatar (Spitzner, 2002).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Process of dealing with phishing incidents 
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4.3.5  Review of Organisational Strategy of Defence Against Phishing 
 
All organisations interviewed have a planned strategy to defend against e-crimes in 
general by providing layers of protection from the technological solutions (either 
hardware or software) policies and awareness. Most of the experts stated that spam 
filters are not reliable and some phishing attacks might bypass them, and therefore it is 
important to educate their employees and clients on how to recognise phishing attempts 
and to react effectively. The Head of Prosecution reported he is working to limit 
phishing by awareness, enhancement of laws that criminalise this phenomenon, 
participation in related conferences and cooperation with other countries and all 
competent authorities to limit this phenomenon.  
 
The Doha bank has taken some actions to prevent phishing attacks, such as creating the 
need for 24 hours to activate accounts added as a third-party account on the client side, 
reducing the limit of daily transactions from 50,000 to 40,000 QR, by default not 
allowing transactions over the phone, providing SMS services for clients for any 
transactions in their account and increasing the level of security in online banking by 
involving randomised security questions and virtual keyboards which protect the user 
from Trojan programs intended to capture user key strokes. 
 
In addition, the interview with the voluntary administrator of the Ministry of 
Endowments and Islamic Affairs revealed that the ministry has closed a lot of 
suspicious charity centres. The ministry has established a licence system which allows  
some charities and Red Crescent Societies to collect charity and „Zakat‟ (see Appendix 
C, p.365) from individuals and institutions once they have passed rigorous checks to 
ensure they are not associated with criminal or terrorist organisations. As a further 
check, delegates have been assigned in many countries to verify the arrival of donated 
funds for eligible applicants. The ministry stresses to people they should donate only to 
accredited institutes and individuals. However, the interviewee pointed out that 
enhancing awareness on the topic could have a negative impact on those in need since it 
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could create a kind of lack of confidence in any message received, even if it was correct 
and genuine.   
 
None of the interviewed organisations in Qatar would hold a phishing penetration test to 
assess their employees‟ or clients‟ level of awareness of phishing, some were, perhaps, 
overconfident in the awareness level of their employees, but others said it would be hard 
to implement as it would require high level authorisation. Most were concerned about 
the ethical and legal issues that might be associated with such an audit and some pointed 
out that this might affect employees‟ trust in their organisation, and that there is also a 
possibility that phishers might utilise this by sending the same e-mail which instead will 
direct victims to a malicious website. The Head of Prosecution noted that penetration 
tests could be legal if it was mentioned in their employment contract but there are 
ethical issues that should be taken into consideration regarding employees‟.  
 
The Chief of Operations at First Base Technologies stated that it is hard to protect 
against phishing since people are vulnerable because phishers are using clever tricks 
which are difficult to identify, and there is a lack of awareness and training about 
phishing. The company carries out penetration tests, explains guidelines and policies for 
employees and provides awareness and education on best practice through seminars, 
videos and publications, which will usually take up to one hour. Their best practice 
includes never clicking on a link in an e-mail but instead browsing to the site manually, 
and if in doubt, checking the e-mail message headers and turning on the anti-phishing 
function in the Internet browser with the NoScript plug in. 
 
4.3.6  Process Deployed for Awareness 
All the interviewed organisations emphasised the importance of awareness of phishing 
since people are the weakest link. Q-CERT is responsible to develop an aware 
community with regard to ICT, and the PR department in the MOI is responsible for 
enhancing awareness of the public on various topics, one of which is phishing (Nagy, 
2009). The PR department stated that they have to deal with the matter cautiously to 
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avoid intimidating society, as the people are conservative and have ethical and religious 
beliefs.  
Most of the interviewed organisations showed that they have diffused awareness on 
e-crimes, including phishing, by using various techniques: e-learning, seminars, 
exhibitions, publications, posters, leaflets, newsletters, SMS, e-mail and media (TV 
programmes, newspapers). Although all were found an effective way of education 
against phishing, the majority of experts emphasised the media since it reaches a high 
proportion of people. In addition, most interviewees agreed that an anti-phishing game 
is an interesting idea for achieving an effective and motivating awareness, especially for 
children.  
Q-CERT added that ictQATAR, a cooperative member in the development of the Child 
Online Protection initiative, had conducted an awareness workshop to protect Qatar‟s 
children from cyber crime in cooperation with the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) as an initiative for the Telecommunications and Information Society Day 
(Al Jaber, 2009). In addition, ictQATAR cooperates with the Supreme Education 
Council (SEC) and private schools in Qatar in conducting workshops in Arabic and 
English. Currently, QCERT is developing an awareness campaign called K2-12 Cyber 
Safety Curriculum for schools in cooperation with SEC, the Council of Family Affairs 
and ITU. It aims to address the gap between the heavy use of technology in schools and 
the knowledge of how to use it safely. It covers the topics of Cyber Community 
Citizenship, Online Personal Safety, Cyber Predator Identification, Cyber Security and 
Intellectual property.  
However, the Director of one of the high schools in Qatar in the Ministry of Education 
and Higher Education opposed the inclusion of awareness of phishing in the curriculum, 
since it is contrary to the values and principles that the Ministry tries to instil in the 
students, such as trust and kindness. She added that the Ministry is trying to make 
students aware away from the curriculum by bringing in with other organisations in this 
field such as the Ministry of Interior and ICT to hold seminars and workshops in 
schools. Furthermore, she noted the awareness should be planned with a clear aim and 
objectives, taking account of participants‟ background, by providing interactive and 
interesting awareness tools to keep people engrossed and by awarding a certificate of 
approval. She also suggested that personal observations, simple tests, questionnaires and 
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interviews held with participants might in evaluating the effectiveness of the awareness 
programme. She added that the difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of an awareness 
programme and in getting people to remember what they learned depends on the 
participants‟ personalities. and therefore research has been done in this area.  
One of the Computer lecturers at the Institute of Administrative Development, an 
institute responsible for staff development in Qatar, stated that employers are 
responsible for providing security awareness training programmes for their employees, 
especially on phishing and e-crimes.  
 
4.4  Summary 
 
This chapter shows the existence of the e-mail phishing problem in Qatar. Due to the 
massive development in the Qatar economy, the availability of huge numbers of online 
users, the absence of electronic law and the effect of culture, Qatar was found to be an 
attractive place for phishers to commit their attacks (see Figure 4.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Why Qatar is attractive to phishers  
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This was supported by interviews with experts. However, they believed that although 
there is a high frequency of e-mail phishing in Qatar, incidents have been reduced 
recently where some organisations have adopted a strategy of defence against phishing 
by applying technological solutions and policies and focusing on awareness and 
education. It was agreed that awareness would be a more effective means of defence 
since technological solutions have been found to be unreliable against the clever tricks 
phishers use to bypass technological solutions. Although there is a clear cooperation 
between organisations in Qatar to deal with phishing incidents, there are still some 
problems encountered, for example in blocking phishing sites, getting hold of phishers 
and proving the innocence of the victims of identity theft. However, the main concern of 
this research is to focus on awareness so it does not cover these problems, although it is 
worthwhile to point them out.    
Interviews have given a clue to various techniques organisations use in developing 
awareness, including e-learning, seminars, exhibitions, publications, posters, leaflets, 
SMS, e-mail and media, with an emphasis on the latter and on the idea of developing an 
anti-phishing game. Also, experts in education have pointed to the importance of 
developing an effective awareness programme that is well planned and interesting, and 
this will be considered in the development of the e-mail phishing awareness framework. 
 
The majority of interviewees believed that Qataris are vulnerable to phishing because 
they are not sufficiently aware of it. Interviews with experts have concluded with 
identifying some of the aspects which make Qatari citizens susceptible to phishing, as 
follows: 
 The nature of Qataris is to feel embarrassed and stupid to mention or report phishing 
and that they have fallen prey to it.  
 There is a lack of clear e-law in Qatar to protect people from electronic crimes. 
 The majority of people are still not sufficiently aware of phishing. Most do not 
know how to protect themselves against phishing attacks and how to detect and 
react to phishing. With the rapid development experienced in Qatar many Qataris 
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become susceptible to phishing because they have not absorbed sufficiently the 
technology revolution 
 Qatar culture has an effect on people‟s falling prey to e-mail phishing attacks 
(Further investigated in Chapter 6). 
 Qataris are trustful, religious, helpful, generous, emotional and good-willed 
therefore they could be vulnerable to phishing which exploit these characteristics.  
 
In addition, interviews with experts revealed that there are no specific criteria for 
victims of phishing, especially if the phishing convinces them by engaging their 
interests. This will be examined more in the following chapter (penetration tests and 
laboratory experiment). The interviewees stated that culture has an effect on people‟s 
failing prey to e-mail phishing attacks, especially when phishers exploit their virtuous 
qualities and this is going to be examined in depth in the next chapters on the survey 
and the reality and experimental studies.  
 
The next chapter presents the survey data collection method by means of a 
questionnaire used in Qatar and the UK and interviews with Qatari e-mail users. The 
survey outcome outlines the level of the e-mail phishing problem in Qatar society, the 
level of awareness of Qataris, along with possible methods to defend against attacks. 
The next chapter also examines the significance of the results of the survey made in 
Qatar and the UK. 
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Chapter 5  Surveying Awareness of Phishing 
 
This chapter describes the survey data collection. It begins by defining the survey aim 
and sampling criteria. Next, it describes the survey planning, design and execution. 
Finally, it concludes with a quantitative and qualitative data analysis of the survey to 
discover the extent of the e-mail phishing problem in Qatar society, how to defend 
against it and the possible cultural and country-specific factors which make this 
problem arise.  
 
5.1   Questionnaire Aim 
The ultimate aim of the questionnaire is to draw a profile of Qatari people‟s awareness 
of e-mail phishing and their views on the best method of defence against this attack 
compared to the views of people in other developed nations such as the UK. The survey 
will gauge people‟s knowledge about e-mail phishing, give a good indication of their 
vulnerability to this threat and define the extent of the problem by presenting a profile 
of the number of people who have been attacked by e-mail phishing. In addition, it 
reveals their views on the best way they propose to defend against phishing attacks and, 
in particular, what they believe is the most effective tool to deploy and to embed 
awareness and education about e-mail phishing attacks.  
 
5.2   Questionnaire Sampling 
Leedy (1997: 219) argues, “…the two elements that are more important than any others 
in survey research are randomization and bias”, and “…the descriptive survey method 
demands that the researcher select from the general population a sample population that 
will be both logically and statistically defensible”. According to Bryman and Cramer 
(1990: 99), “…researchers should strive to create, as accurate as possible, a 
representative sample of the general population or case of study, and that such sample, 
if planned precisely, will highly increase the external validity of the research”. In 
addition, according to Bryman and Cramer (1990), “…the researcher should divide the 
population into strata. The strata must be categories of a criterion.” 
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This research has taken into consideration the above points in defining an accurate 
sample for study. The sample was first narrowed down from the general public of the 
UK and Qatar to a more focused sector of the society. The aim was to define criteria for 
users most likely to fall prey to e-mail phishing attacks. Participants were chosen 
randomly from the focused sector of British and Qatari society and the criteria were 
used to refine the sample. The criteria set for inclusion in the questionnaire were only 
those people who use the Internet and have an e-mail address because they are the 
potential e-mail phishing victims. To further narrow inclusion, people aged 12 and 
above were defined to fulfil the criteria.  Other segments of UK and Qatari society (e.g. 
children) were not involved because they are not potential victims and can not provide 
clear decisions about the phenomenon investigated. In conclusion, participants were 
randomly selected from UK and Qatari citizens using the adopted criteria (e-mail users 
aged over 12). 
 
5.3  Questionnaire Planning and Design 
Punch (2003) states that “Developing the questionnaire operationalises the research 
questions”; therefore the questionnaire template (see Appendix A) was developed with 
the consideration of the research questions. There is extensive literature on surveys 
which discusses the design of questionnaires (e.g. Jeffrey, 1986; Fischer and Rohs, 
1985; Sudman, 1982; Babbie, 1973).  In addition, Leedy (1997) has defined four 
practical guidelines in developing a questionnaire, as follows: 
1.  Using clear language  
2.  Meeting research aims  
3.  Planning development, sample, distribution and collection  
4.  Creating a solid cover letter  
 
Although designing a perfect questionnaire is impossible, the study does, however, 
follow the above guidelines in the case of this questionnaire. It was designed and 
developed to provide answers to the research questions and concerns and used simple 
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language. Since the survey was targeted at Qatari and British e-mail users over 12, two 
versions of the survey were designed, in English and Arabic, as they are the official 
languages in the UK and Qatar, respectively. However, respondents had a choice of 
version. Before achieving the ultimate design, this questionnaire passed through first 
review and pilot-test towards providing an effective questionnaire. Each stage is 
explained below: 
  
5.3.1   First Review  
Reviewing the questionnaire first, before field application, helps in creating an 
enhanced questionnaire, fit for purpose. Therefore, it was reviewed by researchers and 
domain experts to assist in determining its strengths and weaknesses. The researchers  
were Dawson, Professor of Knowledge Management at Loughborough University, and 
Benkhalil, Post-Doctoral Research Assistant and Teaching Fellow at Bradford 
University. The experts in the domain of information security also involved were 
Lethold, Head of Middle East Operations at InfoGuard, a Swiss company specialised in 
information security. Other experts were employees of Q-CERT (Qatar Computer 
Emergency Response Team) which is Qatar‟s coordination centre for dealing with 
internet security problems. These were Lewis, Deputy Director of Q-CERT, Mundie, Q-
CERT's manager for Outreach and Training, and Phelps, an information scientist 
working with Outreach and Training. The review took a couple of weeks as it involved 
discussions with the researchers and domain experts to plan an effective questionnaire.  
 
Following the review, the questionnaire was refined accordingly. The major outcome 
was some corrections in the language, suggestions for a cover letter and some changes 
in the questionnaire format (see Appendix A). A short, simple cover letter was created 
to notify the participants of the aims, significance of the research and the targeted group 
and to verify the privacy and the confidentiality of the questionnaire. The cover letter 
was written both in simple English and Arabic language and attached to the 
questionnaire to encourage recipients to respond honestly. Since it was difficult to 
inspect each participant to determine whether he/she fitted the defined questionnaire 
criteria (i.e. e-mail users above 12 years, who are either Qatari or British citizens), the 
cover letter clarified the questionnaire criteria.  
                                                                                           Chapter 5: Surveying Awareness of Phishing 
106 
5.3.2   Pilot-test 
 
Although the questionnaire had been refined by experts, to achieve an efficient 
questionnaire it was crucial for the draft questionnaire to be completed by a sample of 
Qatari and British people fitting the criteria similar to the final respondents.  Later, in a 
semi-structured interview, participants were asked to provide their feedback on the 
questionnaire regarding simplicity, structure, length and design, along with some 
questions from the Salant and Dillman (1994) method of pilot testing. Finally, the 
questionnaire was evaluated according to the answers to the following questions: 
   
 Were all questions clear and simple? If not, then please specify which ones were 
unclear or hard to understand? 
 Did you find the questionnaire is well structured (i.e. has a clear and attractive 
layout)? If not, what is your criticism?  
 Was the questionnaire too long or was it reasonable? 
 Did you have the chance to answer all of the questions?  
 Have you any other comments?  
 
Salant and Dillman (1994) used: 
 Does the question measure what it needs to measure? 
 Do respondents understand all the words? 
 Are questions interpreted similarly by all respondents? 
 Does each closed-ended question have an answer that applies to each respondent? 
 Does the questionnaire create a positive impression, one that motivates people to 
answer it? 
 
Both the Arabic and English versions of the questionnaire were pilot-tested with 20 
people of different ages and levels of education with a view to creating an effective and 
understandable final questionnaire. The conclusion of the pilot-test was that the 
majority of participants found the questionnaire somewhat long and contained too many 
questions. Therefore, the author removed some of the unnecessary questions and 
merged some into another related question. Finally, the questionnaire was shortened to 
two pages instead of four, which the pilot test indicated would be more realistic (see 
Appendix A). Also, the author observed that during the pilot phase, most participants 
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went immediately to the questionnaire questions without reading the cover letter, 
therefore it was decided to include the questionnaire criteria as questions within the 
questionnaire in order to include only appropriate participants and to exclude those not 
meeting the criteria.   
 
5.4  Questionnaire Structure 
The questionnaire was divided into different sections according to the required 
information to assist both the participants in reading and completion of the 
questionnaire and the author in analysing the questionnaire and drawing associated 
conclusions. The questionnaire consisted of 20 simple questions relating to e-mail 
phishing, some of which were closed-ended, such as yes/no multiple choices, and others 
were open-ended. Also, there were some contingency questions. The questionnaire had 
a structured response format with graphical user interface (GUI) of radio buttons, check 
boxes and text fields. The ultimate aim of the questionnaire was to draw a profile of 
people‟s awareness of e-mail phishing and their views on the best method of defence 
against this attack, therefore the questionnaire consisted of six sections, each 
contributing to the aim of the whole questionnaire. 
 
The first section requested background information from the respondent, which 
although useful for questionnaire analysis, was also used to determine participant 
inclusion in or exclusion from the questionnaire results, according to the criteria 
explained above, to provide a fair analysis. The decision tree for determining 
appropriate inclusion is explained in Figure 5.1 below.  In addition, this section 
contained an e-mail request, where participants would be asked to disclose their e-mail 
address if they would like to receive more information about phishing, the research 
topic.  This actually had a hidden purpose designed to survey participants‟ willingness 
to disclose their private information (e-mail address) in a kind of penetration test to 
measure people‟s vulnerability to e-mail phishing in reality. 
 
 
 
                                                                                           Chapter 5: Surveying Awareness of Phishing 
108 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Decision tree for determining appropriate participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Questionnaire structure 
  
Sections 1, 2, and 4 contribute towards drawing a profile of people‟s awareness of 
e-mail phishing, whereas section 5 draws a profile of their views on the best method of 
defence against e-mail phishing. Figure 5.2 represents the outline of the questionnaire 
along with the aim and the sequence of each section within the questionnaire (see 
Appendix A for fuller details about the questionnaire design).  
Section 1: Background information 
Section 2: Knowledge of e-mail phishing 
Section 3: Vulnerability to e-mail phishing 
 
Section 5: Defence against e-mail phishing 
 phishingphishing 
 
Categorising participants by knowledge of 
e-mail phishing threat 
Surveying participants‟ vulnerability to e-
mail phishing 
Section 4: Extent of e-mail phishing 
 
Surveying participants on number of 
successful attacks they face and why.   
Surveying participants on best method to 
defend against e-mail phishing  
Awareness 
of e-mail 
phishing 
Defence 
against 
e-mail 
phishing 
Determining appropriate participants and 
categorising appropriate participants by 
Gender, Age, Education and Occupation. 
Also surveying willingness to disclose private 
information (e-mail addresses)  
Do you have an e-mail? 
Your nationality 
Yes No 
Qatari Others 
Appropriate participant Inappropriate participant 
Inappropriate participant 
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5.5   Questionnaire Implementation 
Participants were randomly selected using the above-mentioned criteria (e-mail users 
over 12, either Qatari or British citizens). There is a wide range of questionnaire 
formats, e.g. written, oral and electronic questionnaires, and these can be distributed 
using a variety of media. In this research, the questionnaire uses the household drop-off 
and pick-up and online types of questionnaire. In the household drop-off, the author 
went to the respondent‟s home or organisation and handed over the questionnaire and 
then picked it up once completed. With this approach, the respondent could work on the 
questionnaire in private, when it is convenient and the author could make personal 
contact, answer questions and give clarification about the study. On the other hand, 
online questionnaires provide another option where the author would e-mail the 
organisation or respondents a description of the survey along with a link to the survey 
(Trochim, 2006)  
 
The online questionnaire was created from a free online survey software tool available 
from (http://freeonlinesurveys.com). This website allows users to create their own 
online website survey easily without the need to install any software. Also, it offers live 
results collected automatically from the website with the features of customisation and 
filtering the results.  The filter feature provided an in-depth quantitative analysis of the 
questionnaire results. The author used this feature in the questionnaire analysis phase to 
provide a comprehensive quantitative analysis as it can be used to filter, for example, an 
age group to see their response in the questionnaire. 
 
In general, the online questionnaire provides more flexibility in processing the 
questionnaire results and also flexibility for some organisations which prefer to 
complete an electronic form of survey rather than to do it manually since it is faster and 
needs less effort. It is reasonable to assume that this would increase the response to the 
survey.  
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The questionnaires were distributed in Qatar and the UK to organisations in the private 
and public sectors. They were contacted before distributing the questionnaires to 
confirm their support for the research. The organisations which offered to distribute and 
collect the questionnaires were chosen. 
5.5.1 Sample Size 
The following equation (Bock et al., 2007: 442- 443) was applied to find the sample 
size: 
 
where z= z value, n= sample size, p = population proportion and ME= margin of error, 
which identifies the chance of error. To ensure an accurate result, the researcher used 
3.1% as a smaller chance of error. Confidence level defines certainty level; levels of 
95% or 99% are more common. The 95% certainty level was used in this analysis with a 
95% confidence level and α= 5% (level of significance). Therefore, α /2 = 0.025 
and to the right of = 0, =0.5–0.025=0.475. Looking at the standard z distribution table, 
z=1.96. Values of p  and q  were estimated, for the worst case, the value of p =0.5 
(maximum variability) will define the largest sample necessary regardless of the true 
proportion.  imilarly, q  0.  since q  1- p . 
 
n=999.4 
This shows at least 1000 respondents are required both in Qatar and the UK to keep the 
margin of error 3.1% with confidence level of 95% and ±5% precision.  
5.5.2 Participant Contribution  
In both the UK and Qatar, about 2,000 paper-based questionnaires were distributed 
manually to those organisations which confirmed their support, along with the online 
questionnaires distributed through e-mail. Within the collection phase, 20 respondents 
with different backgrounds were interviewed using a semi-structured interview based on 
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their point of view on the subject area and on their responses to the survey in order to 
have a better understanding of participants‟ responses.  
The questionnaires were managed and tracked by the author to enhance the response 
rate. Good support was obtained from the participating organisations and the response 
rate was about 50%, much higher than usual in a survey investigation.  In the results‟ 
gathering phase, all the hard copy questionnaires were collected and entered by the 
author into the online survey to gather the entire questionnaire results into a single 
database source. Finally, 1,200 participants contributed to the questionnaire both in UK 
and Qatar. Afterwards, the filtering feature in the online survey was used to exclude 
participants not meeting the questionnaire criteria explained above (see Figure 5.1).  As 
a result, only 1,000 UK citizens and similarly 1,000 Qatari citizens of E-mail users 
participated in the questionnaire. This implies that the researcher had reached the 
minimum sample size defined for margin of 3.1% with confidence level of 95%.  
 
This high response was due to the support giving by the organisations to the research, 
the use of different survey types, online and hard copy and to the offer of chocolate for 
participants which promoted people‟s contribution to the survey. This idea was taken 
from Wagner‟s (2004) „Will Trade Passwords for Chocolate‟, which shows that more 
than 70% of the subjects would reveal their password in exchange for a piece of 
chocolate. However, this technique was not applied for the online survey. 
 
Generally, these were government officials, private sector employees, businessmen/ 
women, university lecturers and students, and secondary and primary school students 
(see Appendix A for fuller details about participants). The questionnaire in Qatar has 
taken advantage of the researcher‟s large family, friends, personal contact with the 
organisations and ICT Qatar support with communication with other Qatari 
organisations. The questionnaire in the UK has taken advantage of friends, neighbours, 
people in public areas such as restaurants and towns and personal contacts with 
organisations and the support of the Qatar Embassy in distributing the online survey to 
all Qatari students in the UK.  
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5.6  Survey Analysis 
The analysis of the investigative survey allows the combination of findings from both 
quantitative and qualitative data in order to create an initiative for developing an 
anti-phishing awareness and an educational framework regarding e-mail phishing.  
 
The analysis began by identifying the general responses of the questionnaire along with 
analysis of some of the participants interviewed. Later, in-depth analysis applied 
correlation to discover possible relationships between key variables. Also, the results of 
interviews with Qatari participants and domain experts were used to elaborate on the 
findings from the questionnaires.   
  
5.6.1  Questionnaire Analysis 
The research followed Punch‟s (2003) three main principles for quantitative data 
analysis of creating variables, distributing variables across the sample and creating 
relationships. 
In the questionnaire structure in Figure 5.2, each section generates a number of 
variables drawn from its aims as follows:  
1. Background information: nationality, e-mail user, e-mail address, gender, age, 
education and occupation. However, nationality and e-mail user are variables used 
only to determine suitable respondents for this questionnaire. Although the request 
for e-mail address is in the background information, it is really used to detect 
people‟s vulnerability to e-mail phishing. The request is there to lead participants 
into revealing their e-mail addresses as if part of the survey data collection, but in 
fact it reveals willingness to disclose their private information (e-mail address) and 
is therefore a kind of penetration test to measure people‟s vulnerability to e-mail 
phishing, in reality without obligation. Therefore, the e-mail request is considered a 
crucial variable of vulnerability to e-mail phishing.   
2. Knowledge of e-mail phishing: Forecast of e-mail phishing trend, e-mail phishing 
level of knowledge and its source.    
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3. Vulnerability to e-mail phishing: Participants‟ worries about e-mail phishing, usage 
of anti-phishing software, ability to detect a phishing attack, their procedure once 
attacked and their own divulging of their e-mail addresses. 
4. Extent of e-mail phishing: Number of phishing e-mails received by participants, 
number of times participants have been tricked and the reason for being tricked.  
5. Defence against e-mail phishing:  Efficiency of existing anti-phishing software, the 
best way for participants to defend themselves against e-mail phishing and their 
preferred method of being made aware of and educated about this attack. Each 
method of awareness creation listed constitutes a variable to be addressed in the 
analysis stage.  
 
The general analysis used basic frequency distribution to illustrate the characteristics of 
the survey participants according to the defined questionnaire variables. Further, the 
in-depth analysis identified the possible relationships between the above variables. 
Moreover, the findings from interviews with 20 of the Qatari survey participants 
extended and gave further details about the survey outcome. 
 
5.6.1.1   General Analysis of the Qatar Questionnaire  
General quantitative analysis of the questionnaire was made in relation to the variables 
defined in Section 5.6.1. Details of the analysis are explained below. 
 
1.  Background information 
The questionnaire survey involved 1,000 Qatari e-mail users; most were female, with 
the highest number of participants in the age group 18-29. In addition, the majority were 
employees and students of higher or further education level (see Figures 5.3 to 5.6).  
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Figure 5. 3: Gender (Qatar) 
 
Figure 5.4: Age group (Qatar) 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Education level (Qatar) 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Occupation (Qatar) 
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2.  Knowledge of e-mail phishing 
Knowledge of e-mail phishing needs to be „good‟ or „expert‟. „Poor‟ and „average‟ are 
not at all enough to protect respondents in the mysterious world of phishing. 
Participants were asked to assess their level of knowledge of e-mail phishing according 
to the following criteria: 
None: Do not know anything about e-mail phishing 
Poor: Have heard of e-mail phishing    
Average: Know the term e-mail phishing and understand its simple techniques 
Good: Know the term e-mail phishing, understand more about its techniques and how to 
protect against it.  
Expert: Know the term e-mail phishing; understand more about its complex techniques, 
how to protect against it, how to detect it and how to react to it 
 
The result of the questionnaire shows that few Qatari citizens, about one third, have the 
required knowledge (good to expert) about e-mail phishing (see Figure 5.7). Most 
participants gained this knowledge from the Internet and media, then schools and 
universities, very few from employers and from others such as friends, relatives and 
their own experience (see Figure 5.8). Most participants forecast that the e-mail 
phishing trend is increasing (Figure 5.9). 
 
Figure 5.7: E-mail phishing knowledge (Qatar) 
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Figure 5.8: Source of knowledge (Qatar) 
   
Figure 5.9: Trend of e-mail phishing (Qatar) 
  
In conclusion, most Qatari participants did not have enough knowledge of e-mail 
phishing and only 31% of them did. The academic sector and employers do not play a 
huge role in enhancing awareness of phishing and the majority of participants consider 
it to be an increasing threat. It is good that Qatari citizens have the latter perception 
regarding their region; however, there is a need to enhance the knowledge of Qatari 
citizens about the phishing threat and to get involvement of academics and employers in 
achieving it.  
 
3.  Vulnerability to E-mail phishing 
The survey shows that there is a large percentage (more than 70%) worried about the 
e-mail phishing threat (Figure 5.10). This has been reflected in the high use of 
anti-phishing software by respondents (about 69%) as most protect themselves from 
such attack by installing anti-phishing software such as spam filters and anti-viruses 
(Figure 5.11).  
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Figure 5.10: Participants’ worry about e-mail phishing (Qatar) 
 
Figure 5.11: Use of anti-phishing software (Qatar) 
 
Participants were also asked to identify cases of e-mail phishing in a list of e-mails in 
order to determine their ability to detect phishing or fraudulent e-mail. Table 5.1 shows 
the examples of e-mails presented in the questionnaire, the possibility of phishing for 
each and the percentage of responses for each type of e-mail. Participants who fail to 
detect a phishing e-mail might be vulnerable to being „hooked‟ by such an attack.  
 
About half of the participants, 44%, failed in detecting legitimate e-mails such as those 
which address users by their first and last name and those which direct users to a 
website with a URL starting with https and to a website containing a legitimate security 
certificate. Most of the participants interviewed after completing the questionnaire said 
that they are not familiar with the security indicators such as the terms „https‟ and 
„security certificate‟  and most of their decisions were just guesses. A few participants, 
just 11%, chose to skip this question (see Figure 5.12). 
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In contrast, about 57% failed to distinguish phishing e-mails. Those which ask users to 
enter information about their account and which convey a sense of urgency and surprise 
were detected by more than half of the participants. However, e-mails which had been 
classified as junk or spam mails, contained an attachment with viruses or asked users to 
phone a number, were detected by only about one third of the participants (see Figure 
5.12). That is because the majority of interviewed participants stated that not all e-mails 
classified as junk or spam mails or which contain viruses are fraudulent and some do 
check their junk mails and sometimes download attachments with viruses, even if the 
sender is unknown. Also, some participants think that communicating off-line by 
telephone or post is more trustworthy and safer than online communication since most 
thought that online methods are more commonly used in a fraudulent attack. However, 
this is not true since hackers nowadays use different communication channels to commit 
their attacks.  
 
Table 5.1: E-mails and possibility of phishing 
Which of the following generally indicates that an 
e-mail may be phishing or fraudulent? 
Possibility 
of 
phishing 
% indicating 
they believe the 
email is phishing 
Asks you to enter information about your account 
 
Phishing 53.2 
Addresses you by your first and last names 
 
Legitimate 8.1 
Directs you to a website containing a security certificate 
matching the name of the website. 
 
Legitimate 17.7 
Conveys sense of urgency and surprise 
 
Phishing 57.9 
Classified as junk or spam mail by your e-mail system. 
 
Phishing 31.5 
Contains attachment, notifying you that it might contain 
viruses that could harm your computer. 
 
Phishing 38.2 
Directs you to website with URL starting with https. 
 
Legitimate 17.8 
Asks you to phone number supplied in the e-mail. 
 
Phishing 35.7 
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Figure 5.12: Participants’ ability to detect a phishing attack (Qatar)  
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Figure 5.13: Participants’ procedure once attacked (Qatar) 
 
Regarding the actions which would be taken by victims on being tricked, fewer than 
half of the participants change their account details, check their financial statement 
immediately, cancel their credit cards or report the incident to their banks or other 
organisations whose details they have disclosed. Few report the incident to the police or 
any specialised body dealing with such cases or to the company whose e-mail address 
or website was faked (see Figure 5.13). Some of the interviewed participants 
commented that reporting to the police would create more problems and some people 
said “The law does not protect the dupe” (a common saying in Qatar).  Also, it was 
believed that reporting the case to the company whose e-mail address or website was 
faked will not make any difference to what happens, as most think that it will not take 
the matter seriously. Furthermore, some stated they did not know that there is a 
specialised body to deal with such cases, the Q-CERT (Qatar Computer Emergency 
Response Team), which handles Internet crimes in Qatar. In general, the nature of the 
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surrounding culture leads Qatari citizens to be ashamed to report that they have been 
caught by phishing since the community is small and people would laugh at them. On 
the other hand, other participants proposed other valuable actions such as sharing their 
experience in one of the well-known blogs and forums to alert other people to such 
threat and contacting the service provider to take further action.  
 
However, for an ideal situation, victims of such attack should apply all of the above 
actions in order to protect themselves from its further consequences. Fewer than 10% of 
the participants would take all of the above steps and about a seventh of them would do 
nothing once they have been tricked by phishing, which means most are vulnerable to 
huge consequences as a result (see Figure 5.13). Regarding the e-mail request, about 
38% of the respondents disclosed their e-mail addresses, which shows a lack of 
awareness of some participants (see Figure 5.14).   
 
 
Figure 5.14: Participants' disclosure of their own e-mail addresses (Qatar) 
 
In conclusion, even though the majority of participants do worry about the e-mail 
phishing threat and use specific software to protect themselves from it, most Qatari 
citizens are not able to detect phishing e-mails from legitimate ones. Even the most 
straightforward phishing attacks which ask users to disclose their confidential 
information and usually convey a sense of urgency and surprise were not distinguished 
by a large percentage of Qatari participants, which makes them vulnerable even to such 
basic phishing attacks. In addition, the majority do not take enough or even any action 
to diminish the possible consequences of successful phishing. The responses to e-mail 
requests indicate that some Qatari citizens are willing to disclose their private 
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information to anyone. Even though they noticed that the survey was on phishing, very 
few detected that this trick request was seeking to phish their e-mail addresses. In brief, 
this means that Qatari citizens are generally vulnerable to e-mail phishing threats. 
 
4.   Extent of E-mail phishing 
Responses showed that the majority of participants, about 80%, receive phishing 
e-mails on a regular basis and that about 50% had fallen prey to phishing, with 11% 
having been tricked more than three times, which clearly shows these participants were 
not able to detect phishing (see Figures 5.15 and 5.16). 
 
Figure 5.15: Frequency of receiving phishing e-mails (Qatar) 
 
Although phishing e-mails were received very often, 40% of respondents indicated they 
had never fallen prey to them. The rest of the responses vary, the highest, 19%, being 
that respondents do not know whether they have been tricked, about 15% have been 
tricked once and 11% have even been tricked more than three times (see Figure 5.16). 
The interviews indicated that most of those who have been tricked more than once have 
become more aware of phishing. Most now have more ability to detect phishing attacks 
than those who have not been tricked at all. Also, the procedures they carry out after 
being tricked are more planned. As expected, this implies that the more participants 
have been tricked, the more their awareness will increase. In the interview, participants 
revealed that because they did not believe they were being tricked, because they lacked 
awareness of the phishing threat and because of the smart and varied techniques used by 
phishers against their victims, these participants frequently fall prey to such attacks. 
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The participants refer to the reason for their being tricked as being the following, 
arranged in descending order by percentage of responses: 
 Phishers come up with smarter tricks which make it difficult to identify phishing 
 They did not install software to protect against phishing e-mails and websites 
 They did not believe they would be tricked 
 The fake website looked almost identical to a legitimate one 
 They lacked awareness and training about phishing 
 The e-mail came up with sense of urgency and surprise 
 They trusted the e-mail because they did not know about phishing (this confirms 
the response in the previous question) 
 They were not aware of the importance of the information they had divulged. 
 
The above responses indicate all of the above reasons were significant causes of Qatari 
participants‟ falling prey to e-mail phishing attacks (see Figure 5.17).  
 
In conclusion, the extent of the e-mail phishing threat in the State of Qatar is high in 
view of the regular quantity of phishing e-mails received in participants‟ e-mail inboxes 
and the rate of successful phishing attacks.   
 
 
Figure 5.16: Frequency of being tricked by e-mail phishing (Qatar) 
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Figure 5.17: Reason for participants’ being tricked by phishing (Qatar) 
 
5.  Defence against e-mail phishing 
Although the use of technological protective solutions such as anti-phishing tools and 
software will assist in identifying and protecting against the phishing threat, phishers are 
still improving and trying to bypass those technological solutions and phishing is also 
related directly to human decision making and behaviour. Therefore, technological 
protective solutions are not able to diminish the risk of incorrect user behaviour. This 
was understood by about one third of participants who believe that anti-phishing 
software is not effective enough to protect online users from the professional and 
talented phishers today, since most who use it commented that they still receive 
phishing e-mails and viruses even though they use such software. In contrast, about the 
same percentage said that such software was very effective (see Figure 5.18). 
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Figure 5.18: Efficiency of existing anti-phishing software (Qatar) 
Although there are lots of ways to protect against e-mail phishing attacks, it was of 
interest to discover Qatari participants‟ outlook on the best way to defend themselves. 
The responses were positive, since most (66%) considered awareness to be the best 
defence, then came use of technological solutions, guidelines and, finally, fewer than 
10% think that the experience of getting infected by phishing would be the best method 
of defence. In addition, others suggested that they follow employer policies, 
continuously upgrading protective software (see Figure 5.19). 
 
Figure 5.19: The best way to defend against phishing (Qatar) 
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Figure 5.20: Participants’ preferred method for awareness and education (Qatar) 
 
Most participants, about 77%, preferred to be educated about e-mail phishing through 
web-based e-learning and media. The rest prefer other tools ranging from videos, 
seminars, newsletters, posters, interactive games, screen savers to cartoons (see Figure 
5.20). Furthermore, interviews have revealed the importance of considering the 
background of people before applying an awareness programme, since participants' 
background has a major influence on their responses. 
 
5.6.1.2  In-depth Analysis of the Qatar Questionnaire 
Creating relationships between variables was significant in the analysis of the 
questionnaire results. Since the main target is Qatari people, an in-depth analysis was 
carried out only for the questionnaire used in Qatar. This was undertaken to define 
possible relationships between the questionnaire variables for better understanding of 
the outcome.  
The chi-squared test (χ2) is used to test hypotheses. In this research, the test was applied 
to show the relationships between the responses gathered in Qatar using a null 
hypothesis which states that there is no relation between the responses: 
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H0= The two responses are not related 
with  
H1= The two responses are related  
χ2 was calculated using the following formula: (Bluman, 2008: 578-584; Bock et al., 
2007: 608-615) 
 
where  is the observed number of individuals in category  and  is the expected 
number of individuals in category . 
In this research, the value of P (level of significance) is usually 1%, 5% and 10%. For 
small P value, χ2 is larger and this leads to the rejection of H0, therefore 5% was chosen 
as the target level. An online chi-squared calculator was used (Kirkman, 1996) 
There were some relationships between the following variables according to the chi-
squared test: 
1. Worries about e-mail phishing with age, education and occupation.  
2. E-mail phishing level of knowledge with age and education. 
3. Divulgence of e-mail addresses with gender, worries of e-mail phishing and e-mail 
phishing level of knowledge.  
4. Use of anti-phishing software with divulgence of e-mail addresses and efficiency of 
anti-phishing software 
In brief, the major findings of the analysis are as follows (see Appendix A for the full 
results): 
 
1. E-mail phishing level of knowledge.  
The chi-squared test shows clearly a relation between level of knowledge with age and 
education. Responses show that about one third of participants with different ages have 
the required knowledge of e-mail phishing and this was less (about 28%) for 
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participants aged 18-29. The majority of those with postgraduate and school education 
levels have a required level of knowledge, more than those with further or higher 
education and others.  
 
2. Participants’ worries about phishing.  
It was discovered that most Qatari participants of middle age, 30-50, were slightly less 
worried about e-mail phishing than other age groups. Business men and participants 
with school education were less worried about e-mail phishing than those with other 
educational levels and occupations. 
 
3. Participants’ disclosure of their e-mail addresses.  
Males were more likely to disclose their e-mail information than females since about 
65% of them did so in the survey. This is likely to be because the culture of Qatar is 
such that females would not normally disclose their private information such as phone 
numbers and e-mail addresses.  
 
One shocking result is that 100% of participants with „expert‟ knowledge failed the 
penetration test by giving their e-mail addresses, in contrast to participants with other 
levels of knowledge. This means most participants who thought that they had expert 
knowledge actually did not notice the possible tricks that phishers would use to trick 
their victims, so their knowledge was not as good as they believed. Therefore, Qatari 
citizens should understand that phishing is becoming more sophisticated and that 
achieving a „good‟ or „expert‟ level is not easy and requires continuous updating of their 
knowledge of e-mail phishing. Those who failed in this test stated in the interview that 
this question was trusted because it was within a survey for a research purpose and 
some said they did not think their e-mail addresses were confidential information that 
should not be disclosed. 
Most of the participants (70%) who were worried about e-mail phishing succeeded in 
passing the penetration test, since most of them did not disclose their own e-mail 
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addresses. This implies worries of e-mail phishing have a significant influence on the 
awareness of people since this makes them more cautious and therefore less vulnerable 
to falling prey to phishing. In addition, more than 50% of participants who use anti-
phishing software did not disclose their e-mail addresses. This implies that they are 
aware of phishing. However, the interviews show that most users of such software may 
rely too much on their software to detect phishing which makes them more vulnerable 
than others in the case where e-mail bypasses the software, as they tend to trust such 
e-mail.  Although there is no need to be over concerned about phishing, there should be 
a balance of concerns about e-mail phishing so that users will not take the wrong 
decisions and this aspect is considered in the awareness programme research in this 
thesis. 
 
4. Use of anti-phishing software  
The majority of participants who use anti-phishing software were confused about the 
efficiency of what exists and about one third were not sure or found it efficient. However, 
about 38% found the software was not enough to rely on for detecting all possible types of 
phishing, even though the anti-phishing software will also designate some legitimate 
e-mails as phishing. They agreed that although the software helps to detect a lot of the 
phishing e-mails, it will not detect them all. 
 
5.6.2   General Analysis of UK Questionnaire  
The ultimate aim of this data collection is to measure Qatari citizen‟s awareness of 
e-mail phishing and their vision of defence against this attack compared to citizens of 
developed nations. Hence a similar questionnaire was used in the UK, an example of a 
developed country, in order to provide such a comparison. Quantitative analysis of the 
outcomes in the UK was made according to the defined questionnaire variables (see 
section 5.6.1). 1000 British citizens who met the sampling criteria were surveyed, with 
demographic details as follows: 
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1. Background information  
Male participants were slightly more than females. Nearly half the participants were in 
the age group 18-29 (50%), with the next biggest group being aged 30-50 (35%). About 
half of the participants had further or higher education, then come postgraduate students 
(29%). With regard to occupation, most were employees (52%) and there were many 
students (50%) (see Figures 5.21-5.24). 
 
  
Figure 5.21: Gender (UK) 
 
Figure 5.22: Age group (UK) 
 
Figure 5.23: Education level (UK) 
                                                                                           Chapter 5: Surveying Awareness of Phishing 
131 
 
Figure 5.24: Occupation (UK) 
 
2. Knowledge of e-mail phishing 
The majority of participants claim to have an „average‟ or „good‟ knowledge of e-mail 
phishing and about one third of UK participants have the required knowledge (see 
Figure 5.25). The majority (about 68%) indicated the Internet as the main source of their 
knowledge, then came the academic sector (34%) and media (26%), with only a few 
indicating employers (11%) (see Figure 5.26). Most participants forecasted phishing 
would be an increasing threat in the UK, the majority (about 68%) forecast the trend of 
phishing is increasing and only a few (about 12%) thought it is staying the same or 
decreasing. The rest (about 21%) didn‟t know (see Figure 5.27). 
 
 
Figure 5.25: E-mail phishing knowledge (UK) 
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Figure 5.26: Source of knowledge (UK) 
 
Figure 5.27: Trend of e-mail phishing (UK) 
 
3. Vulnerability to e-mail phishing 
The survey outcome shows that the UK is less susceptible to e-mail phishing attacks 
since most respondents do worry about e-mail phishing, most use protective software 
and most know how to detect such attacks and the action to take once tricked. Only a 
few failed the penetration test which aimed to phish their e-mail addresses. 
Worries about e-mail phishing and the use of anti-phishing software are high in the UK. 
A high proportion of participants (89%) worry about e-mail phishing and about the 
same percentage (81%) use software to protect themselves from phishing (see Figures 
5.28 and 5.29).   
 
It is a good indication that most of the UK participants (73%) recognise how to detect 
phishing e-mails, only 20% of them failed in detecting the legitimate e-mails and a very 
few participants (7%) did not know how to spot such attacks (see Table 5.1). Most 
detected e-mail phishing in e-mails that convey a sense of urgency and surprise and 
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those which ask for their account details (see Figure 5.30). In addition, about one third 
of respondents carry out all the listed actions to protect themselves once tricked and 
only 18% do nothing. The rest would perform some of the listed actions, mostly 
changing account details, checking their financial statements and reporting to the bank 
or other bodies (see Figure 5.31).  Although the majority (79%) declined the request for 
their e-mail addresses, some (21%) did fail in this test and disclosed their private 
information.  However, only 3% knew that such a request was a type of phishing. A few 
(less than 1%) provided more than one e-mail (see Figure 5.32).  
 
Figure 5.28: Participants' worry about e-mail phishing (UK) 
 
Figure 5.29: Use of anti-phishing software (UK) 
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Figure 5.30: Participants' ability to detect phishing attack (UK) 
 
Figure 5.31: Participants' procedure once attacked (UK) 
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Figure 5.32: Participants’ disclosure of own e-mail addresses (UK) 
 
4. Extent of e-mail phishing 
The responses show that the extent of e-mail phishing in UK is quite high, with only 
17% of participants indicating that they never receive such e-mails. The majority (about 
83%) indicate that they receive such e-mails on a regular basis, mostly monthly or 
weekly (see Figure 5.33). However, the majority of participants (68%) claim they have 
never fallen prey to e-mail phishing. About a quarter knew they had been tricked, 
ranging from once to more than 3 times and only 5% did not know (see Figure 5.34). 
Most who were tricked blamed the smart tricks phishers use, the fake websites that 
looked legitimate and a lack of anti-phishing software (see Figure 5.35). 
 
Figure 5. 33: Frequency of receiving phishing e-mails (UK) 
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Figure 5.34: Frequency of being tricked by e-mail phishing (UK) 
 
Figure 5.35: Reason for participants’ being tricked by phishing (UK) 
 
5. Defence against e-mail phishing 
39% indicated that anti-phishing software is not enough to protect against all kinds of 
phishing, 24% do think existing technological solutions are effective enough and the 
rest do not know (see Figure 5.36). Also, the majority (77%) consider the awareness of 
the phishing threat as the best means of defence against such attack, then comes the use 
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of anti-phishing software, policies and guidelines and, finally, experience of getting 
affected by phishing was found to be an effective way of learning about phishing (see 
Figure 5.37). With regard to awareness, most participants prefer to be educated about 
phishing through the media, e-learning, newsletters, videos and seminars (see Figure 
5.38). 
 
 
Figure 5.36: Efficiency of existing anti-phishing software (UK) 
 
 
Figure 5.37: Best way to defend against phishing (UK) 
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Figure 5.38: Participants’ preferred method for awareness and education (UK) 
 
5.7  Comparison of Questionnaire Outcomes for the UK and Qatar  
The chi-squared test (χ2) was used to compare the responses gathered in the UK and 
Qatar according to the following hypotheses (Bluman, 2008: 578-584; Velleman and De 
Veaux, 2007: 608-615; Kirkman, 1996; Bock et al., 2007): 
H0= Responses and country are independent. Therefore, it implies no significant 
difference between the UK and Qatar result. 
H1= Responses and country are related. Therefore, it implies a significant difference 
between the UK and Qatar result.  
 
In conclusion, the test results show that there is definitely a significant difference 
between responses in each country except for the following: e-mail phishing level of 
knowledge, use of anti-phishing software and reason for being tricked (see Appendix A 
for test results) 
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A comparison between responses in each country is given below:  
 
1. Knowledge of e-mail phishing 
The knowledge of e-mail phishing is about the same in Qatar as in the developed 
country, the UK. One third of participants in the UK and Qatar have the required 
knowledge on e-mail phishing. 
There is a misunderstanding by Qatari participants on their level of knowledge of e-mail 
phishing.  The majority of those interviewed thought that they had expert knowledge of 
e-mail phishing since they know how to use the computer and the Internet very well in 
chatting and accessing information or they have heard about the term phishing. Most 
have gained their knowledge from the Internet and media. However, the academic 
sector in UK plays a greater role in educating people about e-mail phishing compared to 
Qatar, with an additional 10% of British citizens having gained their knowledge from 
this source. Furthermore, the majority (over 60%) believe e-mail phishing is an 
increasing trend.  
 
2.  Vulnerability to e-mail phishing 
Vulnerability to phishing in Qatar is very high compared to the UK, because of the 
following: 
o UK citizens are more worried (about 20% more) about phishing compared to Qatari. 
o Compared to Qatar, the use of anti-phishing software is higher in the UK. A high 
percentage of UK citizens (about 10% more than Qatari) use anti-phishing software 
to protect themselves from attacks  
o The UK public are aware of phishing techniques and are better at detecting phishing 
e-mails than Qatari citizens. In contrast to Qatari citizens, only a few British 
participants do not know how to detect phishing e-mails, a greater percentage of 
British participants (28% more compared to Qatari) have successfully detected 
phishing e-mails and only a few (20%) failed to identify legitimate e-mails 
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compared to Qatari citizens, where the figure is doubled (44%). However, the level 
of detection for different phishing e-mails was nearly the same for both Qatari and 
UK participants, most of whom detected e-mails asking users to provide their 
account details and those conveying a sense of urgency and surprise.   
o Compared to Qatari citizens, the British are more concerned once they have been 
tricked by phishing and about one third of them try to take all possible actions to 
protect themselves from possible consequences of such attack, whereas only 10% do 
so in Qatar. Nevertheless, the types of response for each action for both sets of 
citizens was similar, where most do change their account details, check their 
financial statements, cancel their credit cards and report the incident to their banks.   
o The e-mail request indicated that British citizens are more aware of phishing since 
most (79%) do not fall for this trick compared to Qatari citizens, where the 
percentage of failure reached 38%. Even the identification of such a request as 
phishing was higher for UK citizens. 
 
3.  Extent of e-mail phishing 
According to the questionnaire, UK citizens receive more phishing e-mails (about 10% 
more) compared to Qatari citizens. However, fewer (27%) UK citizens were tricked by 
them compared to Qataris, where the figure reached 50%. In addition, two thirds of UK 
citizens have never been tricked (67%) compared to just over one third of Qatari 
citizens (about 40%). Nevertheless, the reasons for being tricked were similar for both, 
where most users blamed the smart tricks used by phishers, the lack of technological 
protection (e.g. spam filters), users‟ not believing they would be tricked, the legitimate 
appearance of a fake website and a lack of awareness. However, the responses give an 
indication that UK citizens believe that lack of awareness was one of the main reasons 
for their being tricked (UK responses show a result of about 10% more compared to 
Qatar). 
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4.  Defence against e-mail phishing 
There are minor differences between the responses in Qatar and UK with regard to the 
variables related to defence against e-mail phishing. Although about one third of the 
participants in both societies were unsure about judging the effectiveness of existing 
anti-phishing technological tools, about the same percentage (more than one third) 
found anti-phishing technological tools not to be efficient in providing enough 
protection against phishing since most still receive the offending e-mails. Awareness 
and education were considered in both societies as the supreme method of defence 
against e-mail phishing, with the percentage somewhat higher in the UK compared to 
Qatar (about 10% greater in UK). With regard to the method of creating awareness, 
participants in both the UK and Qatar preferred education about phishing through 
media, videos, seminars, newsletters and posters, with less than 20% preferring 
interactive quizzes and games. However, it might be a good idea to have such a method 
where education is carried out with fun. 
 
5.8  Summary 
Surveys of Qatari and British e-mail users provided a profile of their awareness of 
e-mail phishing and their views on the best method of defence against this attack. The 
questionnaire design passed through several stages, first review and then pilot-test to 
achieve an effective and carefully designed questionnaire which was then completed in 
the UK and Qatar by a broad sample of respondents. It addresses the knowledge of 
e-mail phishing, vulnerability of participants, extent of e-mail phishing and defence 
against it. Later, the questionnaire results were gathered and analysed quantitatively 
according to defined variables. Interviews with participants supported the questionnaire 
outcome. 
In conclusion, responses for Qatari e-mail users show that there is a problem of e-mail 
phishing in Qatar since most participants forecast that the e-mail phishing trend is 
increasing and many receive phishing e-mail regularly, with a high rate of successful 
phishing attacks.  
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In addition, Qatari citizens are generally vulnerable to e-mail phishing threat; the survey 
has recognised a number of the aspects which make Qatari citizens vulnerable to 
phishing, as follows: 
1. There is a lack of knowledge and awareness deficiency on phishing threats, 
indicated by participants not being able to distinguish phishing attempts from 
legitimate e-mails, with the failure in detection reaching 57% and 44% for phishing 
and legitimate e-mails, respectively. In addition, about 38% disclosed their e-mail 
addresses upon request. Few (about one third) have the required knowledge (good to 
expert) of e-mail phishing. However, more than 70% were worried about the e-mail 
phishing threat, but there is still clearly a lack of knowledge on phishing. Therefore, 
these worries should be exploited in enhancing people's awareness of the phishing 
threat without intimidating them. 
2. Although there is a high use (about 69%) of anti-phishing software, about half of the 
users were confused about the effectiveness and reliability of anti-phishing software 
in providing enough protection against the phishing threat. 
3. The majority does not know how to protect themselves against phishing attacks and 
how to detect and react to phishing, e.g. do not understand security indicators and 
some think phishing is limited to online communications. Fewer than 10% of the 
participants take all required actions once they have been tricked by phishing and 
about a seventh of them do not react at all because either they did not know that 
there is a specialised body (Q-CERT) which handles Internet crimes in Qatar or they 
have little trust in the ability of the police and the company whose e-mail address or 
website was faked to investigate the case. 
4. Qataris are affected by the manner of incentives and disincentives, since more than 
half of the participants do not distinguish phishing e-mails which convey a sense of 
urgency and surprise. 
5. The surrounding culture leads Qatari citizens to be ashamed to report that they have 
been trapped by phishing 
6. About 30% did not believe they would be tricked 
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The results show clearly that there is a need for enhancing Qataris‟ awareness of e-mail 
phishing, especially since 66% considered awareness to be the best defence against 
phishing, with 77% preferring to be educated through web-based e-learning and media 
and other tools such as seminars, posters, interactive games and cartoons. Therefore, the 
rest of this thesis focuses on awareness of e-mail phishing as a method to reduce 
phishing in Qatar. It can be concluded that responses for e-mail phishing level of 
knowledge, use of anti-phishing software and reasons for being tricked were similar for 
both Qatar and the UK. However, other responses were significantly different, with a 
much higher vulnerability to phishing in Qatar than in the UK. 
 
The next chapter describes the experiments in Qatar to understand Qatari citizen‟s 
vulnerability to e-mail phishing and attempts to investigate further the cultural and 
country-specific factors which make phishing successful in Qatar. This will then be 
considered in the development of the proposed awareness framework. 
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Chapter 6       Penetration Tests and Laboratory Experiment 
 
This chapter describes experiments in the State of Qatar to measure the vulnerability of 
Qataris to e-mail phishing and their ability to differentiate such attack from legitimate 
e-mails. Also, it outlines the factors which make Qatari citizens vulnerable to e-mail 
phishing attacks such as cultural, country-specific factors, interests and beliefs, effect of 
religion and personal characteristics. Some of these factors were already identified 
earlier in previous chapters but in this chapter Qataris‟ vulnerability to phishing is 
addressed in depth empirically. Also addressed in this chapter is whether there are 
specific criteria for phishing victims as discussed in Chapter 4 in interviews with 
experts in the field of e-crime. 
 
6.1  The Phishing Experiments 
Many researchers focus on studying why people could fall victims to phishing by means 
of experiments, either in the laboratory or in reality, using tests which aim to assess 
people‟s ability to distinguish phishing e-mails. These researchers have made some 
findings but they do not recognise the aspects which might make people vulnerable to 
phishing, including cultural, country-specific and other factors (see Chapter 2). 
Therefore, this research focuses on studying the possible factors which affect users‟ 
response to phishing, leading them to be possible victims. 
 
Three experiments were used in this research: penetration test 1, penetration test 2 and a 
laboratory experiment. Different participants were used in each experiment in order to 
get a reliable outcome from experiments on how vulnerable they are to phishing. To 
measure and evaluate Qataris‟ vulnerability to e-mail phishing real and anonymous e-
mail phishing penetration tests were applied to two sample groups: company employees 
and a convenience sample of Qatari citizens. The laboratory experiment is a form of 
phishing experimental laboratory using a sample of Qatari government employees to 
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identify their ability to distinguish legitimate e-mails from phishing ones and identify 
their vulnerability to phishing and why.  
Following the experiments, interviews were held with employers, participants and 
experts in IT awareness and culture in order to get a better understanding of why Qataris 
are vulnerable to e-mail phishing attacks. Samples were chosen according to their 
convenience and job titles. Several interviews (see Chapter 3 for brief plan) were also 
held for each experiment with the following people: 
Penetration test 1:    
- Some of the 129 participants in the test 
- The Managing Director of AAB (Abdulghani and Brothers), one of the most 
successful automobile businesses in Qatar  
- The Manager of IT, the head of the IT section and the network administrator in the 
IT department at AAB. 
Penetration test 2: 
- The 30 participants in the test 
- An Information Scientist working with Outreach and Training at Q-CERT (Qatar 
Computer Emergency Response Team), Qatar‟s coordination centre for dealing 
with Internet security problems.  
- The Acting OA&T manager at Q-CERT 
- The Senior Incident Manager at Q-CERT 
Laboratory experiment: 
- The participants in the experiment  (30) 
- A First Lieutenant and Network Engineer in the IT department of the Ministry of 
Interior, State of Qatar.   
- A First Lieutenant and Software engineer in the IT department of the Ministry of 
Interior, State of Qatar.   
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- A First Lieutenant and Information Security Specialist in the IT department of the 
Ministry of Interior, State of Qatar. 
- A Post-Doctoral Research Assistant and Teaching Fellow at Bradford University in 
the UK 
- The Head of Middle East Operations at InfoGuard, a Swiss company specialising in 
information security 
- An Information Scientist working with Outreach and Training at Q-CERT 
- The Cultural Attaché at the Qatar Embassy in London 
- A Researcher in Qatar culture from the Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage in 
Qatar 
Finally, this chapter concludes by identifying the factors which make Qataris 
susceptible to falling prey to phishing attacks, some of which were discovered as well in 
previous chapters (Chapter 4 and 5). 
 
6.2  Penetration Tests 
The vulnerabilities of Qataris to e-mail phishing attacks was tested in reality through 
two penetration tests, one with a sample of Qatari employees from one organisation in 
Qatar and the other with a sample of the Qatari public. Both tests aimed at tricking them 
by taking advantage of their beliefs and interests. In these tests, spear phishing attacks 
were made on highly specific targets, instead of sending a huge amount of e-mails to 
large numbers of people (Microsoft, 2006).  
 
6.2.1 Test 1 
The aim of this study was to identify the state of awareness of e-mail phishing for a 
sample of Qatari employees and the possibility of phishers to reach sensitive 
organisational or private information by tricking employees with e-mail phishing 
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attacks using different techniques. The target for this test was a medium-sized Qatari 
organisation with an e-mail system regularly used by its employees in their daily 
operations. 
6.2.2  Authorisation 
Permission had been sought to do such a test in governmental and private organisations. 
However, due to its sensitivity, it was difficult to find a government organisation to 
authorise the study because legal and other permissions are required from a sequence of 
senior officials and governmental bodies, which is time-consuming and not guaranteed. 
Therefore, a private company was sought to support the study in their premises and, 
finally, a private company, Abdullah Abdulghani and Brothers (AAB), agreed to allow 
the study with its employees. 
 
AAB is one of the most successful automobile businesses in Qatar, with a good 
reputation in the market through its customers, business partners and employees. It sells 
two makes of car, Lexus and Toyota, and has developed from its early beginnings with 
small sales and only 30 staff to vast annual sales and more than 1600 staff. AAB is 
managed by a Board of Directors currently consisting of the Chairman, Abdulrahman 
Abdullah Abdulghani, Vice-Chairman Abdulrahman Abduljaleel Abdulghani, and the 
Managing Director, Dr. Nasser Abdulghani Abdulghani. The authorisation for study 
was given by those three top managers. The company has maintained its position in the 
market through ensuring quality of product and services. Currently, AAB has 
undertaken a major BPR (Business Process Reengineering) programme in order to cope 
with the challenges ahead, keeping in line with the huge world competition and aiming 
for more than 8 million global sales by the year 2010 (AAB, 2003).   
 
In an interview, the Managing Director stated that the AAB mission is to maintain the 
number 1 position in the automobile industry in Qatar and this would be  
achieved by enhancing its current solid reputation established over 40 years ago through 
providing the highest standards of quality customer service. He commented that the 
company will continue to meet its social responsibilities as one of the emerging leaders 
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in the business community, contributing to the national cause by actively participating 
in the country‟s economic, social and cultural activities. He added that AAB is 
supporting education and students, and would, therefore, accept the study on its 
employees, and it would be beneficial for the company in measuring their vulnerability 
to phishing attacks and their awareness of such a threat.   
 
6.2.3  Test 1 Process 
The process of the e-mail phishing penetration test involved three phases: planning and 
designing, running the test and, finally, analysing results and discussing findings to 
achieve the overall aim of the study (see Figure 6.1). Each phase is explained as 
follows:   
 
 
Figure 6.1: Penetration test 1 
 
6.2.3.1  Planning and Design 
Planning this study was done with cooperation from the AAB Company. An in-depth 
discussion group was set up with the researcher and three employees from AAB‟s IT 
department: Mr. T. Nagarajan, Manager of IT, Mr. H. Fitrianto, Head of the IT section, 
and Mr. T. Nava, a Network Administrator.  Discussions with these IT professionals 
were necessary to set up a plan for the study suitable for both the researcher and AAB. 
 
Since only Qatari employees were targeted, it was necessary to ensure the study 
excluded non-Qataris. The Manager of IT stated that AAB has about 1,600 employees 
from different nationalities (Indian, Egyptian, Lebanese, etc.) and about 400 of them use 
the company e-mail system in their daily operations. It was necessary to exclude the 
other nationalities and Qatari top managers due to the sensitivity of such a study. 
Plan & 
Design  
Run test Analyse results & 
discuss findings 
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Ultimately, the study sample consisted of only 129 Qatari employees. Regarding the 
phishing e-mails, the Head of IT and the Network Administrator suggested using 
complex phishing attacks, ruling out straightforward ones like winning in a lottery, 
which is becoming well known to Qataris.  
 
Finally, discussions concluded on using three phishing e-mails with different techniques 
to trick employees. Since AAB stated that communications within the company are 
usually in English and all employees have a good level of English, it was agreed that the 
e-mails should be in English. These e-mails were: 
 E-mail 1: a request for account verification,  
 E-mail 2: a request to download an attachment,  
 E-mail 3: a request for private information by e-mail or SMS  
Details of the planning of the three phishing e-mails are given in Appendix C pp. 355-
365. 
 
1. E-mail 1: A request for account verification 
This e-mail conveyed a sense of urgency and it looked official (see Figure 6.2). It aimed 
to direct employees to disclose sensitive information (username and password) into a 
fake website which looked identical to the legitimate one (AAB company webmail) 
except that the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) was different from the original, 
genuine AAB webmail page http://webmail.aabqatar.com/Login.aspx (see Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2: E-mail 1 (Account verification) 
In addition, the e-mail message contained some grammatical errors not usually found in 
official e-mails (see Section 2.5.2.1.1) (see Figure 6.2, error highlighted in red). This 
was another clue which could identify the illegitimacy of the e-mail. The fake webpage 
had PHP (Hypertext Preprocessor) script to record any username and password entered 
in the fields; also, it contained a counter using a Google analytics tool to count visitors 
to the website (see Appendix C for design details). Furthermore, the test applied 
embedded training, where victims who failed in the test and had given their login details 
were directed automatically to a webpage which alerted them to phishing. The alert 
message is shown in Figure 6.3. 
who 
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Figure 6.3: Embedded training alert message 
E-mail 2: A request to download an attachment 
This e-mail conveyed a sense of surprise and excitement to trick employees to 
download the attachment which is interesting for most employees in AAB, „The latest 
Toyota car model‟ (see Figure 6.4). Although the attachment was safe, this e-mail 
assessed employees‟ vulnerability to falling prey to phishing e-mails which may contain 
viruses or Trojan horses in an attachment.  The attachment had a counter using the 
Google analytics tool to count the number of people who download the attachment file 
(see Appendix C, pp.359-360 for more details). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: E-mail 2 (Request to download attachment) 
Alert Message 
 
age 
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E-mail 3: A request for private information by e-mail or SMS 
This e-mail asked employees to disclose their name and country through offline 
communications (telephone) or an online communication (e-mail). The e-mail conveyed 
a sense of moral decency and urgency and tried to exploit people‟s emotions by 
discussing human cloning and requesting support for a petition against it (see Figure 
6.5).    Please see amendments in the Appendix C version. 
 
Figure 6.5: E-mail 3 (Request for private information by e-mail or SMS) 
 
Due to the confidentiality of such a study, it was agreed that the IT team in AAB would 
have full control of the reality study by providing them with all the files and databases 
required to have control of all of the information disclosed in the study (i.e. access to 
the web host supplied in e-mails 1 and 2, access to the e-mail address and phone number 
and e-mail address supplied in e-mail 3). Moreover, to ensure the privacy and security 
of the study, they undertook the implementation and provided the researcher with the 
results. In order to ensure a fair study, the AAB team used an unknown e-mail address 
to send the three e-mails to the 129 Qatari employees. 
 
6.2.3.2  Running the test 
Before running the study, it was necessary to ensure that the three e-mails were received 
in the mail inbox and not in the junk or spam mail, in order to assess employees‟ 
responses to attacks that breached the technological phishing defences (e.g. spam filter 
and anti-virus software). In addition, a test was made to determine whether the AAB 
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e-mail system allows the sending of valid confidential information such as usernames 
and passwords from its e-mail system. 
It was found that the three e-mails sent to the IT Manager were received in his e-mail 
inbox which means they were not filtered by the AAB e-mail system and that it also 
allowed the sending of employees‟ valid account information. For comparison, the 
author applied the same test to the Loughborough University e-mail system; it was 
encouraging to discover that the system does not allow sending of valid Loughborough 
e-mail account information (i.e. username and password).   
It was agreed to send the three e-mails one at a time and a reminder after one week to 
remind employees and to present a sense of urgency. After two weeks, the results of the 
study were gathered. The researcher required the following information from the study: 
From the Microsoft Outlook Read Notification:  
This gives the number of employees who read the three e-mails. However, this is still 
not very reliable because the recipients have to confirm the read notification. 
Nevertheless, it gives an indication of the approximate number of employees who have 
read the e-mail. 
From the website counter (Google analytics tool):   
This gives the number of employees who entered the website supplied in e-mail 1 and 
downloaded the attachments in e-mail 2.  
From the website database in e-mail 1:  
This gives the number of employees who would disclose their account information 
(username and password) 
From the e-mail address and phone number supplied in e-mail 3: 
This gives the number of employees who would disclose their private information on 
either communication channel (phone or e-mail)  
From AAB’s IT call centre:  
This gives the number of employees who reported the case or called for assistance. 
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Due to the confidentiality of the information required in e-mail 1, AAB did not agree to 
the inspection and validation of the disclosed information (i.e. username and password).   
 
6.2.3.3  Analysis of the Results and Discussion of the Findings 
The results of the study gathered from the AAB team (see Table 6.1) were a shock for 
AAB, as nearly half (44.2%) of the employees had failed in the reality study. Most 
failures were with e-mail 2 and then e-mail 1, with only a few failing on e-mail 3. The 
IT Manager noted that there were no replies by SMS which might be due to its cost.  
However, the percentage of people who read the e-mails was quite low: 29%, 27.1% 
and 21% for e-mails 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The AAB team explained this low figure 
with the possibility that some employees might ignore the e-mails because they detect 
them as phishing and some might not be interested. They also referred to the 
inopportune timing of the study in summer when most employees were on vacation and 
did not check their e-mails. However, that was the most convenient timing for both the 
researcher and the AAB team. Nevertheless, the percentage of people who became 
victims in the attack as a proportion of those who read the phishing e-mails was very 
high, at 95-99%. Furthermore, more than 97% of people who entered the URL given in 
e-mail 1 did then verify their account information. This implies that most victims do not 
have the ability to recognise phishing attempts from an e-mail message with a fake 
website by checking the URL. It was reported by AAB that out of the 72.1% of 
employees who took positive action by calling the IT department for assistance on the 
received phishing e-mails, there was a high percentage (59%) for e-mail 1 and none for 
e-mail 3.  
 
The AAB team reported receiving more calls from employees requesting help on e-mail 
1 because it looked official, as though it was from the AAB Webmail Administrator, 
and a lot of employees were concerned, whereas the other two were not related to AAB, 
especially e-mail 3 about human cloning. They added that they did not expect that 
nearly half would succumb to phishing, and e-mail 2 made them concerned that their 
employees are vulnerable to viruses or Trojan programs. In addition, e-mail 1 comes 
                 Chapter 6: Penetration Tests and Laboratory Experiment 
155 
next in the number of failures and it was a shock for the AAB team that 15% of the 129 
employees had disclosed their confidential information. On the other hand, fewer 
employees fell prey to e-mail 3 (only 4%), which is a good point to consider. However, 
AAB mentioned that e-mails 1 and 2 are more hazardous than e-mail 3 which asked for 
general private information (name and country) that will not cause major consequences 
for the company compared to viruses accessing employees‟ PCs or to unauthorised 
persons‟ access to employees‟ e-mail accounts. In conclusion, the ABB team deduced 
that there is a need for a programme to enhance employees‟ awareness of phishing.  
Table 6.1: Results of Reality Study 1 
Reality study 1 results 
Total e-mails sent to Qatari employees 129 
E-mail 1 
Received read notification from users 54 41.8% 
Users opened URL given in e-mail 49 38% 
Users verified their e-mail account 19 15% 
Users called the IT department 22 59% 
E-mail 2 
Received read notification from users 35 27.1% 
Users downloaded attachment given in e-mail 33 26% 
Users called the IT department 5 14% 
Email 3 
Received read notification from users 27 21% 
Users replied by e-mail 5 4% 
Users replied  by SMS None 
Users called the IT department None 
 
The penetration test has identified the factors which make Qatari employees susceptible 
to phishing attacks. The factors, having been discovered from the test outcome, were 
were further explored through interviews held with the AAB IT team. The results are 
summarised in Table 6.2. 
                 Chapter 6: Penetration Tests and Laboratory Experiment 
156 
Table 6.2: Vulnerabilities identified in Penetration Test 1 
Factors making Qatari employees susceptible to 
phishing 
Evidence 
Most do not react/ report phishing incidents. 79% did not report to the IT 
department 
Qataris are affected by incentives and disincentives 
which can lead sometimes to circulating and 
exchanging of phishing e-mails and sites among 
people, which give phishing credibility. 
There is a lack of knowledge on Internet threats, in 
particular, phishing threats and on how to protect 
themselves against phishing attacks and how to 
detect phishing. 
Interview with employer and IT 
team at AAB. 
44% failed in the test where all 
e-mails involved incentives and 
disincentives matters.  About half 
have lack of awareness of 
phishing. 
They trust official communications, especially 
through their employers 
 
 
15% failed on  e-mail 1 which 
involved the use of official 
communication and trust of 
employers 
A few Qataris are motivated by religious and moral 
considerations, being helpful, emotional and good 
willed in their philanthropy, compassion and 
clemency, especially for people in need. Maybe it 
was not interesting and attractive for this group for 
particular reasons. 
 4% have failed on e-mail 3 which 
exploits people‟s emotion. 
Qataris have a curiosity and seek out knowledge and 
discovery, especially in matters close to their 
interests.  
Qataris have a susceptibility to different kinds of 
temptations, to satisfy their desires and needs 
26% failed on e-mail 2.  
Interview with the employer and IT 
team in AAB. 
Discussions with the employer 
It is in their nature of Qataris to feel too embarrassed 
and stupid to mention or report phishing and that 
they have fallen prey to it. 
Interview with the employer and IT 
team in AAB. 
Many Qataris have not absorbed the technology, 
especially with the rapid development experienced 
in Qatar. 
Some have overconfidence in technological tools, 
especially anti-virus software, for protecting 
against all kinds of phishing. 
Interview with the employer and IT 
team in AAB. However, this is in 
conflict with the survey results in 
Chapter 5 where Qataris were 
found to be confused about the 
reliability of such tools 
  
6.2.4   Conclusion  
The penetration test showed that the state of awareness of e-mail phishing for Qatari 
employees in AAB needs to be improved since about 44% failed in the test, which 
means there is a possibility of phishers‟ reaching sensitive organisational information or 
private information. It was found that phishing e-mails with attachments are more 
successful in tricking employees than official-looking ones which asked for confidential 
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information and e-mails which exploit people‟s moral feelings. In addition, the result 
shows that victims were unable to recognise phishing attacks from the fake URL given 
or from the e-mail message being from an unknown sender or from an e-mail which 
contains a deceptive message with either a request for information or downloading of 
files which contain viruses.   
Although this study was made with a small sample of employees in one organisation in 
Qatar, it was valuable since it assessed Qatari employees‟ responses to phishing e-mails 
in reality. However, there was a need for another penetration test where the researcher 
would have more control, could use different phishing techniques, make the study on a 
sample of Qataris with different backgrounds (age, education, occupation and computer 
knowledge) and interact with them. The second penetration test was therefore carried 
out. 
6.3  Penetration Test 2  
Phishing has two parts: as well as the technical aspects, there is social engineering, 
where phishers try to study the community and the characteristics of victims for use in 
tricking them and attaining their goal.  
From the literature and from the interviews held with the officer of the Computer 
Crimes Unit in the Ministry of Interior and the information security specialists in 
Q-CERT in the field of e-crime and awareness (see Chapters 2 and 4), it can be 
concluded that phishers usually study the interests of potential victims to use them to 
attract their targets. This study aims to assess the vulnerability of Qatari citizens to 
being tricked when phishers try to attract them using their interests. The intention was to 
conduct an anonymous experiment which targeted a selected sample of Qatari e-mail 
users aged over 12 with different backgrounds in age, education, occupation and 
computer knowledge.   
6.3.1  Test 2 Process 
The spear phishing penetration test went through different stages from planning and 
designing through conducting the experiment to, ultimately, analysing the results and 
discussing the findings (see Figure 6.6).  
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Figure 6.6: Penetration test 2 
 
6.3.1.1  Planning and Design  
As it is difficult to recognise the interests of strangers, with a view to using them to 
snare their victims in phishing attacks, it was decided that the experiment would take 
advantage of the researcher‟s family and relatives.  
In the planning and design phase, experts in IT and awareness were involved in defining 
an effective plan for the experiment. A discussion took place between the researcher and 
experts from Q-CERT (Qatar Computer Emergency Response Team), Dr. D. Phelps, an 
information scientist working with Outreach and Training, N. Al-Abdullah, the acting 
OA&T manager and M. Kamal, the Senior Incident Manager. 
 
The group of experts found the proposed experiment to be novel and interesting but had 
some concerns on the legality and authority of the experiment. However, since the 
experiment used the researcher‟s family and relatives, she found no problems in 
conducting it since it was not harmful to the „victims‟.  However, the discussion 
concluded that it would be useful for participants to certify their approval after the 
experiment to confirm retrospectively that they did not object to participating (see 
Appendix C).  
 
The experimenter had identified a list of family members and relatives and then chose 
only the ones meeting the experimental criteria (Qatari e-mail users aged above 12), as 
mentioned earlier. Finally, 30 participants of different background (age, education, 
occupation and computer knowledge) were chosen to be targeted victims for the 
experiment. 
Plan & 
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The participants were reasonably representative of the population as a whole and they 
varied in their background as follows: 
Age: 6 below 18, 19 in the range 18-29, 3 in the range 30-50 and 2 over 50 
Education: 15 school, 12 higher education, 3 postgraduate education 
Occupation: 16 students, 7 employees, 4 both employees and students, 7 others (e.g. 
retired or housewife) and 2 businessmen. 
Computer knowledge based on researcher‟s judgement: 8 poor, 8 average, 7 good and 7 
with expert knowledge  
 
Before designing the phishing e-mails, the interests of each victim were identified, 
according to the researcher‟s knowledge gained from the long family relationship with 
the victims. The judgement of computer knowledge was based on whether they had an 
e-mail account and a computer and what they used the Internet for. Also the length of 
time of their computer experience was taken into account. For example, if the victim 
had recently acquired a computer and an e-mail account but had not previously used a 
computer, then it is more likely that they would have poor computer knowledge (see 
Appendix C).    
The researcher tried to phish the targeted victims without them noticing by taking 
advantage of her knowledge about them, such as their e-mail address and interests. See 
Appendix C for full details of the experiment planning and design. The study was kept 
private and in total 30 separate phishing e-mails were sent, one to each target 
participant, with each e-mail tailored at the intended victim‟s interests, supported by 
different techniques to attract them, such as conveying a sense of urgency and 
excitement. For example the participants who have an interest in cars were sent offers of 
winning free cars in order to attract their interest. Arabic or English e-mails were sent to 
participants depending on the e-mail topic and the participant‟s English level; only four 
e-mails were in English.   
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6.3.1.2  Running the Test 
The researcher chose to do the experiment in Ramadan since it is the month of blessing, 
worship and spirituality and also in this month there are a lot of deals, offers, and 
releases of new TV series and films for the coming Eid celebration. It was therefore 
considered to be an opportune time for the experiment to try to phish people by 
exploiting the circumstances and the activities of this month.  
Ramadan is one of the five pillars of Islam which all Muslims are expected to follow. It 
is the month when the Qur‟an was first revealed to the Prophet Mohammed. In 
Ramadan, Muslims fast from eating, drinking, smoking and indulging in anything that is 
in excess or ill-natured, from dawn until sunset. It is the time for spiritual reflection and 
prayer, therefore Muslims are expected to do good actions (e.g. avoid lying and greed 
and help poor people). After Ramadan, Muslims celebrate „Eid Ul Fitr‟ where Muslims 
break their fast. It begins with a special Eid prayer and then Muslims wear their finest 
clothes and meet each other, have special meals and exchange gifts. This has some 
similarities to Christmas celebrations in the UK. At Eid, it is obligatory to give ‘Zakat 
al-Fitr‟, an amount of money for charity, to help poor people to celebrate Eid (Gaffney, 
2003: 394-400). 
 
To measure the victims‟ response to phishing attacks, counters were added to the 
websites and attachments in the phishing e-mails, using the Google analytics tool. Also 
the researcher viewed the victims‟ replies to phishing attacks either through e-mails, 
SMS or through registration to websites. To give more chance for replies, the 
experiment lasted for about two weeks: e-mails were sent in the middle of Ramadan and 
the data collected after Eid. 
 
6.3.1.3  Analysing Results and Discussing Findings 
The result of the experiment shows a quite high level of user failure, 17 out of the 30 
participants (56.7%) having been tricked by the phishing e-mails. To have a better 
understanding of participants‟ responses, semi-structured interviews were held with 
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participants after the experiment. The reasons for their failure in the experiment varied 
for each participant. Some of the reasons were:  
 The amazing offer made in the e-mail,  
 Over-confidence of the participant that they will not get phished,  
 The e-mail‟s appeal to their interest,  
 A lack of awareness about the global extent of phishing and trust in the native 
language (they did not think phishing attacks would be made in Arabic), 
 A lack of awareness of possible phishing attacks and techniques (some thought 
that phishing will ask only for confidential information such as a password and 
bank account),  
 The existence of similar e-mails in this month (e.g. offers of discounts),  
 The appeal to participants‟ good will (e.g. the participant never thought there 
would be phishing associated with „Zakat al-Fitr‟, required of every Muslim).  
 
Not all participants who did not fail in the experiment detected that the e-mail was a 
phishing attack. Only 5 out of 30 recognised that it was a phishing attempt. The attacks 
were recognised because: 
 It was from unknown sender  
 They had been tricked before 
 They had heard about similar e-mail attacks  
 
The rest did not fail in the test for the following reasons:  
 They had not had the chance to check their e-mails 
 The need for registration 
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 Their preference for a physical shopping experience 
 The influence of religion and the circumstances of the month which overcame 
the interest of the participants (e.g. one of the participants did not download the 
music they were interested in because they believe that it is not right to listen to 
music in Ramadan since it is the month for worship of God).  
 
None of the participants had looked at the security indicators such as https or security 
certificate and most were unaware of these terms. According to the interviews with 
participants, about 70% of them did not know the term „phishing‟ and the rest did but to 
a varied extend. This implies a lack of awareness of this threat. In addition, about 60% 
of participants revealed that they open e-mails from unknown senders and junk mails if 
they attract their attention.  
About 67% had anti-virus software installed in their PC, but only about a half ever 
updated their anti-virus software. Only a few (13%) had installed spam filters and the 
rest did not even know what spam filters are. The majority of those who had anti-virus 
software were surprised that they could be tricked with phishing even with the software 
installed, since they thought it should be a reliable solution to overcome any threat 
targeting their computers.  
 
Although 7 out of the 30 participants were computer „experts‟, the failure rate was quite 
high (4 out of the 7) in this group. According to the chi-squared test (see Appendix C, 
P.369), there is a relationship between participants‟ computer knowledge and their 
ability to detect phishing e-mails. However, for more reliable results there is a need for 
further investigation with a larger sample size (see Appendix C, p.369). 
 
This implies that generally, the responses show experts in computing can also fall prey 
to phishing, e.g. an e-mail sent to one of them on the coming Arabic drawing exhibition 
made him fall for it because it attracted his interest in drawing. However, other experts 
did not fall prey to such e-mails because they had a higher level of knowledge of 
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phishing and therefore knew not to respond to e-mails from unknown senders. 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that there are no specific criteria for being a victim of 
phishing and everyone might be vulnerable, even experts in computers. This implies a 
need for enhancing all people‟s awareness of phishing. There is a common English 
saying that „A little learning is a dangerous thing‟ (Alexander Pope, 1711). This is 
because people who may be frequent users of computers may think they are more expert 
than they really are and this can lead to overconfidence in their own phishing detection 
abilities.  
 
Finally, the test has identified factors which make Qatari employees susceptible to 
phishing attacks and these are listed in Table 6.3.  Many of the factors are similar to 
those identified from Penetration Test 1. The additional knowledge from both tests has 
allowed some categorisation of factors in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: Vulnerabilities identified in  Penetration Test 2 
Factors which make Qataris susceptible to phishing Evidence 
Embarrassment 
It is in the nature of Qataris to feel too embarrassed and stupid to 
mention or report that they have fallen prey to phishing. 
Interviews with participants 
Lack of Knowledge of Phishing 
Many Qataris have not absorbed the rapid advances in technology in 
Qatar, this leads to: 
 Qataris lack knowledge of Internet threats and, in particular, phishing 
threats 
 Many do not expect to be phished  
 They believe they do not have anything worth stealing 
 Some do not know how to protect themselves against phishing attacks 
and how to detect and react to phishing 
 
Interviews with participants 
showed 70% did not know 
the term phishing  
60% open e-mails from 
unknown senders and junk 
mail.  
Although 67% have anti-virus 
software on their PC, only 
33.3% keep it up to date. 
Only 13.3% have spam filters  
Trust in the Security of their Country 
They only expect phishing to be limited to certain topics or geographical 
areas – they feel safe in Qatar and therefore think phishing does not 
reach Qatar 
Qataris are more likely to be influenced by and trust e-mails in their 
native language (Arabic) 
Interviews with participants 
 
Overconfidence in Technology and the Internet 
Some Qataris have overconfidence in technological tools, especially 
anti-virus software, for protecting against all kinds of phishing.  
Some have overconfidence in the technological revolution and believe 
that everything on the Internet is true.   
Interviews with participants 
 
 
Religion, Morality and Generosity  
Qataris are motivated by religious and moral considerations, being 
helpful, generous, emotional and good willed in their philanthropy, 
compassion and clemency, especially for people in need, in particular 
in the religious seasons, and when disasters and famines occur around 
the world.  
Qataris have a love for spreading good, e.g. spreading good ideas, which 
can be used by phishers to distribute phishing e-mails  
When the tests were held in a 
religious season it was 
discovered that religion has 
major effect on people‟s 
responses to the test 
Interviews with participants 
Trusting Nature 
Qataris are trustful and not do not have bad faith in people, believing 
that others will be equally driven by religious and moral 
considerations  
They believe in e-mails that exploit religion and people‟s generosity at 
times of natural disasters 
They trust official looking communications from trustworthy institutes 
in the society  
Confidence and trust in friends gives phishing e-mail credibility if sent 
from a person they know. 
When the tests were held in a 
religious season it was 
discovered that religion has 
major effect on people‟s 
responses to the test 
Interviews with participants 
Curiosity and Temptation 
Qataris have a curiosity and seek out knowledge and discovery, 
especially in matters close to their interests. 
Qataris have a susceptibility to different kinds of incentives and 
temptations to satisfy their desires, needs and beliefs, such as magic, 
superstition, envy, horoscopes, astrology  
Qataris excitement over incentives and temptation can sometimes lead 
to circulation and exchange of phishing e-mails and sites among their 
contacts, which gives the phishing credibility. 
57% failed in the test which 
exploited their interests and 
needs. 
Interviews with participants 
Personal Characteristics 
Qataris can be overconfident that they, themselves will not be tricked 
Interviews with participants 
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6.3.2  Conclusion 
The experiments show that more than half of the participants (57%) were vulnerable to 
fall prey to phishing attacks. The detection rate was fairly small (about 17%) and the 
rest did not fail the test for other reasons, such as not having the chance to check their 
e-mails. It was observed that religion has an effect on participants‟ responses to 
phishing and sometimes it even comes as a first priority over their interests, especially 
in the month of Ramadan when people‟s good will and emotions could be exploited by 
phishers. Furthermore, the study illustrated that Qataris are vulnerable to e-mail 
phishing when it plays on their interests, emotions and religion.  
 
More than 50 per cent of participants were not aware of phishing and opened e-mails 
from unknown senders and from junk mail and had not installed spam filters to help to 
protect themselves against phishing. Although it was pleasing that about 67% have anti-
virus software, there is a problem that most do not update it regularly and have over-
confidence that these programs will remove all online threats. This shows that there is a 
lack of awareness of phishing and how to defend against it. 
Also, results indicate that there are no specific criteria for being a victim of phishing and 
everyone might be vulnerable, even experts in computers, though a few experts in 
phishing were more able to protect themselves. Therefore, there is a need for enhancing 
people‟s awareness of phishing to improve their protection level against it. 
 
6.4  Laboratory Experiment  
The laboratory experiment aimed to discover the factors which might affect Qataris‟ 
responses to e-mail phishing attacks such as the cultural, country-specific factors. Also 
it attempt to assess Qataris‟ responses to phishing in a laboratory experiment compared 
to previous penetration tests.  
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6.4.1  Experimental Process 
A procedure with four stages was carried out: planning and designing, conducting the 
study, evaluating participants‟ responses and, finally, analysing results and discussing 
findings (see Figure 6.7). Each stage is explained as in Figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.7: Laboratory experiment process 
 
6.4.1.1  Planning and Design 
In the planning stage, a group of six experts in IT and education were involved in the 
planning and designing of the experiment to ensure it was efficient and well planned 
(see chapter introduction for details of experts involved).   
 
Planning and designing the study took two weeks, as it involved discussions on 
identifying an effective experiment which would suit participants and fulfil the aim of 
the study. One or two, 1 to 2 hour discussions were held with each person. A group 
discussion was held with the 3 First Lieutenants in the Ministry of Interior for reasons 
of convenience and their relationships with each other, whereas the rest were met 
individually. 
 
It was agreed by the group to plan and design an experimental lab study where study 
participants would be asked to identify the phishing e-mails from a list consisting of an 
unknown mixture of phishing and legitimate e-mails 
There was much debate on the reasonable number of e-mails for the study, finally the 
decision was to have only 10 since this is a practical number for participants not to get 
bored and at the same time enough for the researcher to assess participants‟ recognition 
of different phishing attacks.  
Plan & Design   Evaluate participants‟ 
response 
 
nses  
Analyse results & 
discuss findings 
Run 
experiment 
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There was a suggestion of having the study as a kind of quiz where the e-mails would 
be displayed one by one and participants would be asked to make their decision of 
either phishing, legitimate or skip. However, there was another suggestion which was to 
provide the study with the effect of a real environment by inspecting real e-mails 
received instead of images presented in a quiz. Ultimately, the group decided on the 
latter, where the researcher signed up a multiple e-mail address and sent the 
experimental e-mails into those accounts to set up the test. Later, she provided 
participants with the login details for the e-mail accounts to access and inspect the 
e-mails and then indicate their decisions of either phishing or legitimate in the paper-
based answer sheet provided. 
  
With regard to the e-mails designed for the study, it was decided have 10 e-mails, 4 in  
English, 5 in Arabic and 1 in both languages. The final 10 e-mails were 6 phishing e-
mails in Arabic and 4 legitimate ones in English. However, this does not indicate that 
phishing e-mails should be in Arabic or vice versa, the decision on the language 
depended on the topic of the e-mail itself (e.g. bank e-mails are usually in English 
whereas Zakat requests are in Arabic). The test applied contextual training, where 
victims at the end of the test were given some knowledge on the phishing threat, similar 
to that shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
In total, 30 new participants from different backgrounds (age, education level, e-mail 
phishing knowledge and occupation) were involved in the study, similarly to the 
previous one. In this study, the researcher used convenience sampling, taking advantage 
of friends and colleagues in her workplace to take part in the study.  
Participants were asked to give their demographic details which were as follows: 
E-mail phishing level of knowledge: 10 poor, 8 average, 7 good and 5 with expert 
knowledge 
Age: 15 in the range 18-29, 11 in the range 30-50, with only 4 over 50 
Education: 8 school, 19 higher education, 3 with postgraduate education 
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Occupation: 13 students, 14 employees, 2 both employees and students and 3 others 
(retired, housewife, unemployed) 
 
Before designing the phishing e-mails, it was crucial to search for both legitimate and 
phishing ones and then choose those that would best fulfil the aim of the study. E-mails 
assigned for the experiments were adapted from legitimate e-mails and phishing e-mails 
gathered from searching and or were new e-mails associated with Qatar (e.g. an e-mail 
about Doha Bank and Q-tel) designed by the researcher.  Legitimate e-mails were 
gathered from legitimate communications from Microsoft, Doha Bank, Dohasooq (the 
first e-commerce initiative by a leading financial entity in the Middle East) (Dohasooq, 
2007) and Facebook which has recently become popular in Qatar as a form of 
communication. The e-mails offered the following: a discount for Doha Bank Travel 
Insurance, a free anti-phishing tool from Microsoft (namely, Microsoft Phishing Filter 
Add-in for MSN Search), fabulous prizes from Dohasooq and an invitation from 
Facebook. Although the invitation from Facebook would be from an unknown person, it 
might be legitimate since it directed the recipient to go to the official Facebook website.  
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Table 6.4: Six Phishing E-mails Used in Identification Test 
E-mail topic Techniques of phishing e-mail 
Fulfil your 
Zakat online 
 
 
Uses Qataris‟ emotions and religion and their trust in the Zakat fund 
institute and also requests victims to distribute the e-mail with their 
mailing list by using the belief in God‟s blessing and the need for 
help in spreading doing good. This type of phishing takes advantage 
of victims in distributing the phishing e-mail without their noticing 
the deception, which will then end up with more victims falling in 
the attack since the next victims might trust the e-mail because it 
comes from a person they know. This trick leads to building more 
confidence in the phishing e-mail.    
You can 
know the 
person who 
loves you 
Conveys a sense of excitement and interest through using people‟s 
emotions and love. As in the previous email, it makes a demand to 
distribute the e-mail to 15 people, leading to further exposure to the 
e-mail content. 
Q-tel 
downloads 
mozaic  
Identical to an official and legitimate e-mail sent from an ISP in 
Qatar (Q-tel), but which directs to a fake website similar to the Q-tel 
official site with only a small difference in the URL. Conveys a 
sense of official communication from a trusted institute. 
Buy/sell your 
shares online 
 
 
The Doha Securities Market (DSM) created in 1995 has become 
well known in Qatar from 2005, after establishment of the Financial 
Markets Authority (QFMA) and Doha Securities Market Company 
(DSMC) which plays a big role in securities‟ trading. However, in 
June 2009, Qatar Exchange (QE) had a successor (DSMC), with the 
aim of creating an international exchange based on international 
best practices (Qatar Exchange, 2009). To take advantage of this 
event, e-mails sent to invite people to use new QE website for 
online securities‟ trading, misusing trust built in the secure Qatar 
share market website.   
Help to 
enhance 
e-services in 
Qatar 
Uses trust in MOI e-services with an apparent official 
communication employing the Ministry of Interior (MOI) logo to 
direct people to fake website very similar to URL of MOI website. 
It also, conveys a sense of intimidation and urgency to pay bills as 
soon as possible to avoid the bills increasing. 
Carrefour 
promotions 
Identical to a legitimate e-mail sent by Carrefour supermarket,  well 
known in Qatar, that keeps customers updated on recent 
promotions, products and services, but instead of directing 
customers to original Carrefour site, actually directs them to fake 
URL similar to legitimate one but with numbers appearing at 
beginning. The e-mail uses an existing Carrefour image but embeds 
a fake URL hidden under a button. This e-mail uses sense of 
excitement and interest and takes advantage of time when children 
are going back to school.  
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The phishing e-mails aimed to measure the vulnerability of Qataris to phishing by using 
different techniques to trick Qataris such as by playing on their emotions and religion. 
Ultimately, the study involved inspecting the 10 e-mails listed in Table 6.4 (see 
Appendix C for more details). 
 
6.4.1.2  Running the Experiment 
The study was made with a sample of people chosen according to pre-defined criteria 
(Qatari e-mail users over 17, since at this age they are mature and responsible for their 
actions, where most have a source of income and a bank account which most e-mails in 
the study ask for, with different backgrounds in terms of level of knowledge of e-mail 
phishing, age, education and occupation). It was decided in the discussion group that 30 
participants were enough as a sample for the study. The researcher found difficulty in 
recruiting participants for the study and therefore the decision was made to take 
advantage again of friends and relatives. Since the sample was quite large for the 
researcher to handle in one session, the study was held in her workplace in 3 sessions, 
with 10 people each time, according to their availability.  The study was prepared in 
advance, where the 10 e-mails sent to e-mail addresses assigned for the experiment, 
then it was necessarily to ensure that all e-mails were received in the inbox.  Later, the 
study commenced with an explanation for participants on the aim and procedure of the 
study, showing them an example of how to complete the test. The participants were 
allowed 20 minutes to complete the test, as the discussion group concluded that a 
maximum of 2 minutes should be spent in inspecting each e-mail.  
 
The participants were asked to log in into the e-mail account to view the 10 e-mails 
received and to identify the phishing e-mails from a complete list of the e-mails on an 
answer sheet provided. Participants were instructed to inspect the e-mails carefully but 
without paying attention to the sender‟s e-mail as all e-mails were sent from the 
experimenter‟s account for the purpose of the study (see Appendix C for more details). 
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6.4.1.3   Evaluating the Participants’ Responses 
Unlike the previous studies, in this study, full interaction with participants was possible 
during the experiment. To facilitate assessment of the study, participants were scored 
out of 100 according to their responses in the answer sheet, a score of 10 being assigned 
for each correct answer. Later, all scores were collected and counted along with the 
wrong detections made by each participant, which was important for the evaluation.  
The participants‟ responses were evaluated to identify the factors which make Qataris 
vulnerable to e-mail phishing. The participants were also asked to provide their opinion 
on the study, giving the reasons for their responses and identifying the influence of any 
culture effect in making phishing successful in Qatar. This was achieved by holding in-
depth discussions with individual participants after the experiment based on their scores 
and wrong detections and the following semi-structured discussion points (see 
Appendix C for more details about the evaluation phase): 
1. Were you aware of the phishing threat before? 
2. What was the reason for your taking more time than allocated? (For participants 
who took more time than allocated to complete). 
3. Which of the given e-mails did you spend more time on to detect whether it was 
phishing or legitimate? And why? 
4. Look at your wrong detections, what are the reasons for your incorrect response? 
(For participants with scores less than 100).  
5. Which was the most tempting phishing e-mail? 
6. Which of the given e-mails was difficult or tricky to detect as phishing or 
legitimate? And why? 
7. Why do you think Qatari people could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail 
phishing attacks (e.g. effect of native language, kindness, etc.)?  
8. How do you think Qatari culture affects people‟s responses to phishing attacks? 
Why is that? What are the possible cultural factors? 
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9. What do you think is the most successful trick that phishers could use on Qataris? 
Why?   
10. What have you learnt from the study? Have you achieved any new knowledge about 
phishing? 
11. Did you find it useful? And what did you like and dislike about it? 
12. Do you have any comments or suggestions on how to improve the study? 
 
After discussions with all participants, the factors which make Qataris vulnerable to 
phishing attacks were identified. The outcomes were then presented to experts in Qatar 
culture for review and to further focus on the cultural effects. Semi-structured 
interviews were held with the Qatar Cultural Attaché in the UK and a researcher in 
Qatar culture from the Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage.  
 
6.4.1.4   Analysis of Results and Discussion of the Findings 
The data gathered from the evaluation were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively to 
identify participants‟ susceptibility to phishing and the cultural and country-specific 
factors which make Qatari citizens susceptible to this kind of attack. The participants' 
level of detection was classified according to their scores in the study as follows: 
excellent (100), very good (70-90), good (50-60) and poor (below 50) (see Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5: Score rating for laboratory experiment 
Participants’ 
detection level 
Scores Number of 
participants 
N=30 
% of 
participants  
Excellent 100 3 10 
Very good 70-90 9 30 
Good 50-60 11 37 
Poor Below 50 7 23 
 
The responses show that 20 (67%) of the participants had a good or very good detection 
level, only 3 (10%) had an excellent level and the rest had a poor level. Although this 
shows a reasonable level of detection by participants, a single instance of a wrong 
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detection of phishing can lead to failure against this attack and to major consequences. 
Similarly, wrong detection of legitimate e-mails might lead to other consequences such 
as wrong reactions and ignorance. Therefore, there is a need to increase all participants‟ 
level of detection to excellent. 
In addition, 40% of detections were wrong. The wrong detections for phishing e-mails 
were fewer (36%) than legitimate ones (46%), which indicates that participants were 
less able to distinguish legitimate e-mails which might lead sometimes to ignoring legal 
e-mail. However, more than one third are vulnerable to an e-mail phishing attack which 
is more risky than ignoring legitimate e-mails (see Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6: Results for the Laboratory experiment 
No. E-mail topics Number of 
Wrong 
detections 
% of total 
Wrong 
detections 
Phishing e-mails 
1 Fulfil your Zakat online    22 18% 
 
2 You can know the person you love  11 9% 
3 Q-tel downloads mosaic 8 7% 
4 Buy/sell your shares online 15 13% 
5 Help to enhance e-services in Qatar 5 4% 
6 Carrefour promotions 4 3% 
Legitimate e-mails 
7 Doha Bank Travel Insurance  20 17% 
8 Protect from viruses and phishing 19 16% 
9 You can win fabulous prizes in Dohasooq 11 9% 
10 Invitation from Facebook  5 4% 
 
Accordingly, false positive and false negative rates were measured as follows:  
False positive rate = no. of false positives/no. of legitimate sites 
False negative rate = no. of false negatives/no. of phishing sites 
 
According to the test results, the false positive rates were slightly higher  with an 
average of 13.8 (46%) than false negative rates which reached an average of 10.8 
(36%). This implies that there is confusion in discrimination between phishing attempts 
and legitimate e-mails. 
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However, the number of wrong detections varies for each e-mail in the study. For 
phishing e-mails, the e-mail with the request to fulfil Zakat online and the e-mail for 
online securities trading had high wrong detection compared to other phishing e-mails. 
The participants revealed in their interviews that this was because they were written in 
the participants‟ native language, participants trusted the institute, the e-mails exploited 
their emotions, beliefs and religion and there were very minor differences between the 
fake and the real URL.  
On the other hand, two legitimate e-mails were wrong designated as phishing by at least 
five participants, the Doha Bank travel insurance and Microsoft protection from viruses 
and phishing. The reason given was that Microsoft and the banks were commonly 
targeted by phishing. Participants were confused in making the right detection for the 
legitimate Facebook invitation because of the known recent exploitation of Facebook by 
phishers (Acohido, 2009; Dodge, 2009; Mills, 2009; Schofield, 2009) (see Table 6.6).  
The discussions indicated that many people do not normally take enough time to 
recognise phishing attempts by inspecting security indicators, and some were even 
guessing. However, the pattern of results could not be derived from pure random 
selection by the participants so they had clearly considered their answers in the tests. 
These were to be expected as the participants were aware of the importance of their 
contribution and were asked to read everything carefully and were given enough time to 
do so. However, some mentioned that they did not have sufficient knowledge about 
security certificates and how to check their validity and their decisions, therefore, were 
made according to their intuition rather than from reading the e-mail content itself. 
Participants were generally more cautious in this test due to the fact they knew it was a 
test, and this led them to consider the possibility that most e-mails could be phishing, 
which the discussions revealed would not be how they would react in their normal daily 
activity. 
 The majority found that the most tempting phishing e-mail was the one about “You can 
know the person you love”; this was exciting and a clever trick which attracted people‟s 
emotions and beliefs about love. 
Following the experiment, participants and experts in Qatar culture were then invited 
into discussions. The participants found the experiment very useful since it enhanced 
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their knowledge of phishing, especially on how to detect phishing attempts against 
legitimate e-mails. In addition, discussions with participants and experts in Qatar culture 
highlighted some of the false beliefs such as over-confidence in the reliability of anti-
virus software to detect phishing, over-trust of e-mails apparently from official and 
trusted institutes in Qatar and belief in a limitation of use of certain topics for phishing, 
especially religious ones. However, some participants recommended repeating the 
experiment with more participants to get more reliable results.  
From the experiment conclusions were also drawn on the aspects which make Qataris 
susceptible to phishing threat. Some factors confirmed the findings of the penetration 
tests but there were some additional factors. In Table 6.7 the factors repeating the 
findings of the penetration tests are in italics, though the evidence in the right hand 
column is new evidence from the laboratory experiment and the follow-up interviews. 
New factors are underlined. 
Table 6.7: Vulnerabilities identified in laboratory experiment 
Factors which make Qataris susceptible to phishing Evidence 
Embarrassment 
It is in the nature of Qataris to feel too embarrassed and stupid to 
mention or report that they have fallen prey to phishing. 
Interviews with participants, 
the Cultural Attaché and the 
expert in Qatar culture 
Lack of Knowledge of Phishing 
Many Qataris have not absorbed the rapid advances in technology in 
Qatar, this leads to: 
 Qataris lack knowledge of Internet threats and, in particular, phishing 
threats 
 Many do not expect to be phished  
 They believe they do not have anything worth stealing  
 Some do not know how to protect themselves against phishing attacks 
and how to detect and react to phishing. 
40% of the decisions were 
wrong because of a lack of 
ability to detect legitimate 
and phishing e-mails 
90% of participants made at 
least one wrong decision 
Interview with participants, 
Cultural Attaché and the 
expert in Qatar culture  
Trust in the Security of their Country 
They only expect phishing to be limited to certain topics or geographical 
areas – they feel safe in Qatar and therefore think phishing does not 
reach Qatar 
Qataris are more likely to be influenced by and trust e-mails in their 
native language (Arabic) 
They believe they have no enemies who want to hurt them 
 
Interview with participants, 
Cultural Attaché and the 
expert in Qatar culture  
Overconfidence in Technology and the Internet 
Some Qataris have overconfidence in technological tools, especially 
anti-virus software, for protecting against all kinds of phishing.  
Some have overconfidence in the technological revolution and believe 
that everything on the Internet is true.   
Interview with participants, 
Cultural Attaché and the 
expert in Qatar culture  
 
Religion, Morality and Generosity  
Qataris are motivated by religious and moral considerations, being 
helpful, generous, emotional and good willed in their philanthropy, 
compassion and clemency, especially for people in need, in particular 
in the religious seasons, and when disasters and famines occur around 
73% were tricked by the 
e-mail to fulfill Zakat online 
Interview with participants, 
Cultural Attaché and the 
expert in Qatar culture 
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the world.  
Qataris have a love for spreading good, e.g. spreading good ideas, which 
can be used by phishers to distribute phishing e-mails  
Trusting Nature 
Qataris are trustful and not do not have bad faith in people, believing 
that others will be equally driven by religious and moral 
considerations  
They believe in e-mails that exploit religion and people‟s generosity at 
times of natural disasters 
They trust official looking communications from trustworthy institutes 
in the society  
Confidence and trust in friends gives phishing e-mail credibility if sent 
from a person they know. 
73% were tricked by the 
e-mail to fulfill Zakat online 
18% were tricked by the 
e-mail appearing to be from 
the MOI 
Interview with participants, 
Cultural Attaché and the 
expert in Qatar culture  
 
Curiosity and Temptation 
Qataris have a curiosity and seek out knowledge and discovery, 
especially in matters close to their interests. 
Qataris have a susceptibility to different kinds of incentives and  
temptations to satisfy their desires, needs and beliefs, such as magic, 
superstition, envy, horoscopes, astrology. 
Qataris excitement over incentives and temptation can sometimes lead 
to circulation and exchange of phishing e-mails and sites among their 
contacts, which gives the phishing credibility. 
Qataris love adventure 
 
36% fell prey to the e-mail on 
“You can know the person 
you love” 
The majority failed at least 
one test where the emails 
attracted their interests 
Interview with participants, 
the Cultural Attaché and the 
expert in Qatar culture 
Personal Characteristics 
Qataris can be overconfident that they themselves will not be tricked 
They lack concern about consequence of phishing, especially if not on 
their own computer (e.g. work PC) 
 
Interviews with participants 
Friendliness and Courtesy to Others. 
Qataris are friendly and like making friends and knowing people 
Qataris are courteous to other people, including strangers and even to 
extent of giving confidential information when asked. 
 
Interview with participants, 
the Cultural Attaché and the 
expert in Qatar culture 
E-Law 
There is lack of clear e-law to protect citizens from electronic crimes 
 
Interview with the Cultural 
Attaché 
Other Country-Specific Factors 
Qataris motivated by tribal, sectarian or partisan concerns since Qatari 
society has a tribal structure 
 
Interview with the Cultural 
Attaché and the expert in 
Qatar culture 
 
Following the discussions with participants an interview was made with the London 
Qatari Cultural Attaché, who made a valuable input in confirming the findings. He also 
had seen phishing become popular in Qatar. However, he found responsible institutes 
are paying attention to protecting against phishing and enhancing public awareness. He 
pointed to the rapid development in Qatar in recent years, which has raised the profile of 
Qatar and therefore phishers found it an attractive place for them, especially in the 
absence of e-law. However, the e-law is near to reality which will assist in solving the 
problem of phishing in the State.  
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He added that since Qatar is a conservative country with its customs, traditions and 
culture, the culture therefore has a major effect on people‟s responses to phishing 
attacks. He added Qataris are vulnerable to phishing due to cultural, country-specific 
factors, religion, and personal interests and characteristics. He supported the factors 
which make Qataris vulnerable to phishing discovered by the researcher. In addition, he 
pointed out more factors as follows:   
1. Motivation by tribal or sectarian or partisan concerns since the society has a tribal 
structure 
2. Feeling of safety,  especially that Qatar is a safe country 
3. Love of adventure 
4. Love of spreading good, e.g. spreading good ideas which can be used by phishers, 
which is called a pyramid system. 
5. Belief that he/she has no enemies who want to hurt him/her 
6. Lack of concern about the consequence of phishing, especially if you are not using 
your computer (e.g. work PC) 
Phishers try to use all of these factors and exploit them to their advantage to persuade 
and trick their victims to fall prey to phishing. Since Qataris are emotional and Islam 
plays a big role in their life and in being good willed, religious topics are more 
persuasive, especially if it influences their emotions, especially in religious seasons such 
as Ramadan and in existing disasters. He pointed out that phishing attacks which exploit 
Qataris‟ emotions, morals and religion, especially in religious seasons and disasters, are 
more successful in Qatar. Adding, it is obvious that phishing emails with a religious 
theme do indeed occur in reality in Qatar. For example, he once received an e-mail 
requesting a charitable contribution for Palestine Muslims who were suffering and 
needing help from their brothers in Islam to survive.  
Finally, he stated that Qatar, as other developing nations, is in the stage of development 
and since the development is rapid, people might not have absorbed this revolution and 
this will take time.  
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He added that although there is lack of awareness of the phishing threat due to the rapid 
revolution experienced in technology in Qatar, the government is working on assisting 
the society to absorb this revolution by enhancing their knowledge and improving the 
education curriculum. He predicted that the younger generation will be more aware. 
Furthermore, the country has a lot of money and it is valuable to invest in awareness 
because it is the best way to defend against phishing.   
He noted that even experts in computer are not all aware of phishing attacks and he 
mentioned that he had fallen prey to e-mail phishing before, when he got wrong advice 
from a computer expert. He received an e-mail from an unknown sender requesting him 
to verify his MSN e-mail account or it would be blocked and a computer expert 
confirmed that this e-mail was legitimate. The phisher had then stolen his e-mail 
account and impersonated the Cultural Attaché, sending an e-mail to all contacts 
requesting help and money by using his name.  He stated that he has now become more 
cautious about phishing because he had learned from that lesson. 
 
Since Qatar is a safe and peaceful, this leads many Qataris to feel they are safe and to 
trust people. He added that there is more influence and trust in messages written in the 
native language (Arabic) than in English because using Arabic will be more 
understandable for victims, phishing e-mails are less common in Arabic than in English 
and, in some cases, Arabic will express the message more effectively, especially if it 
uses religious citations from the Holy Quran.   
 
6.5 Collating the Results of All Tests 
From the in-depth group discussions with participants in the experiment, interviews in 
the region and especially with the Cultural Attaché of Qatar in the UK, and observations 
from experiments in the region, it was recognised that Qatar has a tribal community 
structure. It is governed by customs and traditions and is tied to the Islamic religion 
which plays a major role in people‟s life. The culture of Qatar is affected by all of these 
factors. A representation of the multiple factors affecting Qataris‟ response to e-mail 
phishing as well as personal characteristics (e.g. greedy, careless) is given in Figure 6.8. 
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However, the personal characteristics or personality are also affected by the culture to a 
varied extent, depending on the individual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Why are Qataris vulnerable to phishing? 
 
This only gives a general guide as it might be found that there are other factors or 
influences and overlaps that are not shown in the figure. In conclusion, there are many 
factors which make Qataris vulnerable to phishing as revealed in previous chapters and 
in the empirical work presented in this chapter.  These factors are now presented in 
Tables 6.8 to 6.12. Each table corresponds to a different influence shown in Figure 6.8. 
Some factors occur in more than one table, reflecting the overlap between these broad 
categories of influencing factors. 
 
In the tables the following column header abbreviations are used: 
Sur: Survey 
T1: Penetration test 1 
T2: Penetration test 2 
LE: Laboratory experiment test 
IP: interview with participants 
IE: interview with experts in the field 
 
Culture 
 
Personal 
characteristic
s 
 
Country-
specific 
factors 
 
Religion 
effect 
Interests 
and 
believes 
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Table 6.8: Vulnerabilities of Qataris to Phishing Identified in this Research:  
Culture Factors 
Why Qataris are vulnerable to phishing Sur T1 T2 LE IP IE 
Embarrassment 
It is in the nature of Qataris to feel too embarrassed 
and stupid to mention or report that they have fallen 
prey to phishing. 
      
Friendliness and Courtesy to Others 
Qataris are friendly and like making friends and 
knowing people 
Qataris are courteous to other people, including 
strangers and even to extent of giving confidential 
information when asked. 
      
Trusting Nature 
Qataris are trustful and not do not have bad faith in 
people, believing that others will be equally driven 
by religious and moral considerations  
Confidence and trust in friends gives phishing e-mail 
credibility if sent from a person they know. 
Qataris are more likely to be influenced by and trust 
e-mails in their native language (Arabic) 
They believe they have no enemies who want to hurt 
them 
      
They believe in e-mails that exploit religion and 
people‟s generosity at times of natural disasters 
      
They trust official looking communications from 
trustworthy institutes in the society  
      
Curiosity and Temptation 
Qataris have a curiosity and seek out knowledge and 
discovery, especially in matters close to their 
interests. 
Qataris have a susceptibility to different kinds of 
incentives and  temptations to satisfy their desires, 
needs and beliefs, such as magic, superstition, envy, 
horoscopes, astrology. 
   
 
   
Qataris excitement over incentives and temptation can 
sometimes lead to circulation and exchange of 
phishing e-mails and sites among their contacts, 
which gives the phishing credibility 
Qataris love adventure 
      
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Table 6.9: Vulnerabilities of Qataris to Phishing Identified in this Research:  
Country-specific Factors 
Why Qataris are vulnerable to phishing Sur T1 T2 LE IP IE 
Lack of Knowledge of Phishing 
Many Qataris have not absorbed the rapid advances in 
technology in Qatar, this leads to: 
 Qataris lack knowledge of Internet threats and, in 
particular, phishing threats 
 Many do not expect to be phished  
 They believe they do not have anything worth 
stealing 
 Some do not know how to protect themselves against 
phishing attacks and how to detect and react to 
phishing 
      
Overconfidence in Technology and the Internet 
Some Qataris have overconfidence in technological 
tools, especially anti-virus software, for protecting 
against all kinds of phishing.  
Some have overconfidence in the technological 
revolution and believe that everything on the Internet 
is true. 
      
Trust in the Security of their Country 
They only expect phishing to be limited to certain 
topics or geographical areas – they feel safe in Qatar 
and therefore think phishing does not reach Qatar 
Qataris are more likely to be influenced by and trust 
e-mails in their native language (Arabic) 
They believe they have no enemies who want to hurt 
them 
      
Lack of an E-Law 
There is a lack of clear e-law to protect citizens from 
electronic crimes 
      
Other 
Qataris are motivated by tribal, sectarian or partisan 
concerns since society has a tribal structure 
      
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Table 6.10: Vulnerabilities of Qataris to Phishing Identified in this Research:  
Religious Factors 
Why Qataris are vulnerable to phishing Sur T1 T2 LE IP IE 
Religion, Morality and Generosity  
Qataris are motivated by religious and moral 
considerations, being helpful, generous, emotional 
and good willed in their philanthropy, compassion 
and clemency, especially for people in need, in 
particular in the religious seasons, and when 
disasters and famines occur around the world.  
      
Qataris have a love for spreading good, e.g. spreading 
good ideas, which can be used by phishers to 
distribute phishing e-mails 
      
Trusting Nature 
Qataris are trustful and not do not have bad faith in 
people, believing that others will be equally driven 
by religious and moral considerations 
      
They believe in e-mails that exploit religion and 
people‟s generosity at times of natural disasters 
      
 
Table 6.11: Vulnerabilities of Qataris to Phishing Identified in this Research:  
Interests and Beliefs 
Why Qataris are vulnerable to phishing Sur T1 T2 LE IP IE 
Curiosity and Temptation 
Qataris have a curiosity and seek out knowledge and 
discovery, especially in matters close to their 
interests. 
      
Qataris have a susceptibility to different kinds of 
incentives and  temptations to satisfy their desires, 
needs and beliefs, such as magic, superstition, envy, 
horoscopes, astrology. 
      
Lack of Knowledge of Phishing 
They believe they do not have anything to be stolen or 
worth stealing 
      
Trusting Nature 
They believe in e-mails that exploit religion and 
people‟s generosity at times of natural disasters  
They believe they have no enemies who want to hurt 
them 
      
 
Table 6.12: Vulnerabilities of Qataris to Phishing Identified in this Research:  
Personal Characteristics (two examples) 
Why Qataris are vulnerable to phishing Sur T1 T2 LE IP IE 
Qataris can be overconfident in their own mind that 
they will not be tricked 
      
They have a lack of concern about the consequence of 
phishing, especially if it is not on their own computer 
(e.g. work PC) 
      
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6.6   Summary 
Experiments demonstrate the need to enhance the state of awareness of e-mail phishing 
for Qataris. This is particularly shown by the 44% failure in detecting phishing by 
Qatari employees at AAB in the reality experiment, where it was found that they trusted 
e-mails from an unknown sender and were incapable of  distinguishing phishing attacks, 
in particular phishing e-mails with attachments, which led them to be vulnerable to 
viruses.  
 
Furthermore, in the penetration test with a sample of Qataris, more than half of the 
participants failed to detect phishing attempts, with a detection rate of about one in six 
e-mails. It was concluded that there are no specific criteria that can identify potential 
victims of phishing and even experts in computing are vulnerable, especially when the 
topic attracts their interest. There is clearly a lack of awareness of how to detect, react 
and protect against phishing. For example, some Qataris have overconfidence in the 
reliability of anti-virus software to detect all phishing attempts, and some do not install 
spam filters and open e-mails from unknown senders and junk mail.  
 
In the experimental study, the detection rate for phishing e-mails was higher (64%) than 
penetration tests which reach 56% and 43% for tests 1 and 2, respectively. This is 
because all participants knew they were in an experiment and they may have considered 
it as a challenge and wanted to display their knowledge. In contrast, participants in test 
1 were more aware of phishing threat than in test 2, because they were employees who 
use computers in their daily work. 
 
The study shows the need to raise participants‟ level of detection to excellent (i.e. 100% 
of correct detections) since any wrong detection for legitimate or phishing e-mails 
might lead to huge consequences. Although the correct detections were higher than the 
wrong ones, not all participants took enough time to recognise phishing attempts by 
inspecting security indicators and some decisions were made by guessing. Some 
participants were more confused about making the right detection since they were more 
cautious than they needed to be, which led them to consider legitimate e-mails as 
                 Chapter 6: Penetration Tests and Laboratory Experiment 
184 
phishing. Discussions with the majority of experts and participants indicated that 
Qataris trust phishing e-mails in their native language rather than in English, they have 
overconfidence in official and trustworthy institutes in Qatar and they believe that 
phishing will be limited to certain topics and, especially, do not expect phishing in 
e-mails connected to religion.  
 
The experiments have demonstrated that Qataris are vulnerable to e-mail phishing, in 
particular when it exploits their interest, emotions, beliefs and religion. According to the 
discussions with participants following experiment 2, this is especially true in the 
religious seasons or when there is a disaster, when religion sometimes even becomes a 
fist priority over their interests. This shows they are more likely to become victims of 
phishing in the religious season than in other seasons. However, this sill requires further 
investigation to prove it. Since Qataris are living in a conservative society committed to 
its culture, the response to e-mail phishing was discovered to be affected by the culture 
of Qatar which is influenced by the tribal community structure, customs, traditions and 
religion which play a big role in people‟s life. In conclusion, Qataris were found to be 
vulnerable to e-mail phishing attacks due to multiple factors: the culture, country-
specific factors, religion, interest and beliefs, as well as personal characteristics. 
 
This chapter identifies the need for awareness to enhance people‟s recognition of 
phishing attempts, and how to react and defend against them, and shows that any 
awareness programme needs to take into consideration the factors which make Qataris 
vulnerable to phishing.  
 
The next chapter demonstrates the grounded theory applied to the development of an 
anti-phishing awareness framework as a means to reduce the risk of e-mail phishing in 
Qatar. 
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Chapter 7       Findings and Recommendations 
 
Since much literature confirms the available phishing technological solutions cannot be 
relied on as it is hard to predict human behaviour, so many researchers turn to 
awareness as another line of defence. Awareness can be enhanced either through a set of 
recommendations, advice or best practices or through an educational awareness 
programme. In this research, the focus is on enhancing awareness of e-mail phishing by 
applying both recommendations and education and training as part of an overall 
awareness framework (see Chapter 2).   
 
This chapter describes the grounded theory applied in this research based on gathering 
and analysing the findings from all previous phases of research to create an e-mail 
phishing awareness framework. This framework consists of set of recommendations 
produced for the Qatar government, for organisation officials responsible for ensuring 
information security and for Qatari citizens, and an effective educational framework of 
best practices to counteract the problem of e-mail phishing in Qatar. This chapter 
defines the recommendations part of the framework, the educational framework is 
discussed in the next chapters. These recommendations have been evaluated by experts 
to identify their potential effectiveness in reducing the e-mail phishing threat in Qatar. 
 
7.1  Findings  
The main contribution of this research is to propose an effective e-mail phishing 
awareness and educational framework to reduce the threat of e-mail phishing in Qatar 
society. This was identified using grounded theory based on findings from previous 
chapters (see Figure 7.1). A summary of the main outcomes from each chapter is given 
in Table 7.1.  
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Figure 7.1: Grounded theory 
 
All of the findings in Table 7.1 have clearly demonstrated that Qataris are vulnerable to 
e-mail phishing attempts due to many factors, many of which are cultural and 
country-specific. There is clearly a lack of awareness of e-mail phishing in Qatar and 
there is therefore a need to enhance Qataris’ awareness. Consequently the need arises 
for an effective e-mail phishing awareness and educational framework based on a set of 
viable recommendations directed at the Qatar government, organisation officials 
responsible for ensuring information security in Qatar, and Qatari citizens. A set of 
recommendations were therefore identified for those target groups as given in the next 
sections.   
 
Qatar in the eye of phishers  
Survey 
Reality & experimental studies 
Awareness 
Framework 
Literature review  
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Table 7.1: Main outcomes of the research 
Chapters Main Outcomes 
Literature 
review  
(Chapter 2) 
There is no research reported on phishing or any e-crime in Qatar. 
There are no statistics about phishing trends in Qatar 
Qatar in the eye 
of phishers  
(Chapter 4) 
The E-mail phishing problem exists in Qatar and is becoming more common. There 
is a need to define a strategy of defence against phishing with major focus on 
enhancing awareness since technological solutions are unreliable against the smart 
tricks used by phishers to bypass these solutions. Various techniques of awareness 
such as e-learning, seminars, posters, SMS, e-mail and media, have been suggested 
with an emphasis on the latter and the idea of developing an anti-phishing game. 
Experts in education state that it is important to develop an effective, well planned 
and interesting awareness programme, as the majority of interviewees believed that 
Qataris are unaware of phishing which makes them vulnerable to such threat. 
  
There are many aspects which make Qatar attractive for phishers to commit their 
crimes: the rapid economic development, the growth of Internet users, the effect of 
culture and the lack of an e-law. The lack of an e-law was identified as one of the 
major problems organisations face in overcoming phishing attacks. In addition, 
culture was found to have an effect on people’s falling prey to e-mail phishing 
attacks, especially when phishers exploit their kindness, goodness, trust, morals, 
emotions and religion.  
Surveys 
(Chapter 5) 
 
The survey has shown. Qataris are generally vulnerable to e-mail phishing threat 
because of lack of awareness about phishing; they are even more vulnerable to 
phishing than UK citizens. Few know how to take the right actions and many do not 
report phishing because of cultural effects such as feelings of embarrassment and 
stupidity. They considered awareness to be the best defence against phishing and 
they prefer to be educated on phishing through web-based e-learning and media and 
other tools such as seminars, posters, interactive games and cartoons.  
Penetration tests 
and laboratory 
experiment 
(Chapter 6) 
 
Many of Qataris are incapable of differentiating between phishing e-mails and 
legitimate ones as they did not take enough time to detect phishing attempts by 
inspecting security indicators and some decisions were even guesses. In the 
laboratory experiment, the detection rate for phishing e-mails was higher than in 
penetration tests, indicating that people are less cautious in reality. Experiments 
revealed that there are no specific criteria for being victims to phishing and even 
computer experts are vulnerable, mainly when it attracts their interest. There is an 
obvious lack of awareness on how to detect, react and protect against phishing. This 
shows the need for an awareness programme which makes people aware of the 
phishing threat without causing them to be too worried since this might also lead to 
wrong detections. 
 
Qataris are vulnerable to fall prey to e-mail phishing attacks due to multiple factors: 
the culture, country-specific factors, religion, interest and beliefs, as well as 
personal characteristics, which were discovered mainly in the experiments. 
Examples of aspects which make Qatari vulnerable are: lack of awareness, having 
overconfidence in the reliability of anti-viruses to detect all phishing attempts, 
overconfidence in e-mails that appear to be from official and trustworthy institutes 
in Qatar, trust of the native language and belief that phishers limit their use of 
certain topics, and certainly not religious ones. Also, they were found to be 
vulnerable to e-mail phishing which exploits their interests, emotions, beliefs and 
religion, especially in religious seasons.  
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7.2  Recommendations 
7.2.1  Recommendations for Qatar Government 
1. Findings from previous chapters show clearly the need for enhancing people’s 
awareness in Qatar. Although there are some existing awareness programmes on 
e-crime, there is a need to pay more attention to enhancing awareness of the 
phishing threat, since it is becoming more frequent and because of the rapid 
development in technology leaving people unable to absorb sufficiently the threats 
of the technology revolution. It is, therefore, recommended that there should be a 
greater focus on awareness to reduce the risk of phishing in Qatar. Effective 
awareness can be promoted through different instruments such as posters, videos, 
publications and especially the media in enhancing public awareness on such threats 
since they are popular in Qatar and trusted.  
2. Interviews with experts in the field have revealed that there is no explicit e-law 
assigned in Qatar. Currently there is a fairly small section within the Penal Law 
No.11 of 2004 (Ministry of Public Prosecution, 2004) which covers computer 
crimes. This section does not cover all types of e-fraud that currently exist and it 
does not even criminalise phishing attacks (e.g. it does not criminalise viruses which 
are distributed over the Internet, by e-mail or even by a USB memory stick; it only 
criminalises viruses distributed through floppy disks and CDs).  It is quite old for 
this type of law and has not been updated since its enactment in 2004. However, the 
government have recognised the need for a separate e-law and currently members 
from Q-CERT are working within a group led by ictQATAR to draft an electronic 
law for Qatar. 
While the Qatari government’s readiness to develop an e-law in Qatar is recognised, 
it is recommended that a comprehensive e-law should be developed to establish a 
framework and legislation to criminalise attackers, in particular phishers, to protect 
online consumers from possible electronic threats and to support actions taken in 
such cases (e.g. blocking phishing sites). 
 It is also recommended that the e-law should cope with Qatar-specific factors and 
culture (e.g. forbidding anti-Islamic items) equivalent to e-laws in developed 
countries, such as the UK‘s Data Protection Act of 1998 and Computer Misuse Act 
                 Chapter 7: Findings and Recommendations 
189 
of 1990, and in other neighbour nations, such as the UAE’s e-law. By taking 
advantage of the experience of others, mistakes in the drafting of such laws can be 
avoided. In addition, compared to the current law, the new law should be more 
robust and adaptable to cater for the fast improvement in technology, by referring to 
general concepts, such as storage devices, instead of using specific technologies or 
brand names, such as Floppy disks. 
3. Since interviews demonstrate that e-crimes usually come from abroad, it is 
recommended that the government works to build cooperation with the countries 
from which these crimes have been exported and to exchange information in this 
regard to reduce the risk of phishing attacks which originate from outside Qatar. 
4. Currently, the computer crimes unit in the Ministry of Interior is responsible for 
researching and investigating reported e-crime, taking all actions required in 
cooperation with other organisations in Qatar and abroad such as blocking the 
phishing site, and also for providing a report of the case to the Ministry of Public 
Prosecution. However, it was discovered from interviews with the Ministry of 
Interior and the Public Prosecution that the latter finds difficulty in understanding 
most of the terms used in the Ministry of Interior’s report which they largely depend 
on to decide whether to prosecute the accused or not. 
Therefore, it is recommended that public prosecutors, justices and lawyers should be 
involved in educational sessions and courses to enhance their knowledge of 
e-crimes, so they can understand how to deal with such crimes, how to investigate 
them and how to enforce the law. 
5. Since there is lack of research on e-crime in Qatar and on phishing in particular, it is 
recommended that a research centre on e-crimes is created to focus on identifying 
the factors which make such attacks successful in Qatar and investigating how to 
defend against such attacks, paying attention to the culture effects in Qatar. 
6. Investigation shows that there are no tangible figures or statistics on the trend of 
phishing in Qatar and it is therefore recommended that a statistical database of 
e-crimes, particularly phishing attacks, is created to identify the extent of such 
threats to be used for research purposes. The Ministry of Interior are in the best 
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position to create such a database since reports of all e-crimes in Qatar are reported 
there. 
7. It was discovered that many attackers and phishers in particular, use Qatar’s iparks 
because it is hard to identity the attacker since the iparks are open to the public and 
are without any controls. Therefore, to reduce insider phishing attacks coming from 
iparks, it is recommended that access to the Internet at an ipark should require some 
kind of ID proof, such as a Visa card, ID number or a kind of registration process. 
For example, users could enter their phone number to receive an SMS with a 
password for free access to the Internet. Although people might complain about this 
procedure, it will help protect them and others from possible e-crimes. 
 
7.2.2  Recommendations for organisation officials responsible for ensuring 
information security 
1. Officials need to recognise that technological solutions can not be relied on to 
protect people against phishing and, therefore, awareness will act as another level of 
defence in parallel with technological solutions and policies. Therefore, it is 
recommended that an effective awareness programme on phishing threats is 
developed to enhance the defence level of employees or clients. The programme 
should use different techniques to raise awareness, such as e-learning, seminars, 
posters and SMS. The awareness programme has to be well planned and interesting, 
such as involving interactive quizzes or games which will bring fun to the training. 
It should make people aware of the phishing threat without causing them to be too 
worried since this might lead to wrong detection and rejection of legitimate e-mail 
communication. It is recommended that organisations have a security awareness 
team which works on developing awareness of threats facing the organisation from 
both inside and out, taking into account the national culture and the culture of the 
organisation itself. There should also be an evaluation process defined to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the programme, such as by holding anonymous penetration tests 
and carrying out surveys before and after the awareness programme is implemented.   
2. Since it was established that people would learn more about phishing when they 
have encountered or have been tricked by such attacks, it is recommended that 
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e-mail phishing penetration tests are carried out to measure an organisation's 
vulnerabilities and to be part of a programme to enhance awareness on phishing. 
Due to legal and ethical issues associated with such an audit, it is recommended that 
an independent, approved and trusted organisation with experts in information 
security should carry out audits on request. This trusted organisation could be 
Q-CERT or any organisation specialised in information security similar to First 
Base Technologies in the UK. The trusted organisation would provide an important 
service of a reliable and confidential audit which would give a certification of the 
client organisation’s defence level against phishing, including the level of awareness 
of phishing of their employees. 
3. It is recommended that each organisation should study its own needs and set up 
some guidelines to help their employees in their defence against phishing. The 
guidelines must be clear and reasonable to follow, for example suggesting that 
employees do not open e-mails from an unknown sender. It is recommended that 
employees are motivated to follow the guidelines with incentive schemes offering 
certificates, awards, rewards and even promotion. 
4. It is recommended that the e-mail server for the organisation should not allow 
employees or clients to send confidential information, particularly the username and 
password to access the organisation network, to anyone by e-mail. This safeguard 
exists in the Loughborough University e-mail system.  
5. Interviews showed that only a few organisations have an incident management 
centre responsible for dealing with any incidents, such as a phishing attack, advising 
their clients/employees on how to react. Therefore, it is recommended that a team of 
experts should be formed to become an incident management centre to record 
incidents and provide effective advice. This will act as a measurement tool for the 
effectiveness of the organisational strategy of defence against phishing and it will 
also provide data for studying the pattern of phishing attacks to update and refine 
the defence strategy, the technological tools, policies and awareness.  
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7.2.3  Qatari Citizens 
For Qatari citizens, recommendations are in the form of the following separate pieces of 
advice, mostly based on the factors revealed earlier which make Qataris vulnerable to 
e-mail phishing. 
1. You should know that technological solutions are not 100% reliable to detect e-mail 
phishing attempts, especially since phishers use smart tricks to bypass them. There is 
no technology that can protect you fully from phishing. Your suspicion is your only 
friend. 
2. You should make sure you know how to detect and react and protect yourself 
against phishing attacks. 
3. You should make an effort to continuously update and improve your knowledge of 
phishing since reports of this kind of attack are becoming increasingly common in 
Qatar and elsewhere.  
4. You should take the time to recognise phishing attempts by inspecting security 
indicators. So just be suspicious – all the time. Trust no machine. 
5. You should recognise that there is no limit for topics used by phishers. They can 
exploit people through many different topics, even religious ones.  
6. You should report phishing incidents without feeling embarrassed to help in 
reducing such threats. 
7. You should not over-trust e-mails written in your native language (Arabic) as   
phishing e-mails can be written in any language. And look at the Arabic; is it good 
Arabic – as you would write it? In English, non-English ‘English’ can be easily 
spotted. The same applies in Arabic. 
8. You should not have overconfidence in your own level of knowledge of phishing 
since this might lead you to fall prey to it. 
9. You should not be too worried about phishing since this might lead to wrong 
decisions even on legitimate e-mails. You should always be cautious but not too 
worried. 
                 Chapter 7: Findings and Recommendations 
193 
10. You should not have overconfidence in the reliability of anti-virus software to detect 
all phishing attempts. 
11. You should not have overconfidence in official and trustworthy institutes in Qatar 
because phishers could target them. 
12. You should not be overconfident or too trusting about the information available on 
the Internet because not everything there is true. 
13. You should not put too much trust in a known e-mail sender addresses because 
phishers could impersonate the trusted users. An e-mail return address may not be 
the real sender. 
14. Be particularly careful about phishing e-mails that exploit your interests, emotions, 
beliefs and religion, especially in religious seasons and following disaster events. 
15.  If an offer seems very good, beware, temptation is a common trick used by 
phishers. 
16. Don’t be affected by incentives and disincentives that phishers could utilise. 
17. Don’t give away your e-mail address unless you are sure about the legitimacy of the 
people you are giving it to, even if they seem to be asking for it in a good cause, 
because it could be used to distribute phishing e-mails and give them credibility.   
18. Don’t over-trust official looking communications since phishers could misuse them 
to persuade you they are legitimate.   
19. Don’t let courtesy lead you to disclose your confidential or private information 
20. Don’t think phishing could not reach you, because there is no limited geographical 
area for phishing as it could reach any place around the world with a simple click. 
Although Qatar is a safe country, anyone using the Internet is vulnerable as the 
phishing attack may come from a different country. 
21. Don’t fall prey to phishing that plays on your religion, emotion and goodness. So if 
you receive a request from a charity you should check with the Ministry of 
Endowments and Islamic Affairs that it is a registered charity centre. 
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22. Don’t over-trust or have good faith in people, especially those you don’t know 
23. Don’t ever think you don’t have anything to be stolen or worth stealing. Phishers  
may be just out to steal your identity 
24. Don’t forget that phishers attack thousands of people around the world, few of 
whom they will know, so even though you have no enemies you are still a possible 
target for phishing 
25. Don’t fall prey to phishing e-mails which have a tribal, sectarian or partisan appeal 
 
7.3  Evaluation of Recommendations 
To evaluate the proposed recommendations, the following 12 experts in the field of 
e-crimes and Qatar law and culture were asked for their opinions: (see Appendix D) 
 An officer of the Computer Crimes Unit, Economic Crimes Prevention Division, 
General Admin. of Public Security Criminal Investigation Dept., Ministry of 
Interior, Qatar. 
 A manager of the Public Relations Dept., Ministry of Interior. 
 The Senior Incident Specialist, Incident Management, Q-CERT, Qatar. 
 An Analyst, Critical Infrastrusture Protection, Q-CERT, Qatar. 
 A Public Awareness Manager, Q-CERT, Qatar. 
 A manager of ISPs, Qtel, Qatar. 
 The Head of Prosecution, Ministry of Public Prosecution, Qatar 
 A judge at the Courts of Justice under the category of the Senior Civil Court Judges, 
The High Judicial Council, Department of Administrative & Financial Affairs, 
Qatar.  
 The Computer Systems Administration course leader, Bradford University, UK. 
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 The Chief of Operations, First Base Technologies, leader in providing information 
security and testing services, UK  
 The Cultural Attaché, Embassy of Qatar in the UK 
 A researcher in Qatar culture, Ministry of Culture, Arts and Heritage   
 The Managing Director of HandShaikh Ltd., UK, which provides cross-cultural 
seminars and consultancy for business with Arabs. He is also a researcher in Gulf 
culture and author of the book Don't they know it's Friday?. 
 
The Cultural Attaché of Qatar and the Managing Director of HandShaikh Ltd were 
asked to evaluate only recommendations for Qatari citizens since they are experts in 
Qatar culture. Since the Chief of Operations of First Base Technologies is not part of 
the Qatar government, he was not involved in the evaluation of Qatar government 
recommendations. The remainder of the mentioned experts participated in the 
evaluation of all three sets of the proposed recommendations. 
 
In addition, to involve Qatari citizens in the evaluation, a convenience sample of 30 
Qatari e-mail users above the age of 12 were selected from a cross section of the 
researchers friends, colleagues and relations to assess people’s acceptability of the 
recommendations and to feedback. 
The following recommendations were considered: 
 The proposals assigned for Qatari citizens (see Section 7.2.3) 
 The need for implementing an awareness programme by government and 
organisation officials responsible for ensuring information security to enhance 
public awareness of the phishing threat. 
 The provision of a kind of identity verification, such as a visa card, ID number in 
some form of registration process before accessing the free Internet in iparks. 
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 The carrying out of e-mail phishing penetration tests to measure an organisation’s 
vulnerabilities to such threat. 
 The setting up of some clear and reasonable guidelines to help in defending against 
phishing, bearing in mind that employers should be motivating their employees 
without intimidating them to follow such guidelines. 
 The addition of a level of security on an e-mail account which would not allow an 
e-mail user to send their confidential information (e.g. username and password) to 
anyone over the e-mail. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were held with the above evaluators. All were first shown 
the recommendations, and then face-to-face individual discussions were held to evaluate 
the recommendations according to their effectiveness, feasibility and ease of 
implementation. The following questions were asked: 
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
3. Are there any difficulties that might be experienced if they were implemented (e.g. 
in cost or resources)? 
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
 
7.3.1  Recommendations for Government  
Both experts and public evaluators believed that generally the recommendations were 
potentially extremely effective and, if they were implemented successfully, they would 
certainly help in reducing the risk of e-mail phishing in the state of Qatar as they are 
well defined and based on research carried out in the region.  
The experts in the law and e-crime from the Ministry of Interior, Q-CERT and Qtel 
believed all recommendations to be valuable, especially because they cover different 
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target groups, they were clear and were derived from a research base. They added that 
Qatar e-law is on the way to reality and the Q-CERT team is involved in co-operation 
with associated organisations including ITU (International Telecommunication Union), 
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Public Prosecution, High Judicial Council and others. It 
is important to consider the dependabability and adaptability of the law, especially with 
the fast improvement in technology. The new e-law has taken into consideration 
experience of other countries in e-law. Basically, it is a combination of e-law of 
Australia, America, UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia, customised to be unique for the state 
of Qatar.  
 
The experts agreed that building an e-law from scratch would be time-consuming and 
prone to error, and therefore it is worthwhile to learn from others’ experiences in e-law. 
In addition, they stated that the effectiveness of the e-law would be known only after the 
law comes into practice, but this could be achieved with co-operation from all sectors, 
including governmental and private organisations and Qatari citizens. The experts 
agreed it would be important to announce and publicise the implementation of the law 
and make it an open source to the public. The law could be improved regularly once it is 
implemented. They expected that the new e-law would deter people with malicious 
intent who attempt to deceive and exploit others through electronic telecommunication, 
especially phishers. However, the Head of Prosecution and Justice suggested that 
although the new law would definitely provide a framework for Qatari citizens, it would 
be difficult to implement, especially for crimes committed from other countries, such as 
Nigeria, where it is hard to reach the phisher and punish them even if there is co-
operation, since there is no stability in the country. Therefore, the experts suggested that 
it would be better to make people aware of the threat and be cautious with e-mails from 
those countries, and to wait a while until these countries become more stable and before 
Qatar tries to build strong co-operation.  
 
With regard to the need for public prosecution, the experts agreed that judges and 
lawyers will need to enhance their knowledge on how to deal with e-crimes and how to 
understand and implement the new e-law, but they suggested it should be an optional 
                 Chapter 7: Findings and Recommendations 
198 
course for those interested in becoming experts in e-crime. It would be sufficient to 
have a team of experts in e-crime and then refer all e-crime cases to them.  
Most of the experts believed there is a need for a research centre on e-crime in Qatar, 
especially now that Qatar is investing in education and research and there is a huge 
revolution in technology. However, they noted that although establishing such a centre 
is feasible, it would require huge resources from experts in the field, money and tools. 
However, they believed it would be possible with support from the government and 
other institutes, especially educational institutes, and the support would grow with the 
reputation of the centre.  
 
The experts argued about the implementation of a phishing database in practice. Half of 
the experts suggested that although keeping a record of phishing incidents on a database 
seems to be an easy step, most organisations do not do it. It is part of the Qatari culture 
that people do not want to report, they just want to react and solve the problem, 
believing anything more is a waste of paper and time. Moreover, the experts in Q-CERT 
commented that there are databases that already exist, such as Q-CERT’s incident 
database. However, the records are not gathered into a single database, so they agreed 
that once all incidents are gathered into a single database and classified, this could be 
used for further research. The experts in Qatar culture agreed on the need for such a 
database, pointing out that Qataris usually prefer to react to incidents rather than 
reporting and documenting things. However, some experts still had doubts about 
creating a statistical database of every single e-crime incident, suggesting it would be 
unrealistic in daily operation even though this might be beneficial for a research base. 
Experts from the Ministry of Interior added that such a database required sufficient 
resources, including a team of experts working on gathering all incidents, classifying 
them and reporting them.  
 
The majority of Qatari citizens and experts pointed out the need for an effective 
awareness framework to enhance public awareness of the phishing threat, especially 
through the media. However, the public relations experts from the Ministry of Interior 
and Q-CERT mentioned the difficulties of acquiring resources for such a programme 
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and gaining cooperation from the many institutes in Qatar (e.g. educational institutes, 
media and governmental organisations) needed to facilitate a successful awareness 
programme.  
 
Regarding the iparks, the experts agreed that as the iparks are currently not monitored, 
they have become the source of many e-crimes inside Qatar since there is no method of 
tracing the user. They agreed that adding a kind of registration process to prove the 
identity of the user would be a valuable solution. They agreed the SMS registration 
would be a good idea since a lot of Qatari citizens have mobile phones, even children, 
and all mobile phones in Qatar are registered, making it easy to trace the user in cases of 
Internet misuse. Q-tel pointed out that using an SMS service is becoming common in 
Qatar; it already exists in the Ministry of Interior and in many banks and institutes. 
People would therefore accept it, it would not be difficult to implement and it would be 
reliable as SMS messages would be received within seconds for the user since there is 
no difficulty with mobile signals in any of the iparks. 
 
The provision for such service should come from Q-CERT since ipark is one of their 
projects. Also, there should be a co-operation with telecommunication service providers 
since they have control over telecommunication channels in Qatar, including Internet 
and mobile phones. Q-CERT agreed that this recommendation is feasible but it would 
require a lot of resources and cooperation with Internet service providers. They pointed 
out that there would be the need to provide a unique username and password for each 
registered user which would expire immediately when the user disconnected from the 
Internet. It was agreed that although this might be annoying for people to have a 
different login each time it was used, it would be safer, since it would ensure the 
identity of the user is known each time. There would be a risk that mobile phones could 
be stolen and used by phishers for this purpose, but as there is no 100% solution, the 
user would have to immediately report any such loss so that the SIM card could be 
blocked.  
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Generally, most of the Qatari citizens thought that adding registration would be valuable 
and necessary but it might not be accessible for people who do not have mobile phones. 
More than 70% of evaluators claimed that they would still use the ipark even if 
registration is required, because they are used to SMS services, and they found it fast 
and effective, especially with their experience with SMS banking services where, within 
a few seconds of performing any transactions on their bank account, they receive an 
SMS to verify the transactions. In contrast, less than 10% of evaluators disagreed 
believing that adding a registration might make the use of the ipark too complicated for 
the user. 
Finally, some of the experts highlighted the need to motivate the government to accept 
the proposed recommendations and approve their implementation without delay so that 
these recommendations could be effective in reducing the risk of phishing in the State 
of Qatar. 
 
7.3.2  Organisation recommendations 
All of the experts found all the recommendations for organisations valuable, although 
they thought it might be feasible only if there is sufficient budget for the organisation to 
fund the approach. Funding and resources were considered to be the largest obstacle to 
implementation, especially for providing an incident management centre. Although the 
experts agreed that such a centre is essential, they thought many organisations would be 
reluctant to spend a lot on it. They considered it likely that organisations would only 
react once an incident had happened, usually referring to responsible organisations to 
perform the required actions, such as the Ministry of Interior and the banks, because 
they are trusted and are experts in dealing with such cases.  
 
The experts from Q-CERT, Q-tel, the Ministry of Public Prosecution and the Ministry 
of Interior stated that within the organisation there should be an incident management 
centre which would report, react and work on the incidents, but still there is no shame in 
requiring help from responsible organisations such as Q-CERT and the Ministry of 
Interior. The expert in computer crime from the Ministry of Interior stated that if each 
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organisation had an incident management centre, the Ministry’s duty would be 
simplified since the centre would know with whom to interact and this would help the 
Ministry to further investigate the case. These experts confirmed that they thought many 
organisations would be reluctant to spend enough money to provide an incident 
management centre or a good quality education and awareness programme.  
 
All of interviewees stated that their organisations did not use penetration tests to 
measure employees’ vulnerability to possible threats such as phishing because of legal 
and ethical issues. However, a few (under 10%) pointed to the importance of planning 
and measuring the extent of the problem by holding such phishing penetration tests to 
assess the current strategy of defence and to work to improve it. Nevertheless, some of 
the experts stated that penetration tests would be possible if they were carried out by a 
trusted organisation, such as Q-CERT. They noted that the need for penetration tests 
would depend on the organisation size and information held. For example, the 
ministries hold sensitive information so it would be essential to perform such tests 
regularly, whereas other organisations may not necessarily require any tests.  
 
The experts agreed that a certificate to say that an organisation has been audited by 
penetration testing and has passed to a high level of defence against phishing would be 
very useful. However, the certificate would need to be approved nationally and 
internationally for credibility, as this would motivate organisations to do such an audit. 
In contrast, over half of the Qatari citizens interviewed disagreed with holding 
penetration tests because it would be annoying, create distrust in an organisation and 
they do not like to be watched and audited regularly since this might negatively 
influence their work performance. As a result of this evaluation, an extra 
recommendation was added that organisations should explain to employees the 
importance of such an audit and of having an approved defence certificate.    
 
With regard to the need for defining understandable and reasonable guidelines to avoid 
phishing, both experts and citizens thought these were important. However, they 
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mentioned that some employers go too far and define guidelines that are unreasonable 
and difficult to follow. For example, some organisations require a compulsory reset for 
their network password every three months which, although it is more secure, 
employees find difficulties in remembering and this leads them sometimes to write it on 
a sticky note in front of their desks. This therefore makes them vulnerable to social 
engineering attacks. As a result of this feedback, a further recommendation was made 
that organisations need to understand that there is a potential threat from setting up 
unreasonable guidelines and that they need to assess the feasibility of the guidelines to 
make sure all of them are short and understandable and are presented clearly to 
employees. Most of the interviewed citizens suggested that the recommendations should 
include motivating employees to follow such guidelines, although few organisations in 
Qatar currently have any culture of motivating employees whether by financial or any 
other means.      
 
With regard to adding a security level to an e-mail account which will not allow the  
user to send confidential information (e.g. username and password) to anyone by e-mail, 
the majority of interviewees thought it was a valuable and feasible suggestion. The 
experts agreed that it is technically feasible and organisations would find it a safeguard 
feature. However, some citizens disagreed and stated that they sometimes send their 
log-in details to their trusted families or friends. Despite this dissent, it was decided that 
this recommendation should remain, as it safer not to trust anyone, since everyone is 
responsible for any negative action performed from their computer or their account.  
 
7.3.3  Qatari citizens’ recommendations  
Most evaluators found the recommendations were useful to help reduce the risks from 
phishing but they felt there may be too many points for the average person to consume. 
They suggested consolidating some points to make the list shorter. Some suggested that 
a piece of advice that contains the threat should also contain the cure. So there is a need 
to tell Qatari citizens what they should do. Otherwise, you're only sending a scare that 
might drive people away from using technology. Therefore, they suggested re-wording 
the recommendations into positive things to do because people are reluctant to follow 
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negative recommendations. However, around 80% thought that the recommendations 
were well defined since they covered poor practices followed in their own daily on-line 
activities.   
Some of the experts stated that some of the recommendations were not illustrated 
sufficiently, such as the reason why technological solutions are not 100% reliable in 
detecting e-mail phishing attempts and how official institutes could be phished. Also, 
the recommendations should suggest how to detect, react and protect oneself against 
phishing attacks, how one should continuously improve one’s knowledge of phishing 
and how to inspect security indicators. Most experts noted that the recommendations 
were understandable but it would also be valuable to include some real examples, 
perhaps with screenshots, to help illustrate the points made.  
 
In response to the researcher’s explanation that the suggested recommendations were 
based on the discovered factors which make Qataris vulnerable to phishing, including 
the cultural aspects, the experts in Qatar culture agreed that the culture plays a huge role 
in making Qataris vulnerable to phishing, especially that Qataris are generally trustful, 
generous and helpful. Also, the experts warned there may be difficulties in presenting 
recommendations to Qatari citizens which may require approval from government or 
other organisations. Also, it would be difficult to measure the effectiveness of the 
recommendations in reducing the e-mail phishing problem in Qatar in reality. 
In addition, the Cultural Attaché of Qatar in the UK, stated that there is a difficulty in 
resolving phishing problems in Qatar because Qataris prefer not to think about the 
problem until they face it themselves, i.e. they are re-active rather than pro-active.  
 
7.3.3.1  Revised Recommendations for Qatari citizens 
Generally, there were no changes made for Government and organisational 
recommendations which all evaluators endorsed. As a result of the feedback from the 
experts and the sample of citizens, the recommendations for citizens were modified to 
make them more understandable and fewer in number as follows:    
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1. You should know that technological solutions are not 100% reliable to detect e-mail 
phishing attempts, especially since phishers use smart tricks to bypass them. 
You should know how to detect, react and protect yourself against phishing attacks. In 
addition, you should not have overconfidence in your own level of knowledge of 
phishing since this might lead you to become a victim. You need to continuously 
improve your knowledge of phishing and, to help in reducing such threats, you must 
report phishing incidents without feeling embarrassed. You will find a lot of 
information and tips on phishing online from United States Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), SCAMwatch which is run by the Australian Competition & Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), Anti-phishing.info and Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG). 
Just be suspicious – all the time. Trust no machine. 
 
How to avoid phishing? 
 Install antivirus software and spam filters and keep them up-to-date (e.g. the Firefox 
and Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE7) phishing filters)  
 Do not trust offers that seem too good to be true. Phishers usually trick people by 
conveying a sense of urgency, surprise, exploiting their goodness and interest. Also 
they usually employ official mail; however, look at the language as they tend to 
make spelling and grammatical mistakes. 
 Do not open an e-mail classified as junk mail unless you trust it. 
 Do not download an attachment from an unknown sender, it may contain viruses. 
 Be suspicious about e-mails that ask for private or confidential information  
 Spend enough time to recognise phishing attempts by inspecting security indicators. 
This is done by first inspecting the URL of the site to see whether it is an 
unprotected web page (the URL begins with http) or it is protected with SSL/TLS 
(begins with https), then the padlock icon to see whether it is locked (protected with 
SSL/TLS) or unlocked (unprotected with SSL/TLS) and finally the legitimacy of the 
security certificate.  This can be accessed by double clicking on the padlock where 
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you must then ensure that the certificate is valid and issued for the entitled site by a 
trusted certificate authority (CA) such as VeriSign and Thawte.  
 Consider security alerts appearing from your operating system, anti-virus, Internet 
browser and spam filters. 
 Finally, do not respond to suspicious mails  
 
How to react on being phished? 
To reduce the possible negative impacts from phishing, you must follow the following 
remedial actions once you fall victim to phishing:  
 Report incidents to the Ministry of Interior, your bank or to Q-CERT  which is a 
responsible organisation dealing with Internet crimes in Qatar 
 Check your financial statements immediately 
 Cancel your credit and debit cards 
 Change the account details you have been disclosing 
 If your PC was infected, run a virus check 
 Finally, it is recommended that you share your experience and make others aware.  
You should recognise that there is no limit for language or topics or  geographical area 
for phishers, they can exploit people through different topics, even religious ones, 
written in any language, even Arabic, so do not think phishers could not reach you. 
They attack people around the world, so even though you have no enemies you are still 
a possible target for phishing.  
2. You should not over-trust e-mails which appear to be official communications from 
known and trusted addresses because phishers could steal their identities and 
impersonate the real users to commit their crimes. So you should not have 
overconfidence in e-mails that appear to come from official and trustworthy 
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institutes in Qatar. Remember that not all information available on the Internet is 
true.  
3. Do not fall to temptation or incentives from e-mails that exploit your tribal, 
sectarian interests, emotions, good will, beliefs and religion, especially in religious 
seasons and following disaster events. For example, if you receive a request from a 
charity you should check with the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs that 
it is a registered charity centre and if you receive an e-mail requesting help, taking 
advantage of your tribal loyalties. 
4. There is no need to be too courteous. Just because the sender seems friendly, you are 
not obliged to reply. The sender may be being friendly just to tempt you. Don't over-
trust or have good faith in people you don't know. 
5. Don’t forward e-mails if you are not sure about their legitimacy even if they seem to 
be aimed at spreading goodwill because this could help in distributing phishing 
e-mails and give them credibility.   
6. Don’t ever think you don’t have anything worth stealing, even a few small coins or 
simple information such as your name is worthwhile for phishers. 
7. You should not be too cautious or worried about phishing since this might lead to 
wrong decisions, even on legitimate e-mails. Don’t think every e-mail from an 
unknown sender is phishing, it could be legitimate and safe.  
 
7.4  Summary 
This chapter presented the recommendations for the Qatar government; for organisation 
officials responsible for ensuring information security and for Qatari citizens to 
diminish the e-mail phishing threat in Qatar. The recommendations were derived from 
grounded theory based on findings from the research carried out in the field. The 
proposed recommendations were evaluated by a sample of Qatari citizens and experts 
from Qatar and the UK in the fields of e-crime, Qatar law and culture. They concluded 
that the recommendations were potentially very effective and would help in reducing 
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the risk of e-mail phishing in the State of Qatar if implemented successfully since they 
are based on sound research. 
 
With regard to the recommendations for a Qatar e-law, the experts stated that this 
initiative is already under way with the team from Q-CERT working in co-operation 
with associated organisations nationally and internationally. The law has taken into 
consideration the experience of other countries in e-law, dependability and constant 
improvement and is to be available to the public. More than half of the interviewees 
pointed to the need for having a team of experts in e-crime involving public 
prosecution, justices and lawyers. Since Qatar is investing in education and research, 
they should consider the possibility of creating an e-crime research centre. 
 
The common obstacle to implementing most of the recommendations for government 
would be the need for resources of money, staff and tools and support from government 
and other institutes. In addition, as Qatari citizens tend to react to incidents rather than 
reporting and documenting them, this has led to the difficulties in building a record of 
phishing incidents within any organisation. The Ministry of Interior supported the 
concept of keeping a record of incidents but pointed out the need for a team of experts 
working on gathering all incidents to classify and analyse them to produce reports on 
the extent of the problem.  
 
All of the experts and most, though not all, of the citizens agreed there is a need for an 
effective awareness framework to enhance public awareness of the phishing threat in 
Qatar, especially through the media. Regarding the ipark, both experts and citizens 
agreed that adding a registration process to prove the identity of the user would be a 
valuable solution and that SMS registration would be very effective, although it might 
not be accessible for people who do not have mobile phones.  
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The experts thought all recommendations for organisation officials were valuable but 
some suggested that many organisations would be reluctant to support the spending to 
provide an incident management centre, a measurement tool to measure employees’ 
vulnerability to phishing and an education and awareness programme. In addition, there 
were conflicting views regarding the phishing penetration test. Some thought it would 
be beneficial to assess the effectiveness of the organisational strategy of defence against 
phishing, while others disagreed because of legal and ethical issues, the distrust that 
may be created and the negative influence on employees’ work performance.  
 
There were also conflicting views on the provision of strict guidelines, with employers 
believing this will enhance their security level, whereas others thought it might be 
unrealistic. Even where the guidelines are strictly enforced, employees may still find 
ways to bypass them and this could potentially make them vulnerable to other attacks 
such as those of social engineering.  Therefore an organisation should consider the 
importance of motivation to inspire their employees to cooperate. 
With regard to the recommendations defined for Qatari citizens, most evaluators agreed 
they were useful since they are based on the factors which make Qataris vulnerable to 
phishing. However, there were too many and some were not explained adequately. 
Therefore, the recommendations were simplified and clarified to take into 
considerations the evaluators’ feedback.  
 
In conclusion, the recommendations were thought by a sample of experts and Qatari 
citizens to be potentially effective for reducing the risk of e-mail phishing attacks in the 
State of Qatar. However, some obstacles were identified that might be faced when 
implementing the recommendations and these should be considered and planned for 
when putting the recommendations into practice. However, it is of some concern 
whether the recommendations would actually be effective when implemented. The 
researcher is unable to implement all of the recommendations into reality since this 
would require many resources and the approval of government and many institutes in 
Qatar. Some experts identified the need to motivate the government and target groups to 
acknowledge the proposed recommendations and implement them to reduce the risk of 
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phishing in the State of Qatar. The limitations of time and resources for this research 
and the need for approval at many levels means it will not be possible to evaluate all of 
the proposed recommendations. However, the recommendation for implementation of 
an effective e-mail phishing awareness programme could be evaluated by implementing 
aspects of the suggested programme to show that awareness could help in reducing 
phishing risk in Qatar. Research outcomes through all phases have illustrated the need 
for developing an anti-phishing awareness and educational framework for the State of 
Qatar to help reduce the e-mail phishing threat. 
 
The next chapter describes the development of a comprehensive and interesting e-mail 
phishing awareness framework, along with the evaluation of its effectiveness in 
enhancing people’s knowledge and defence level against the phishing threat. The 
framework is designed to be suitable for all Qatari citizens and has taken account of the 
findings of previous research (see Chapter 2) with regard to awareness, such as 
considering participants’ background, not intimidating people and the factors which 
make Qataris vulnerable to phishing.  
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Chapter 8 An Educational Programme for Phishing 
Awareness 
 
Many research papers support the need for education and training on the phishing threat 
to improve online users’ defence against phishing and therefore reduce the effect of 
phishing through awareness (see Section 2.5.2.2). It can be concluded from the literature 
that there are different educational and training methods which apply learning principles 
which have been shown to be effective in improving users’ abilities to detect phishing 
attempts. The literature review suggests that a comprehensive e-mail phishing 
educational framework should involve embedded training, contextual training, learning 
programmes and e-learning. Development of such a framework has taken account of 
this. Accordingly, training materials are presented in different forms including a game, 
quizzes, posters, presentations, cartoons and through the media to provide effective 
education against phishing threat. The developed awareness framework includes 
different training techniques as shown in Figure 8.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 1: Awareness framework 
Awareness framework 
Embedded 
training 
Contextual 
training 
Learning 
programme 
E-learning 
Media 
Seminar 
Posters 
Cartoons 
Game &Quizzes 
Presentation 
Booklet 
Posters 
Cartoons 
Game &Quizzes 
Presentation 
Booklet 
                                           Chapter 8: An Educational Programme for Phishing Awareness 
211 
 
This chapter describes the development of an effective educational learning programme 
on e-mail phishing to enhance people’s awareness and thereby reduce the problem. 
Learning programmes could be executed widely through media or locally through 
learning sessions and can involve multiple educational components including posters, 
leaflets, cartoons, quizzes, games and giving presentations (see Section 2.5.2.2).  
A programme session for Qatar was developed to make its citizens aware of the e-mail 
phishing threat and how to recognise, react and protect themselves against it. Different 
learning tools (e.g. posters, game, quizzes and cartoons) are suggested to create an 
interesting and enjoyable educational session based on established learning principles, 
without intimidating the participants, and taking into account the factors which make 
Qataris particularly vulnerable to phishing. 
 
8.1  Development of an Educational Programme 
It was decided to develop a two-fold, anti-phishing, learning programme, presented as 
learning sessions and e-learning, involving different learning tools such as posters and 
quizzes and also as a TV programme. The author was motivated to use the media to 
enhance public awareness on phishing since many researchers have proved the 
influence of media awareness on people’s behaviours and on increasing their knowledge 
on many issues (Goddard and Saunders, 2001; Levy, 1999; Krugman, 1996; Andrews, 
McLeese and Currant, 1995: 929-930; Burrows, 1988). In addition, this research applies 
effective methods in the e-mail phishing learning sessions along with e-learning, 
benefiting from tutorials and training found in the literature and the information they 
involve. The different learning tools in the e-learning and learning session are: scenario-
based cartoon posters, cartoons, presentation slides, quizzes and an anti-phishing game 
for testing the effectiveness of each part of the learning tools. The educational tools 
were also assembled as an e-learning website to provide flexibility of learning and to 
facilitate the evaluation process for the learning session. The components of the anti-
phishing programme passed through a development phase and were then put into a 
programme session and e-learning site to assess the effectiveness of each component. In 
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addition, the use of media, in particular a TV show on the danger of phishing, was tried 
and evaluated. 
 
In the development phase of the learning programme, two experts in awareness were 
met individually: the public awareness manager in Q-CERT and the manager of the 
Public Relations department in the Ministry of Interior. Those experts are responsible 
for enhancing public awareness in Qatar and discussions with them were aimed at 
building a learning programme. It was concluded that such a programme should be 
simple, understandable, attractive and interesting. In addition, it should cover all the 
topics required about e-mail phishing without being too long (e.g. what e-mail phishing 
is, its impact, how to react, recognise and protect against phishing, in simple guidelines 
that are understandable and easy to follow). They supported the need for different tools 
(e.g. game, poster, cartoon, etc.) for developing awareness and in both Arabic and 
English, since Qatar is a multi-ethnic country.  Furthermore, they agreed on the need to 
make people aware of phishing without intimidating them and to take account of 
people’s background and the factors which make Qataris vulnerable to phishing. 
 
The manager of the Ministry Public Relations department particularly emphasised the 
need to provide a framework associated with Qatar using the media and posters for 
enhancing public awareness. On the other hand, the expert from Q-CERT put more 
emphasis on the effectiveness of training sessions, applying the training in an interesting 
way to teach the principles involved. 
 
8.1.1  Poster Development 
To test the effectiveness and discover the advantages and disadvantages of using posters 
as a means of creating awareness, three posters were developed.  
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Poster 1: Be aware of phishing 
The first poster was intended to be an attractive poster which demonstrates effectively 
the dangers of phishing through a visual image that is easily understood, with a simple 
description of phishing underneath. Since ‘phishing’ sounds the same as ‘fishing’, this 
suggested the concept of phishing for potential victims as a shark that preys on small 
fishes. Therefore, there was a need to either capture a picture of the moment where the 
shark is attacking its prey or to use an existing picture. Due to the difficulties in 
obtaining such a picture, an existing one was used and, after a search, it was decided to 
use a picture from the well known 3D cartoon film, Finding Nemo. The image has the 
copyright of Walt Disney in the USA, so permission was sought from Walt Disney to 
use the image and this was granted for use in this research project. The Photoshop 
application was used to create a scary atmosphere by adding an abandoned ship. 
 
The poster reflects the conflict between good and evil and demonstrates the risk of 
phishing, where phishers tempt their victims into troubled waters to attain their goal. 
The predator shark symbolises the phisher who hunts for victims, depicted as the two 
small fishes on the poster, one of which is the well-known cartoon fish ‘Nemo’, which 
were led into a terrifying place in the ocean with an abandoned ship. This symbolises 
the seriousness of the consequences of phishing attacks and also the need for awareness. 
There is a common saying in Arabic ‘If you are not a wolf, the wolves will attack you’, 
which means there is a need to be aware and cautious. The poster was entitled Be aware 
of phishing and it contains a profile sentence about phishing: Phishing with a ‘Ph’ is an 
attack which seeks to trick people in order to gain their confidential or private 
information for promised goods, services, money and  more (see Figure 8.2). Although 
the poster uses the well-known characters of the Nemo film, discussions with the 
experts confirmed that while it is attractive and reflects its purpose, it is not unique to 
Qatar and does not contain sufficient details of phishing, its techniques and how to 
protect against it. Therefore, a second poster was developed, containing more 
information and a greater association with Qatar. 
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Figure 8.2: Poster 1- Be aware of phishing 
 
Poster 2: Let's make phishing disappear! 
The second poster Let's make phishing disappear! introduces the term ‘phishing’and 
gives recommendations on how to avoid it. In addition, it demonstrates that phishers use 
many tricks to attain their goal by showing three examples of phishing e-mails, each 
using different techniques. E-mail 1 works on people’s emotion and religion with an 
apparent request from a charity fund to download an attachment in the e-mail which 
                                           Chapter 8: An Educational Programme for Phishing Awareness 
215 
 
might contain viruses. E-mail 2 uses the format  of an official communication, 
conveying a sense of urgency, intimidating the victim with the threat of shutting down 
all unused accounts and demanding that the victim verifies his/her hotmail account in a 
fake website. E-mail 3 uses a sense of surprise and the format of an official 
communication, asking for a reply to gain a lottery prize of £600,000. To make this 
poster unique to Qatar, the researcher has used a character well-known to Qataris, the 
awareness officer ‘Naseh’ who reflects the culture of Qatar in the traditional dress of a 
Qatari policeman (see Figure 8.3). Copyright clearance for using the character was 
obtained from the Public Relations department of the Qatar Ministry of Interior which 
uses Naseh for promoting traffic awareness (see Appendix E). Therefore, Naseh is used 
as a trusted symbol for Qataris to make them aware of the phishing threat. In addition, 
the background of the poster contains some Islamic inscriptions in a maroon colour 
which links to the white and maroon of the Qatar flag. The experts favoured this poster 
because they believed it contains more information about phishing in a way associated 
with Qatar and makes people aware without intimidating them, whereas the previous 
poster was more terrifying rather than helping to create awareness. However, young 
people who were interviewed after they took part in the awareness session (described 
later in this chapter) took the opposite view and found it less attractive. 
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Figure 8.3: Poster 2- Let's make phishing disappear! 
 
Poster 3: Story board 
This poster provides a story board which makes people aware of phishing through the 
scenario of an interesting story. It takes the best idea from the two previous ones: the 
memorable cartoon with well known characters and a more informative poster 
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associated with Qataris. The main characters of the story board are from the Freej 
cartoon, which is the Middle East’s first ever and much loved 3D animated TV series, 
which presents the Gulf culture, thus making the storyboard interesting, attractive and 
unique. Permission to use the Freej characters was granted by Lammtara, the official 
creators of the Freej cartoon.    
 
Freej is produced in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) by Mohammed Saeed Harib 
(Saffarini, 2006) and is centred on four elderly Emirati women trying to live a peaceful 
life in a secluded neighbourhood in the midst of the ever-expanding modern day city 
around them. The show’s main characters and the booming city unveil new social issues 
every day that they would have to tackle and solve in their own simple way. The Freej 
official website is available at http://www.freej.ae/. Since the poster uses the Freej 
cartoon, the target group for this story board were the people who watch it, a wide range 
of the population including children and adults. 
 
The story board looks attractive and was entitled Phishing in Freej. It has illustrated 
different types of phishing attacks by showing that phishing can come through different 
communication channels: e-mail, mail, phone and others. Also it shows the tricks 
phishers use against their victims such as exploiting their interest and how victims react 
once they receive such an attack by giving an example of an aware and unaware victim 
and, finally, it gives some tips to avoid the phishing threat (see Figure 8.4). All of the 
posters had versions in both English and Arabic in order to be understood by a large 
number of Qatari citizens. For the Arabic version of the posters, see Appendix E, pp. 
418-420. 
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Figure 8.4: Poster 3- Story board 
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8.1.2  Cartoons   
Discussions with the experts have confirmed that presenting a cartoon about phishing is 
a good idea to make people aware of such threatening attack. Therefore, two cartoons 
about phishing were drawn. The first, In phishing you are the fish, so don't bite!, 
illustrates phishers and how they trick people to fall prey to their attacks. The phisher 
was presented as a fisherman but, instead of delivering a catch of fish, he cast a 
deceptive e-mail as bait to entice people to bite on its hooks. Fish presented in the 
cartoon demonstrate a sample of victims available on the Internet; some have money 
and valuable information to be stolen by phishers and others might have nothing but 
they could still be targeted by phishers to be used, for example, to distribute phishing 
e-mails or to use the victims’ computers from which to perform their crimes (see Figure 
8.5). The second cartoon, Don't fall for it, they try to phish you, illustrates victims of 
phishing, how they react once they receive a phishing e-mail and what makes them 
vulnerable to falling prey to such attack, especially when it conveys a sense of urgency 
and surprise. The poster demonstrates that people should not trust offers that seem too 
good to be true and they have to be aware of phishing and its tricks (see Figure 8.6).    
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Figure 8.5: Cartoon 1 
 
Figure 8.6: Cartoon 2 
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8.1.3  Presentation Slides 
Presentations can give more details about the phishing threat and, in particular, e-mail 
phishing. Therefore, a series of simple, understandable presentation slides about the 
phishing threat was developed for use in a seminar tutorial. So that the presentation is 
associated with Qatar, it uses the awareness officer, Naseh, as a trusted symbol 
representing Qatari police. The presentation delivers enough of the information required 
about phishing to enhance people’s defence level against such attack and covers the 
following topics in the form of brief questions: what is phishing? what is the impact of 
phishing? why is phishing successful? how do you avoid phishing? and how should you 
react once you are tricked? It also shows an example of a phishing attack and how it 
could be recognised. Since the awareness officer is commonly used for traffic 
awareness, traffic signs are used to present the suggested guidelines on how to avoid 
phishing attempts. They will also help participants to remember the guidelines (see 
Figure 8.7). Also, the meaning of the same guidelines is represented in a related 
diagram which makes the presentation more interesting and easy to understand and 
remember. For a full version of the English and Arabic presentation, see Appendix E. 
The manager of the public relations department at the Ministry of Interior was shown 
the presentation after development and found it potentially effective, understandable 
and well presented. 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Presentation slide 
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8.1.4   Booklet  
The idea of the booklet came from the experts in awareness from the Public Relations 
department of the Ministry of Interior who suggested it would be likely to be effective 
in making people aware of the phishing threat. It is essentially the presentation slides in 
a different form in an A5 booklet as a handy means of making people aware of the 
phishing threat. 
 
8.1.5  Quizzes 
Quizzes aim to measure people’s knowledge in a particular subject area and, in the case 
of phishing, they could be used to measure people’s vulnerability to e-mail phishing 
according to knowledge of phishing, behaviours and reactions and ability to recognise 
phishing attempts. Therefore three automated and interactive quizzes were developed to 
achieve this aim. Quizzes were also used to evaluate the effectiveness of the awareness 
framework by comparing the results of participants in some aspect of the framework 
with the results of people who had not participated.  
 
8.1.5.1  Quiz 1 
This quiz is to assess people’s vulnerability to e-mail phishing based on knowledge of 
e-mail phishing attacks provided earlier in the presentation slides, as five open-ended 
questions related to phishing, as follows: 
1. What is phishing? 
2.  What is the impact of phishing? 
3. Why is phishing successful? 
4. How do you avoid phishing?  
5. How should you react on being tricked or on encountering phishing? 
In this quiz, users do not get any feedback on their answers since it is hard to give 
scores because of the open questions used. However, it will give an indication of the 
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amount of knowledge users have on the phishing threat before and after the learning 
session. 
  
8.1.5.2  Quiz 2 
This quiz measures vulnerability to e-mail phishing based on behaviours and reactions. 
It will also assess whether those behaviours have improved after the learning session. 
From the literature review, various behaviours were discovered which might make 
people vulnerable to phishing (e.g. not installing anti-virus software, opening junk mail) 
(see Section 2.5.2.1).  These behaviours were then put into the form of a quiz with 20 
Yes/No questions. The questions, with the correct choices, are as follows: 
1. Are you aware of the phishing threat? Yes   
2. Do you install anti-virus software or a spam filter in your PC? Yes 
3. Do you upgrade your anti-virus software regularly? Yes 
4. Do you regularly run a check for viruses on your PC? Yes 
5. Do you inspect URLs in e-mails? Yes 
6. Do you open e-mails from unknown senders? No 
7. Do you open junk mails? No 
8. Do you use the same password for more than one application? No 
9. Do you give your confidential information (e.g. password, bank account) to anyone, 
even your friends or relatives, on request? No 
10. Do you download attachments from unknown senders? No 
11. Do you check a file’s extension before you download it from the Internet?  Yes 
12. Do you inspect the digital certificate of the website before entering confidential 
information? Yes 
13. Do you enter your personal or financial information into pop-up windows? No 
14. Do you trust e-mails that do not address you by your name? No 
15. Once you receive a suspicious e-mail, do you contact the company directly instead 
of going to the URL or phone a number in the e-mail? Yes 
16. If you think you have received a phishing e-mail message, do you report it (e.g. to 
the police or a bank)? Yes 
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17. Do you type addresses directly into your browser instead of clicking on a hyperlink 
supplied in the e-mail? Yes 
18. Do you consider the security warnings? Yes 
19. Do you switch off your firewall application or anti-virus software when notification 
messages keep appearing to you frequently? No 
20. If you think you have been tricked, do you do any of the following actions: Yes  
Change the account details that you have revealed? 
Check your financial statements immediately? 
Cancel your credit and debit cards? 
 
Even if one choice is wrong, this means the respondent is vulnerable to e-mail phishing. 
Each correct choice earns 1 point. At the end of the quiz, users are given their scores 
and their level of vulnerability to phishing along with the correct answers. Assessment 
of people’s level of vulnerability to phishing was based on total quiz scores in Table 
8.1:  
Table 8. 1: Scores assessment for Quiz 2 
Scores 
(out of 20) 
Vulnerability level 
20 Very low vulnerability. Excellent, you are hardly ever vulnerable to 
phishing because you are well defended against it. Try to keep up to date 
on the subject of phishing. For more information go to 
http://wwww.antiphishing.org 
19-15 Low Vulnerability. Very good, but it is better to pick up, as follows: (Give 
advice on correct behaviours which users get wrong)  
14-10 Average vulnerability. Good, but you have to improve as follows:  (Give 
advice on correct behaviours which users get wrong) 
9-5 High vulnerability. Satisfactory, you have got lots to learn, as follows: 
(Give advice on correct behaviours which user get wrong)  
< 5 Very High vulnerability. Unsatisfactory, you are easily hooked by phishing, 
you should recover as follows: (Give advice on correct behaviours which 
users get wrong) 
 
8.1.5.3  Quiz 3: Anti-phishing Game 
Sheng et al. (2007) present a useful and effective game for enhancing users’ defence 
levels against phishing based on the URL, which motivated the researcher to build a 
similar anti-phishing game, but which broadens the learning concept of ways to detect 
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phishing e-mails through security indicators and message content as well as URLs. 
Therefore, an anti-phishing game was developed to raise people’s awareness of the 
threats associated with e-mail phishing and to teach them how to identify and avoid 
phishing e-mails using a range of indicators. 
 
The deployment of the game encourages people to learn about phishing while playing 
an exciting game. This changes the concept of learning and awareness from formal 
teaching and boring lessons into fun and interesting learning through an interactive 
game carefully designed for this purpose. This quiz was introduced as part of an 
interactive game which will both educate the user and also help assess the user’s ability 
to recognise phishing attacks through using an enjoyable tool. 
 
Game Planning and Design 
The anti-phishing game is a web game for educating e-mail users on how to identify 
e-mail phishing. To develop an attractive game, an iterative design process was used. 
The design has passed through different stages from early plans made on paper, through 
Flash prototypes until the final version of the game. 
The game was implemented by the researcher using Flash MX 2004. This provides a 
great deal of flexibility, particularly when creating animations, making it easy to 
quickly update the content. Most workstations have the Flash player, so there is no need 
for additional downloads.  Flash is integrated with Adobe applications such as 
Photoshop and Fireworks and Dreamweaver.  In the anti-phishing game, MySQL was 
used to store the user’s data and PHP was used as middleware to process the data. The 
main reason for choosing PHP is that it is open source software and is widely used and 
supported by ISPs (Internet Service Providers). MySQL was chosen because it supports 
multi-user connections, it is open source and, like PHP, it is widely supported by ISPs. 
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Game Mechanics 
The game is designed to help users understand the mysteries of the world of phishing. 
From the literature review, it was concluded that there are three main factors in 
detecting e-mail phishing: the URL of the website, the security certificate and the 
message content. Accordingly the game was designed to address these factors (see 
Figure 8.8).  
 
Figure 8.8: Factors addressed in game 
 
This educational game teaches users how to detect e-mail phishing through 3 games, 
each focusing on one of the above factors (see Figure 8.9). 
 
 
Figure 8.9: Three educational games   
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The game assesses users’ abilities to distinguish phishing e-mails by these three main 
indicators, assessing the users’ vulnerability to phishing from the scores of each game. 
These games were based on the ‘Anti-Phishing Phil’ game designed at Carnegie Mellon 
University by Sheng et al. (2007) in research on the factors which make people 
vulnerable to phishing, and on the phishing archive (MillerSmiles, 2006) which gives an 
overview on e-mail phishing tricks. The archival collection defined examples of 
phishing URLs which were found to be either IP-based URLs, extended URLs with 
sub-domains and misleading ones with visual similarities to legitimate URLs. The game 
was designed to include both legitimate and phishing e-mails to test the ability of the 
user to identify phishing. Five typical questions for Games 1 and 2 and 3 are shown in 
Table 8.2.   
                                           Chapter 8: An Educational Programme for Phishing Awareness 
228 
 
Table 8. 2: Typical questions for games 
 Game 1 
Do you trust the 
following URLs ? 
Game 2 
Do you deal or no deal ? 
Game 3 
Do you trust the following 
messages? 
1 http://natwest.natwes
tbank-updates.com 
Website: 
http://www.ebay.com/login. 
Owner: ebay,Inc. Verified by: 
Secure,Inc. 
You receive an e-mail 
classified as junk mail by your 
e-mail system. 
2 
http://165.71.1.96/nat
west/ 
 
Website: 
http://www.natwest.com/personal.
ashx. Owner: Natwests,Inc. 
Verified by: VeriSign,Inc. 
E-mail asks you to verify your 
account by directing you to 
official website 
3 
http://www.ebay.com Website: www.paypal.com. 
Owner: Paypal,Inc. Verified by: 
VeriSign,Inc. 
You receive e-mail from your 
bank which asks you to phone 
number supplied in e-mail for 
more information about new 
courses 
4 
http://entertainment-
memorabilia.ebay.co
m/ 
Double-clicking lock icon on 
status bar takes you to security 
certificate issued to same domain 
name (www.microsoft.com) as 
Web site domain name in address 
bar.  
E-mail asks you to reply with 
your account details through 
given e-mail address 
5 
http://tesc0.co.uk Website: www.amazoon.com. 
Owner: Amazoon,Inc. Verified 
by: VeriSign,Inc. 
You receive e-mail which 
addresses you by your first and 
last name (e.g. Dear Prof. Ray 
Dawson) 
 
Game Tales 
The main characters of the game are from the Freej cartoon. These four characters (Um 
Saeed, Um Saloom, Um Allawi and Um Khammas) have been chosen along with the 
character Um Um Khammas, with the cat, who plays the role of the phisher in the game. 
Um Allawi is presented as the story-based agent who will assist the user during game 
(see Section 2.5.2.2). The game was designed in the form of a story to attract players 
and it uses sound and graphics to encourage better user interaction with the game. In all 
three games, the player has to try to save the fish from the phisher. Each character plays 
a role in the game, as shown in Figure 8.10. 
                                           Chapter 8: An Educational Programme for Phishing Awareness 
229 
 
 
Figure 8.10: Game characters screen 
1. Fishing game 
The main characters of the game are the Phisher ‘Um Um Khammas’ and the fish. The 
tale is that the phisher is fishing and the player can release the fish if he or she identifies 
the legitimate websites from the URLs provided. For each question the player gets right, 
he or she will earn 10 points and will save the fish from the phisher, otherwise the fish 
will be caught. 
2. Fish market game 
The character Um-Saed is shopping in the fish market and the sales lady, Um 
Khammas, is selling fish. The player has to help Um-Saed by selecting the right deal for 
the fish by figuring out the legitimacy of the security certificate.  The player has to 
select the fish and then decide whether to deal or not deal. For each one the player gets 
right, he or she will earn 20 points and Um-Saed will get the fish, otherwise it will be 
taken by the phisher’s cat. 
3. Fish maze game 
The fish is in a maze and the player has to help it to reach the safety of its owner, the 
character Um-Saloom, by figuring out whether the message is trustworthy. For each one 
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the player has got right, he or she will earn 10 points and will save the fish, otherwise 
the fish will be caught by the phisher and the cat. 
 
Game Description 
The anti-phishing game begins with the initialisation of global variables while the game 
loads. It then asks the player to log in by entering his/her username and password. 
Alternatively, in the case of a new user, the player has to register before logging into the 
game (Figure 8.11). The game then brings the user to a welcome page (Figure 8.12) 
where he/she has the choice to go for a brief introduction of the game which is given 
along with a short movie clip which shows the phisher ‘Um Um Khammas’ who is 
fishing on the sea and the agent ‘Um Allawi’ tries to stop her and to raise users’ 
awareness of the phishing threat (Figure 8.13). Heinich et al. (1993) have stated that the 
use of animation would transform education and make it more motivating for students.  
 
 
Figure 8.11: Log in and register screen 
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Figure 8. 12: Welcome screen 
 
  Figure 8.13: Introduction movie clip 
 
The game menu consists of four options (Figure 8.14):  
1. Games which then presents the three games (Figure 8.18, 8.19 and 8.20) 
2. Conceptual knowledge (Figure 8.16) 
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3. Procedural knowledge which gives the user some information about phishing 
threat to raise their defence level (Figure 8.17)  
4. Quit option to exit from the game, leading back to the Log in and register screen 
(Figure 8.11).  
 
 
Figure 8.14: Game menu 
 
Figure 8.15: Game instruction screen for the fish maze game 
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Figure 8.16: Conceptual knowledge screen 
 
 
Figure 8.17: Procedural knowledge screen 
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Figure 8.18: Game screen for the fishing game 
 
 
Figure 8.19: Game screen for the fish market game 
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Figure 8.20: Game screen for the fish maze game 
 
 
Figure 8.21: ‘Game over’ screen for the fishing game 
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Figure 8.22: Results screen for the fishing game   
 
The games option consists of three games: Fishing, Fish Market and Fish Maze.  
Whichever game the user chooses, he/she will be able to see the game instructions 
which provide an introduction to the game and how to play it (Figure 8.15). Once the 
user chooses to play the game, the game timer will start counting down and the score is 
automatically increased when the answers are correct (see Figures 8.18, 8.19 and 8.20). 
 
For testing purposes, the game questions are selected randomly from the sample of 20 
questions in the data file to provide a reliable test. The games are flexible to enable 
them to be developed, so the questions could be easily enhanced and extended in the 
future for large groups of people. When the time is over, or all of the game questions are 
answered, the game is over and the user's score and rating (see Figure 8.21) are 
displayed according to the scores gathered (see Table 8.3). 
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Table 8.3: Scores assessment for game 
Scores 
(out of 100) 
Vulnerability level 
100 Very low vulnerability. Try to maintain 
90-80 Low vulnerability. Better to pick up 
70-60 Average vulnerability. You have to improve 
50-40 High vulnerability. You have lots to learn 
<40 Very high vulnerability. You are easily hooked by 
phishing, you should recover 
 
The user then has the option of replaying the game, quitting to the game menu or 
viewing the results (see Figure 8.22). The results page shows the game questions, 
whether the user has answered them correctly, incorrectly or not answered at all. Also, it 
shows brief comments on each question to provide users with an opportunity for 
reflection. The flow chart in Figure 8.23 gives an overview of the game process.  
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Figure 8.23: Game flow chart 
Loading game (Initiate global variables) 
Log-in 
Are you registered? Register 
Yes 
No 
Welcome Page 
Request introduction? 
Yes 
No 
Display Introduction of game 
Game Menu (Select your option) 
Option 1: Games Option 2: Concepts Option 3: Procedures Option 4: Quit 
Select your Game (Fishing, 
Fish Market or Fish Maze) 
 
Request game 
instructions? 
Yes 
 
No 
Display game 
instructions 
Play game 
No 
 
Game over (select your option) 
Yes 
Timer or 
questions end 
Display concepts Display Procedures 
Results 
Replay  
Quit 
Display game 
results 
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8.1.6  Development of anti-phishing e-learning 
With the rise of the Internet, there is a corresponding rise in the need for e-learning sites 
(Zenger and Uehlein, 2001). Although the traditional form of education is still 
important, e-learning and distance learning are now becoming a more prominent form 
of education since they add flexibility to the education process where people can learn 
through the Internet at any time convenient for them (Horton, 2000) (see e-learning in 
Section 2.5.2.2). Although e-learning is a useful educational tool, traditional education 
is still important since the student can have a full interaction with the teacher which is 
lacking in e-learning (Lord, 2001; Van Dam, 2001; Horton, 2000; Hall, 1997). 
However, a lot of research on e-learning is directed towards improving the effectiveness 
of the learning from educational websites, such as improving the accessibility, usability, 
visual representation, HCI (Human Computer Interaction) and live support (Martin, 
2007; Zaharias, 2004; Feldstein, 2002).  
 
Since the Internet has become a main source of information for many people, a usable 
e-learning website on e-mail phishing threat was developed. This site involves a range 
of educational tools including posters, cartoons, presentation slides and quizzes to 
educate people on such threat. In addition, the e-learning site facilitates evaluation of 
the awareness programme, since it involves user registration, along with a 
questionnaire, and it also constructs automated quizzes where the results are stored in a 
structured database for the researcher to use. The database stores users’ profiles, 
behaviours, feedback and results. The questionnaire helps in evaluating the site with 
regard to its educational material, including whether it enhances users’ knowledge of 
e-mail phishing, how users would best describe it, whether the information provided is 
regarded as good and important to know, which of the educational materials were more 
effective and, in general, if users have any comments or suggestions for improvement. 
 
Users are asked to register before accessing the educational material. The registration 
process asks for user’s age, education, occupation, nationality, level of computer 
knowledge and use of e-mail and choice of username and password. This information is 
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used in the evaluation phase of the awareness programme. A print screen of the login 
page of the e-learning site is shown in Figure 8.24 (see Appendix E and F for more 
details on e-learning design). 
 
Figure 8.24: Login page of e-learning site 
 
8.2  Running programme session 
Both experts on awareness suggested that educational institutes should be targeted and, 
in particular, schools in Qatar, since children are the next generation but are probably 
less aware of phishing as they are unlikely to have much confidential information or 
financial income to be stolen. Therefore the researcher targeted the teenage student age 
group 14-18, as they often use the Internet and are sometimes thoughtless in their 
decisions and actions. As there are difficulties in getting authority from community 
schools since permission should come from the Ministry of Education, private schools 
were contacted where permission is granted by the School Director. Two schools in 
Qatar (Amna Bint Wahab and Al-Shima Secondary School) agreed to accept the 
awareness session since they found it would best fit into one of their computer lectures 
on the topic of security for year 10 (age 15-16). The computer lecturer explained that 
the session should last for one hour like a usual school session. Therefore the researcher 
tried to make the awareness session shorter and easy to evaluate for effectiveness in the 
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time available. The programme session involved presentation slides, posters, cartoons, 
games and quizzes, and filling in a questionnaire to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
programme. The researcher used e-learning in the session to run the quizzes and 
questionnaire to assist in analysing results.  
 
The plan for the awareness session was as follows: 
1. Students required to register on the e-learning site 
2. Quizzes on the e-learning site to assess people’s knowledge and vulnerability to 
phishing before the awareness session 
3. The awareness seminar where the researcher showed the PowerPoint presentation 
slides, the posters and cartoons. 
4. Students complete the quizzes again to evaluate whether their vulnerability to 
phishing had improved after the seminar. 
5. Students answer the questionnaire given in the e-learning site. This was helpful to 
evaluate the effectiveness of each piece of educational material and of the overall 
awareness framework. 
 
Finally, students were invited to make any suggestions or comments on the session and 
were given a guidance booklet about phishing which contains the information shown in 
the presentation slides. The outcome of the session is described in the next chapter. 
 
8.3  Running the media programme 
The media programme was another interesting way of creating awareness which 
reached more people worldwide. Running the media programme involved several stages 
as follows: 
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1. Setting up a television programme 
The Al-Jazeera Children’s Channel was approached for an interview with the director of 
production to discuss whether the media play a role in enhancing awareness of the 
Internet threat and in particular phishing. He mentioned that they had not covered such a 
topic but he thought it is important to discuss and improve public awareness of the 
phishing threat which shows a high potential for victims in the region and around the 
world. He agreed that the media has a major effect in passing a message to a large 
number of the population in a short period of time. He pointed to the importance of 
designing awareness material that is understandable, attractive, consistent, without bias 
and suitable for the intended targeted audiences, who are children who watch the Al-
Jazeera Children Channel. The researcher was then invited to participate in a television 
show called Nadhra ala to speak about Dangerous e-mails, the programme produces 
phishing threat. 
  
2. Presenting the Television Programme 
The programme was in Arabic and involved the following participants: the female 
anchor, the researcher, 2 teenage phisher boys and 2 teenage girls around a table and a 
studio audience of about 30 other children. The programme took the form of a debate 
between programme participants, involved some vox pop (i.e. voice of the people which 
is usually gathered from interviews with the general public) reports with opinions of 
some children on the subject and there was also a poll question. The programme was 
subsequently translated with English subtitles (see Appendix G). 
 
3. Summarising the Programme Outcome 
The programme generally discussed the importance of the Internet in children’s lives, 
what it is being used for, whether children know its advantages and disadvantages and 
what their views are on hackers, and in particular, on phishing. The programme asked 
whether they know how to protect themselves, are able to control what they see and 
learn through the Internet, are subject to supervision by their parents, whether they 
believe in online friendships and consider it a modern way to communicate with others 
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and build friendship, know the ways in which hackers can penetrate their computers and 
how to protect themselves from hacking and phishing.  The programme also tried to 
find out why phishers are motivated to commit their crimes. 
 
In summary, the programme had the following key items:  
1. vox pop and discussion with the studio audience  
The discussions with the participants and reports from some children show that most 
love the Internet because of its many advantages, such as improving education, research 
and communication, leisure, searching, saving a lot of time and effort in finding 
information, electronic commerce and the many services on the Internet. 
 
There were different views expressed in the discussion by those who spend long hours 
on the Internet and those who believe that the use of Internet is important but with 
limits. Some were restricted by their parents to use it only at weekends and for a limited 
time in order to avoid its interfering with their studies. Some of those who spend long 
hours on the Internet reported pain in their back and eyes and they felt isolated from 
people in the outside world, which therefore affected their studies and daily duties. 
Some even admitted to being addicted to it but others become annoyed with spam 
messages, viruses and hackers. 
 
2.  The two boys in round table discussion 
The boys claimed to be phishers and said that they are subjected to nuisance from 
unknown people and, in turn, they commit their crimes on people who bother them. 
When they decided to harm someone, it is normally premeditated and usually involves 
building a relationship with their victims through chatting and then enticing them to 
give their confidential information such as their username, password and security 
questions. If they hack a victim’s e-mail address, they attempt to steal their victim’s 
details without the victim’s being aware of what has happened. However, the phishers 
felt they were not harming their victims. Their aim was often to copy their victim’s 
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contacts or to boast to their victims that they have such private knowledge about them. 
They felt it was normal to send threatening e-mails to victims to intimidate and annoy 
them. They found it fun, exciting and a form of revenge. They did not believe they were 
doing anything wrong or that they were violating someone’s privacy, although the 
phishers admitted they would get upset if they, themselves faced such an attack and they 
took safety measures to prevent other hackers from hacking their PCs.  
 
Even after a long discussion, the phishers still seemed to be happy about what they were 
doing to others. The phishers seemed to have conflicting views of themselves, thinking 
they were ‘half evil but hiding inside the clothes of a fine man’. In the end, they still 
admitted that they will continue to be expert hackers in the future and they will not stop 
phishing. This shows that they might already be addicted to phishing and they will 
continue to not consider the consequences of what they are doing, not only to others but 
also to themselves, as they could be criminalised. Thus there arises the responsibility of 
the government, in particular the Ministry of Interior, to pull them away from this field 
and shift them to a more constructive use of their skills, for example getting them to 
become ‘white hat hackers’ where they work on auditing the security level of the system 
by hacking into it to identify its weaknesses with the benefit of developing a secure 
system. This is done by many global organisations such as Microsoft which attract 
hackers to work in their premises towards improving their system. Parents clearly need 
to control their children’s activity on the Internet so that they will not be driven into 
criminal and illegal actions. 
 
3. The two girls in the round table discussion 
The girls were against hacking but love to learn everything about the Internet including 
hacking. They claimed that anyone who practices hacking will begin to see it as 
something normal and his/her conscience will die, because every day they will harm 
people. They thought that they have not been hacked because they are peaceful and they 
have not harmed anyone else. However, the researcher stated that this might not be true 
because phishers could target anyone and they direct a lot of attacks at many people 
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they do not know.  Even simple information or a small amount of money is valuable to 
phishers because they will build up their habit from one victim to another. 
 
4. The researcher’s contribution 
The researcher pointed out that the Internet mostly becomes available for children in 
their own home, so there is therefore a need for parents to observe and control their 
children’s Internet activity rather than preventing them from accessing the Internet. This 
control is available through many computer programs such as Parental Control.  
However, whatever methods of protection are available, phishers seem to become ever 
more powerful and devious. She mentioned the strategy of Qtel and Vodafone in 
shutting down and blocking these sites after research and verification of their malicious 
intentions.  However, the solution is not in blocking those sites, because hackers or 
phishers will launch another site with a new name and will repeat phishing. Phishers 
seek to bypass the technological tools by trying to look at gaps and weaknesses in the 
program to bypass it. Therefore it is important to update anti-virus programs regularly. 
The researcher stated that the children who became phishers may be motivated by their 
love of excellence in their sabotage of others or perhaps they consider it entertainment. 
She warned that maybe they are now just enjoying what they do but, perhaps with time, 
they may become addicted, so the problem must be addressed through awareness. 
 
5. Poll question with studio audience  
The studio audience was asked to answer a question on what they mostly use the 
Internet for. The results were as follows: 12% use the Internet for research, 38% to 
enjoy the games and half (50%) use it for e-mail and social networks such as Twitter 
and Facebook. Despite the irony of the result, it really reflects the reality. This indicates 
that e-mail is a common method of communication and therefore it is more attractive for 
phishers. 
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Finally, the show concluded that although researchers try to make everyone aware not to 
open a message when they are not sure of its source, people do not follow this advice. If 
they receive a message that says ‘I love you’, some would feel curious to know this 
person who loves them. The discussions showed that people are vulnerable to phishing 
which exploits their interests, beliefs, emotions, generosity, helpfulness, trust, good will, 
religion and others, which was mentioned by the researcher and agreed by the 
participants in the programme. Although there are many recommendations presented on 
how to protect against phishing, these phishers are stronger than those warnings. An 
evaluation of the programme is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
8.4   Summary    
This chapter has presented the development of part of the awareness framework which 
is the awareness programme and how it has been implemented. It involved seminar 
sessions, along with e-learning and a television show. The seminar sessions and 
e-learning used attractive and motivating educational tools, including a presentation, 
posters, quizzes and cartoons to educate people on the risk e-mail phishing. Interactive 
quizzes were used to assess people’s vulnerability to phishing according to knowledge 
of phishing, behaviours and reactions and ability to recognise phishing attempts. The 
interactive quiz game made the learning into an enjoyable, interesting and interactive 
awareness tool which measured vulnerability to phishing. Although e-learning was 
developed to support the learning session it was actually useful as a training method on 
its own. 
 
The television programme concluded that there are people in Qatar who are 
hackers/phishers and as they seemed to find their task easy and enjoyable would do it 
many times with little motivation. They were not troubled by any conscience and did 
not recognise the severity of the crime, so they will continue to hack/phish regardless of 
the consequences. In addition, it was found that there is clearly a lack of awareness of 
the phishing threat in young Qatar citizens and they were vulnerable to phishing which 
exploits their interests, beliefs, trust, good will and religion.  
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The next chapter presents the evaluation of the proposed e-mail phishing awareness 
framework and how the framework is put together and tested. The framework is a 
collection of methods that could be used to make people aware of the risk of e-mail 
phishing. The learning programme described in this chapter is a set of methods taken 
from the framework that was used on one specific occasion. 
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Chapter 9       Evaluation of the Educational Framework 
 
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of an educational framework on e-mail phishing 
in enhancing Qatari citizens‟ level of awareness of the e-mail phishing threat and, 
consequently, in reducing the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar. The proposed 
educational framework involves different training methods, such as embedded training, 
contextual training and a learning programme which involves a media programme and 
an educational session with e-learning (see Chapter 8). Each is evaluated to identify its 
effectiveness in improving user awareness of phishing in Qatar. 
 
9.1  Development of the Educational Framework 
The review of available literature led to the conclusion that awareness is an important 
solution to reduce the effect of phishing and there is a need for a comprehensive e-mail 
phishing educational framework which involves different training methods including 
embedded training and contextual training, learning programmes and e-learning. Table 
9.1 describes the implementation of each training method in the awareness framework. 
 
Table 9.1: Research implementation of each training approach 
Training 
type 
Training  implementation details 
Embedded 
training  
Phishing penetration test where 3 phishing e-mails were sent: Request account 
verification, Request to download attachment and Request for private information 
by e-mail or SMS. Failing participants automatically alerted with a message about 
phishing providing conceptual and procedural knowledge on how to defend 
against phishing (see section 6.1.1). 
Contextual  Laboratory experiment where 10 e-mails were asked to be inspected, 6 phishing 
and 4 legitimate e-mails. At the end of the test, participants were given a booklet 
containing conceptual and procedural knowledge on how to defend against 
phishing (see section 6.2). 
E-learning A flexible learning, anti-phishing educational website provided with presentation 
slides, posters, cartoons, games and quizzes (see Section 8.1.6). Results are stored 
in a database for analysis. 
                                                 Chapter 9: Evaluation of the Educational Framework 
249 
Learning 
programme 
 
 
A programmes involving learning sessions/e-learning and media programme was 
created (see Chapter 8 for more details). Learning session involved presentation 
slides, posters, cartoons, games and quizzes to educate users on e-mail phishing. 
E-learning was used to facilitate analysis of users‟ activity as the results were 
stored in a database for subsequent analysis. A television programme was 
conducted with Al-Jazeera Children‟s Channel to enhance public awareness 
 
 
The development of the educational framework applied the learning principles 
discussed in the literature review in Section 2.5.2.2 (see Table 9.2). 
 
Table 9.2: Learning principles applied in framework 
Principles of 
Learning 
Where applied in this research 
Learning-by-
doing 
Applied in embedded training where training is presented after the user has 
been tricked by phishing e-mail. Embedded training is applied within the 
reality test designed not only to assess users‟ vulnerability to phishing but also 
includes embedded training material where users who fail in the phishing test 
will be educated immediately about phishing. 
Immediate 
feedback 
 
Provided when users fall for the phishing e-mail in the embedded training. 
Also given in the learning programme after playing the anti-phishing game 
and quizzes so that the learners have an indication of their vulnerability level 
and what they should do to reduce their susceptibility and improve their 
defence level.  
Contiguity 
 
Considered in the design of the educational framework where pictures and 
relevant text are placed with instructions alongside. This is seen in the 
presentation slides, games and posters. 
Personalisation  
 
The educational material such as the story-board poster, the cartoons, the anti-
phishing game and the TV show incorporates a conversational style. 
Story-based 
agent 
 
Applied in posters, presentation slides and the game by using common local 
and international relevant cartoon characters such as Freej, Naseh and Finding 
Nemo. 
Reflection Considered in development of proposed educational programme where 
learners have chance to review new knowledge gained. In particular, 
presentation slides at the end summarise knowledge on how to avoid phishing 
and in the game and quizzes where at the end users are provided with their 
scores and answers, showing them the correct answers so that they learn from 
their mistakes.  
Conceptual 
and procedural 
knowledge 
 
Both conceptual and procedural knowledge are involved in the different 
training methods. In the teaching materials, users are taught conceptual 
knowledge about phishing and its techniques along with procedural 
knowledge on how to avoid it and react through a couple of understandable 
and straightforward best practices.  
Motivation Incorporated in the learning programme where learners are motivated by 
interactive learning materials (the games and quizzes). 
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9.2  Evaluation of the anti-phishing educational framework 
To evaluate the effect of the educational framework on participants, a quasi-
experimental method was used. This method is frequently used for the evaluation of 
educational programmes when random assignment is not possible (Mark and Cook, 
1984). It provides a comparison of participants according to some measures (Shadish et 
al., 2002; Mark and Cook, 1984; Campbell and Stanley, 1971). Therefore, it was used in 
this research to compare the outcomes for individuals before and after being involved in 
educational training either in penetration test, laboratory test or learning programme to 
measure participant‟s improvement in phishing knowledge. Four months after the initial 
training, the penetration test, laboratory test and quizzes developed for the learning 
programme were held again using a selection of the same participants to measure their 
knowledge retention. However, to provide reliable results, different participants were 
involved for each of the different educational training methods. Table 9.3 shows the 
evaluation process used for each training method of the framework. 
 
Table 9.3: Evaluation process used for each training method 
Educational 
training 
Participants Training evaluation 
Embedded 
training  
Qatari employees who use e-mail in 
their daily work activity (Required 
authorisation from organisation). 
Participants=129 from the AAB 
company  
Quantitative analysis of % of people 
who fall prey to phishing 
Contextual  Convenience sample of Qatari e-mail 
users aged above 17. 
Participants=30 (friends and 
colleagues of researcher)  
Quantitative analysis according to 
number of false positive and false 
negative identifications of phishing 
emails. 
 
Sessions/ 
E-learning 
Sample of teenagers (between 15-17 
years old) who are e-mail users 
(Required authentication from school). 
Two schools involved in test. 
Participants= 50 students. 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of participant‟s vulnerability to 
phishing, calculated from quiz scores 
and questionnaire results after the 
seminar and online questionnaire. 
Media Television show targeting children 
since held on Al-Jazeera children‟s 
channel. 
Participants= 35 children in the studio  
Qualitative analysis from interviews 
with 20 experts and Qatari e-mail 
users with different backgrounds who 
had watched the show. 
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For each training method, the results were measured before, immediately after training 
and after four months to measure the learners‟ knowledge retention for each approach. 
The evaluation showed the value of all education methods in enhancing the students‟ 
knowledge of the phishing threat and, hence, in reducing the risk of phishing through an 
awareness programme. All post-test measures show a clear reduction in the number of 
phishing failures, false positive and false negative identifications. The retention is quite 
high even after four months of training and this implies that the awareness sessions 
were understandable and memorable for most participants.  
 
9.3 Outcomes for Embedded and Contextual Training 
Embedded training shows a reduction of 35% in the number of people who fall prey to 
phishing. Even after four months, the increase in the number of failures from 9 to 11% 
show very little drop in knowledge. Contextual training shows a reduction of about 6% 
in both false positive and negatives, but after the four months there was an increase of 
about 5%. This shows that embedded training gives better knowledge retention and will 
improve users‟ knowledge more effectively than contextual learning and that people 
will learn more once they have faced the problem themselves. This confirms the 
findings of the literature review (see section 2.5.2.2). The results for each training 
method of the framework are shown in Table 9.4. 
 
Table 9.4: Outcomes for the embedded and contextual training methods 
Training 
method 
Pre-test Post-test After 4 months of 
training 
Em-
bedded 
training 
% of people who fall 
prey to phishing = 
44% (see penetration 
test 1, Chapter6) 
% of people who fall 
prey to phishing = 
9% 
% of people who fall  
prey to phishing = 
11% 
Context-
ual 
Training 
False positive rate= 
55/4=14 
False negative rate= 
65/6= 11 
(see laboratory 
experiment, Chapter6) 
False positive rate=  
30/4= 7.5 
False negative rate= 
25/6= 4 
False positive rate= 
50/4= 12.5  
False negative rate= 
48/6= 8 
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9.4 Outcomes for Learning Sessions and E-Learning 
In the learning sessions, the results of the quizzes show a clear reduction in participants‟ 
vulnerability level but this increases a little after four months when they have forgotten 
some of the information they have learnt. 
 
Since Quiz 1 contained open-ended questions, it was hard to include scoring, but it 
could still give an overview of how aware students are of phishing. The results show 
clearly that the level of knowledge and awareness of phishing had obviously improved 
after the awareness session since responses to the quiz were more precise and clear, 
whereas before they were short, not very clear and some were completely incorrect (e.g. 
there were some who did not understand the term phishing and thought it was fishing or 
a virus). Students were able to remember some of the educational material four months 
after the session, especially Naseh‟s tips on how to avoid phishing since it was linked 
with traffic sign images which students are familiar with. 
The results for Quiz 2 and Quiz 3 are given in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 which show the 
percentage of participants in each category of vulnerability to phishing. 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Quiz 2 results 
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Figure 9.2: Quiz 3 results 
  
The majority (74%) of participants in the awareness session stated that the methods 
used have enhanced their knowledge and awareness of e-mail phishing and only a few 
(8%) disagreed. Most (66%) described the awareness session as excellent, 23% very 
good and less than 10% as good and average. The majority (74%) found the information 
provided by the educational material to be good and believed it to be important to know, 
but there were some (23%) who did not feel they knew enough to be able to judge the 
information provided. The participants found all the educational materials were 
effective in enhancing awareness and publicising the message. The educational method 
thought to be most effective was the use of quizzes, then posters, cartoons and, finally, 
the presentation slides, though the difference in popularity of all these methods was 
small (see Figures 9.3- 9.6 giving response percentages). 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Does it enhance the users’ level of defence? 
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Figure 9.4: How it can be best described? 
 
 
Figure 9.5: Is the information provided important to know? 
 
 
Figure 9.6: Which educational material was more effective? 
 
Before the awareness session, more than half of the respondents (56%) had high to very 
high vulnerability to phishing. About 42% had low and average vulnerability and it was 
a shock to find that less than 5% had a very low vulnerability and were well defended 
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against phishing. However, no matter how high a score was achieved in this test, there 
might still be a chance of falling victim to phishing attacks. This is because the 
limitation of the questions proposed in the quiz does not cover all aspects of this type of 
attack and provides only a sample of behaviours that could make people vulnerable to 
phishing.  
 
Overall, the majority (98%) showed they were not aware of the phishing threat through 
their incorrect behaviour as most of them do not inspect URLs and security certificates, 
they use the same password for more than one application, they disclose their personal 
information in pop-up windows, they do not report phishing incidents, they trust 
hyperlinks supplied in the e-mail or they ignore security warnings. 
In conclusion, the results based on student behaviours and reactions to quiz 2 show an 
alarming vulnerability to phishing. However, this improved dramatically after the 
awareness session when only 12% had high to very high vulnerability to phishing, a 
much greater percentage (56%) had very low vulnerabilities to phishing and the 
remainder varied from low to average. The responses clearly show an improvement of 
52% in user awareness where it reaches very low vulnerability level (see Figure 9.1). 
 
The results for the quiz 3 game show that the participants‟ ability to detect phishing 
attempts was clearly low before the awareness session, where few (less than 10%) 
achieved a score of 100 in the games but later, after the session, a quarter of the 
participants reached this score. About 60% had high to very high vulnerability to 
phishing before the session but this percentage decreased to 21% after the session (see 
Figure 9.2). Generally, more participants were less vulnerable to phishing e-mails using 
phishing sites with a fake security certificate than they were to sites with fake URLs and 
phishing messages. The average improvement reached about 8% (see Figure 10.2), with 
the highest for game 3 (ability to detect phishing messages) then game 2 (ability to 
detect security certificate). The participants stated that although it is easy to detect 
security indicators, some people do not know about them or how to view them, and it is 
especially difficult when the victim is in hurry or when phishers use icons that are very 
similar to legitimate security indicators. Some participants suggested extending the 
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session to more sessions and giving the students the chance to contribute in the session 
by exchanging their knowledge and experience. 
 
9.5  Evaluation of the Television Programme 
It was hard to evaluate the television programme while recording but the researcher had 
the chance to meet the two phisher boys, the two girls  and a sample of the audience 
before the programme to introduce herself and discuss with them the phishing problem 
and to see whether they were aware of phishing or not. The phishers certainly showed 
an interest in phishing and awareness of it but the rest were unaware of phishing, 
although some were more aware of the terms „hacking‟ and „viruses‟. Later, after the 
programme ended, the researcher asked them again about how they had found the 
programme and all stated that it was very helpful and enjoyable and that it had 
definitely enhanced their knowledge and awareness of phishing. They found the 
information to be illustrated clearly and in a logical sequence, starting with the 
importance of the Internet in everyday life then moving on to its disadvantages with a 
focus on phishing as a potential threat. However, this short session was not enough for 
the researcher to have a solid evaluation of the programme. Another evaluation was 
therefore made after it was broadcast when the researcher asked a sample of 20 Qatari 
citizens from different backgrounds (age, education, occupation, e-mail phishing 
knowledge) and five experts in e-crime and awareness in Qatar, two from the Ministry 
of Interior and three from Q-CERT, to evaluate the programme. This was done by 
holding face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with the evaluators separately. Each 
interviewee was asked the following questions after watching the television show: 
Q1: Was the show useful in enhancing your knowledge and your level of defence 
against e-mail phishing? What have you gained from this show? 
Q2:  How can you best describe the show? Give me your point of view about the show. 
Q3: Do you think that the information provided by the TV show is good and important 
to know? 
Q4:  Are you going to be more concerned from now on about the phishing threat? 
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Q5.  Do you have any comments or suggestions for improvements to the television 
show? 
 
All the evaluators agreed that the television show was very useful in enhancing people‟s 
knowledge and awareness of the Internet threat and, in particular, e-mail phishing. They 
liked the way the show was presented as it did not intimidate the audience by moving 
directly into hacking but started gradually by talking about the importance of Internet 
technology in our lives and its advantages, before demonstrating the disadvantages of 
hacking as one of the threats associated with the Internet. They found the information 
was understandable, especially since the compère used the term „hacking‟, which is 
more commonly recognised by the audience, rather than „phishing‟ which is a 
specialised type of hacking.  The information presented was simple, understandable and 
easy to follow. Also, it attracted the interest of the audience as it depended not only on 
conversation but also on reports and involved interaction with the audience in the 
studio. They found it useful as well that the compère summarised the points discussed 
from time to time to keep the attention of the audience on the important issues. Most 
had no doubt in describing the show as excellent. Most found the information provided 
was very useful and important to know, especially when discussing how to protect 
against the phishing threat and when explaining its huge consequences. All of the 
evaluators were concerned about the phishing threat after watching the TV show and 
they said that they would follow the recommendations proposed in the programme to 
protect themselves against the phishing threat in the future.  
 
The expert evaluators were also impressed by the programme presentation and how 
carefully it was planned. They were surprised by how the phishers freely admitted that 
they commit phishing attacks and how their parents were not able to control them 
before reaching this stage. They pointed out that the advantages of this programme, not 
only for children but also for adults and parents, were that it demonstrated some 
recommendations for the latter to control children‟s activity by using available parental 
control programs. Generally, most commented that the show was “fantastic” and shed 
light on a subject which was not covered enough before, especially for children. They 
suggest opening discussion with outside audience. 
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The enthusiasm about the show led some interviewees to suggest taking it further. Some 
suggested having more similar programmes talking about hacking and different hacking 
methods such as social engineering, viruses, Trojan programs and so on. They argued 
that there was a lot of information to discuss and one show was not enough. Some 
suggested opening the interaction in the show to an outside audience to enable the 
public to ask questions and talk about the subject. However, these ideas are not under 
the control of the researcher. She had hoped to demonstrate some of the developed 
educational materials in the show but this was not possible. Finally, some interviewees 
suggested using the phishing awareness session developed in this research in public 
education (e.g. in schools, universities) to enhance people‟s awareness of e-mail 
phishing. It was also suggested that research is needed on the intentions and motivation 
of phishers and why it has attracted a number of young and teenage Qataris, as was 
demonstrated from the television show.  
 
The main lessons learned from the television programme were: 
1. There are some clever child hackers operating in Qatar who are not being watched 
or restricted in their actions. Clearly more control over the actions of these children 
is necessary. 
2. There is a clear lack of awareness of phishing amongst most young people in Qatar. 
This echos the findings from earlier chapters. 
3. Using the media as a channel for public awareness is very effective in passing the 
message on to a large number of people. 
 
Some quotes from the interviewees after the show are ‘It was an interesting TV show’; 
‘I was amazed how phishers could deceive people to disclose their confidential 
information’, ‘I have become more aware and cautious after the show’ and ‘I learned a 
lot of tips and clues on how to avoid phishing’. Overall, the television experience 
showed the power and effectiveness of television as an education medium. 
The advantages and disadvantages of each method in the framework is provided in 
Table 9.5 so that the user can decide when and where to use each method in the 
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framework according to the requirements and available resources. This analysis was 
based on available literature, views of experts in the field and the public, along with the 
researcher‟s experience from running each part of the framework. 
 
Table 9.5: Advantages and disadvantages of each method in the framework 
Training 
methods 
Advantages Disadvantages Where  
applicable 
Contextual 
training 
Measures the ability to distinguish 
phishing attempts from legitimate ones in 
a laboratory experiment. Allows trainers 
to measure false positive and false 
negative rates.  
Enables assessment of vulnerability to 
different phishing techniques 
Enables the study of behaviour while 
training to identify factors which make 
participants vulnerable to phishing. 
Full interaction between learners and 
trainers. 
Requires users‟ motivation to involve 
them in such training 
May not give reliable results since 
users may be more cautious regarding 
phishing because they are in a 
training  session (Herzberg, 2008). 
Requires special set up and careful 
selection of training questions on 
both legitimate and phishing e-mails, 
trying to cover different phishing 
techniques and tricks 
In 
organisations 
needing to 
enhance their 
employees‟ 
awareness of 
the phishing 
threat or for 
academic 
research 
Embedded 
training 
A well designed penetration test will 
assess peoples‟ ability to recognise 
phishing attempts during their daily 
activity. 
Provides effective training since it is 
related to real world testing (Anderson 
and Simon, 1996) 
Gives a better understanding of users‟ 
behaviour during day-to-day online 
activities (Herzberg, 2008) 
Only people not able to recognise 
phishing attempts will receive automatic 
training materials. 
Less expensive to run for large number 
of people. 
Requires less teacher effort. 
Helps to overcome users‟ overconfidence 
in their own ability 
More motivating than regular learning 
messages (Kumaraguru et al., 2007) 
High knowledge retention compared to 
regular phishing alert messages (Alnajim 
and Munro, 2009; Kumaraguru et al., 
2007). 
Requires some form of approval to be 
carried out 
Ethical and privacy issues should be 
considered 
Might create distrust amongst people 
who have been tested 
Such penetration tests might be 
ignored in the future if used too 
frequency 
Requires user recognition to gain 
acceptance such as awarding a 
certificate, and giving promotions 
and praise for those who have not 
fallen in training. 
No full interaction between learner 
and trainers - trainers must based 
results on the number of people who 
fail the test 
Can only test a limited number of 
different phishing techniques due to 
sensitivity of such training 
In 
organisations 
needing to 
enhance their 
employees‟ 
awareness 
 
E-learning Provides flexible and accessible learning 
(Zenger and Uehlein, 2001; Web-based 
Training Cookbook, 1997: 108). 
Applies new learning technology and 
reduces learning time requirements 
(Miller, 1990). 
Less expensive than traditional learning 
because does not require teachers or 
classrooms.  
Raises learning knowledge and retention 
Missing personal learning experience 
Users require a computer and Internet 
access 
Requires some programming and 
designing knowledge to set up 
Users may not understand fully the 
training material and they can not get 
help immediately, unless there is an 
effective live support service 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2007) 
Suitable for 
global public 
awareness 
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(Fletcher, 1991: 33-42; Fletcher, 1990) 
Will reach potential victims worldwide 
more quickly 
Requires consideration of many 
issues in the design, such as security, 
privacy and usability. 
Media 
programme 
Will reach large numbers of people 
locally and internationally. 
Engages people in discussions and  can 
involve other people‟s experience 
through vox pop and other techniques. 
Very passive and entertaining way of 
learning 
Enhances awareness effectively and 
make it easy to remember because of its 
visual nature  
People tend to trust national and 
respectable television channels 
Requires a contact and cooperation 
with media channels  
Some argue that media might not 
affect user behaviour (Wilson and 
Wilson, 2001; Spitzer, 1993; 
Windahl et al., 1992: 102; Wimmer 
and Dominick, 1991)  
Expensive to set up, requires special 
expertise in filming, using a camera, 
presenteing ,etc. 
Requires being more aware of what 
you are saying (i.e. not to be 
offensive or biased). 
Suitable for 
public 
awareness 
locally and 
internationally 
Session 
Poster Portable 
High resolution image 
Relatively cheap compared to media 
Issue presented in simple form and 
focuses on passing a specific message in 
a simple way 
Pleasant to view, attractive 
Easy to get damaged 
May not have high educational value 
or function because issues are not 
covered in detail 
Requires placement in a proper place 
or an organisation to support its 
distribution 
Not all people will be attracted by all 
posters, most posters would need to 
target a specific group 
Needs careful design to reach the 
maximum number of people and to 
pass the message clearly 
Hard to get people‟s feedback  
Suitable for 
public 
awareness, 
particularly 
suitable for 
people who 
regularly visit 
certain places, 
for example 
children 
visiting 
schools 
Quizzes and 
Games 
Exciting, interactive and will effectively 
raise knowledge and retention for users 
(Zhang et al., 2007; Quinn, 2005; 
Repenning and Lewis, 2005; Gee, 2003).    
Understandable and easy to remember 
(Mayer, 2001; Klein, 1999). 
Uses fun in applying learning 
Requires expertise in programming 
and animation 
Can require special software to run 
the game 
Tends to be of interest to young 
people more than adults and older 
people. 
Suitable for 
organisations 
and the 
academic 
sector, 
especially for 
young people 
Seminar 
 
 
 
 
Good for large groups 
Can be accompanied by oral or 
recorded presentations 
Can use a variety of different media and 
methods in the seminar 
Can get lot of information across in short 
time  
It can work on enhancing knowledge 
through interaction and discussions 
Gives an opportunity to get users‟ 
qualitative feedback. 
Somewhat expensive as labour 
intensive 
Some could find it relatively 
uninteresting  
Teachers require communication 
skills and learners require listening 
skills 
Requires good material 
Needs a means to get people together 
and venue  
Everybody needs to be available at 
the same time 
Suitable for 
organisations 
and the 
academic 
sector 
 
 
Cartoon Passes message in an informal, funny 
way. 
Requires imagination to create the 
drawings 
Inexpensive to produce 
Quite fun and interesting 
Can contain a conversational form and 
Requires drawing and special skills 
Tends to link to previous knowledge 
a user is presumed to have which 
may not be the case 
Expensive to distribute in widely read 
media 
The message is limited in length in a 
Suitable for 
public 
awareness 
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story board 
Humour is a powerful rememberable 
message. 
cartoon 
Booklet Gives information about something in 
brief in a handy form. 
Cheap to produce 
Can contain more information 
Particularly useful as reference material 
Effective to make people aware of 
subject if information is understandable 
and brief. 
People may treat it as junk mail and 
therefore may not pay attention to the 
message. 
Can be time consuming to design and 
distribute 
Information can become outdated  
since it is hard to make changes once 
printed. 
Hard to get people‟s feedback on it 
Too much information would lead 
people to forget 
Suitable for 
public 
awareness 
 
9.6  Summary 
This chapter has discussed the awareness framework which consists of multiple training 
methods. The framework was developed with the assistance of experts in the field of 
e-crimes and awareness. These experts stressed the importance of making people aware 
of phishing without intimidating them, creating a framework associated with Qatar and 
taking into account people‟s background and the factors which make Qataris vulnerable 
to phishing. The different educational materials developed in the previous chapters were 
all used as part of the framework.  
 
In conclusion, the qualitative and quantitative evaluation shows the obvious 
effectiveness of the awareness educational framework in enhancing people‟s awareness 
level on the e-mail phishing problem and their vulnerability to such attack and even in 
increasing the users‟ ability to retain the knowledge learned even after a period of four 
months. These findings support the outcomes of Kumaraguru et al. (2007) , Merrienboer 
et al. (1997) and Sheng et al. (2007) show that those users who were taught how to 
recognise phishing attempts were better able to remember and distinguish phishing after 
the training. 
 
The learning session was able to draw on most of the different components of the 
framework, showing the value of such a multi-channel approach. This suggests that the 
framework should not be used simply to select the best method of awareness education 
for a given situation but that it would be better to use a selection of educational 
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methods. The advantages and disadvantages of each framework component are listed to 
help guide users when and where to use each educational method in the framework 
depending on their individual circumstances and resources.  
Embedded training, sessions and e-learning were found to be more effective than 
contextual training due to the direct interaction between learners and tutor and the fact 
that people learn and remember better when they face the real attack than when reading 
a piece of information. This agrees with other research (see literature review, Section 
2.5.2.2). Similarly, using the media to enhance public awareness was found by a 
number of evaluators to be very valuable in reducing the risk of phishing in Qatar, 
despite the obvious cost.  
 
The next chapter presents conclusions and suggests future work. 
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Chapter 10      Conclusions and Future work 
 
This concluding chapter presents the research contributions and implications, 
achievements and limitations and, finally, a summary of findings and suggestions for 
future work.   
 
10.1  Research contributions and implications 
The research provides a significant contribution to knowledge by shedding light on the 
e-mail phishing problem in a particular area of the world which has not been covered 
before in the literature, which is the State of Qatar. The research contributes by 
establishing the existence of the problem, its extent, addressing the factors which make 
Qatari citizens vulnerable to e-mail phishing threat, including the cultural and country-
specific factors, and defining an e-mail phishing awareness and educational framework 
to help in reducing the danger of such threat in Qatar. The framework will help the 
Qatari government and organisations in enhancing people‟s awareness of the e-mail 
phishing threat through a set of useful recommendations and effective educational 
methods. The research is beneficial for the target groups (Qatari Government, citizens 
and organisations responsible for ensuring information security) to enable them to help 
preserve the security and privacy of Qatar and its inhabitants and reduce the level of 
e-crime, in particular phishing, in the state. Many of the ideas would be helpful for 
e-mail users, e-mail research scholars, and researchers on e-mail phishing and 
awareness, especially in those countries with a culture similar to Qatar‟s such as the 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and Arab countries.  
 
On a personal level, the research was challenging and intellectually stimulating. It has 
also made a major contribution in improving the researcher‟s knowledge professionally, 
academically and personally in many aspects, including researching, problem solving, 
communication skills, oral and writing skills and gaining further expertise in the field of 
information security, in particular, phishing. Furthermore, the researcher has had an 
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enjoyable experience in being in a television show and holding some real-life 
experiments and carrying out an awareness programme with young Qataris, not without 
surprises, on meeting face-to-face with some current practising and committed teenage 
phishers. In addition, the researcher was led to empirical investigation of the implication 
of Qatar culture for people‟s responses to phishing threat, which was a challenging and 
exciting field, not discussed before in the literature. This research will make a valuable 
input in the researcher‟s forthcoming professional work of being responsible for 
ensuring network security in an organisation where phishers will inevitably try to 
breach by targeting people since they are considered to be the weakest link of the 
security of their organisation. Therefore, making people aware of phishing would 
enhance their trust decisions when the technological defences fail as often users tend to 
over trust technology. 
 
10.2  Research Achievements 
The research aim and objectives (see Section 1.6) were achieved in this thesis through 
empirical and non-empirical research in Qatar by a case study of the e-mail phishing 
problem and also, for comparison, in the UK, as an example of a developed country. 
The research followed a carefully planned progression through the intended objectives 
which built on each other, coming finally to fulfilling them by proving the existence, 
extent and danger of the e-mail phishing problem in Qatar, a fertile ground for phishers. 
It also, addressed the factors which make Qataris vulnerable to e-mail phishing where 
awareness was found to be weak and therefore proposed for target groups some 
effective recommendations and an awareness framework to help reduce the problem in 
the State of Qatar. 
 
10.3  Research Limitations 
Due to the limitation of resources, the researcher was not able to implement the 
proposed recommendations in reality. However, the recommendations were tested by 
using the opinion of experts from a range of private and government organisations in 
the field of e-crime, Qatar culture and law, awareness and education.  
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The researcher was unable to extend the educational programme to a large number of 
Qatari citizens, due to difficulties in obtaining authority for access and enough funds 
and support from responsible organisations. 
 
There were also major difficulties in getting authority from organisations for holding a 
penetration test for phishing for ethical, security and privacy reasons. Even when 
authority was granted, the collaborating organisation still required full control over the 
test to ensure its privacy. However, giving the authority to do such a test was a 
significant concession on the part of the organisation.    
 
Furthermore, respondents‟ reluctance to contribute to the research by participating in 
interviews, surveys and experiments was a further constraint. However, the researcher 
tried to take positive steps to encourage people to participate, for instance by motivating 
them by using successfully the previously mentioned tried and tested „chocolate 
method‟ and taking advantage of personal contacts with families and friends. 
 
Also, the research was limited in comparing the survey outcomes for Qatar and the UK 
which shows a clear difference in the awareness level of the people, the UK being more 
aware. However, it would have been useful to take the comparison further between both 
countries in the other research methods, including the experiments, but due to the lack 
of resources and access to organisations as well as the time constraint, the researcher 
was unable to provide a complete cross-cultural comparison on phishing and people‟s 
vulnerability to it. 
 
10.4  Conclusion 
This thesis shows the existence and extent of the e-mail phishing problem in Qatar. 
Also, it shows that there are many factors which make Qatar an attractive place for 
phishers since there is availability of money and victims, with no obvious e-law to 
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protect them. This view was supported by experts as well, which shows that the 
phishing problem exists in the region and has become significant. There is a readiness 
by the government and responsible organisations to solve this problem in spite of some 
difficulties encountered, for instance in tracing phishers and persuading victims to 
report incidents. Most experts stated that Qatari citizens are susceptible to phishing due 
to multiple factors but mainly the lack of awareness of it. 
 
The surveys of Qatari and UK e-mail users provided a profile of their awareness of 
e-mail phishing and their views on the best method of defence against this attack. The 
questionnaire addressed the knowledge of e-mail phishing, the vulnerability of 
participants, the extent of e-mail phishing and the defences used against it. Responses in 
Qatar illustrate that a phishing problem exists, is increasing and that phishing is very 
successful because citizens are commonly vulnerable to e-mail phishing attack. There 
are many reasons for this, mainly resulting from the lack of awareness of the phishing 
threat. The research found that the questionnaire responses regarding the e-mail 
phishing level of knowledge, the use of anti-phishing software and the reasons for being 
tricked were similar in both Qatar and the UK. However, other responses were 
significantly different, indicating a much higher vulnerability to phishing in Qatar than 
in the UK.  
 
The penetration tests confirmed that Qataris are indeed vulnerable to e-mail phishing. It 
is of particular concern that about half of the people tested were incapable of 
distinguishing phishing attacks, indicating a need to enhance the state of awareness of 
e-mail phishing for Qataris. The tests have demonstrated that Qataris are particularly 
susceptible to e-mail phishing when it exploits their interest, emotions, beliefs and 
religion, especially when deployed in religious seasons. Discussions with the 
participants indicate that Qataris tend to trust phishing e-mails in their native language 
rather than in English, they have overconfidence in e-mails that appear to come from 
official and trustworthy institutes in Qatar and they believe that phishing will be limited 
to certain topics and especially do not expect e-mail phishing to be connected with 
religion. 
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Qataris live in a conservative society committed to its culture and, as a result, their 
response to e-mail phishing has been found to be affected by the culture of Qatar which 
is influenced by the customs, traditions and religion which play a big role in people‟s 
life. In conclusion, Qataris were found to be vulnerable to e-mail phishing attacks 
because of multiple factors: the culture, country-specific factors, religion, interest, 
beliefs, as well as personal characteristics.  
 
The research shows a clear lack of awareness on how to detect, react and protect against 
phishing. For example, some Qataris have overconfidence in the reliability of anti-virus 
software to detect all phishing attempts, some do not install spam filters and some open 
e-mails from unknown senders and junk mail. The overconfidence and trustfulness of 
the Qatari people is likely to be a result of the new found oil wealth in the State of Qatar 
which, in turn, has led to a rapid growth in the use of technology and the Internet. While 
education levels are also rapidly increasing in the country, there is clearly a lack of 
maturity in the knowledge of phishing crime that is a threat to the security of systems in 
Qatar and the privacy of its people.  
 
Recommendations then emerged from grounded theory based on the findings from the 
research carried out in the field. Recommendations were defined for the Qatar 
government, citizens and organisation officials responsible for providing information 
security to diminish the e-mail phishing threat in Qatar. According to a sample of Qatari 
citizens and experts from Qatar and the UK in the field of e-crime and Qatar law and 
culture, the recommendations were considered to be effective in reducing the risk of 
e-mail phishing in the State of Qatar. Although some of the recommendations are on the 
way to realisation, such as the establishment of an efficient e-law,  some difficulties 
were identified which might be faced in the enforcement of the law and in getting 
cooperation from citizens, national and international institutes and other governments, 
especially from unstable countries such as Nigeria. Some obstacles, which might be 
faced in implementing the recommendations, are the requirement for resources, the need 
for support from government and other institutes, and the preference of Qatari citizens 
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to react to incidents rather than reporting and documenting them, which has led to 
difficulties in building a record of phishing incidents within organisations.  
 
The evaluators agreed on the need for applying an effective awareness and educational 
framework to enhance public awareness of the phishing threat in Qatar, especially 
through the media. This then led to the development an e-mail phishing educational 
framework which involved different training methods, including embedded training, 
contextual training and a learning programme incorporating a television programme and 
an educational session with e-learning. The use of this framework was found to be 
effective in raising awareness of and defence against the phishing threat in Qatar since 
an average improvement was detected in people‟s knowledge of and vulnerability to 
phishing threat and this was mostly retained even four months afterwards.  
 
The success of the framework raises the question of whether it might also be valuable to 
other citizens of a similar culture, e.g. in the GCC countries, and in developed countries 
such as the USA and the UK, where there might be cross-cultural considerations. Some 
of the factors are likely to be common to other countries, such as the value of the 
penetration test, but some aspects are particular to Qatar, such as its rapid development 
and country-specific factors. Other countries need to consider each point of the 
proposed framework in their own environment. 
 
10.5  Suggestions for Future work 
Although this research has had some significant success, there is considerable scope for 
further work. Suggestions are as follows: 
1. Verifying the findings 
Although the number of participants in the surveys undertaken is large, it would still be 
useful to increase the sample size to obtain more reliable results and reduce the margin 
of error. It would also be useful to verify the findings of the various tests as, in many 
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cases, the number of participants was small and often a convenience sample. Carrying 
out penetration tests and laboratory tests on more people would give greater confidence 
in the results, though this would difficult because of the authorisation and permissions 
needed and the ethical constraints on such tests. 
2. A long term study of the applicability of the research 
The recommendations in this thesis and the awareness framework developed have been 
tested as far as it is possible within the time constraints of a PhD project. Ideally, the 
research needs to continue over a long period to see the effects of the recommendations 
and framework being put into practice in the State of Qatar. This research would require 
the cooperation of the government and other institutions to apply the recommendations 
and awareness framework so the effects can be studied. This is clearly well beyond the 
scope of a PhD research project. 
3. Further investigation of cultural and country specific factors 
This research has revealed that cultural and country-specific considerations are 
important factors affecting the Qatari‟s vulnerability to phishing. Factors identified 
included the trusting nature of the Qatari people particularly in the religious seasons and 
the rapid adoption of technology which has left most Qataris unaware of the dangers 
involved. The discovered factors which make Qatari citizens vulnerable to phishing give 
only a general guide and other factors or influences may be found, particularly where 
the influences overlap in the areas mentioned in the previous section. It would be 
interesting to find if there are other cultural and country-specific factors and whether 
these affected some parts of Qatari society more than others. More sociological 
investigation and studies of human behaviour may reveal other characteristics not 
covered in this research. 
4. A business plan for the implementation of the recommendations and framework 
A more thorough evaluation of the viability of the proposed recommendations and 
awareness framework is suggested as future work to motivate the government and 
responsible and targeted bodies to bring them into reality. This would require estimates 
of the costs of implementing each recommendation and framework component, and 
estimates of the cost savings these would bring over the short and long term. All 
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stakeholders who would benefit would need to be identified and the costs and benefits 
for each one would need to be estimated. This would take considerable investigation 
that would not be possible to achieve within the scope of a PhD project, yet it would be 
exceedingly useful to motivate the government and other bodies to implement the 
recommendations and awareness framework proposed in this research. 
5. Further examples of each component of the framework 
Each component of the framework developed in this research was tested by examples. 
However, there was only one example of many of the components. For example, there 
was only one booklet produced and only one television show broadcast. While these 
were both successful, further research would be necessary with different variations of 
each aspect of the framework to discover what type of booklet is best, what format of 
television programme is most effective, etc. Such an analysis would be very extensive 
and would require far more than a PhD project to fully investigate. 
6. Extending the framework 
The ideas for the framework were derived from the literature and from the survey 
findings. However, the framework is unlikely to contain all possible awareness 
methods. For example, some “pop” stars have sometimes sought to include a message in 
their songs (e.g. John Lennon‟s song “Give Peace a Chance”). This is just one possible 
way in which an awareness message can be spread. This research has investigated and 
tested some of the more common ways of educating people, but further research could 
extend the framework to the many other ways in which awareness could be promoted. 
Investigating the possible extensions to the framework and testing each one would 
require considerable research and would require many PhD projects to do so.   
7. Comparison with other countries 
In this research, some comparison has been made with the UK as an example of a 
developed country. However, it would be useful to know what factors affect other 
countries and whether the many cultural and country-specific factors can be found 
elsewhere. Similar surveys in other countries are suggested to measure people‟s level of 
awareness of the phishing threat and discovering the factors which make people 
susceptible to such attack. It would be helpful to compare Qatar with other countries in 
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the region such as the Gulf and Arab countries, and with countries in completely 
different regions to get a better understanding of the influences of the cultural and 
country-specific factors. 
8. Investigating the applicability of the framework in other countries 
The recommendations and awareness framework developed has been specifically 
designed for Qatar. However, it is likely that many of the recommendations and parts of 
the framework would be applicable in other countries. It is likely that the Gulf States 
would have similar conditions that would make most of this research applicable but it is 
uncertain how much would be applicable in other parts of the world. The various 
different components of the framework could be tested in a number of different 
countries to discover what parts of the framework work well in different countries and 
this would also help identify the conditions that would make each component and 
recommendation applicable. This further research would then help other countries 
decide how to apply the recommendations and framework themselves. 
9. Incorporating m-learning into the framework 
The developed educational materials could be presented not just as e-learning but also 
as m-learning, or „mobile learning‟ which provides more accessibility for learners by 
taking advantage of the learning opportunities offered by mobile technologies. There are 
many researchers of m-learning who have claimed its effectiveness and the need to 
move towards such technology with the small screen size of the mobile phone (Moore, 
2009; Maniar  et al., 2008; Masters and Ng'ambi, 2007; McConnetha, 2007 ; Savill-
Smith et al., 2006; Naismith et al., 2005; Sharples, 2000). Further work is suggested to 
test and evaluate awareness methods through m-learning in Qatar and elsewhere to see 
whether it could be an appropriate part of the awareness framework. Furthermore, as 
other technologies develop, it will be necessary to carry out research on each new 
development to find the best way to apply the new technology. 
10. New tool development 
Since it was discovered that people‟s awareness might decay with time after attending 
an awareness programme, it is suggested that a tool should be developed for enhancing 
people‟s phishing awareness instantly on interacting with an e-mail system. The tool 
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could be embedded into the email system so it could detect the wrongful action of a 
user, such as sending an email with their password in the text, and then display some 
education material to make the user aware of the danger. Such a tool would take a 
significant development and research would be needed to determine how to detect an 
incorrect user action and the most appropriate educational material to display.  
 
10.6  The Success of this PhD Research 
Although this research is a first step in uncovering e-mail phishing problems in the State 
of Qatar, there is still scope for future work in extending investigations. However, the 
research was very successful since the aims and objectives were achieved. Although 
there were some limitations, they were not serious and some were tackled.  
The research has been shown to be original and to make a valuable contribution to 
knowledge, particularly in relation to Qatar. Perhaps the greatest test of the success of 
the research is whether the results will be used. In this research, several of the ministries 
of the Qatar government have shown interest in its results and are planning to take it 
forward into implementation. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
 
A1  First version of questionnaire in English 
 
Phishing Survey 
Aim:    This survey will gauge people’s awareness of e-mail phishing and the best way to 
defend against such attacks. You are now going to be asked 20 simple questions particularly 
about phishing e-mails 
Q1: General information  
 
A.  Your country 
 
 
B. Gender 
     Male                Female              
 
C. Age 
     Under 18  18-29             30-49             Over 50          
D. Education level   
      School                        Further Education     Higher Education  
     Postgraduate              Others, please specify  
E.  Occupation 
      Student         Business man       Unemployed   
      Employee, please specify your job title    
 
Q2  Do you have an e-mail address? 
     Yes        No 
 
If your answer is Yes, then please answer Q3 
 
Q3. How often do you open your e-mail? 
     More than once a day       Once a day      More than once a Week           
     Weekly       Monthly        Very rarely    Not at all     Others, Please Specify               
Q4: How well do you know about phishing? 
     None      Poor       Average      Good        Expert  
Note: Phishing is a criminal fraudulent process.  It attempts to gain sensitive 
information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by masquerading as 
a trustworthy party in an electronic communication. Phishing is usually carried out by 
e-mail and often directs users to enter details at a fake website which looks and feels 
almost identical to a real one. 
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If you answer to Q4 is None, then please skip Q5 
 
Q5: From where do you know about phishing? 
     Internet           Media (e.g. TV, newspapers, magazines)         Employer 
     Friend             Others, please specify  
If your answer is  Employer, then please answer Q6. 
 
Q6: How do you learn from your employer about phishing?   
      Set of guidelines 
      Awareness and training program  
      Others, please specify 
Q7: Which of the following is generally NOT a sign that an e-mail may be 
fraudulent? 
      It asks you to click a link in the e-mail message to enter information about your 
account. 
      It conveys a sense of urgency and surprise 
      It addresses you by first and last name. 
      Security certificate for site matches name of site. 
      It asks you to verify some personal information. 
      Website's URL starts with https 
Q8: You receive an e-mail from your bank asking you to phone a number given in it, 
Do you…..? 
      Phone the number  
      Check to ensure it is your bank's real number  
      Delete the e-mail  
Q9: Do you worry about phishing?  
     Yes       No      
Q10: Do you think e-mail phishing incidents in Qatar or UK have? 
      Increased        Decreased         Same       Don’t know 
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Q11: How often do you receive phishing e-mails? 
     Very often      Sometimes       Very rarely      Don’t know  
Q12: How many times have you been tricked by phishing e-mails?  
     1-5          5-10        More than 10         None        Don’t know  
If you answer Q12 None, then please skip Q13, Q14. 
Q13: If you have been tricked with phishing e-mail, what was the reason ?  Please 
select from the following list:.  
     Didn’t install anti-phishing or anti-virus software to detect phishing e-mails 
     Phishers are coming up with smarter and smarter tricks that make identifying 
phishing e-mails difficult.  
     They came up with sense of urgency, surprise and morality 
     I trusted it 
     I didn’t know about phishing before 
     Lack of awareness and training about phishing (e.g. What does it looks like?  What’s 
its threat? How do you resist it?) 
     It directed me to enter details at a fake website whose look and feel were almost 
identical to the legitimate one  
     I didn’t believe I would be tricked 
     Others, please specify  
Q14: If you have been attacked with phishing e-mail, what was the impact of loss 
from the attack? 
    Financial loss, please state roughly how much  
    Amount lost                      Currency                           (Note: please use US$ or QR) 
    Confidential information, please specify what type  
    Others, please specify  
    Don’t know   
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Q15: Which of the following actions should you take if you think you've been tricked 
by a phishing scam? 
Report it to the company whose e-mail address or Web site was forged 
Report it to the police 
Change the passwords on all your accounts 
Check your financial statements immediately 
Cut up your credit and debit cards 
Do nothing    
Others, please specify  
Q16: Do you use a product or tool to detect or protect  against e-mail phishing, e.g. 
antivirus and anti-phishing software? 
    Yes, please specify the product or the tool you use  
    No        
Q17: What is the most important feature you would like the anti-phishing product or 
tool to have in order to prevent phishing e-mails?  
      Detect phishing e-mails by just pointing on the link (without having to go to the 
actual site). 
      Give positive confirmation that you are at the right site 
      Block phishing e-mails 
      Protect your password from being captured by keyboard Trojans 
      Others, please specify   
Q18: What do you think is the best way to defend against e-mail phishing?  
     Have an effective anti-phishing product or tool to detect and prevent phishing e-
mails 
     Define clear and reasonable guidelines addressing phishing (e.g. Don’t give your 
password through the e-mail, check the sender e-mail address, etc.) 
     Provide an educational program consisting of awareness and training to alert people 
to the phishing threat and teach them how to resist it. 
     Carry out penetration testing, because I will learn more when I encounter or am 
affected by a phishing e-mail (i.e. A fake phishing e-mail will be sent to your e-mail, the 
e-mail will not harm you as it is only to measure your response to phishing e-mails and 
to educate you) 
     Others, please specify   
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Q19: Regarding the educational programme, which tool or method do you think is 
effective to deploy awareness and training against e-mail phishing? 
      Newsletters and documents  
      Pub-up screens and Screen savers  
      Presentation slides 
      Posters 
      Cartoons 
      Videos 
      Interactive anti-phishing games (e.g. Computer-based game) 
      Penetration testing, because I will learn more when I encounter or am affected by a 
phishing e-mail 
      Others, please specify  
Q20: By what means do you prefer the education tools to be embedded?  
      Traditional education, paper-based 
      Regular seminars with speakers 
      Stand alone application (e.g. educational program embedded in your desktop with 
screen saver and pop-up screens to regularly remind you of how to resist phishing 
attacks) 
      E-mails (i.e. regularly send educational programs to your e-mail) 
      False phishing e-mails, designed to test your response to phishing attacks and 
educate you against phishing (e.g. A fake phishing e-mail will be sent to you. Once you 
have been tricked and you have clicked on the URL to enter your private information, it 
will immediately point you to the educational site to teach you about phishing) 
     Media (e.g. TV, newspapers) 
     Web-based e-learning (i.e. Having an online educational program containing all of 
the educational tools and materials) 
     Others, please specify  
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A2  Questionnaire after first review 
E-mail Phishing Awareness Survey 
 
 
Q1: What is your level of  knowledge about e-mail phishing, also called scam, spam, 
spoofing or fraud e-mails?  
    None       Poor        Average       Good         Expert   
If you answer Q1-None, then please skip Q2 
 
Q2: How do you know about phishing? 
     Internet        Media (e.g. TV, newspapers)       Employer      School or university        
     Others 
Q3: Do you think e-mail phishing incidents are? 
     Increasing         Decreasing          Staying the same        Don’t know 
Q4: Do you worry about e-mail phishing?  
     Yes           No      
Q5: Which of the following is generally a sign that an e-mail may be phishing or 
fraudulent? You receive an e-mail from your bank which.... 
Asks you to enter information about your account ( e.g. Your username and 
password) 
Addresses you by your first and last name (e.g. Dear Ms. Mariam K Al-Hamar). 
Directs you to a website containing a security certificate that matches the name of 
the website. 
Conveys a sense of urgency and surprise (e.g. You have won $1million in the raffle, 
enter your account details now)  
Has been classified as junk or spam mails by your e-mail system. 
      Contains an attachment notifying you that it might contain viruses that could harm 
your computer. 
Points you to a website with a URL that starts with https. 
Asks you to phone a number given in the e-mail. 
Don’t know 
 
 
Note: The following shapes mean:     Choose one answer only       Can choose more than 
one answer 
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Q6: Which of the following actions should you take if you think you've been tricked 
by a phishing e-mail? 
Report the incident to the company 
whose e-mail address or Web site 
was faked. 
Report the incident to the police or 
an institute that specialises in dealing 
with these cases.  
Report the incident to your bank or 
other organisation for which you 
have revealed details.      
      Change the account details that you have 
revealed 
Check your financial statements immediately 
Cut up your credit and debit cards 
Do nothing    
Others 
Q7: How often do you receive phishing E-mails? 
   I don’t have an E-mail      Daily       Weekly       Monthly      Never      Others            
If you answer Q7: I don’t have an E-mail or Never, then please skip Q8 and Q9. 
Q8: How many times have you been tricked with phishing E-mails?  
    Never        Once       Twice        3 times         More than 3 times       Don’t know 
If you answer Q8: Never, then please skip Q9 . 
Q9: If you have been tricked with a phishing e-mail, what was the reason you were 
tricked? 
 I didn’t install a software to prevent 
phishing e-mails and websites(e.g. 
anti-virus, anti-phishing, spam filters)  
The phishers are coming up with 
smarter tricks which make it difficult 
to identify phishing 
The fake website looks almost 
identical to the legitimate one 
I didn’t believe I would be tricked 
      The e-mail came up with a sense of urgency and 
surprise  
Lack of awareness and training about phishing 
I trusted the e-mail because I didn’t know about 
phishing 
I was not aware of the importance of the 
information that I revealed 
Other 
Q10: Do you use software to protect you from phishing e-mails and websites (e.g. 
anti-virus, anti-phishing software or spam filters)?  
     Yes         No 
Q11: Do you think using anti-virus, anti-phishing software or spam filter is enough to 
prevent all types of phishing e-mails?  
     Yes          No, please specify why                                                                  
     Don’t know 
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Q12: What do you think is the best way to defend yourself against phishing E-mails?  
Be aware and be educated about 
phishing 
Follow clear guidelines addressing 
  phishing (e.g. Check the web address, 
Don’t give your private information 
through the e-mail.etc) 
Install effective anti-virus, spam filter or 
anti-phishing software 
Get affected by phishing e-mails, because I 
will learn more 
Others 
Q13: How do you prefer to be educated about phishing, Is it by.....? 
     Interactive tutorials and quizzes        Videos        Cartoons        Posters       Web-
based e-learning       Media       Seminars       Newsletters and documents       Screen 
savers       Others 
Q14: About yourself 
 
A. Gender 
 
        Male                 Female              
B. Age group  
 
       Under 18             18-29               30-49              Over 50        
C. Education level   
      School          Further or Higher Education         Post Graduate          Others 
D. Occupation 
 
      Student        Businessman       Employee, please specify your job title                                                            
Others 
 
E. Country 
 
F- Your e-mail address (If you would like to receive educational material about 
Phishing) 
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A3  Questionnaire final version (after pilot-test) 
Covering letter 
Dear Fellow Citizen, 
I am a PhD student at Loughborough University in the UK and I am doing my research 
on “e-mail Phishing” That is a criminal fraudulent process that attempts to gain 
sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by 
pretending to be a trustworthy party in an electronic communication such as an e-mail.  
It has become increasingly important as all of us are threatened financially and 
personally by the menace of e-phishing. 
I have designed a questionnaire to see how aware people are about e-mail phishing and 
how to defend against it. This questionnaire is intended only for Qatari or British 
citizens who have an e-mail.  Therefore, if you are one of them, please help us by 
completing the questionnaire, otherwise just ignore it. It is important that participants 
answer the questionnaire honestly.  
The questionnaire will take no more than 5 minutes of your time to complete.  I hope 
you will contribute. It is intended to use the results in developing training materials so 
people can become aware of the crime of e-phishing and learn to protect themselves 
against e-phishing attacks 
Please bear in mind that participants should be only Qatari or British citizens who use e-
mail. I assure you that all responses will be confidential and kept private.  
Thank you in anticipation of your involvement. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Mariam Al-Hamar 
 
For any questions about the research topic please do not hesitate to contact me by e-
mail: m..k.j.al-hamar@lboro.ac.uk. 
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E-mail Phishing Awareness Survey 
 
 
 
 
Q1- Gender 
        Male                 Female              
 
Q2- What age group are you in? 
 
       Under 18             18-29               30-49              Over 50       
Q3- Education level   
      School          Further or Higher Education         Post Graduate          Others 
Q4- Occupation 
 
      Student      Business man/ woman       Employee, please specify your job title                                         
 
       Others 
 
 
Q5- Nationality 
 
 
Q6-Do you have an E-mail? 
 
        Yes                   No      
 
Q7- Your E-mail (If you would like to receive an educational material about “Phishing“) 
 
Q8: How well do you know about E-mail Phishing, it is also called (Scam or Fraud E-mails)?  
 
 
 
 
    None       Poor        Average        Good         Expert   
If you answer Q8-None, then please skip Q9 
 
Q9: From where do you know about phishing? 
     Internet        Media (e.g. TV, newspapers)       Employer       School or university  
      Others 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Note: The following shapes means:      Choose one answer only          Can choose more than 
one answer 
 
None: Don’t know anything about e-mail phishing. 
Poor:   Have heard of e-mail phishing.   
Average:  Knows the term e-mail phishing and understand its simple techniques 
Good:  Knows the term e-mail phishing, understand more about its techniques and 
how to protect against it. 
Expert:  Knows the term e-mail phishing; understand more about its complex 
techniques, how to protect against it, how to detect it and how to react to it. 
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Q10: How frequent do you think e-mail phishing incidents are? 
     Increasing         Decreasing          Staying the same        Don’t know 
Q11: Do you worry about e-mail phishing?  
      Yes           No     
Q12: Do you use software to protect you from phishing e-mails and websites (e.g. anti-virus, 
anti-phishing software or spam filters)?  
     Yes          No 
Q13: Do you think using anti-virus, anti-phishing software or spam filter is enough to 
prevent all types of phishing e-mails?  
       Yes       No, please specify why                                                                                 
      Don’t know                  
Q14: Which of the following is generally a sign that an e-mail may be phishing or 
fraudulent? You receive an e-mail from your bank which.... 
Asks you to enter information about your account (e.g. your username and password) 
Addresses you by your first and last name (e.g. Dear Ms. Mariam K Al-Hamar). 
Directs you to a website containing a security certificate matching the name of the website. 
Conveys a sense of urgency and surprise  
Has been classified as junk or spam mail by your e-mail system. 
Contains an attachment notifying you that it might contain viruses that could harm your 
computer. 
Points you to a website with a URL starting with https. 
Asks you to phone a number given in the e-mail. 
       Don’t know 
Q15: Which of the following actions should you take if you think you've been tricked by a 
phishing e-mail? 
Report the incident to the company 
whose e-mail address or Web site was 
faked. 
Report the incident to the police or an 
institute specialising in dealing with 
these cases.  
Report the incident to your bank or 
other organisation for which you have 
revealed details.      
      Change the account details you have revealed 
Check your financial statements immediately 
Cut up your credit and debit cards 
Do nothing    
Others 
Q16: How often do you receive phishing E-mails? 
   Daily         Weekly         Monthly         Never        Others            
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Q17: How many times have you been tricked by phishing e-mails?  
    Never        Once       Twice        3 times         More than 3 times       Don’t know 
If you answer Q17 Never, then please skip Q18. 
Q18: If you have been tricked by a phishing e-mail, which of the following was the reason 
you were tricked? 
 I didn’t install a software to prevent 
phishing E-mails and websites (e.g. 
anti-virus, anti-phishing, spam filters)  
 Phishers are coming up with smarter 
tricks which make it difficult to 
identify phishing 
The fake website looks almost 
identical to the legitimate one 
I didn’t believe I would be tricked 
      The e-mail appears with a sense of urgency and 
surprise  
Lack of awareness and training about phishing 
I trusted the e-mail because I didn’t know about 
phishing 
I was not aware of the importance of the information 
that I revealed 
Other 
Q19: What do you think is the best way to defend yourself against phishing E-mails?  
Be aware and be educated about 
phishing 
Follow clear guidelines addressing 
phishing (e.g. check web address, 
don’t give your private information 
in an e-mail.etc.) 
Install effective anti-virus, spam filter or anti-phishing 
software 
Get affected by phishing e-mails, because you will 
learn more 
Others 
Q20: How do you prefer to be educated about phishing, Is it through.....? 
     Interactive tutorials and quizzes        Videos        Cartoons         Posters         Web-based e-
learning          Media        Seminars         Newsletters and documents          Screen savers               
     Others 
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A4  Electronic version of questionnaire in Arabic and English 
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A5  Questionnaire participants     
 
In Qatar, 1000 Qatari e-mail users over 12 participated in the questionnaire survey, as 
follows: 
 
 Al-Shaima secondary school 
 Carnegie Mellon University 
 Commercial Bank of Qatar 
 Doha Bank 
 Friends and relatives 
 Georgetown University 
 ICT Qatar 
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 International Bank of Qatar (IBQ) 
 Ministry of Defence 
 Ministry of Economy & Commerce 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 Ministry of Higher Education  
 Ministry of Interior 
 Ministry of Municipal and Agriculture Affairs 
 Qatar Foundation 
 Qatar Petroleum (QP) 
 Qatar Telecommunication (Qtel) 
 Ras Gas 
 Sidra Medical and Research Centre 
 University of North Atlantic (CAN) 
 University of Qatar 
 
 
On the other hand, 1000 British e-mail users over 12 were participated in the 
questionnaire survey as follows: 
 
 Birmingham University 
 Bradford College 
 Friends and neighbours   
 Grange School, Bradford 
 Human Relief, Bradford 
 In public areas, e.g. Cyprus restaurant, mosque in Bradford and city centre  
 Leeds Metropolitan University 
 Leicester University 
 Loughborough College 
 Qatar Embassy 
 Qatar Medical and Cultural Attaché 
 Qatari students in the UK through Qatar Embassy 
 Tong High School, Bradford 
 University of Bradford 
 University of Loughborough 
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A6  Questionnaire support  
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A7  Samples of completed questionnaire 
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A8  Questionnaire results 
 
In total, 2000 people have participated in the survey as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A9  In-depth analysis of Qatar questionnaire 
 
Level of 
knowledge /Age None Poor Average Good Expert 
Under 18 61 60 64 56 36 
Between 18-29 46 82 139 87 16 
Between 30-50 51 58 101 71 29 
Over 50 7 10 11 15 0 
 
To find whether there is a relation between participants' level of knowledge on e-mail 
phishing and age, the author applies Chi-squared test as follows: 
  
Contingency table 
 
       A      B      C      D      E 
 
1     61     60     64     56     36    277 
2     46     82    139     87     16    370 
3     51     58    101     71     29    310 
4      7      10     11     15      0      43 
 
     165    210    315    229     81   1000 
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        A          B          C          D          E 
 
1    45.7       58.2       87.3       63.4       22.4     
2    61.0       77.7       117.       84.7       30.0     
3    51.1       65.1       97.7       71.0       25.1     
4    7.09       9.03       13.5       9.85       3.48     
 
χ2 was calculated using the following formula: 
 
Chi-squared χ2 = 43.5  
degrees of freedom = (4-1)* (5-1) =12 
Critical value of x= 21.03 for p=5% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where: 
H0= There is no relation between the two responses 
H1= There is relation between the two responses 
 
The author concludes that definitely participants' level of knowledge on e-mail phishing 
and age are related.  
 
Related variable are illustrated with the value of chi-square in tables below:  
 
 Worries of e-mail phishing 
Age X= 7.815, χ
2
=23.6 
Education X= 7.815, χ
2
=60.6 
Occupation X= 7.815, χ
2
=14.3 
 
21.03 
P=0.5 
χ2 distribution 
Accept  H0 Accept  H1 
χ2 = 43.5 
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 Level of knowledge 
Age X= 21.03, χ
2
 = 43.5 
Education X= 21.03, χ
2
= 54.6 
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 Divulgence of e-mail addresses 
Gender X= 3.841, χ
2
=222 
Level of knowledge of e-mail phishing X= 9.488, χ
2
= 149 
Worries of e-mail phishing X= 3.841, χ
2
= 186 
Use of anti-phishing software X= 3.841, χ
2
= 40.2 
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 Efficiency of anti-phishing software 
Use of anti-phishing software X= 5.991, χ
2
= 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
037 
A10  Comparison between Qatar and UK 
 
χ2 were calculated using the following formula: 
        Where p (level of significance) =5% 
 
Questionnaire variables χ2 Significance 
between Qatar 
and UK 
Knowledge of e-mail phishing 
E-mail phishing level of knowledge 8.62 Not significance 
Source of knowledge 19.6 Significance 
Predicted e-mail phishing trend 8.23 Significance 
Vulnerability to e-mail phishing 
Participants’ worries about e-mail phishing 3.96 Significance 
Use of anti-phishing software 2.35 Not significance 
Participants’ ability to detect e-mail phishing 79.8 Significance 
Participants’ procedure once attacked by e-mail phishing 46.9 Significance 
Participants’ divulgence of their e-mail address 21.3 Significance 
Extent of e-mail phishing 
Amount of phishing e-mails received by participants  63.5 Significance 
Number of times participants have been tricked with e-mail 
phishing 
136 Significance 
Reason for being tricked 5.84 Not significance 
Defence against e-mail phishing 
Participant’s view on efficiency of existing anti-phishing 
software 
25.6 Significance 
Participant’s view on  best way to defend against e-mail 
phishing 
15.7 Significance 
Participants’ preferred method for awareness and education 
against e-mail phishing  
26.2 Significance 
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A11  Interviews during questionnaire phase 
 
20 participants in the survey from Qatar and UK were interviewed face-to-face by semi-
structured interview containing the following questions:   
Q1: According to Q14, if participants got the detection of phishing e-mails wrong, what 
is the reason?  
Q2: According to Q15, if participants have not reacted once they have been tricked, 
what is the reason? 
Q3: If you revealed your e-mail address, why did you? 
The following questions were put only to Qataris:  
Q3: Why do you think Qatari people could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail 
phishing attacks?   
Q4: How do you think Qatari culture affects people’s responses to phishing attacks? 
Q5: Do you believe country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development 
experience in Qatar in all sectors especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence 
of an e-law, have assisted development of phishing in Qatar?    
Q6: Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes in 
particular, phishing?    
Q7: Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid developments in 
ICT and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their 
advantages but also to be aware of the threats associated with them?   
A12  Conclusions from interviews 
1. Most of the participants interviewed after completing the questionnaire said that they 
were not familiar with the terms for security indicators such as https and security 
certificate and most of their decisions were just guesses. 
2. The majority of interviewed participants stated that not all e-mails classified as junk 
or spam mails or which contain viruses are fraudulent and some do check their junk 
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mails and sometimes download attachments with viruses, even if the sender is 
unknown. Also, some participants think that communicating off-line by telephone or 
post is more trustworthy and safer than online communication, since most thought that 
online methods are more commonly used in a fraudulent attack.   
3. Some of the interviewed participants commented that reporting to the police would 
make the case bigger and some people said the law does not protect the dupe (a 
common saying in Qatar).  Also, it was beieved that reporting the case to the company 
whose e-mail address or website was faked will not make any difference to what 
happens, as most think that it will not take the matter seriously. Furthermore, some 
stated they did not know that there is a specialised body to deal with such cases, the Q-
CERT (Qatar Computer Emergency Response Team), which handles Internet crimes in 
Qatar. 
4. In the interview, participants revealed that they did not believe they were being 
tricked, because they lacked awareness of the phishing threat, and because of the smart 
and varied techniques used by phishers against their victims, these participants 
frequently fall prey to such attacks.   
5. Those who failed in this test stated in the interview that this question was trusted 
because it was within a survey for a research purposes and some said they did not think 
their e-mail addresses were confidential information that should not be disclosed. 
6. The majority of those Qatari citizens interviewed thought that they had expert 
knowledge of e-mail phishing since they know how to use the computer and Internet 
very well in chatting and accessing information or they have heard about the term 
phishing. 
7. The majority stated that Qatari people are vulnerable to e-mail phishing attacks 
because they are generous, trustful and helpful.  A lot of them did not understand 
properly how to protect themselves against such attack, how to spot threats and how to 
react once they have been tricked. And a lot do not install anti-viruses or spam filters. 
8. All of the interviewed participants have noted that Qatari culture has an effect on 
people’s responses to phishing attacks. Since Qataris are living in a conservative society 
with a collection of tradition, customs and religious beliefs which have become tracking 
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on part of their culture. Furthermore, most Qataris are religious and follow Islamic 
beliefs in being moral, doing good, treating people nicely, trusting them and helping 
them when required, therefore when phishers use these factors which touch their 
emotions and religion then they would believe it. Also, Qataris in general are generous, 
trustful and helpful and this would be used by phishers to fool them. 
9. A lot believe that the society needs time to absorb such huge changes which have 
happened in the country and by that time people will get used to such changes and will 
be more aware since the government and institutions in Qatar are trying to defend 
against such attacks by awareness of  people and enhancing the security measures.  
10. Almost all of the interviewed participants believe that the evolution in the economy 
and ICT has assisted in the existence and the development of the phishing problem in 
Qatar and has made it attractive for phishers with the availability of a lot of money and 
online users who are novices to the Internet and most likely do not know the risks 
associated it with it. However, some commented that this does not mean the country has 
to stop developing. Furthermore, some state that phishers are taking advantage of the 
lack of e-law in Qatar and therefore the establishment of e-law would be essential in 
helping to reduce e-crimes in Qatar and, in particular, phishing.  
A13  Examples of interviews  
The following are two examples of interviews with Qatari participants 
Example 1 
Q1: According to Q14, if participants got the detection of phishing e-mails wrong, 
what was the reason?  
Most of my decisions were just guessed since I'm not familiar with the terms https and 
security certificate. 
With regard to the 'E-mail asks you to phone a given number', I did not think that offline 
communication by telephone or post is fraudulent, because it is usually done through 
online communication.  
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Q2: According to Q15, if participants have not reacted once they have been tricked, 
what is the reason? 
If I have been tricked, I will just report to my bank and they will react and cut up my 
credit card. 
I don't prefer to report to the police, I think I would look stupid and the law does not 
protect the dupe. I also did not know that there is a specialised body to deal with such 
cases, the Q-CERT (Qatar Computer Emergency Response Team), which handles 
Internet crimes in Qatar. 
Q3: If you revealed your e-mail address, why did you? 
Because I trusted it because it was within a survey for a research purpose and I did not 
think it was phishing me.  
Q4: Why do you think Qatari people could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail 
phishing attacks? 
The majority of Qataris are vulnerable to e-mail phishing attacks, although some might 
have heard the term phishing but a lot of them do not understand properly how to 
protect themselves against such attack, how to spot threats and how to react once have 
been tricked. 
Q5: How do you think Qatari culture affects people’s responses to phishing attacks? 
It does affect them, since Qataris are living in a conservative society with a collection of 
traditions, customs and religious beliefs which have become part of their culture. 
Qataris in general are generous, trustful and helpful and this would be used by phishers 
to fool them.    
Q6: How have  country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development experience 
in Qatar in all sectors, especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence of an e-
law, assisted development of phishing in Qatar? 
Yes, I do believe that the evolution in the economy and ICT has make Qatar attractive 
for phishers with the availability of a lot of money and online users who are novice to 
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the Internet and most likely do not know the risks associated it with it. Also phishers 
take advantage of the lack of e-law in Qatar.  
Q7: How much time do Qatari people need to cope with the rapid developments in 
ICT and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their 
advantages but also to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
Yes, I think the society needs time to absorb such changes which have happened and by 
then people will get used to such changes and will be more aware. 
Example 2 
Q1: According to Q14, if participants have made a wrong detection of phishing e-
mails, what is the reason ? 
I did not detect that e-mails in junk mails are harmful because I do not think all of them 
are or contain viruses. However, I don't think it is an accurate measure and I always 
check my junk mails even if the sender is unknown.  
Q2: According to Q15, if participants do not react once have been tricked, why is 
that? 
I will do nothing if I have been tricked, I believe reporting would not make any 
difference to what happens, it would only waste paper. If I have already been tricked 
neither can anyone bring back what has been stolen from me. I have to bear the 
consequences of my mistakes. What I would do to make others aware is by sharing my 
experience in the well-known blogs and forums such as Qatar University forum and 
Qatar Share Market forum. 
Q3: If you revealed your e-mail address, why did you ? 
I did not think that my e-mail address is confidential information that should not be 
disclosed. 
Q4: Why do you think Qatari people could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail 
phishing attacks? 
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Because phishers are getting smart and use various techniques to trick their victims and 
some of these are over confident and believe  they are smart enough but would be 
tricked one day. 
Q5: How do you think Qatari culture affects people’s responses to phishing attacks? 
I think it has a major affect, since most Qataris are religious which implies goodness, 
treating people nicely, trusting  them, helping them when required, therefore when 
phishing uses these factors which touch their emotions, religion and beliefs,  then they 
would believe it.       
Q6: How have country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development experience in 
Qatar in all sectors, especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence of an e-law, 
assisted development of phishing in Qatar?  
I do think all of these have assisted in the existence and the development of the phishing 
problem in Qatar. However, this does not mean we have to stop developing. However, I 
think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes in Qatar and, in 
particular, phishing.  
Q7: How much time do Qatari people need to cope with the rapid developments in 
ICT and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their 
advantages but also to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
I think that after two years people will be more aware because the government is trying 
to find a solution to defend against such attacks by making people aware and enhancing 
the security measures. 
Appendix B 
309 
Appendix B:  Interviews  
This section provides a full breakdown of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews held 
with experts in Qatar in relation to e-mail phishing and enhancing people's awareness on 
such attack.  Also, there was a structured interview by e-mail with one of the leading 
companies in the UK in providing information security and testing services since 1989.   
B1  Draft Letter to Interview Participants 
    
5 August, 2009 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
             E-mail Phishing 
You may have already heard or read about or have even been affected by e-mail 
phishing. This is a fraudulent process used by criminals. What they do is try to acquire 
sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by 
pretending to be an honest and trustworthy person in an electronic communication such 
as an e-mail. This can have very serious financial and social consequences for their 
victims.  As a PhD student at Loughborough University in the UK, I am doing research 
on 'e-mail phishing' as a contribution to foiling those criminal schemes.  
The research aims to reduce the e-mail phishing hazard in the State of Qatar by 
developing an effective e-mail phishing awareness framework and to point to 
possibilities of wider application. In order to achieve the desired goals, I need to 
interview officials and citizens such as you, who are in a position to provide valuable 
information on attitudes in Qatar culture, e-mail phishing, awareness and related data. 
We would like to invite you to be part of this study, which will help the researcher to 
review the extent of e-mail phishing, the cultural effect associated with people‟s 
responses to phishing, organisational strategy, views on protecting themselves and/or 
their customers from e-mail phishing attacks and in particular the methods they use for 
creating awareness among their employees and customers and for educating them about 
such threats. 
I assure you all responses will be confidential and kept strictly private.  
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Thank you in anticipation of your involvement 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Mariam Al-Hamar 
For any queries about the research topic, please don't hesitate to contact me through my 
e-mail:         m.k.j.al-hamar@lboro.ac.uk. 
         
 
B2  Consent Form for Interview Participants 
 
 
CERTIFICATION BY PARTICIPANT 
 
 
I, certify that I am voluntarily giving my consent to provide information for the above 
described project entitled: Reducing the Risk of E-mail Phishing through Awareness 
and Education: An Empirical study of the State of Qatar Considering Cultural 
Differences, being conducted at Loughborough University, UK by: Ms. Mariam AL-
Hamar. 
 
 
I certify that I have agreed to be interviewed in the subject of as previously explained by 
Ms. Mariam AL-Hamar and that that I freely consent to participate in this project. I 
have had the opportunity to have any questions answered, I have been fully explained 
the procedures of interview and that information gathered will be only used for the 
benefit of the entitled research and will be confidential and kept strictly private.  
 
 
Signed: ….............................................. 
Witness other than the interviewee:        Date: …................. 
…............................................................. 
 
For any queries about the research topic please don't hesitate to contact the researcher 
(Name: Ms. Mariam AL-Hamar, ph. +974 5553493, E-mail: m.k.j.al-
hamar@lboro.ac.uk). 
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B3  Interview questions for domain experts 
 
1.  IT professionals in the private and government sectors interviewed face-to-face: 
Officer of the Computer Crimes Unit, Economic Crimes Prevention Division, General 
Admin. Public Security Criminal Investigation Dept., Ministry of Interior. 
Manager of Public Relations Dept., Ministry of Interior.  
Manager Operational Risk, Doha Bank 
Manager of ISP, Qtel 
Network engineer, ISP Department, Qtel  
Senior Incident Specialist, Incident Management, Q-CERT 
      Analyst, Critical Infrastrusture Protection, Q-CERT 
      Public Awareness Manager, Q-CERT 
2. General framework for questions asked during interviews  
2 .1  Extent of e-mail phishing  
Is e-mail phishing the most frequent phishing attack you have experienced?  
How often do your organisation and its clients receive phishing e-mails? Is the 
frequency increasing? 
Are e-mail phishing incidents increasing in your organisation? 
What is the number of successful phishing attacks? Is it increasing? 
2.2  Review of organisational strategy of defence against phishing 
What is your strategy to protect your organisation and its clients from e-mail phishing 
attacks? Do you make a phishing penetration test to examine your employees‟ 
vulnerability to phishing? 
What actions does your organisation take once phishing frauds are encountered? And 
what actions do you take once attacked by phishing frauds? 
Do you cooperate with other organisations to take the case further (e.g. ICT)? 
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How do your employees and clients react to phishing attacks before and once they have 
been tricked?  
2.3  Processes deployed for phishing awareness 
Does your organisation consider awareness of phishing important to defend itself  
from such attack? 
 
If yes, then what process do you deploy to enhance your employees‟ and customers‟ 
awareness on phishing? How is it carried out? And what methods of enhancing 
awareness do you deploy (e.g. e-learning, posters, seminars, newsletter, leaflets, etc.)?   
Do you believe your employees and clients are well aware of the phishing threat? And 
of how to protect themselves? Do they know how to spot cases and how to react? 
2.4  Interviewee opinions 
What do you think is the best method for creating awareness and educating people 
about e-mail phishing?     
Why do you think Qatari employees and clients could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-
mail phishing attacks? 
How do you think Qatari culture affects people‟s responses to phishing attacks? 
How aware do you think Qatari employees and clients are aware of e-mail phishing 
threat? 
Do you believe country-specific factors have helped development of phishing in Qatar?    
Like, first, the vast development experience in Qatar in all sectors especially the 
economy and ICT?  Second, the absence of an e-law?  
Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes, in particular 
phishing?    
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years ? First to be able to understand their 
advantages?  Second, to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
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Do you believe Qatari people are well aware of the phishing threat? How to protect 
themselves? How to spot threats and how to react? 
Since two organisations, the Ministry of Interior and ICT Qatar, are dealing with e-
crimes in Qatar and in particular, phishing, additional questions were added to the 
above in the section „Review organisational strategy of defence against phishing‟.   
Since you are dealing with e-crimes in Qatar, what is the procedure you are currently 
following when you receive a phishing incident? What actions do you take once 
attacked by phishing frauds? And which organisations/institutes are you cooperating 
with to deal with such crimes? 
Are you in the process of developing an e-law in Qatar to protect online users? What 
does the law involve? Which organisations are involved in the development of the e-
law? And when is it going to be established? 
Does your organisation play a role in enhancing the awareness of Qatari society about 
the phishing threat? Similarly, since Qtel is the main telecommunication service 
provider in Qatar, further questions were added to the section „Review organisational 
strategy of defence against phishing‟. 
Since you are the main telecommunication service provider in Qatar, do Qatari 
organisations and people refer to you to deal with phishing incidents?  
If yes, what action do you take once you receive such a request?  
B4  Interview with Head of Prosecution, Ministry of Public 
Prosecution. 
After looking at interviewees‟ backgrounds and expertise, the questions were designed 
to discuss the topic of phishing in general without going in depth into the technical 
aspects. 
1.  Extent of phishing 
Is phishing is the most frequent attack you have experienced?  
What is the number of successful phishing attacks? Is it increasing? 
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2.  Review of organisational approach to phishing attacks  
What is your strategy to protect the society from phishing attacks?  
What actions do you take once you receive a case of phishing? 
What problems do you face in e-crimes and in particular phishing crimes? 
Does your organisation consider awareness of phishing as an important method of 
defence? 
What do you think is the best method for creating awareness and educating people 
about phishing? 
3.  Interviewee opinions 
How do you think Qatari culture affects people's responses to phishing attacks? 
Do you think organisations are allowed to make phishing penetration tests to examine 
their employees' vulnerability to phishing? 
Do you think Qataris are vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail phishing attacks? and why? 
Do you believe country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development experience in 
Qatar in all sectors, especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence of an e-law, 
have assisted development of phishing in Qatar?  
Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes, in particular 
phishing?    
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their advantages 
but also to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
How aware do you think Qatari people are of the phishing threat? How to protect 
themselves? How to spot threats and how to react?  
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B5  Interview with expert in Islamic studies,  voluntary administrator, 
Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs 
1.  Use by phishers of religious, emotional and moral issues 
Phishers exploit victims‟ emotions, morals and religion to commit their crimes. Why do 
you think this is successful in Qatar?   
Should your Ministry make people aware of such a threat? What effect would this have 
on people (e.g. they may not trust others, become unhelpful)?  
Are there some people who refer to you once they have been tricked with phishing? 
And what do you advise them?  
Have you experienced such cases of attack happening in Qatar? 
B6  Interview with experts in education and training 
Director of one of the high schools in Qatar, Ministry of Education and Higher 
Education 
Computer Lecturer, Institute of Administrative Development. The institute is 
responsible for enhancing administrative development for organisations in Qatar by 
developing employees' skills. 
1.  Best process for education and awareness 
What do you think is the best method for awareness and educating people?  
Does people‟s background play a big role in awareness?  
What are the best conditions for increasing awareness ? How to get people interested, 
especially in such topics?  
How to assess the awareness programme? What is the preparation required ? 
How to get people to remember what they learned?  
How to get people interested in training again? 
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2.  Processes deployed for phishing awareness 
Does your organisation play a role in educating people about cyber threats, in particular 
e-mail phishing? If no, do you want to? 
3.  Interviewee opinions  
If no, do you think it is important to have some material about such threats in academic 
institutions to make students aware? 
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their advantages 
but also to be aware of the threats associated with such technology? 
 
B7  Examples of signed Consent Forms 
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B8  Details of interviews  
Interview 1  
Date of interview: 12
th
 August 2009 
Duration: Approximately 1 hour 30 minutes 
Interviewees:   Two people from the Ministry of Interior were interviewed together: 
Mahmoud Salah D. Ibrahim, Officer of the Computer Crimes Unit,        
Economic Crimes Prevention Division, General Admin. of Public 
Security Criminal Investigation Dept., Ministry of Interior. 
Abdullah Al-Muftah, Manager of Public Relations Dept., Ministry of 
Interior. 
1.  Extent of e-mail phishing 
 Is e-mail phishing the most frequent phishing attack you have experienced? 
Yes, it has peaked recently and has become more concern. We receive lots of phishing 
attacks in the form of SMS, E-mail, websites and phones. Most reported phishing 
attacks were attacks which target banks. Banks have got a restricted law from the Qatar 
Central Bank (QCB) in which they have to refer to us in case of any attacks, in 
particular, phishing attacks which they have encountered otherwise the bank will be 
fined. Since the case is critical, usually banks will only refer to us for  forensic and deal 
with the case, most don‟t refer to other institutes such as ICT Qatar or Qtel as they find 
bank reputation is the top priority. In most cases, we found difficulty to forensic the 
phishing crimes since, in most cases, phishers do not use their personality, but they take 
advantage of people in Qatar or sometimes they steal their identity or impersonate them 
to commit their crimes, usually without their knowledge. However, it is difficult to 
prove the good faith of the person. Usually, the stolen money is transferred abroad 
interrelated, for example, from China to Nigeria and Russia, which makes it difficult 
catch the phisher especially since there is no cooperation between Qatar and other 
countries in such matters, such as China and Nigeria. Not only financial losses are 
consequences of such attacks, also loss of information and moral losses such as 
reputation are confidential and in some cases very critical. 
How often do your organisation and clients receive phishing e-mails? Is the frequency 
increasing? 
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I'm not sure but I think it is decreasing because we have applied some security 
measures. 
Are e-mail phishing incidents increasing in your organisation? 
No, but possibly through personal e-mails 
What is the number of successful phishing attacks? Is it increasing? 
It is undetermined or null  
2.  Review of organisational strategy of defence against phishing 
What is your strategy to protect your organisation and its clients from e-mail phishing 
attacks? Do you make a phishing penetration test to examine your employees‟ 
vulnerability to phishing? 
Anti-phishing filters are effective. One of our strategies to combat phishing is to train 
people to recognise phishing attempts and to deal with them. Education can be effective, 
especially where training provides direct feedback. We don‟t conduct a penetration test 
for our employees because they are well aware of phishing and therefore there is no 
need to assess them.   
What actions does your organisation take once phishing frauds are encountered? And 
what actions do you take once attacked by phishing frauds? 
We collect all information and data for further investigations and actions. 
Do you cooperate with other organisations to take the case further (e.g. ICT)? 
We do co-operate with Qtel in some cases to block certain websites or IPs. However, 
banks have got a strict law to follow from Qatar Central Bank to refer to us once such 
cases are detected.  
How do your employees and clients react to phishing attacks before and once they have 
been tricked?  
Our employees will immediately report the incidents towards dealing with the case 
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Since you are dealing with e-crimes in Qatar, what is the procedure you are currently 
following when you receive a phishing incident? What actions do you take once 
attacked by phishing frauds? And which organisations/institutes are you cooperating 
with to deal with such crimes? 
First we file the case then the cyber crime centre of CID department deals with the 
crime investigation and collecting data and sometimes it require a cooperation with 
other organisations such as Qtel. 
Are you in the process of developing an e-law in Qatar to protect online users? What 
does the law involve? Which organisations are involved in the development of the e-
law? And when is it going to be established? 
ICT Qatar is in the process of developing e-law, I don‟t know what it involves but it 
will cover all issues related to online communication. 
Does your organisation play a role in enhancing the awareness of Qatari society about 
the phishing threat?  
Yes, through public relation programmes, awareness seminars and classes were done 
about e-crimes.  
3.  Processes deployed for phishing awareness 
Does your organisation consider awareness of phishing important to defend itself from 
such attack? 
Yes, awareness is very important to protect from phishing attacks since phishers try to 
trick victims by clever techniques which in most cases are not detected by technological 
tools such as spam filter or anti-viruses because they are clever, improving and trying to 
overcome those tools. In the field of awareness, we deal with the matter cautiously to 
avoid intimidating the society. On the topic of e-crime, we don't want to intimidate 
people since Qatar society is still safe, conservative and has ethics, principles and 
religious beliefs.   
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If yes, then what process do you deploy to enhance your employees‟ and customers‟ 
awareness on phishing? How is it carried out? And what methods of enhancing 
awareness do you deploy (e.g. e-learning, posters, seminars, newsletter, leaflets, etc.)? 
We use to train people through various processes like e-learning, seminars, exhibitions, 
posters and newsletters, SMS and media (through newspapers and TV programmes) to 
recognise phishing attempts and to deal with those attacks. We publish monthly a 
magazine called The Police is with you; it is distributed to almost all organisation in 
Qatar private and government and it is usually published in newspapers. It contains a lot 
of articles on different topics that matter to Qatar society and  some of our publication 
have articles about e-crimes and cyber crimes.   
Public Relations Department in Ministry of Interior is responsible for raising public 
awareness on topics which many need consciousness such as drugs and recycling; 
however, they did not yet provide awareness on phishing in particular. Initially, CID 
provides public relations with the topic of awareness and they develop the awareness 
tool, usually  a poster, leaflet and video. Public relations has coordinated with CID in 
the past period to give lectures to school students about the dangers of the Internet and 
the ways to avoid and the procedures that must be taken in case of being fooled. Also 
there is a plan to develop leaflets and posters on e-crimes.  
However, they found media, especially TV, are the best way to enhance public 
awareness since it is more watched and preferred by Qataris. We did not yet provide any 
awareness for e-crimes, but there is a plan for that since we found there is a need to 
make people aware since we found it becomes more noticed. I think the game is an 
interesting tool for awareness, especially for kids. 
Do you believe your employees and clients are well aware of the phishing threat? How 
to protect themselves? Do they know how to spot cases and how to react? 
Our employees are well aware but our client „public citizens‟, most of them are not. 
4.  Interviewee opinions 
What do you think is the best method for creating awareness and educating people 
about e-mail phishing?  
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I think it is the media, SMS and sending e-mail messages within each organisation, also 
with cooperation with ISPs to send such information to personal e-mail holders. The 
public relations have got what is called „awareness e-mail‟ which is sent to people who 
are registered in our awareness programme, and then every while we sent an awareness 
on specific topics usually according to the occasions (e.g. awareness of safety in 
Ramadan, traffic safety on Eid).   
Why do you think Qatari employees and clients could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-
mail phishing attacks? 
Yes, I do think that. We have received lots of incidents were victims have been preyed 
on through their kindness, trust, morals and emotions, especially since Qatari people are 
still holding on to their culture and Islamic beliefs.    
How do you think Qatari culture affects people‟s responses to phishing attacks? 
Yes, of course phishers and criminals in general study the culture and the personality of 
victims if possible for committing their crimes. For example, since Vodafone was 
launched in Qatar, we have received a lot of phishing attacks which exploit people by 
claiming that they are Vodafone official office in Egypt and they can provide cheaper 
services for them . Basically, attackers use things existing in Qatar. 
How aware do you think Qatari employees and clients are of e-mail phishing threat? 
No, most are not. I think by the time and by providing an effective awareness, they will 
be more aware. 
Do you believe country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development experience in 
Qatar in all sectors, especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence of an e-law, 
have assisted development of phishing in Qatar?  
Yes, I do believe that the rapid development which Qatar has experienced in the last few 
years in all fields, economic, politics, telecom and others makes Qatar vulnerable to 
cyber crimes. With regard to e-law, there is no clear assigned e-law in Qatar. However, 
in penalties law No.11 of 2004, there is a section about computer crimes on pages 142-
147. It is a small section, it does not cover all types of fraud existing nowadays but it 
covers in general topics such as viruses, misuse of data or computers and unauthorised 
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access, etc. It does not even criminalise phishing attacks. However, it does criminalise 
viruses which are distributed through floppy disk and CDs, which means if distribution 
of viruses is through Internet, e-mail or even USB it is not criminalised. Therefore, 
when a phishing case went to the court, there was not actually an explicit law under 
which to punish the phishers, because the law is quite old and was not planned very 
well. Once we receive e-crimes, we research and investigate, then we perform all 
actions required such as ask Qtel to block the site and we provide a report of the case to 
the Prosecution. However, most lawyers and justices do not have knowledge in IT 
therefore they found difficulty even in understanding most of the terms mentioned in 
our report and mostly they depend on our report to either to criminalise the accused or 
not, even though in most cases there is no clear law support decision. 
I think the current law will have to be changed and there should be a separate e-law 
which covers all issues related to electronic communications and crimes. However, Q-
CERT is currently developing an electronic law for Qatar, yet it is not approved. There 
is a plan to establish e-law for all GCC countries to be an umbrella for all countries. 
Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes, in particular 
phishing? 
Yes, I think because there is no clear e-law phishers and criminals can commit their 
crimes freely and escape with no punishment. However, since most phishing attacks 
originate from outside the country, the law might not be able to be enforced in other 
countries such as Nigeria and China.  
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their advantages 
but also to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
Yes, I think the development in ICT went very fast. Nowadays, we can see 5 year-old 
kid with a pc. Most people know how to use the Internet but they do not actually know 
that the Internet has got lots of negatives like the distribution of distructive ideas such as 
Al-Qaeda and existence of crimes and black market. We have to know how to deal with 
the technology, gain the good things only and we have to know how to protect ourself. 
Most people don‟t have anti-virus or even don‟t update it and they download anything 
from Internet, putting themselves at risk of crimes.  I think schools should not only 
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teach students IT but also how to use the Internet safely and protect themselves from 
possible criminal attacks. 
Do you believe Qatari people are well aware of the phishing threat? How to protect 
themselves? How to spot threats and how to react? 
No, most are not well aware. 
Interview 2 
Date of interview: 14
th
 August 2009 
Duration: Approximately 1hour 
Interviewee: Mohamed Darwish, Manager Operational Risk, Doha Bank 
1.  Extent of e-mail phishing   
Is e-mail phishing the most frequent phishing attack you have experienced?  
The first phishing attack we faced was recently in March 2008, since then an average of 
2 attacks per month was experienced, which means it is most frequent. However, it 
stopped in November 2008 due to some counter measures the bank has provided. 
Customers usually phone the call centre in case of any attacks encountered, for example 
we receive calls from customers claiming that he/she has received an SMS from the 
bank stating that an amount of money has been transferred from this account to another 
internally without his/her notice. Usually phishing attacks exploit people‟s interest and 
goods, such as an attack stating that you have won a car but we need you to transfer an 
amount of money for payment of taxes , or we are children at an orphan charity institute 
and we require your help for orphans or even sometimes they are cleverer than that, as 
they claim to use their victims as a  representative or an intermediary for a foreign 
institute or person in Doha, where then they transfer an amount of money into the 
victim‟s bank account where in turn it is transferred later to another account. In most 
cases, victims were promised to gain a percentage amount of money or in some cases 
they exploited  people‟s goodness and emotions, such as claiming that this money is for 
charity. Phishers in most cases use the victim‟s identity to commit any crime. Usually, 
the attacks came from foreign countries such as Russia and Nigeria where attackers 
cannot be reached or criminalised since there is no law of co-operation between these 
countries and Qatar to criminalise those kind of attackers, whereas if the case arises for 
example within the GCC countries the attackers could be criminalised since there is a 
clear corporation between GCC countries in almost all matters. 
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How often do your organisation and clients receive phishing e-mails? Is the  frequency 
increasing? 
It is a lot but I‟m not sure by how many exactly. However, it has been reduced now 
since the bank has applied restricted technical solutions such as filters, anti-viruses, 
malicious code scans, along with restriction policies and, in general, employees have 
become well aware of phishing attack since they have been educated.      
Are e-mail phishing incidents increasing in your organisation? 
No, as I say, they have been reduced 
What is the number of successful phishing attacks? Is it increasing? 
He commented that this was private information that he was not allowed to disclose. 
2.  Review of organisational strategy of defence against phishing 
What is your strategy to protect your organisation and clients from e-mail phishing 
attacks? Do you make a phishing penetration test to examine your employees‟ 
vulnerability to phishing? 
We have done some things to prevent phishing attacks since November 2008, as 
follows: 
 It takes 24 hours to activate any account added as third-party account to one of our 
client accounts and, before that, we call back the account owner to ensure that he 
has taken this action. Also it is not allowed to have a account which adds a third 
party to more than one account on the same day. This has prevented phishers who 
gain access illegally to a client bank account and add themselves or others as 
beneficiary third party account where transactions can be done easily from the 
account owner to any of the beneficiaries listed. So since then, about 5 such 
phishing attacks were caught every month. 
 The bank has reduced the limited amount for daily transactions from 50,000 to 
40,000 QR. 
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 The bank deals with a foreign company which is a professional on information 
security, and it protects the bank from possible hackers.  
 By default, the bank does not allow transactions over the phone, unless the client 
asks for this feature and can also activate and deactive it as necessary avoid phishing 
attacks which can impersonate the client over the phone. Also, clients are not 
allowed to make more than one transaction per day.   
 The bank provides SMS service for clients for any actions they held within their 
account (e.g. once open a new account, transactions either debited or credited, 
access to online banking and adding a beneficiary to your account). Although there 
is a possibility that hackers could sniff the line between Qtel and us to capture the 
message content, but this is hard.    
 The bank provides flexibility for the delivery channel of the PIN mailer (a sealed 
card with the password), so it is delivered to the client either by mail or collected 
from the bank personally or sent via SMS.           
 We have increased two levels of security in online banking: username, password 
and account number, including the added levels, security questions and virtual 
keyboard to avoid any malicious code which detects keyboard typing. The security 
questions are decided upon once the client opens an account with us, from then  on 
each time he/she requires to access the account online, one of these questions is 
selected randomly to be answered, so each time there will  be a different question 
when the client seeks to log in which helps in avoiding phishing attacks.  
 We make our clients aware of phishing attacks through SMS and e-mail. Once we 
experienced an attack which infected a number of people and  we notified all clients 
to avoid it. 
 With regard to penetration test, the bank does not perform such auditing, neither for our 
clients nor employees, since it has some legal issues, and people might complain also that it 
requires a team working on this action and even if it is applied, phishers can use  this by 
sending the same e-mail and direct victims to a malicious website instead. I think there is no 
need for such a test; we try to make people as aware as possible without the need to audit 
and inspect, which people won‟t like.   
Appendix B 
327 
What actions does your organisation take once phishing frauds are encountered? And 
what actions do you take once attacked by phishing frauds? 
 If we receive a phishing attack within the organisation, we block it and add it into 
our database record and inform all of our employees who are also made aware to 
call the incide andt management for help in such cases.    
 With regard to our clients, once we receive a call from a client of a phishing attack 
they have encountered, we first ensure that the case really exists and then we inform 
the Qatar Central Bank and the computer crimes‟ unit in the Ministry of Interior to 
carry out the investigation and in most cases we ask Qtel to block the phishing site 
or phone number. Usually, clients refer to us immediately once they encounter or 
have been tricked, this really facilitates our actions since the case is recent and the 
money can be blocked and held by the bank. 
 According to bank regulation, the bank is not required to pay for the victims who 
fail prey to phishers because it is the responsibility of the client to keep their 
information private from anyone. However, the bank usually recovers the infected 
client since most stolen amounts were relatively small and bank reputation came as 
first priority.     
Do you cooperate with other organisations to take the case further (e.g. ICT)? 
No, we don‟t since the case is critical and confidential for the bank. 
How do your employees and clients react to phishing attacks before and once they have 
been tricked?  
The majority of them who receive an attack or even get infected will report immediately 
to the bank. 
3.  Processes deployed for phishing awareness 
Does your organisation consider awareness of phishing important to defend itself from 
such attack? 
Yes, we do provide awareness for our customers and employees. 
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If yes, what process do you deploy to enhance your employees‟ and customers‟ 
awareness on phishing? How is it carried out? And what method of enhancing 
awareness do you deploys (e.g. e-learning, posters, seminars, newsletter, leaflets, etc.)?  
We people aware of phishing by sending awareness material through their e-mail 
addresses, SMS, and we have got some material on our website. Once we experience a 
frequent attack we send it to our clients to be aware of it. 
Do you believe your employees and clients are well aware of the phishing threat? How 
to protect themselves? Do they know how to spot cases and how to react? 
I think people are still not aware enough, we still receive phishing attacks, even in 
simpler ones people do fail but with the new actions we perform we help to stop 
phishing attacks but does not mean they do not happen.  Some clients won‟t refer to us 
even if they have been attacked, especially well known people, since they think this 
might affect their reputation, some will only change their password immediately. 
However, most clients react immediately once they fall victims by calling the bank. 
 
4.  Interviewee opinions 
What do you think is the best method for creating awareness and educating people 
about e-mail phishing? 
Media is the best way of getting people aware, phishing attacks should be shared with 
media; this is not the case in Qatar, but in other countries, yes.   
Why do you think Qatari employees and clients could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-
mail phishing attacks? 
In general, there are no specific criteria for victims of phishing attacks, nearly all 
categories of Qataris can fall victim to phishing attacks regardless of their backgrounds, 
even people with a high level of education and computer literacy and the poor are 
attacked by phishers. We have experience that  the amount stolen in a phishing attack 
varies from 1000 QR to millions QR.    
Some of our infected clients have claimed that they‟ve never disclosed their account 
details to anyone, but actually they have been infected by spy or malicious software into 
client PC have stolen their account details without client notice. This becomes more 
successful since most victims do not install anti-viruses to protect themselves from such 
attacks.   
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How do you think Qatari culture affects people‟s responses to phishing attacks? 
Yes, Qataris are more trusted, kindness, emotional and in general it is easy to trick them 
especially by utilizing their emotion e.g. need help and pay charity. These types of 
attacks are new to Qatar and sill not all people are aware of it therefore they are easily 
tricked. Also most think phishing attacks will always ask for your account information 
straight forward which is not always the case they are clever than that. How aware do 
you think Qatari employees and clients are aware of e-mail phishing threat? 
I'm not sure, but with refer to our clients there is a significant amount of them are 
unaware of phishing. 
Do you believe country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development experience in 
Qatar in all sectors especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence of an e-law, 
have assisted development of phishing in Qatar? 
Yes, I do. I think people should understand how to use the technology safely and there 
should be a clear low to protect them.  
Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes in particular, 
phishing?    
Yes, I do. 
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their advantages 
but also to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
Yes, they have to know the danger of using the technology and this might take time. 
Do you believe Qatari people are well aware of the phishing threat? How to protect 
themselves? How to spot threats and how to react? 
  No, they still need more awareness programmes to get to understand phishing and 
avoid it. 
 
 
Appendix B 
330 
Interview 3 
Date of interview: 18
th
 August 2009 
Duration: Approximately 1hour15 minutes  
Interviewee:            Two people from the Qtel were interviewed together:  
        Ahmed Rashid Al-Suwaidi, Manager of ISPs, Qtel 
        Firaz, network engineer, ISP department, Qtel  
1.   Extent of e-mail phishing 
Is e-mail phishing is the most frequent phishing attack you have experienced? 
We do not have tangible figures, about 4 cases per month; however, most are not 
reported. Phishing website and SMS are most common phishing attacks. We have 
received a couple of incidents where an attacker impersonated some banks in Qatar, and 
some hack into the website server in Qatar and host their own website and achieve 
phishing where all transactions are then transferred to the attacker. Phishing can trick 
people easily, since most victims do not look at the address bar or even check the 
security certificate. 
An example of phishing attack reported by our customers are denial of service attack 
(DOS), SMS attacks which ask victims to phone or send an SMS to a given number, 
and usually this number deducts more than expected from your account e.g. 300 QR 
instead of few rials, If we are then informed about the case we block the number. 
However, we might face a lot of legal issues, especially if the company is abroad and 
that is usually the case, and then the company might complain and take legal action 
since Qtel‟s action in blocking the number has consequences of financial losses and 
reduction of customers. 
 
There are two ways of attack, either single which is easy to block or the more 
complicated one, multiple attacks such as Botnet attacks resulting in DOS and therefore 
client discomfort. In this attack, multiple systems access a single website, frequently 
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causing overload to the server, but it appears as genuine action and it is hard to find a 
solution for such attack. 
 
The main problem we face now is from attackers from foreign countries who cannot be 
reached because there is no co-operative law with those countries and Qatar. Examples are 
Nigeria and China. Also from ipark since a lot of people access the Internet and perform 
their attacks where it is hard to know the identity of the attacker since it is available to 
the public and as users do not register for accessing the Internet, we cannot even know 
from the Mac address since it is not registered. Therefore there is no control over it and 
we suggest providing some kind of ID proof before accessing the Internet such as visa 
card, ID number, etc. However, the traffic of ipark is low (10%) since the weather is hot 
and not supporting, most who use the ipark are usually foreigners while most Qataris 
have got Internet access in their home and prefer not to access Internet in public places 
where they do not have privacy. 
How often does your organisation and clients receive phishing e-mails? Is its frequency 
increasing?       Are e-mail phishing incidents increasing in your organisation? 
I do not have specific statistics, but I think it is not increasing much since Qtel has 
applied a strategy to prevent phishing attacks.  
What is the number of successful phishing attacks? Is it increasing? 
We do not receive all phishing reports, some people refer to the Ministry of Interior or 
to their bank once they face such attack and in most cases we then get informed of the 
action and usually block the site and we can provide required information about the 
case.  
 
2.  Review of organisational strategy of defence against phishing 
What is your strategy to protect your organisation and clients from e-mail phishing 
attacks? Do you make a phishing penetration test to examine your employees‟ 
vulnerability to phishing? What actions does your organisation take once phishing 
frauds are encountered? And what actions do you take once attacked by phishing 
frauds? 
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Our strategy to protect Qtel from phishing attacks is based on applying effective 
hardware and software on the mail server, provide layers of protection and install spam 
filters and anti-viruses in to the employee‟s PC.  However, some new spams take time 
to be adapted to spams in the existed software and spam filters are not so intelligent to 
detect all possible phishing attacks since some appear legitimate, therefore comes the 
importance to make Qtel employees aware of possible threats and how to react.  
 
With regard to clients, usually we do not take any action until we receive a report of the 
incident from our client or get notices from Q-CERT or Ministry of Interior. And in that 
case we inspect the incident and then decide in co-operation with Q-CERT and the 
ministry whether block it. In general, anti-Islamic, political or sensitive websites are 
blocked immediately by Qtel according to a decision having been made only by the 
Ministry of Interior. We then inspect the IP address of the phishing website  If it is 
inside Qatar, it can be easily blocked from its webhost within hours, but if it outside 
Qatar we can block our clients from viewing it but we usually cannot block it from its 
web host. So anyone abroad can view the website unless there is cooperation with the 
webhost company on blocking the site and in most cases that is hard unless it is 
affecting their business and reputation. However, Q-CERT has cooperation with CERTs 
around the world which are responsible for avoiding e-crimes, therefore if the attack 
comes from abroad it contacts the CERT in that country which will take action and 
block the site, usually in days, but in some countries where there are no CERTs it is 
then hard to block the site, unless the web host company is co-operative.   
Do you cooperate with other organisations to take the case further (e.g. Q-CERT)? 
We cooperate with Q-CERT in a lot of matters, they inform us about any existing virus 
and we then try to control it at that time to avoid its spreading. Once we observe high 
traffic from any PC, in cooperation with Q-CERT we investigate the matter in case it 
might be an attack or denial of service, therefore we phone the person and inform him 
of the high traffic. Usually, most do not know as they may be controlled by a malicious 
code or virus which performs that action. We then ask them to follow certain steps to 
overcome the problem and this involves launching an automated web page portal with 
easy guidelines to follow, involving running a well known virus scan, spam filter or 
malware removing software which is usually 30-day trial. Usually people are 
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cooperative in such cases but if they are not we immediately block them from accessing 
the Internet or block their SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) until the 
problem is resolved.  
How do your employees and clients react to phishing attacks before and once they have 
been tricked?   
Yes, according to our organisation policies, employees have to call the incident 
management in case of such attacks having been encountered where incident 
management will then take action whether communicating with other parties or 
blocking,etc, as I mentioned earlier. 
Since you are the main telecommunication service provider in Qatar, do Qatari 
organisations and people refer to you to deal with phishing incidents? If yes, what 
action do you take once you receive such a request? 
Yes, once they refer to use we perform the same action as explained before. 
 
3.  Processes deployed for phishing awareness 
Does your organisation consider awareness of phishing important to defend itself from 
such attack? 
Yes, we have got a PR department which aims to make customers aware and educate 
them  on how to use the Internet safely. We do that by posting major attacks in the 
newspaper, sending SMS to all clients and we have some materials on our website that 
cover Internet usage policy. 
So then what process do you deploy to enhance your employees‟ and customers‟ 
awareness on phishing? How is it done? And what method of enhancing awareness do 
you deploy (e.g. e-learning, posters, seminars, newsletter, leaflets, etc.)? 
We provide awareness on phishing by newspaper and usually by sending SMS to all of 
our customers since it is a common channel to reach people and make them aware. We 
provide awareness when required, that is, when we experience an attack becoming more 
frequent and a lot of people fall in it, then we decide to make them aware.  However, Q-
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CERT focuses on enhancing public awareness on matters associated with technology.
   
Do you believe your employees and clients are well aware of the phishing threat? How 
to protect themselves? Do they know how to spot cases and how to react? 
No, more effort have to be made to enhance people‟s awareness. Some people become 
doubtful about SMS messages and e-mails, even legitimate ones from Qtel. We still 
receive calls asking for verification whether it is true or fake.  
4.  Interviewee opinions  
What do you think is the best method for creating awareness and educating people 
about e-mail phishing? 
SMS and media are the best method of awareness where you can reach people.   
Nowadays nearly all adults have got a mobile, sometimes even children, therefore it is 
better to use the technology to spread awareness.    
Why do you think Qatari employees and clients could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-
mail phishing attacks? 
In general, I think people with different backgrounds are vulnerable to phishing attacks. 
How do you think Qatari culture affects people‟s responses to phishing attacks? 
Yes, I do. Since phishers utilise Qatari‟s goodness and emotion by mentioning moral 
and emotional topics in the religion, there is need for help. In general, Qataris trust a 
phishing e-mail in Arabic more than in English since they understand it better, it 
presents its meaning perfectly and they might believe it since it is their native language. 
Still, we have not experienced an attack done inside Qatar, most of the time attackers 
come from abroad as it is part of Qatar culture where Qataris do not favour committing 
attacks and getting people harmed whereas this is common in some neighbouring 
countries such as Saudi Arabia.   
How aware do you think Qatari employees and clients are of the e-mail phishing threat? 
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Once we discover an attack that becomes common, such as the recent phishing SMS 
messages about winning a Hammer car, we then do make  our clients aware of such a 
threat, usually through SMS, e-mails. 
Do you believe country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development experience in 
Qatar in all sectors, especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence of an e-law, 
have assisted development of phishing in Qatar?  
Qatar is coming to the forefront in economics and ICT. The existence of Vodafone is 
beneficial for both customers since competition on prices and quality of service existed 
and for Qtel where it has reduced the load and cost. In general all e-crimes are not 
supported by the current law. I think there should be one which will support Qtel 
actions. Till now, we take our action and do blocking without a clear law to support our 
actions e.g. like blocking, therefore anyone can complain about us.  
Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes, in particular  
phishing?    
Yes, there is a strong need for an effective e-law. I have noticed that ICT is working on 
developing an e-law. 
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their advantages 
but also to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
Since Internet penetration is high in Qatar, therefore attackers are increasing their 
interest in Qatar. However, we can‟t stop the development or improvement. As a result, 
people went to a huge transition in technology without being aware enough of how to 
use the Internet in the right way and avoid attackers. 
Do you believe Qatari people are well aware of the phishing threat? How to protect 
themselves? How to spot threats and how to react? 
From my experience, I think people are still not aware enough of phishing. Most calls 
we receive from clients ask us to verify whether the e-mail they received is a phishing 
attack or not and few calls come after they have been phished. Most people do not even 
read the terms and conditions of website, privacy seals to ensure their protection, the 
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majority do not update their anti-virus if they have one and some run peer to peer 
applications where users will open port to attackers to access their computer.  
Interview 4 
Date of interview: 19
th
 August 2009 
Duration: About 2 hours 
Interviewees:             Three people from Q-CERT together: 
                             Mounir Kamal, Senior Incident Specialist, Incident Management, 
Q-CERT 
                             Omar Sherin, Analyst, Critical Infrastrusture Protection, Q-CERT 
                             Nora al-Abdulla, Public Awareness Manager, Q-CERT 
1.  Extent of e-mail phishing 
Is e-mail phishing the most frequent phishing attack you have experienced?  
Phishers usually study security awareness level of victims, e.g. what they like? (e.g. 
cars, shopping), what things attract them?. Once this is done, it might even remove any 
doubt or technical thinking on victims. Phishing has two parts: the technical part of it 
and the social engineering part where phishers try to study the community and the 
characteristic of victims, towards tricking them to attain their goal. In general, the 
majority of phishing is targeting the financial sector, especially banks. Most frequent 
phishing is by phone, SMS or e-mail which mostly target organisations in Qatar. 
Usually phishers exploit vulnerability within the website or the victim‟s PC (e.g. does 
not update software, does not have anti-virus, spam filter,etc.) for malware infection .  
We received two incidents last year with websites infected with malware inside Qatar 
which were then blocked. However, usually phishing attacks are from outside, e.g. 
Argentina and China. We have experienced a vishing attack stating that you have won a 
Hammer or that bad magic is being used against you. Although this seems unrealistic, in 
Qatar culture it is believable and some people have really fallen victim to such attack.  It 
was mentioned in newspapers, being common.   
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In ipark there are security threats associated, therefore we suggest having an 
authentication process. 
How often do your organisation and clients receive phishing e-mails? Is the frequency 
increasing? 
We do not have statistics, but we receive a lot, most are filtered by our spam filter but 
there are some that still who bypass it. 
Are e-mail phishing incidents increasing in your organisation? 
We do not have specific measurement, but I think it is decreasing since we provide 
adequate security measures.  
What is the number of successful phishing attacks? Is it increasing? 
As I mentioned, we don‟t  have records of number of victims.  
2.  Review of organisational strategy of defence against phishing 
What is your strategy to protect your organisation and clients from e-mail phishing 
attacks? Do you make a phishing penetration test to examine your employees‟ 
vulnerability to phishing? 
We use spam filters, firewalls and anti-viruses.  We are also registered with APWG 
(Anti-Phishing Working Group). They provide a feature which can check for phishing 
websites identical to your organisation and once this is discovered Q-CERT will try to 
block the site. If it is local we refer to Qtel and if it is abroad then we refer to the CERT 
in this country to block the site. However, there are no CERTs in some countries such 
as Nigeria. In that case the website can‟t be blocked in the absence of a law to 
criminalise such attacks. We also use open DNS solutions which will check if any 
website is infected. We are also carrying out a honey pot project, so we attract attackers 
to attack us and then we collect the statistics of number of attacks, where they are from, 
their IPs. We study the attacks and we send Qtel a summary report.  In case we discover 
an attack on targeted Qatar institutes or the public whether made inside or outside Qatar, 
we immediately contact Qtel to take action.    
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We can't conduct penetration test, since it is hard to do on a large scale, it requires 
authorisation, people might complain and there is concern also that phishers could use it 
to make their attack.  
What actions does your organisation take once phishing frauds are encountered? And 
what actions do you take once attacked by phishing frauds? 
We take the following steps: 
1.  Verify the incident, the incident management team work on investigating the attack 
to ensure that it is a real crime 
2  We report it, the incident management team work on investigating the attack.  
3.  Layers of protection. First we trace the IP address and then decide whether to block 
it or not and then take blocking action. Usually we block the source of attack (i.e. the 
site) locally in Qatar in cooperation with Qtel. This is done within hours. If the attack is 
from abroad, which is always the case, then we speak with CERT in the country were 
the phishing site is hosted asking them to block the siteand if there is no CERT we then 
contact the organisation hosting the phish site to block the website and in most cases 
they co-operate but sometimes they do not agree to block it. However, even if the site 
was blocked the phisher would launch another new site with no problem of DNS name 
since it is not appropriate business.  
Do you cooperate with other organisations to take the case further (e.g. Qtel)? 
As I mentioned, we co-operate usually with Qtel and now Vodafone and CERTs around 
the world. Ministry of Interior and CID might refer to us as we are an information 
security consultancy. Not all phishing attacks are reported to Q-CERT, most are not, 
especially in banks, as reputation is an important factor for most organisations.  
How do your employees and clients react to phishing attacks before and once they have 
been tricked?  
They report to incident management, then we carry out possible actions. 
Since you are dealing with e-crimes in Qatar, what is the procedure you are currently 
following when you receive a phishing incident? What actions do you take once 
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attacked by phishing frauds? And which organisations/institutes are you cooperating 
with to deal with such crimes? 
I have mentioned that before. 
Are you in the process of developing an e-law in Qatar to protect online users? What 
does the law involve? Which organisations are involved in the development of the e-
law? And when is it going to be established? 
Yes, the law has been set up already with co-operation in the development of the law 
with associated organisations such as Ministry of Interior, Prosecution, CID, Qtel and 
others. However, the law is not yet approved by higher authorities who might take a 
year. The new law covers almost all issues associated with Internet usage including 
topics such as misuse of devices, cyber crime, computer-related fraud and others. 
Although we are late in establishing e-law, it was beneficial, since we have learned from 
others‟ mistakes and experience in e-law.  
Does your organisation play a role in enhancing the awareness of Qatari society about 
the phishing threat?  
Yes, we try to develop an aware community with regard to ICT.   
4.  Processes deployed for phishing awareness 
Does your organisation consider awareness of phishing important to defend itself from 
such attack? 
Yes, we do. 
If yes, then what process do you deploy to enhance your employees‟ and customers‟ 
awareness on phishing? How is it carried out? And what method of enhancing 
awareness does you deploys (e.g. e-learning, posters, seminars, newsletter, leaflets, 
etc.)?    
Awareness is important, since people are the weakest link. We have once written a 
column in the newspaper about Internet crimes. All of our employees are expert in IT 
and are aware of such threat. However, we send them articles very often on various 
security topics to make them aware them of the latest protections, attacks around the 
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world. We provide in our website articles on the topics of security and cyber crimes for 
the benefit of public awareness.     
With regard to the public, ict QATAR is an operative member in the development of 
Child Online Protection Initiative with International Telecommunications Union (ITU). 
On Initiative for Telecommunications and Information Society Day, we conducted an 
awareness workshop to protect Qatar‟s children against cyber crime. We cooperated 
with the Supreme Education Council (SEC) and private schools in Qatar to conduct a 
workshop in Arabic and English. During the workshop children were asked to draw a 
picture describing cyber crime. We found the drawings varied: some were negative 
scary picture and others were positive, some even  provided some guidelines and others 
not, but all this has given us a clue of the level of awareness of children on this matter.  
Currently, we are developing an awareness campaign called K2-12 Cyber Safety 
Curriculum for schools in cooperation with SEC, the Council of Family Affairs and 
ITU. It aims to address the gap between the heavy use of technology in schools and the 
knowledge of how to use it safely. It covers the topics of Cyber Community 
Citizenship, Online Personal Safety, Cyber Predator Identification, Cyber Security and 
Intellectual property. 
However, although awareness is our main concern, there is a budget issue and a need 
for co-operation with other organisations. The K2-12 curriculum is going to be paper-
based, with some articles and maybe cartoons since our target is children and we would 
like to attract them. But posters, leaflets and advertisements are not our consideration, 
since it would require an effort and enough budget. The idea of the game is interesting  
but we do not have enough knowledge on how to build such a game. In general, all of 
the above tools mentioned are nice to have towards achieving an effective and 
interesting awareness; nevertheless, it might be done in the future when resources are 
available. 
Do you believe your employees and clients are well aware of the phishing threat? How 
to protect themselves? Do they know how to spot cases and how to react? 
Phishing could trick even expert people and we fall victim to such attack, Nora went to 
an Islamic website containing Holy Quran software but once she downloaded it, her e-
mail had been stolen. Omar also faced an attack when a phisher stole his father‟s e-mail 
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account and sent him an e-mail pretending to be his father requesting an amount of 
money. Even expert people do not check the security certificate of the site each time or 
even the URL since it looks almost identical but there is a difference of a dot or a letter. 
In security, everything could be faked, even the SSL and the security certificate. Also 
there is a tool which will remove the address bar in the browser and insert a new bar 
with the legitimate address, which happens in seconds, where victims can‟t recognise it, 
leading  the victims to feel that the site is legitimate since the URL is true.          
5.  Interviewee opinions 
What do you think is the best method for creating awareness and educating people 
about e-mail phishing? 
I think it is the media through TV programmes, posters, cartoons and articles published 
in Qatar newspapers. Media is the common means for reaching a high proportion of 
people. I might suggest as well the SMS since it becomes more common now for 
organisations to send advertisements in SMS. However, there might be an issue that 
Qtel might not provide its clients‟ mobile numbers to protect customer privacy. I think 
media are the best. But if you are targeting children then it is better to visit schools and 
conduct a seminar on security.  Your idea of educating and enhancing awareness 
through a game would also be a good idea to try and see children‟s reaction. I think they 
would like it and learn from it better than the seminar, since it is interesting tool of 
learning which children would prefer. 
Why do you think Qatari employees and clients could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-
mail phishing attacks? 
Yes, as I mentioned, anyone can be vulnerable to such attack, irrespective of their 
background,  even experts in security are vulnerable. 
How do you think Qatari culture affects people‟s responses to phishing attacks? 
I think Qatar is a trusted environment, people feel they are safe and therefore this might 
reflect that they would fall in a phishing attack. 
How aware do you think Qatari employees and clients are of e-mail phishing threat? 
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It is difficult to say how aware people are, it is a conflict to discover since it is hard to 
measure security awareness. 
Do you believe country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development experience in 
Qatar in all sectors, especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence of an e-law, 
have assisted development of phishing in Qatar?  
There is no law in Qatar which prevents phishing attacks which make phishing hard to 
control.  
Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes, in particular 
phishing?    
Yes, of course the law will help to establish a framework and legislation to criminalise 
attacks and support our actions of blocking and other organisation such as Qtel. I think 
attackers will be reduced since there will be an e-law to criminalise them. 
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their advantages 
but also to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
Yes, I think there should be work done to enhance the security awareness of the 
community and this is our role. I think this would take a time where people will absorb 
the technology and how to use it effectively and safely. 
Interview 5 
Date of interview: 21
st
 August 2009 
Duration: Approximately 45 min  
Interviewee: Abdullah Al-Malki, Head of Prosecution, Ministry of Public Prosecution 
1.  Extent of e-mail phishing 
Is phishing the most frequent attack you have experienced?  
Yes, this phenomenon began to appear since 2004, since then it has been raised. 
Criminal intention has extended from stolen victim's money, personal/confidential 
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information into exploiting victims in their implementation of the crimes and to 
blackmail or exploiting it for political and terrorist intentions 
What is the number of successful phishing attacks? Is it increasing? 
I don't have a figure  
2.  Review of organisational approach to phishing attacks  
What is your strategy to protect the society from e-mail phishing attacks? 
We are trying to limit them by:  
1. Awareness  
2. Enactment of laws that criminalize this phenomenon  
3. Cooperation with other countries and competent authorities such as ICT and Ministry 
of Interior.  
4.  Trying to fight this phenomenon by participate in relevant conferences to find out the 
latest information and exchange views and experiences  
5. Get aid from companies specialised in the Information security to consult in that 
matter 
What actions do you take once you receive a case of e-mail phishing? 
When we receive a complaint, we send it to justice after a preliminary investigation 
with the assistance of the technical department and then we follow the procedure for the 
issue. 
What problems do you face in e-crimes and, in particular, phishing crimes? 
Since this type of crime is directed at modern banking and financial centres, in the belief 
of maintaining their reputation, they don't report these incidents. We require banks to 
change and increase their security measures and to report any case to the Central Bank 
and, in turns, they will inform us of the case. Also we sensitise and make them aware 
that failure to cooperate with us might have negative results on the economy of the 
country. 
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Victims prefer to keep private the damage that occurred to them from such attacks to 
avoid embarrassment and ridicule and most are unaware of the right measures to take or 
reactions at the crisis time to minimise the possible damage 
We face problems in making people aware of such threat, since we found that through 
enhancing citizen's awareness on such cases, their confidence has begun to decline. 
Also we find difficulty in proving the guilt of the offender since it is usually difficult to 
trace phishers who are most likely to get lost, usually they are from abroad where it is 
difficult to get hold of them and sometimes they use their victim's devices or names to 
commit their crimes. Also we find difficulties on understanding the terms associated 
with e-crimes and on how to deal with them and take the fair decision therefore, we 
usually rely on the ministry of interior investigation report provided to us. 
Does your organisation consider awareness of phishing as an important method of 
defence? 
Yes, because most of the cases are the result of ignorance or willingness to help. Most 
cases can use religious scruples, moral or humanitarian principles to deceive people.  
We cooperate with all competent authorities to educate the community towards limiting 
this phenomenon 
What do you think is the best method for creating awareness and educating people 
about e-mail phishing? 
The media  
3.  Interviewee opinions 
How do you think Qatari culture affects people's responses to phishing attacks? 
Of course, Qatari societies are religious, tribal and modernisation is new for them. Also 
they are not practising these new developments, especially in technology, which 
increasesthe vulnerability to such threats. 
Do you think organisations are allowed to perform a phishing penetration test to 
examine their employees' vulnerability to phishing?  
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Yes, it would be legal only if employees have signed in their employment contract that 
they agreed to have such auditing but there are ethical issues that should be taken into 
consideration where employees should have their privacy.  
Do you think Qataris are vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail phishing attacks? and why? 
Yes, as I mentioned, because Qataris are generous and helpful and phishers try to use 
that to commit their attacks.  
Do you believe country-specific factors such as (1) the vast development experience in 
Qatar in all sectors, especially the economy and ICT, and (2) the absence of an e-law, 
have assisted development of phishing in Qatar?  
Yes, because there is currently an economic turnover, making Qatar an appealing goal 
to phishers and there is a massive development in communications which led to the 
increase in the number of Internet users who mostly have novice knowledge and usually 
use it for entertainment and are therefore unaware of the threats and risks associated.  
 
Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes, in particular 
phishing?    
There is no special law on cyber-crimes to be consulted in such cases; however, the 
current law included some of these crimes. The law is not up to date; it was not 
modified since it was released in 2004 to include the recent and emerging issues of 
cyber-crimes. 
Therefore, we created a new law specialist in electronic crimes in collaboration with all 
relevant bodies seeking access to a comprehensive law that covers all aspects, taking in 
the experiences of other countries in this area and it is developed to suit with the current 
and future developments.  
I think this law will protect victims and help us to take power, there is a common 
saying, “When there is no punishment, people get awful ill-mannered”. 
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their advantages 
but also to be aware of the threats associated with them? 
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Qatar is a rich country, and like other developing countries, it is developing and in a 
stage of conflict to keep up with modernity and modern technology. Therefore the 
community needs time to absorb this technology with its advantages and disadvantages   
How aware do you think Qatari people are of the phishing threat? How to protect 
themselves? How to spot threats and how to react?  
No, I think people are not sufficiently aware because there must be a comprehensive 
awareness from banks, financial institutions and the people. 
 
 
Interview 6 
Date of interview: 24
th
 August 2009 
Duration: Approximately 20 minutes  
Interviewee: Dr.Khalifa Jassim Al-Kuwari, Voluntary Administrator, Ministry of 
Endowments and Islamic Affairs 
1.  Use by phishers of religious, emotional and moral issues 
Phishers exploit victims‟ emotions, morals and religion to commit their crimes. Why do 
you think this is successful in Qatar?   
Because it is part of Qatar culture that people are generous and helpful, especially when it 
touches their emotions, ethic and morals, which phishers could use to get victims. 
Should your Ministry make people aware of such a threat? What effect would this have 
on people (e.g. they may not trust others, become unhelpful)?  
We have established a license for some charities and Red Crescent Societies to collect 
charity and Zakat from individuals and institutions and send to beneficiaries after 
checking a lot of things such as ensuring their dissociation from terrorist organisations 
and their non-exploitation against the security of the countries. Also, we have assigned 
delegates in many countries in the world to verify the arrival of these funds to eligible 
applicants. 
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Are there some people who refer to you once they have been tricked by phishing? And 
what do you advise them?  
Yes, we receive a lot of calls saying that they receive messages or calls from a person or 
an institute requesting funds for charities and they ask us to ensure whether it is 
legitimate or accredited. We therefore direct them to deposit their charities with us and 
we will check whether if they are eligible applicants and then we provide them with the 
money. We also make  people aware to donate for accredited institutions and 
individuals only. 
Unfortunately, enhanced awareness on the topic could result in negative impact on those 
in need, since it will create a kind of lack of confidence in any message received, even if 
it was correct. Furthermore, people becomes doubtful  in urgent humanitarian cases, 
such as the need for blood donation and disasters donations   
Have you experienced such cases of attack in Qatar? 
Yes, we have experienced a lot of suspicious charity centres which we then try to close 
if possible.  
 
Interview 7 
Date of interview: 25
th
 August 2009 
Duration: Approximately 30 minutes  
Interviewee: Director of one of the high schools in Qatar, Ministry of Education and 
Higher Education 
1.  Best process for education and awareness 
What do you think is the best method for awareness and educating people?  
It depends on their age. For example, children prefer games and indirect ways of 
learning, while adults might prefer media and some do prefer seminars and distant 
learning (e-learning). 
Does people‟s background play a big role in awareness?  
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Yes, as I mentioned before. 
What are the best conditions for increasing awareness? How to get people interested, 
especially in such topics?  
First, the awareness has to be well planned with a clear aim and objectives.  The place 
should be appropriate and include all of the required tools and it would be preferred if 
the awareness tools are interactive and interesting to keep people engrossed (e.g. avoid 
formal interaction, add some fun to the training by having some jokes, related stories 
and keep everything simple and related to something they are familiar with to help them 
to remember). Finally, it would be beneficial to provide a certificate of approval to 
recruit them.   
How to assess the awareness programme? 
It is not easy to assess, but personal observations, simple test, well designed 
questionnaires and interviews with participants might help a lot in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the programme in enhancing their awareness level.   
How to get people to remember what they learned?  
Either by having a tool to get people to remember the principles or by demonstrating 
them in a simple diagram presented by pictures. However, some will remember things if 
they have been encountered or if they are repeated to them on a daily basis such as 
having them on their screen savers, so it depend on the personality of each participant. 
However, a lot of research has been done in this area, so it is better to have a look at it. 
2  Processes deployed for phishing awareness 
Does your organisation play a role in educating people about cyber threats, in particular 
e-mail phishing? If no, do you want to do so? 
No, we actually think awareness of phishing should not be involved in the curriculum, 
since it is contrary to the values and principles that we try to install in our students such 
as trust and kindness. Therefore, we are studying this subject and trying to make 
students aware far from the curriculum by collaborating with organisations with 
responsibility in this field such as the Ministry of Interior and ICT.  
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3.  Interviewee opinions  
If no, do you think it is important to have some material about such threats in academic 
institutions to make students aware? 
Yes, of course. Students have to know the threats of the Internet. 
Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years in order to understand not only their advantages 
but also to be aware of the threats associated with such technology? 
Yes, I do. 
 
Interview 8 
Date of interview: 27
th
 August 2009 
Duration: approximately 15 minutes  
Interviewee: Computer lecturer, Institute of Administrative Development 
I went to the Institute of Administrative Development since I thought it is responsible 
for staff development in Qatar and met one of the computer lecturers who asked me to 
not mention his name.  He explained that the institute aims to develop the capacity of 
employees in topics such as time management and how to use the computer desktop and 
things like secretarial skills.  When questioned why they  do not involve awareness on 
e-crimes in general, he replied that employers are the ones who have to include such 
training not the Institute, since its main objective is to develop employees in Qatar with 
high school education to raise their operation in computer and secretarial work  but then 
it had been circulated to some employees.  
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Interview 9  
The author was interested in interviewing an organisation which does phishing audits 
for other organisations. However, there was no such organisation in Qatar. Finally, a 
UK company, First Base Technologies, was discovered which is a leader in providing 
information security and testing services. It also does social engineering audit for 
organisations. Mr. Peter Wood, Chief of Operations, First Base Technologies, was 
interviewed by a structured questionnaire sent by e-mail due to the author's inability to 
arrange a face-to-face interview. The following are print screens of communications 
with the company:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
351 
 
Note:        You may choose one answer only         You may choose more than one answer 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q1: What is your level of knowledge about e-mail phishing (also called scams or fraud e-
mails)?  
     None        Poor          Average         Good     X    Expert   
Q2: Do you think e-mail phishing incidents are? 
     Increasing      X    Decreasing             Stable            Don‟t know 
Q3: Do you worry about e-mail phishing?  
 X   Yes           No      
Q4: Do you think e-mail phishing is still hard to protect against?  
 X  Yes, please specify why       User ignorance and laziness 
No, please specify why     
Don‟t know 
Q5: Why do you think people are vulnerable to being deceived by phishing e-mails? 
 X   They don‟t install a software to 
prevent phishing e-mails and websites (e.g. 
anti-phishing, spam filters)  
 X   Phishers are coming up with smarter 
tricks which make it difficult to identify 
phishing 
 X   The fake website looks almost 
identical to the legitimate one 
      Some people believe that they won‟t be 
tricked 
      The e-mail appears with sense of urgency and surprise  
 X   Lack of awareness and training about phishing 
 X   They trust the e-mail because they don‟t know about phishing 
They are not aware of the importance of the information they 
have disclosed 
Other 
Q6: How do you rank your organisation in identifying phishing e-mails?  
    Zero         Poor         Average          Good     X  Expert 
Q7: How do you find the demand for anti-phishing services by clients has been? 
    Increasing          Decreasing          Same   X  Don‟t know 
Q8: Does your organisation keep statistics on detected / intercepted phishing e-mails? 
   Yes      X    No 
Q9: How often does your organisation receive phishing e-mails? 
X    Daily         Weekly         Monthly           Never           Others            
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We have never been tricked; however all 
of the above are good practice 
If you answer Q9  Never, then please skip Q10 and Q11. 
Q10: How many times has your organisation been attacked with phishing e-mails?  
X    Never        Once          Twice        3 times           More than 3 times           Don‟t know 
Q11: How does your organisation spot phishing e-mails? 
User education on best practice, personal firewalls. 
Q12: What is your procedure for client anti-phishing services (i.e. Your methodology to 
prevent phishing)? 
We are purely penetration testers, so we do not provide this service. However, we do offer social 
engineering services to test for susceptibility to phishing. 
Q13: What services does your organisation provide for clients to develop defences against e-
mail phishing? 
 Install effective spam filter or anti-phishing software 
 Define clear and reasonable security policies and guidelines addressing phishing (e.g. Don‟t give 
your password through e-mail, check web address, etc.) 
 X     Explain guidelines and policies to employees  
         Make clients aware and educate them about phishing. 
 X     Carry out penetration test (i.e. A fake, non-harmful phishing e-mail will be sent to employees, only 
to educate employees and to measure their response to phishing e-mails). Please specify how it is done.  
         Develop  incident management process to report phishing incidents and respond to them. Please 
specify how it is performed  
          Develop effective measurement process to measure organisation‟s vulnerability to phishing attacks. 
Please specify how it is done  
         Others, please specify  
Q14: Which of the following methods does your organisation offer your clients to deploy in 
awareness and training against e-mail phishing? 
     Computer-based game    X  Videos         Cartoons       Posters       Web-based e-learning        Media     
X  Seminars         Newsletters and documents        Screen savers        Others 
Q15: Which of the following actions does your organisation take when tricked by a phishing 
e-mail? 
Do nothing    
Report incident to company whose e-mail 
address or Web site was faked. 
Report incident to police or institute specialising 
in dealing with these cases.  
Report incident to our bank       
       Change account details revealed 
Check financial statements immediately 
Cut up credit and debit cards 
 X    Others   
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Q16: What action does your organisation take for clients when they have encountered or 
have been attacked by phishing frauds? 
Provide advice and refer to best practice. 
Q17: What is your best practice for phishing that you mention in the survey? Is it standard 
policies and guidelines or is it defined by your company? 
  
 Our best practice is simple: 
 1. Never click on a link in an e-mail, but instead browse to the site manually 
 2. If in doubt, check e-mail message headers 
 3. Turn on anti-phishing function in Firefox (or Internet Explorer if you use it) 
 4. Always run Firefox with NoScript plug in (we don't permit our people to use IE) 
  
 Q18: How do you educate or train your clients on these practices? 
 Face-to-face seminars and podcasts with presentation slides. We also use articles in their in-
house publications and on their intranet (see attached example). 
  
Q19: How long does the training take? 
  About 1 hour for live session, about 20 minutes  for  podcast 
Q20: Do you set up different training for different departments,  e.g. for IT staff, other 
employees? 
  So far, we have trained only IT staff 
 Q21: How do you set up the training? Is it after the penetration testing or before? 
 This is not connected to penetration testing, but is part of the security awareness training 
programmes 
 Q22: Do you carry out auditing after the training to see whether the clients are still aware of 
phishing or not? 
  No, that is their responsibility in all projects so far. 
 Q23: How do you motivate employees to attend the training? Bearing in mind that not all 
employees are interested to know about phishing?  
 That is also the client's problem! 
Q24: About yourself: 
 
A. Country 
 
 
B. Occupation 
Your employer      
Your job title         
 
 
 
If you would like to find out more about the topic, please do not hesitate to contact me: Mariam Al-
Hamar, research student (PhD), Loughborough University, UK. My email: m.k.j.al-hamar@lboro.ac.uk  
UK 
First Base Technologies 
Partner, Chief of Operations 
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Appendix C: Penetration Tests and Laboratory Experiment 
C1 Penetration test 1 
 Planning 
The researcher first obtained approval from AAB for conducting the experiment in their premises 
but with a condition that it would be run under their control (see letter below).  
 
A team of IT personnel in AAB were then involved in the planning of the three phishing e-mails for 
the study which were agreed as follows:  
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E-mail 1:  Request account verification 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-mail 2: Request to download attachment   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-mail 3: Request private information via e-mail or SMS. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-mail message 
Through informal message on the topic of topic ‘human cloning’, the message 
uses people’s emotions, sense of urgency and morality to trick employees to 
reveal their private information (such as name, country).  
 
Request to reveal private information by using a given phone 
number or an e-mail address which reflects the message title.  
 AAB logo 
Direct employees to URL to verify their information. The URL will lead employees to a fake 
web mail log-in page, similar to AAB web mail. URL should hide the fake URL. 
Body of message 
Through official message, request employees to verify their e-mail account details to avoid 
terminating them, the message looks official and expresses sense of urgency and intimidation. 
 
Salutation or greeting  
Ending with official valediction  
Copyright and ensure confidentiality of information disclosed 
 
 
 
Attachment 
Contains images of 2010Toyota cars. Author should be able to count the 
number of people who download the attachment 
E-mail message 
Through informal message use attractive and exciting words to trick employees to 
download an attachment of their interest (e.g. latest Toyota car). 
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 Designing 
E-mail 1: Request account verification 
Theoretical design of fake webpage: 
The following diagram illustrates the process of AAB fake webmail:  
 
 
 
The webpage is implemented in Macromedia Dreamweaver 8. MySQL was used to store 
employees’ account details (username and password) and PHP was used as middleware to 
process these data. The main reason for choosing PHP is that it is open source software and 
is widely used and supported by internet service providers. MySQL was chosen because it 
supports multi-user connections, it is open source, compatible with PHP and widely 
supported by ISPs.  
WAMP Server is installed on the administrator PC; it consists of PHP, MySQL and Apache 
Server. This allows running the developed webpage on one machine without the need to 
upload files to a remote server for testing purposes. 
 
Database Design 
 
The MySQL database file (login) keeps records of employees’ login details, the table below 
shows the fields contained in the login database table: 
 
ID  int (integer), unique and auto-incremented.  
Username Employee username - a character. 
Password Employee password - a character. 
Date/time Date and the time of swiping the card, in 
0000-00-00 00:00:00 format. 
 
Basically, the ID gets increased by a factor of (1) each time any data are entered or 
recorded, so in this case each entry has its own ID to make it easy to deal with each entry 
individually as well as allowing the database to distinguish between various entries. 
Employee username, password and  date and time will be recorded automatically when the 
employee logs in.  
 
 
Type 
username and 
password 
 
Process  
Store (username 
& password) in 
database  
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PHP design  
 
After the database was planned and structured, the PHP design was developed. Macromedia 
Dreamweaver was used as a tool in the designing of the webpage and generating the 
appropriate PHP codes for different tasks. In the following sections, the folders will be 
explained with all codes and screen shots that will visualise the project. 
Below is the PHP source code for the fake webpage:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fake webpage will count the number of visitors using Google analytics tool, a free tool 
which enables the website owners to monitor their website traffic (see Figure below). This 
was done simply by adding a simple code provided by Google analytic to the end of the 
HTML body, so that all website visitors will be recorded in Google analytics. This was 
beneficial since the author can know the number of employees who enter the website but do 
not verify their account information. The fake website was hosted in the free webhosting 
website ‘http://www.000webhost.com/’. According to Google analytics, 49 employees 
entered the fake website; however, according to the results provided from the AAB team 
only 19 of them verified their account information 
<?php 
$host="mysql9.000webhost.com"; // Host name 
$username="a7836896_moi"; // Mysql username 
$password="Alhamar6"; // Mysql password 
$db_name="a7836896_moi"; // Database name 
$tbl_name="guestbook"; // Table name 
// Connect to server and select database. 
mysql_connect("$host", "$username", "$password")or die("cannot 
connect server "); 
mysql_select_db("$db_name")or die("cannot select DB"); 
$datetime=date("y-m-d h:i:s"); //date time 
$username=$_POST["login_userid"]; 
$password=$_POST["login_password"]; 
$sql="INSERT INTO $tbl_name(name, email, 
datetime)VALUES('$username', '$password','$datetime')"; 
$result=mysql_query($sql); 
//check if query successful 
if($result){ 
echo "Successful"; 
echo "<BR>"; 
} 
else { 
echo "ERROR"; 
} 
mysql_close(); 
?> 
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E-mail 2: Request to download attachment 
This e-mail seeks to trick AAB employees to download an attachment of interest which is 
‘Latest Toyota car’, containing images of 210 Toyota cars. 
It was important that the author should know the number of employees who failed in the 
attack and downloaded the attachment; therefore to know the latter number, the author 
designed a HTML file with a simple code to redirect users automatically to a website 
containing pictures of Toyota cars and also a counter using Google analytics tool to count 
the number of visitors to the site. According to the Google analytic tool, in total 33 
employees fell prey to the e-mail by downloading the attachment (see figure below).     
The redirecting code was the following:  
<meta HTTP-EQUIV="REFRESH" content="0; www.mail-
aabqatar.comxa.com/webmail/toyota.html"> 
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where 0 is the number of seconds’ wait before redirecting. Set to 0, it redirects straightaway 
to the URL www.mail-aabqatar.comxa.com/webmail/toyota.html. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-mail 3: Request private information via e-mail or SMS 
This e-mail was easy to design and the author wrote a message which tried to trick people 
to provide their private information (name and country) via e-mail or SMS by playing on 
people’s morality and emotions. The decision was to write a message about ‘human 
cloning’, trying to convince people to support a petition against human cloning by 
providing their private information. It was expected that this would trick people since 
human cloning is unacceptable on humanitarian, ethical and social grounds and people 
might thus think that giving their information will save humanity (see Figure below). Note: 
The website contain counter  
Attachment redirecting to URL below 
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the phone number supplied in e-mail 3 was changed by AAB to another mobile number in 
Qatar where they have more control.   
 
C2 Penetration test 2  
 Planning and design 
Participants’ characteristics and interests 
Members of the researcher’s family and relatives were chosen to be victims of the spear 
phishing experiments; they were carefully chosen to represent a sample of Qatari e-mail 
users. Participants were half male and half female, each with different backgrounds in 
terms of age, education, occupation and computer knowledge. To ensure participants' 
privacy, names were identified by their initials (i.e. First and surname). 
Age: 6 are below 18, 19 are 18-29, 3 are 30-50 and 2 are over 50 
Education: 15 school, 12 higher education, 3 postgraduate education 
Occupation: 16 students, 7 employees, 4 are both employees and students, 7 others (e.g. 
retired or housewife) and 2 businessmen. 
Computer knowledge based on author's judgement: 8 poor, 8 average, 7 good and 7 with 
expert knowledge  
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No. Participant 
initials 
Computer 
knowledge 
Age Education Occupation 
1 A K 1 Poor 15 School Student 
2 Y K Poor 14 School Student 
3 J A Poor 14 School Student 
4 F S Poor 51 School Housewife 
5 S A Poor 20 School Housewife 
6 K J Poor 53 Higher education Retired 
7 I A Poor 14 School Student 
8 H A Poor 14 School Student 
9 S Y Average 19 Higher education Student 
10 S O Average 20 Higher education Student 
11 T A Average 27 School Employee 
12 A K 2 Average 20 Higher education Employee/  student 
13 M A 1 Average 16 School Student 
14 M H Average 18 Higher education Student 
15 M A 2 Average 42 Higher education Retired 
16 A J 1 Average 37 Higher education Employee 
17 F M Good 18 School Student 
18 N J Good 39 School Housewife 
19 M A 3 Good 19 Higher education Student 
20 N A 1  Good 19 School Student 
21 N M Good 26 School Employee 
22 M Z Good 23 School Housewife 
23 A J 2 Good 27 Higher education Employee/  
businessman 
24 A K 3 Expert 26 Postgrad Employee 
25 J K Expert 23 Postgrad Employee/  student 
26 N K Expert 27 Higher education Employee 
27 H J Expert 26 Higher education Employee 
28 N A 2 Expert 19 School Employee/  student 
29 A Z Expert 25 Postgrad Employee/  student 
30 A J 3 Expert 25 Higher education Retired/ business 
man 
 
Before designing phishing e-mails, the interests of each victim were identified, this 
knowledge was gained from the long relationship of the victim with the researcher since 
they are members of her family and relatives. 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
362 
 
No. Interests 
1 Games and downloading Arabic movies and series  
2 Mobiles and motor cycles 
3 Photography and chatting 
4 Cooking recipes and interior design  
5 Games and watch TV channels online 
6 Reading newspapers and buy/sell in Qatar share market 
7 Cars and Motorcycles and looking for friendships online 
8 Chatting and watching movies in Youtube 
9 Downloading English scary movies and look for makeup and hair styles. 
10 Look for strange things such as furniture and dresses and register in forums and read 
articles on cooking and decorating 
11 Photography and buying dresses and things from forums 
12 Cars, chatting  and horoscopes  
13 Downloading Arabic movies and shopping 
14 Downloading Arabic movies and listen to music 
15 Reading religious articles and paying Zakat online 
16 Watch short videos in  YouTube and chatting 
17 Register in forums, read articles on cooking and decorating and looking for new 
designs of Jewelleries and accessories  
18 Buying brand-name bags (e.g. GUCCI) and looking at new styles of furniture 
19 Use the Facebook and look for dressing, make-up and hair styles. 
20 Learning English and computer online and reading stories and books  
21 Cake decorating Religious articles 
22 Handcrafts and cooking 
23 Buy and sell shares online and read articles about shares and business in Qatar 
24 Looking for affordable hotels and ticket offers and listen to and download music 
25 Reading topics on computing and downloading new programs and applications 
26 Reading articles on computing and downloading movies 
27 Games and follow-up artists’ news 
28 Drawing and handcrafts 
29 Cars and follow-up sports news 
30 Read newspapers, political articles and books and follow-up economic news 
 
Phishing e-mails were based on victims’ interests. Although it was hard to use each interest 
for each victim, only one interest was chosen, unique and not common to other victims 
towards having a broadened experiment study where e-mail phishing was designed for each 
victim by using just one of their interests to assess their vulnerably to falling prey to 
phishing attacks. Table     shows interest used for each victim along with the subject and the 
language of the designed phishing e-mail. 
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Design of Spear phishing attack 
No
. 
Interest used Spear phishing e-mail 
Language used 
1 Downloading Arabic 
movies and series  
Free and fast downloading for Arabic TV series of high quality.  
(Do you want to watch the latest Arabic TV series? Then register in 
the website below to enjoy free and fast downloading with high 
quality.Don't miss out) 
2 Motor cycles Cheap prices of latest Motor cycles to enjoy summer 
(Do you want to enjoy summer with your friends and family in 
sealine? Here are cheap motor cycles to rent long term. For more 
information contact this number. 
3 Photography and 
visiting Flickr 
website 
The best 10 chosen pictures on flickr  
(don't miss to see the best 10 chosen pictures on flickr by flicker 
website, pictured are in the attached file above) 
4 Cooking recipes  New food recipes for the family in Ramadan 
(You want to be different this Ramadan, you want to make 
something new, visit the following website for new healthy food 
recipes for your family this Ramadan) 
5 Games Assess your intelligence, play the most intelligent game in the world 
for free (Aisha has invited you to play this game to assess your 
intelligence, she have scored 620, can you beat this score, then go 
on to play this most intelligent game in the world. It's free) 
6 Reading news papers We can deliver for you ‘Al-Sharq’ news papers to your home daily 
for only 200 QR per year. Don’t miss out this offer it is limited  
7 Looking for 
friendships online 
(Sarah has invited you to see her new pictures on her Facebook 
account) 
8 Watching movies in 
Youtube 
Look at the most viewed movies in Youtube 
9 Look for makeup 
and hair styles. 
Are you stylish? Do you want to be a beauty expert?   
You have the chance to be one now by just joining our beauty 
course for free. It will guide you step by step.   
10 Register in forums 
and read articles on 
cooking and 
decorating 
You can find a wonderful and unique home decorating just join 
"Aldecor" forum and you will receive a free magazine 
11 Buying dresses and 
things from forums 
There are new collections of fabulous dresses for Eid which will 
make you special.  
12 Cars   You can win a Lexus car for free, you just have to join the big raffle 
which will be held after Ramadan. To join fill in your details in the 
attached file and forward it to us. 
13 Shopping online for 
dress and bags 
Does it cost you a lot to buy luxury  and branded clothes 
You can get one for cheap prices. Click on this URL. 
14 Listen and download For all those who love the singer Yara, here is her new video clip.  
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15 Paying Zakat online Zakat al-Fitr is a duty which is required of every Muslim at the 
conclusion of the month of Ramadan as a token of thankfulness to 
God for having enabled him or her to observe the obligatory fast. 
You can pay your ‘Zakat Al-Fetr’ online with few clicks.  
God bless you all 
16 Chatting Do you want to know the one who blocks you in MSN. 
It's Easy, Secure and Free! 
Try it Now, Click Here 
17 Looking for new 
designs of 
jewelleries and 
accessories  
For every woman who loves Jewelleries and would like to be 
always special and attractive. 
‘Damas’ offers you new collection of Jewelleries for Eid.  
18 Buying brand bags 
(e.g. GUCCI) 
It is amazing, look at the branded bags below, 
They are actually cakes. 
19 Horoscopes  Do you believe in Horoscopes? 
You can receive your daily Horoscopes for free. Just join into this 
website. 
20 Reading stories and 
books  
Here are 2 English novels to help you learn the language 
Undercover White Trash 
The Mars Run 
Download and see how interesting they are. 
21 Religious articles Every Muslim has wundered how to spend his time in Ramadan? 
It is actually easy, just read this article  
'How to invest your time in Ramadan' 
22 Hand crafts Look  at the fantastic collection of wrapping for weddings and 
births celebrations.  
23 Read articles about 
shares and business 
in Qatar 
Are you a business man and worried about your state in the market 
after the world financial crises? 
The article below forecasts the status of Qatar share market after the 
world financial crises.  
24 Looking for 
affordable hotels and 
ticket offers 
Don’t miss out, 35% discount for Intercontinental hotels this month. 
Don't miss out on this bargain.  
25 Downloading new 
programs and 
applications 
New programs released by Microsoft.  
26 Read articles on 
computing 
The latest release of windows. Watch out for hot news on 
computing on [www.computing.com]. You can join for free. 
27 Follow-up on 
Artists’ news 
The latest news of artists in this season. 
28 Drawing Sign up for the coming Arabic drawing exhibition. 
29 Follow-up sport 
news  
Do you want to be up to date with sport events in the world?  Here 
is an electronic version for the Al-Reyada sport magazine.  
30 Follow-up to Economics are changing in 2010. To read more, visit this website.   
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economic news 
 
All were in Arabic except for 4 participants: NA 1, AK 3, JK and NK since their level of 
English is pretty high and the topic needed to be in English. 
 Evaluation 
Interview questions 
Evaluation was done after the experiment by holding semi-structured interviews with 
participants, according to their responses to the experiment, based on the following 
questions: 
Do you usually open e-mails from unknown senders and in the junk?  
Do you think it is a phishing e-mail? If yes or no, explain why? 
Do you install anti-viruses or spam filters?  
Do you know what phishing is? 
If you fell prey to the e-mail: 
What made you get tricked by this e-mail?  
If he/she did not fall prey to the e-mail: 
Did you open the e-mail? If no, why? 
Why didn't you get tricked?  
 
Examples of interviews 
Example 1  
Do you usually open e-mails from unknown senders and in the junk?  
Yes, I do 
Do you think it is a phishing e-mail? If yes or no, explain why? 
Yes, because I have been tricked with phishing before so I have an experience 
Do you install anti-viruses or spam filters?  
Yes, I install anti-viruses but I don’t know anything about spam filters 
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Do you know what phishing is? 
Yes, it will attempt to steal my confidential information such as username and password  
Example 2 
Do you usually open e-mails from unknown senders and in the junk? 
Yes, sometimes  
Do you think it is a phishing e-mail? If yes or no, explain why? 
No, because I did not know about phishing 
 
Do you install anti-viruses or spam filters?  
No, I don’t install any of those 
Do you know what phishing is? 
No 
If he/she fell prey to the e-mail: 
What made you get tricked by this e-mail? 
As I mentioned, I did not know about phishing since I have recently got my e-mail. 
 
 
 Summary of experiment findings 
 
o 17 out of 30 participants have been tricked by phishing e-mails 
o 21 out of 30 did not know the term phishing. 
o 18 out of 30 open e-mails from unknown senders and from the junk. 
o 20 out of 30 have got anti-viruses in their PC, only 10 keep them up to date and only4 
have got spam filters 
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No. Failed in 
experiment  
Explanations of responses 
1 No It required registration and because it was in Arabic 
2 Yes It was a good offer 
I did not expect that I will get phished one day 
3 Yes I'm interested to see the best photos 
4 Yes I did not know about phishing 
I have recently got my e-mail and I don’t know about e-mails 
5 Yes Lack of knowledge about phishing  
6 Yes It was in Arabic, that's why I trust it  
7 Yes I like making friendship online 
I don't think a lady could phish me  
8 Yes It was excited and I usually visit Youtube 
9 Yes I love to cope with fashion and it was for free 
I don’t think there is phishing in beauty  
10 Yes It touches my interest 
11 Yes The timing for the test was appropriate where there are usually offers for 
fabulous dresses. Therefore I was not in doubt 
12 No Because I have heard of this kind of phishing before from friend   
13 Yes Offers are really cheap and I get used to buying from forums  
14 No Because I didn't want to hear music in Ramadan 
15 Yes Because Zakhat al-Fitris is required of every Muslim and I never thought 
there will be a cheat on that  
16 No I have heared about this program 
17 No I prefer to buy jewelleries from shops  
18 No I prefer to buy bags from shops 
19 No I haven't checked my e-mail  
20 No I have opened the e-mail, but I downloaded the attachments because I didn't 
prefer to read from e-books. 
21 Yes I like to know how to get God’s blessing in  Ramadan 
22 No I have not got the chance to look at it 
23 No I don’t open it because it is from unknown sender 
24 Yes It was a good offer and I always look at hotels offers 
25 No Because it was from unknown sender, and because I have knowledge on 
phishing 
26 No Because it was from unknown sender and I have been tricked before with 
phishing 
27 No Did not check his e-mail and because I have knowledge on phishing 
28 Yes I love being in a drawing exhibition 
29 Yes I like to read sport news 
30 Yes I have not faced phishing before 
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Chi-squared test 
 
 
 
Data: contingency table 
 
       A      B      C      D 
1      1      3      6      3     13 
2      7      5      1      4     17 
 
       8      8      7      7     30 
 
Expected: contingency table 
 
        A          B          C          D 
1    3.47       3.47       3.03       3.03     
2    4.53       4.53       3.97       3.97     
 
Chi-square (x2) = 8.33  
Degrees of freedom = 3 
Critical chi-squared= 7.82 
They are quite relationship between participant’s level of knowledge and their ability to 
detect phishing attempts 
C3 Experimental study  
 Planning and design 
 
Participants' characteristics 
30 people participated in the experimental study, each with different backgrounds in terms 
of e-mail phishing level of knowledge, age, education and occupation. Below shows the 
demography of participants, participants were asked to fill out the below table: 
E-mail phishing level of knowledge: 10 poor, 8 average, 7 good and 5 with expert 
knowledge 
Age: 15 are 18-29, 11 are 30-50 and only 4 are over 50 
Level of computer 
knowledge / Phishing 
detections Poor Average Good Expert 
Correct 1 3 6 3 
False 7 5 1 4 
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Education: 8 school, 19 higher education, 3 with post graduate education 
Occupation: 13 students, 14 employees, 2 are both employees and students and 3 others 
(e.g. retired or housewife or unemployed) 
No. Participant  E-mail 
phishing 
knowledge 
Age Education Occupation 
1 D K  Poor 28 School Employee 
2 F L 1 Poor 31 Higher education Student 
3 W M Poor 51 Higher education Employee 
4 S N  Poor 18 School Student 
5 A S Poor 30 School Employee 
6 T O Poor 25 School Student 
7 A A Poor 33 Higher education Student 
8 S M 1 Poor 18 Higher education Employee 
9 M S 1 Poor 53 Higher education Employee 
10 N S 1 Poor 19 Higher education Student 
11 A K Average 32 Higher education Employee 
12 W J Average 38 Higher education Others 
13 N S 2 Average 51 School Student 
14 M M Average 22 Higher education Others 
15 A M Average 20 Higher education Employee 
16 F O Average 52 Higher education Employee 
17 F J Average 28 School Student 
18 R M Average 22 Higher education Student 
19 M S 2 Good 34 Higher education Employee 
20 F L 2 Good 24 Postgraduate  Student 
21 K M Good 34 Postgraduate  Employee 
22 Y N Good 24 Higher education Student 
23 J T Good 36 Higher education Student 
24 H K Good 26 Higher education Employee 
25 B M Good 22 Higher education Others 
26 N K Expert 41 School Student 
27 S M 2 Expert 30 School Employee 
28 J J Expert 27 Higher education Employee 
29 H S Expert 44 Postgraduate  Student 
30 R D Expert 29 Higher education Employee 
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E-mail design  
 
E-mail 
subject and 
language 
Description 
6 Phishing e-mails 
Fulfil your 
Zakat online 
(Arabic) 
Zakat is one of the 5 Pillars of Islam, in which as a Muslim it is our duty to 
contribute a portion of our earnings. All the contributions will then be used for a 
good cause and given to the right people. We are getting to Ramadan soon; it is a 
reminder to pay your Zakat before the blessing month.  
 All you need to do is pay your Zakat online today! www.qzf.org.qa/zakat  
If you have already paid your Zakat, don’t miss to pay Sadaka for people who 
need it, follow this URL:www.qzf.org.qa/sadaka     forget to pay 
Help us in reminding other Muslims; don’t let this message stop with you. Send it 
to your mail list and you will gain the blessing. 
Original site: http://www.zf.org.qa/   
You can 
know the 
person you 
loves  who 
loves you 
(Arabic) 
Do you want to know the person who loves you in secret??? 
Send this message to 15 people and then you can see an image of the person who 
loves you by clicking on this page http://your-love.c.la will  
You will be amazed when you know ... Image that will show you the secret to 
resemble the beloved 50% 
You haven't send the message to 15 people 
If you have sent it please re-visit after a while 
Q-tel 
downloads 
mozaic 
(Arabic) 
Dear Qtel customer, 
You have received Mozaic settings for free. Kindly SAVE/INSTALL and start 
enjoying the coolest Music, latest movies, plus more! www.mozzaic.qa  
Original site: www.mozaic.qa 
Buy/sell 
your shares 
online 
(Arabic) 
The old website for Doha Securities Market (DSMC) has been changed.Now you 
can perform online securities trading in the new site of Qatar Eexchange (QE) in 
the following URL: http://www.dsm.com.qa/pps/dsm/portal/Pages/DSM_Home    
If you a businessman and you're tired of going to the Share market every day, the 
site offers you a secure online securities trading  
Original site: http://www2.dsm.com.qa/pps/dsm/portal/Pages/DSM_Home   
Help to 
enhance e-
Dear Qatari citizens 
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services in 
Qatar 
(Arabic) 
The Ministry of Interior would like to encourage people to use e-government 
services. You can check and pay your bills online such as traffic offenCses on  
http://www.mol.gov.qa/site/arabic/eServices/index.html  
Be aware that any delay in payment will consequently increase your payment   
Original site: http://www.moi.gov.qa/site/arabic/eServices/index.html  
Carrefour 
promotions 
Poster 
(Arabic/eng) 
 
The button directs to this fake site: http://72.32.124.138/carefour.com 
Original site: http://www.carrefourqatar.com/  
 
 
 
4 Legitimate e-mails 
Doha Bank 
Travel 
Insurance 
(English)  
Dear Doha Bank Account Owner,  
Buy Travel Insurance from Doha Bank and ensure peace of mind while on 
vacation. YOU will gain 50% discount, this offer is valid until 15/9/09. For 
details, call Doha Bank customer service 4257517or e-mail:       
bancacpu@dohabank.com. 
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Protect from 
viruses and 
phishing 
(English) 
Microsoft Phishing Filter Add-on for MSN Search Toolbar to protect yourself 
from viruses and phishing, download this software to your pc for free from 
Microsoft site. 
http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/safety/technologies/antiphishing/at_glance.msp
x  
You can win 
fabulous 
prizes in 
Dohasooq 
Poster 
(English) 
 
Invitation 
from 
Facebook 
 
Sign up button goes to the Original site: http://www.facebook.com 
 
 
 
Answer sheet for participants 
Name:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Date: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  100 
Time spent: 
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Decide whether the e-mail is phishing, legitimate or don’t know, and then tick in the 
appropriate field in the table below.  
 
List of e-mails Phishing Legitimate 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
7   
8   
9   
10   
 Evaluate participants’ responses to study 
 
Results  
Participants' level of detection was ranked from poor to excellent according to their 
responses to the study. Final results were as follows:  
Participants' 
detection level 
Scores Number of 
participants 
% of 
participants  
Excellent 100 3 10 
Very good 70-90 9 30 
Good 50-60 11 36.7 
Poor Below 50 7 23.3 
 
 
120 detections were wrong and the remaining 180 were correct. The amount of wrong 
detections varies for each e-mail in the study, as shown below:  
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No. E-mail topics Number of 
Wrong 
detections 
% of Wrong 
detections 
1 Fulfil your Zakat online    22 18.3% 
 
2 You can know the person who loves you 11 9.2% 
3 Q-tel downloads mosaic 8 6.7% 
4 Buy/sell your shares online 15 12.5% 
5 Help to enhance e-services in Qatar 5 4.2% 
6 Carrefour promotions 4 3.3% 
7 Doha Bank Travel Insurance  20 16.7% 
8 Protect from viruses and phishing 19 15.8% 
9 You can win fabulous prizes in Dohasooq 11 9.2% 
10 Invitation from Facebook  5 4.2% 
Total  120 100% 
 
Grid matrices of participants' scores and wrong detections are shown in Table below:  
Participants Scores  Wrong detections 
1 30 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 5 
2 60 1, 2, 4 and 7 
3 50 1, 4, 8, 9 and 10 
4 60 1, 2, 3 and 4 
5 80 7 and 8 
6 50 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9     
7 80 1 and 9  
8 20 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 
9 70 1, 8 and 9 
10 50 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9 
11 60 6, 7, 8 and 9 
12 80 1 and 5 
13 60 1, 2, 7 and 8 
14 30 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 5  
15 20 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10 and 5 
16 60 1, 7, 8 and 9 
17 60 1, 6, 8 and 9 
18 40 1, 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9 
19 30 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 
20 50 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8    
21 80 7 and 8 
22 30 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 10 
23 50 1, 4, 7, 8 and 10 
24 70 1, 7 and 8 
25 100 None 
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26 70 1, 4 and 7    
27 100 None 
28 90 4 
29 70 4, 7 and 5 
30 100 None 
 
 Semi-structured discussion points  
In-depth discussions took place with participants after the study according to the 
observation grid matrix referred to above and the following semi-structured discussion 
points: 
1. Were you aware of the phishing threat before? 
2. For participants who took more time than allocated to complete. What was the reason 
for your taking more time than allocated? 
3. Which of the given e-mails did you spend more time on to detect whether it was 
phishing or legitimate? And why? 
4. For participants with scores less than 100. Look at the wrong detections, ask for the 
reason for such an answer and then explain the right detection. 
5. Which was the most tempting phishing e-mail? 
6. Which of the given e-mails was difficult/tricky to detect whether phishing or 
legitimate? And why? 
7. Why do you think Qatari people could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail phishing 
attacks (e.g. effect of native language, kindness, etc.)?  
8. How do you think Qatari culture affects people’s responses to phishing attacks? Why is 
that ? What are the possible cultural factors ? 
9. What do you think is the most successful trick that phishers could use on Qataris ? 
Why?   
Appendix C 
376 
10. What have you learnt from the study? Have you achieved new knowledge about 
phishing? 
11. Did you find it useful? And what did you like and dislike about it? 
12. Do you have any comments or suggestions on how to improve the study? 
Summary of discussion outcomes 
1. Were you aware of the phishing threat before? 
Most participants stated that they were unaware of the phishing threat and few really 
noticed  it.  
2. Reason for taking more time than allocated  
Most participants completed the study before the time allocated because a lot did not take 
enough time to recognise phishing attempts by inspecting security indicators and some 
were even guessing. Only a few participants spent more than the time allocated for the 
experiment and they explained that this was due to their confusion on making the right 
detection, especially for the e-mail which provided a free tool to protect from viruses and 
phishing since some phishers use this trick to get their victims to fallto phishing.   
3. Which of the given e-mails did you spend  more time onto detect whether phishing or 
legitimate? And why? 
The following e-mails: Q-tel downloads mosaic, buy/sell your shares online, help to 
enhance e-services in Qatar and invitation from Facebook were more confusing phishing e-
mails since the URL given was a  fake but with only slight difference that was hard to 
notice. Some participants were confused by the legitimate Facebook invitation because of 
recent exploitation of Facebook by phishers.  
4. For participants with scores less than 100. Wrong detections looked at , participant 
asked for the reason for such answer and then right detection was explained. 
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No. E-mail topics Reason for  wrong detections 
1 Fulfil your Zakat 
online    
-  I trust Zakat fund institute 
-  It used people’s emotion, beliefs and religion 
-  The fake website was similar to the official site 
-  I trusted it because it was written in my native language (Arabic) 
2 You can know the 
person who loves 
you  
 
- It was exciting and interesting to me 
- Utilising my emotion 
- I love adventure 
- Usually phishing written in English 
- It required distributing the e-mail to my contact list which was 
strange 
3 Q-tel downloads 
mosaic 
- The fake website looks similar to Q-tel official site 
- It is trusted Q-tel institute 
- The e-mail uses common kind of e-mail send by Q-tel 
- I was in my native language (Arabic) 
4 Buy/sell your 
shares online 
- It used the event of changing the website for online securities 
trading from Doha Securities Market Company into Qatar 
Exchange website. 
- I used to buy and sell my shares online since it is secure and 
trustful. 
- A very minor difference in the fake URL 
- It attracted my interest 
- It was inmy native language (Arabic) 
5 Help to enhance 
e-services in 
Qatar 
- Uses official communication 
- The Ministry of Interior is a trusted governmental institute 
- I've been using e-governments services before with no problems 
- I get intimidated with the urgency and penalty payment  
- It was written in Arabic 
6 Carrefour 
promotions 
- It is frequent e-mail sent by Carrefour supermarket 
- It used a poster which is hard to be faked 
- I did not recognise the fake URL because it was embedded in a 
button  within the poster 
- We were in the event of going back to school; therefore it 
attracted my attention, needs and excitement to see the new 
promotions.  
7 Doha Bank 
Travel Insurance  
- Usually phishing targets banks and financial institutes 
- The discount of 50% made me a bit suspicious  
8 Protect from 
viruses and 
phishing 
- Some phishers use this trick to get their victims to fall to 
phishing by attempting to help then to avoid phishing but they are 
really phishing people. 
- Microsoft was a common target for phishers  
9 You can win 
fabulous prizes in 
Dohasooq 
- It contain sense of excitement by offering fabulous prizes which 
is usually used by phishers 
10 Invitation from 
Facebook  
- Recent exploitation of Facebook by phishers 
- The invitation came from unknown person 
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5. What was the most tempting phishing e-mail? 
The e-mail which can know the person you love; this was unexciting and clever trick which 
attracted people’s emotions and beliefs about love.  
6. Which of the given e-mails was difficult/tricky to detect whether phishing or 
legitimate? And why? 
The e-mail which let you know the person you love since it was exciting, interesting and 
adventure. However, I was confused that it might be phishing when it required sending the 
e-mail to my contact list. 
 
7. Do you think the culture affects people’s responses to phishing attacks?  
Yes, it has a major influence of Qataris responses to phishing, the natures of Qataris are 
trustful, and generous, that's in the culture of Qatar. Also, the religion 'Islam' has a major 
effect on people’s life style and in being good willed and trustful. 
8. Why do you think Qatari people could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail phishing 
attacks (e.g. effect of native language, kindness, etc.)?  
After analysing results, the following factors make Qataris vulnerable to phishing:   
1. Qataris are friendly and like making friends and knowing people 
2. Qataris feel embarrassed and stupid to report phishing and mention that they had fallen 
prey to it, that's in their nature.  
3. Qataris are affected by the manner of incentives and disincentives which can sometimes 
lead to circulation and exchange of phishing e-mails and sites among people, which 
gives it credibility   
4. Confidence and trust of friends, this gives the phishing e-mail credibility if it is sent 
from a person they know.  
5. Trust of official communications and of official trustworthy institutes in the society 
6. Influence and trust of the native language (Arabic) 
7. Courtesy for people, even in giving your confidential information 
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8. Lack of knowledge on Internet threats and in particular phishing threat since a lot did 
not absorb the technology, especially with the rapid development in technology 
experienced in Qatar. This led to the following: 
9. A lot expect the limitation of contact for phishing (i.e. they think phishing is usually in 
English or has not reached Qatar where it is not limited to a geographical area) and the 
limitation of topics that phishing uses (e.g. disbelief in the existence of phishing in 
religious and art topics). 
10. Some have overconfidence in technological tools, especially anti-viruses, for protecting 
against all kinds of phishing.  
11. Some people have overconfidence in the technical revolution and that everything in the 
Internet is true.   
12. Some do not know how to detect and react and protect against phishing attacks  
13. Qataris are motivated by religious and moral conditions in being helpful, generous, 
emotional and good willed in showing philanthropy, compassion and clemency, 
especially for people in need, in particular in religious seasons, and in disasters, 
particularly with the existence of a lot of disasters and famines around the world. This 
makes people believe phishing e-mails which exploit it, especially with the media 
coverage of other events which happened in Qatar society. 
14. People are trustful and not donot have bad faith in people  
15. Seek for curiosity and knowledge and discovery, especially in matters of their interests.  
16. Amenable to different kinds of temptations, to satisfy their desires, needs and beliefs, 
such as magic, superstition , envy, horoscopes, astrology and Jihad, either with money, 
spreading thought or propagation of religion)  
17. Believe that he/she does not have anything to be stolen or worth stealing 
18. Overconfidence of their knowledge and thought that they will not be tricked 
 
9. What do you think is the most successful trick that phishers could use on Qataris and 
Why? 
Phishing attacks which exploit Qataris' emotions, morals and religion, especially in 
religious seasons.   
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10. What have you learnt from the study? Have you achieved new knowledge about 
phishing? 
The majority had found the experiment interesting and had enhanced their knowledge on 
phishing, especially on how to detect phishing attempts from legitimate ones. It also 
demonstrates some of the false beliefs such as overconfidence in reliability of anti-viruses 
to detect phishing, overtrust in official and trustworthy institutes in Qatar, and belief about 
limitation of use of topics, especially religious ones, for phishing.     
11. Did you find it useful? And what did you like and dislike about it? 
The experiment was very useful, especially the discussions which brainstormed the factors 
which make Qataris vulnerable to phishing. 
12. Do you have any comments or suggestions on how to improve the study?  
Some recommended holding the experiment with more participants towards getting more 
reliable results.  
Interview with the expert in Qatar culture  
Date of interview: 24 November 2009 
Duration: Approximately 25 minutes 
Interviewee: Mohamed Al-Kabi, Cultural attaché of Qatar Embassy in the UK 
1. Why do you think Qatari people could be vulnerable to falling prey to e-mail phishing 
attacks? And do you think Qatari culture affects people’s responses to phishing attacks? 
Explain you answer and state what are the possible cultural factors 
I think Qatari culture has a major affects on people’s responses to phishing attacks since 
Qatar is a conservative country with their customs and traditions and culture. He added 
Qataris are vulnerable to phishing due to cultural, country-specific factors, religion, 
personal interest and characteristics. Phishers try to utilise all of these factors and exploit 
them their advantage to persuade and trick their victims to fall prey to phishing. 
Appendix C 
381 
The interviewee supported the above factors discovered from the discussions which make 
Qataris vulnerable to phishing. In addition, he pointed out more factors as follows:   
1. Qataris are motivated by tribal or sectarian or partisan concerns since the society has a 
tribal structure 
2. Feeling of safety,  especially that Qatar is a safe country 
3. Love of adventure 
4. Love of spreading good, e.g. spreading good ideas which can be used by phishers which 
is called apyramid system. 
5. Believe that he/she has not got enemies which want to hurt them 
6. Lack of concerns on the consequence of phishing especially if you are not using your 
computer (e.g. work PC)  
2. What do you think is the most successful trick that phishers could use on Qataris and 
Why?     
Since Qataris are emotional and Islam plays a big role in their life and in being good willed, 
I think religious topics are more persuasive, especially if it influences their emotions, 
especially in religious seasons such as Ramadan and in existing disasters.  
3. Do you believe Qatari people are well aware of the phishing threat? How to protect 
themselves? How to spot threats and how to react? 
I can't judge that, but I think they are not enough aware because I have seen phishing 
becoming popular in Qatar and I think the responsible institutes are paying attention to 
protecting against it and enhancing public awareness on phishing. I believe even experts in 
computer are not all aware of phishing attacks, he mentioned that he have failed prey to e-
mail phishing before were he have got the wrong advice from a computer expert. He has 
received an e-mail from unknown sender requesting his to verify his Msn e-mail account 
otherwise it will be blocked and a computer expert mentioned that this e-mail is legitimate. 
Where then phishers has stolen his e-mail account and impersonate the cultural attaché, he 
sent an e-mail to all contacts requesting help and money by using the name of the cultural 
attaché.  He stated that he have been now more cautious on phishing because he have to 
learned from the lesson. 
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I predicted the young generation will be more aware. Furthermore, the country has got a lot 
of money and it is valuable to invest in awareness because it is the best way to defend 
against phishing.   
4. Do you believe country-specific factors have helped development of phishing in Qatar?    
Like, first, the vast development experience in Qatar in all sectors especially the economy 
and ICT?  Second, the absence of an e-law?  
Yes, I do, the rapid development experienced in Qatar in recent years has assisted in 
shedding light on Qatar and therefore phishers found it an attractive place for phishing 
especially with the availability of a huge amount of money, large numbers of victims and 
absence of e-law to protect online consumers.   
5. Do you think the establishment of an e-law will help in reducing e-crimes, in 
particular phishing?   
Yes, of course. I think they are planning to develop this law soon  
6. Do you think Qatari people need more time to cope with the rapid development in ICT 
and technology in Qatar in recent years?  
Yes, Qatar, as other developing nations, is in the stage of development and since the 
development is rapid, people might not have absorbed this revolution and this will take 
time. However, the government is working on that by enhancing human resources and 
improving education curriculum.  
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C4  Consent Form for Experiment Participants 
 
Participants contributing to penetration test 2 and the laboratory experiments study were 
asked to sign the following consent form: 
 
CERTIFICATION BY PARTICIPANT IN THE EXPERIMENT 
 
I certify that I am voluntarily giving my consent to participate in an experimental e-mail 
phishing study for the project entitled: Reducing the Risk of E-mail Phishing through 
Awareness and Education: An Empirical Study of the State of Qatar Considering 
Cultural Differences, being conducted at Loughborough University, UK by: Ms. Mariam 
Al-Hamar. 
 
 
I certify that I have agreed to participate in the experiment of as previously explained by 
Ms. Mariam Al-Hamar and that I freely consent to participate in this experiment. I have had 
the opportunity to have any questions answered, I have had a full explanation of the 
procedures of the experiment and that information gathered will be used only for the benefit 
of the entitled research and will be confidential and kept strictly private.  
 
 
Name: ….............................................. 
Signed: ….............................................. 
Witness other than the participant: Date: …................. 
…............................................................. 
 
For any queries about the research topic please do not hesitate to contact the researcher 
(Ms. Mariam Al-Hamar, ph. +974 5553493, E-mail:  m. k.j.al-hamar@lboro.ac.uk) 
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Appendix D:  Evaluation of Recommendations  
 
D1  Draft Letter to Interview Participants 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
E-mail phishing 
E-mail phishing is a fraudulent process used by criminals. They aim to acquire sensitive 
information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by pretending to be an honest 
and trustworthy person in an electronic communication such as an e-mail. This can have very 
serious financial and social consequences for their victims.  As a PhD student at Loughborough 
University in the UK, I am doing research on „e-mail phishing‟ as a contribution to foiling those 
criminal schemes in the State of Qatar. To achieve the desired goals, I have put together a set of 
recommendations for the Qatar government, organisation officials responsible for ensuring 
information security and for Qatari citizens, towards helping to reduce the phishing threat in 
Qatar. In order to evaluate the recommendations I now need to interview officials and citizens 
on their reactions to them.  I hope you will be able to contribute and let us have your valuable 
feedback by taking part.  
 
Thank you in anticipation of your involvement which will be much appreciated 
 
Yours faithfully,     
Mariam Al-Hamar 
For any queries about the research topic, please do not hesitate to contact me through 
my e-mail:         m.k.j.al-hamar@lboro.ac.uk. 
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CERTIFICATION BY PARTICIPANT    
 
I hereby certify that   am voluntarily giving my consent to provide information for the 
above described research project Reducing the Risk of E-mail Phishing through 
Awareness and Education: An Empirical Study of the State of Qatar Considering 
Cultural Differences being conducted at Loughborough University, UK, by Ms. 
Mariam Al-Hamar. 
I certify that I have agreed to be interviewed on the subject of e-mail phishing, as 
previously explained by Ms. Mariam Al-Hamar and that I freely consent to participate 
in this project. The interview procedures have been fully explained to me and I have 
been informed that information gathered will be used only for purposes of the research 
and will be confidential and kept strictly private. I have had the 
opportunity to have any questions answered. 
 
Signed: ….............................................. 
Witness other than the interviewee:        Date: …................. 
…............................................................. 
 
For any queries about the research topic, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher 
Ms. Mariam Al-Hamar,   Phone: +974 5553493, E-mail: m.k.j.al-hamar@lboro.ac.uk. 
 
D2  Interview questions 
The recommendations were shown to the interviewees and then a discussion was held in 
which they were evaluated on their effectiveness, feasibility and difficulties to 
implement. The following questions were asked for each were 
1.  Do you find the recommendation is valuable and effective in reducing the risk of e-
mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
2.  Is it feasible? Why? 
3.  Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if it was implemented (e.g. in 
cost, resources)? 
4. Overall, is the recommendation useful and do you think it will help in reducing the 
risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
 5.  Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
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D3  Example of signed Consent Form   
 
CERTIFICATION BY PARTICIPANT 
 
I certify that I am voluntarily giving my consent to provide information for the above described 
project entitled: Reducing the Risk of E-mail Phishing through Awareness and Education: 
An Empirical study of the State of Qatar Considering Cultural Differences, being 
conducted at Loughborough University, UK, by Ms. Mariam Al-Hamar. 
 
I certify that I have agreed to be interviewed in the subject of as previously explained by Ms. 
Mariam Al-Hamar and that that I freely consent to participate in this project. I have had the 
opportunity to have any questions answered, I have been fully explained the procedures of 
interview and that information gathered will be only used for the benefit of the entitled research 
and will be confidential and kept strictly private.  
 
Signed: 
 
 
Date: 29 Dec 09 
 
For any queries about the research topic please don't hesitate to contact the researcher: 
Ms. Mariam Al-Hamar, ph. +974 5553493, E-mail: m.k.j.al-hamar@lboro.ac.uk). 
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D4  Details of expert interviews 
Interview 1 
Date of interview: 21 December 2009 
Duration: Approximately 1 hour 
Interviewees:         Two officials from the Ministry of Interior, interviewed together: 
      Mahmoud Salah D. Ibrahim, Officer of the Computer Crimes Unit, Economic 
Crimes               Prevention Division, General Admin. of Public Security, Criminal 
Investigation Dept., Ministry of    Interior, Qatar. 
      Abdullah Al-Muftah, Manager of Public Relations Dept., Ministry of Interior. 
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
Yes, I think they are useful if they are implemented successfully. Certainly, they 
will help in reducing the risk of e-mail phishing in the State of Qatar since they are 
well defined and established from a research base carried out in the region. 
With regard to government recommendations: 
The effectiveness of e-law would be defined only after the law comes into practice 
and this could be achieved with co-operation from all sectors including 
governmental and private organisations and Qatari citizens. It is unreasonable to 
build e-law from scratch, therefore it is worth while to learn from others‟ experience 
in e-law. It is important to announce the law and make it open source for the public.  
I proved that the ipark is currently not monitored, therefore a lot of e-crimes inside 
Qatar come from there since there is no method of tracing the user. I think adding a 
kind of registration process to prove the identity of the user is a valuable solution, 
e.g. SMS registration is very valuable since a lot of Qatari citizens have mobile 
phones, even children, and all mobile phones in Qatar are registered, therefore it will 
be easy to trace the user in case of misuse of the Internet technology provided in the 
park. 
With regard to organisation recommendations: 
They were all valuable. I believe that within the organisation there should be an 
incident management centre which will report, react and work on the incidents and 
there is no shame to require help from responsible organisations in such a manner. If 
each organisation has an incident management centre, our duty will be 
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uncomplicated, since we can know with whom we should interact and we can 
further investigate the case with them.  
It is important to define understandable and reasonable guidelines to avoid phishing. 
However, employers still define guidelines as  unreasonable because they think this 
will enhance    their security level and sometimes guidelines are forced to follow. 
For example, some organisations require a compulsory reset for the network 
password every three months where, although it is more secure, employees are still 
forced to do that and most of them find difficulties in remembering their password. 
This leads them sometimes to write it on a sticky note in front of their desks. This 
therefore makes them vulnerable to social engineering attacks. 
With regard to adding a security level on the e-mail account which will not allow 
the e-mail user to send their confidential information (e.g. username and password) 
to anyone over the e-mail, they found this is a valuable, safeguard feature and it is 
technically feasible. 
With regard to Qatari citizens' recommendations: 
They are useful but too many points, I think they have to be reduced.  
They are well defined since citizens usually perform such actions without 
considering that they are incorrect and they should avoid them to prevent phishing. 
Some of the recommendations were not illustrated sufficiently, such as the reason 
why technological solutions are not 100% reliable to detect e-mail phishing 
attempts, how to protect yourself against phishing attacks, how to inspect security 
indicators and how official institutes could be phished. Not all people know what 
you mean, so it is better to make it clearer for normal people to help illustrate the 
points and maybe you could add some examples. 
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
With regard to government recommendations: 
We found difficulties in defining the resources for the awareness programme and 
approving co-operation from many institutes in Qatar (e.g. educational institutes, 
media and governmental organisations) towards facilitating applying a successful 
awareness programme on phishing. 
With regard to organisation recommendations: 
Many organisations are reluctant to spend enough money to provide an incident 
management centre and a good quality education and awareness training. They are 
likely targets only to react once an incident happened by usually referring to us and 
to trustworthy experts and responsible organisations to perform the required actions, 
such as banks and Q-CERT. 
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Organisations did not pay attention to measurement tools to measure employees‟ 
vulnerability to possible threats such as phishing. They usually spent a lot of money 
on technological tools and react on incidents. However, planning and measuring the 
extent of the problem is essential by holding a phishing penetration test, a 
measurable awareness programme towards identifying the problem, assessing the 
current strategy of defence and working to improve it. Nevertheless, a lot of 
organisations do not prefer holding penetration tests within their organisation 
because of legal and ethical issues.  
I think providing such a test is possible if it was held by trustworthy organisation 
such as Q-CERT, noting that it depends on the organisation size. For example, it 
might be essential to perform such a test regularly for top ministries which hold 
sensitive information whereas other organisations do not necessarily require it. 
Providing a certificate for audit is very useful, but it has to be certified and approved 
nationally and internationally, if possible, such as ISO9001 towards motivating 
organisations to do such an audit. 
 
With regard to Qatari citizens' recommendations: 
Usually people are reluctant to follow negative recommendations; therefore they 
recommend diverting the recommendations into “do” and “should” instead. 
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost, resources)? 
I have already covered some of the difficulties which might be experienced with 
your recommendations.  
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
No, I think it is a precious work and the government certainly has to benefit from 
your valuable findings. 
 
Interview 2 
Date of interview: 23 December 2009 
Duration: About 40 minutes 
Interviewee:   Ahmed Rashid Al-Suwaidi, Manager of ISPs, Qtel, Qatar. 
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
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Yes, I think they are useful. 
With regard to government recommendations: 
All are useful, especially establishing a research centre on phishing and creating a 
database of the incidents.   
About monitoring issues associated with ipark, Q-tel pointed out that this SMS 
service becomes common in Qatar. It already exists in the Ministry of Interior, many 
banks and institutes. Therefore, people could accept it. Technically, it is not hard to 
be implemented and it is reliable and the user can receive SMS of login details 
within a few seconds, since there are no difficulties with mobile signals in all of the 
iparks. However, the request for such service should come from Q-CERT. Also, 
there should be a co-operation with telecommunication service providers including 
Vodafone, since there is a proportion of mobile users who have Vodafone service. 
 
With regard to organisation recommendations: 
I agree on all of your suggestions. Organisations should work hard to protect 
themselves from phishing threat, they should set up a clear strategy of defence, 
including technological tools, policies and awareness, and the strategy must be 
evaluated regularly to prove its effectiveness in defending the organisation against 
phishing.  
With regard to Qatari citizens' recommendations: 
I think they are good ones, people need to know what they have to do and not do to 
avoid phishing. 
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
All recommendations defined for organisations are valuable. However, it requires 
sufficient budget and sometimes co-operation and approval from other organisations 
and from the government. With regard to the phishing audits, I think it is unfeasible 
because of ethical issues associated and employees might complain and feel they are 
being watched and this therefore might affect their work performance and trust in 
the organisation.  
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost and resources)? 
I think there are no difficulties which might found if the above mentioned issues 
were studied and prepared. For example, employers should explain to their 
employees the reason for any auditing, defining reasonable guidelines and effective 
awareness. There might be people who might not accept to be involved in an 
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awareness programme on phishing because it might not be of interest to them, 
therefore comes the need to get them interested and encourage them. 
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
Phishing is a huge field of research although it is hard to understand why people and 
especially Qataris are vulnerable to phishing, but it is excellent to find a research 
done on that and a set of recommendations defined which are easy to follow and 
which will definitely help in reducing phishing threat in Qatar. I think it would be 
beneficial to do a similar study in other countries to see whether there is similarity 
with the findings discovered in Qatar or not.  
Interview 3 
Date of interview: 22 Dec 2009 
Duration: Reply through e-mail on 24 Dec 2009  
Interviewees:  Three experts from Q-CERT,  together: 
                 Mounir Kamal, Senior Incident Specialist, Incident Management,    
Q-CERT, Qatar. 
                 Omar Sherin, Analyst, Critical Infrastrusture Protection, Q-CERT, Qatar. 
                  Nora Al-Abdulla, Public Awareness Manager, Q-CERT, Qatar. 
The following is a print screen of communication with the Q-CERT:    
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1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
Yes, definitely the recommendations were helpful.  
With regard to government recommendations: 
About ipark, yes, it's currently not monitored and users could not be traced, 
therefore it can be misused in hacking, scanning…etc. As a result, I agreed that 
there is a need for registration process to prove the identity of the user and I think 
using SMS technology is a good idea.  We found this recommendation feasible, but 
require a lot of resources, co-operation with Internet service providers. Also there is 
a need to provide a unique username and password for each registered user which 
will expire immediately when the user is disconnected from the Internet. Although 
this might be annoying for people to have a different log each time, it is safer since 
it ensures each time the identity of the user. Although there is a risk that mobile 
phones could be stolen and used by phishers for this purpose, there is no 100% 
solution, and the user has to report immediately once this happens towards blocking 
the SIM card. 
With regard to the researcher‟s recommendations for the creation of a statistical 
database for e-crimes and in particular phishing attacks, there are databases that 
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already exist in Q-CERT‟s incident database and law enforcement database. 
However, the records are still not gathered into a single database. Once all incidents 
are gathered into a single database and then classified , it would be useful for further 
research.  
With regard to organisation recommendations: 
Phishing audit is useful to measure employees‟ vulnerability to phishing and the 
awareness of employees. However, it is not part of our role to provide such audit for 
organisations; it could be done by any other information security institutes. Also it is 
valuable not to allow the e-mail users to send their confidential information to 
anyone over the e-mail. 
With regard to Qatari citizens' recommendations: 
The pieces of advice that contain the threat should also contain the cure. So when 
you tell people not to do something, tell them what they should do. Otherwise, 
you‟re only sending a scare that might drive people away from using technology. In 
other words, it‟s important to give the solution when raising the problem, especially 
when you‟re talking about awareness. 
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
Yes, Qatar e-law is on the way to reality and the team of Q-CERT is involved in co-
operation with associated organisations including ITU (International 
Telecommunication Union), Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Public Prosecution, 
High Judicial Council and others. It is important to consider the dependability and 
adaptability of the law, especially with the fast improvement in technology. The 
new e-law has taken into consideration experience of other countries in e-law; 
basically it is a combination of e-law of Australia, America, UK, UAE and Saudi 
Arabia. However, it is customised to be unique for the State of Qatar. The law will 
be improved regularly as required. 
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost, resources)? 
Yes, there is a need for sufficient budget, resources and approval of 
recommendations to be implemented. Usually organisations do not spend a lot of 
resources on providing an incident management centre and awareness. They usually 
refer to us or Ministry of Iinterior or Q-tel to solve the incident. And there might 
face difficulties in people‟s acceptance of holding phishing audit, awareness, 
following policies, adding registration to ipark.    
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
You can also mention that it‟s a trusting environment and criminals may thus take 
advantage of this. You could mention the importance of security policies within 
organisations and how the enforcement of such policies helps in reducing risks, but 
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that‟s a general recommendation for all security issues. Try to research how you can 
utilise it to deter phishing. Also I suggest not clicking on links in e-mails even if 
they are from senders you know. Retype the link. 
Interview 4 
Date of interview: 24
th
 Dec 2009 
Duration: About 20 minutes 
Interviewee:  Abdullah Al-Malki, Head of Prosecution, Ministry of Public Prosecution, 
Qatar 
 
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
By going over them I think they are useful and they will help the country to protect 
against phishing. 
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
A law will definitely provide a framework for us, but still the law is hard to 
implement, especially for crimes coming from abroad, from countries such as 
Nigeria,  where it is hard to reach the phishers and punish them, even if there were a 
co-operation with them, since there is no stability in such countries. I suggest to 
make people aware to be cautious with e-mails from those countries. The only thing 
we can do is to wait until the country becomes stable and then we could build a 
cooperation. 
With regard to the need for public prosecution, justices and lawyers to enhance their 
knowledge on how to deal with e-crimes, I think the there should be an optional 
course for people who are interested to be experts in e-crimes. It would be enough to 
have a team of experts in e-crimes where all e-crimes cases will then be referred to 
them for investigation. 
I believe there is a need for a research centre on e-crimes in Qatar, especially since 
Qatar is now investing in education and research and there is a huge revolution in 
technology, but this required huge resources from experts in the field, money and 
tools. However, with support from government and other institutes, especially 
educational, once the centre could be reputable.  
I found that keeping a record of phishing incidents in a database, although it seems 
to be an easy step, most organizations do not do it. It is part of our culture, people do 
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not want to report, they just want to react and solve the problem, they think it is a 
waste of paper and time.  
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost, resources)? 
In everything, we might found difficulties, for example the difficulty might be faced 
with co-operation with unstable countries such as Nigeria on e-crimes and in 
particular phishing.    
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
No, I found recommendations were clear and well defined. 
 
Interview 5 
Date of interview: 27 December 2009 
Duration: Reply by e-mail, 4th January 2010  
Interviewee:   Khalid Ali Abdullah Al-Obaidli, Judge at the Courts of Justice under the 
category of the Senior Civil Court Judges, The High Judicial Council, Department of 
Administrative & Financial Affairs, Qatar.  
 
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
By looking at the proposed recommendations, I do find them valuable, especially 
that they covers different target groups and the recommendations were clear and 
concluded from a research base.  
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
Overall, I found them feasible especially that the country has sought for 
development in all sectors, especially in terms of technology, and there is a huge 
amount of money associated for that. I strongly agree on the need to have a 
specialised research centre and a clear database of e-crimes in Qatar towards 
investigating the extent of the problem. 
With regard to e-law, it is on the way to reality in the near future and your 
recommendations with regard to the law to be general and modified regularly were 
considered. However, the law will help in reducing the phishing problem although 
there are some difficulties which have to be considered, such as the ability to build a 
co-operation with other countries, especially those from which crimes usually come, 
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e.g. Nigeria. However, I still think it is hard to build cooperation, especially with 
those countries, because of stability of governments in these areas of the world.  
Also, I agree with you that there should be a team of experts in e-crimes in the court, 
since it is important that they could have enough knowledge on how to deal with e-
crimes. 
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost, resources)? 
Overall, there might be minor difficulties as I mentioned in terms of e-law and 
maybe the ability to motivate the government to accept the recommendations and 
get approval to implement them. This sometimes might take a long time to process 
the recommendations and find how effective they are in reality to reduce the risk of 
phishing.  
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
I suggest trying to transform these recommendations into reality by passing them to 
the government to look at them and benefit from this research. 
Interview 6 
Date of interview: 14th December 2009 
Duration: 45 minutes 
Interviewee:   Dr. M. Kamala, Computer Systems Administration Course Leader, 
Bradford University, UK. 
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
Yes, they are. My main concern is where those recommendations come from. They 
are proved to be based on deep research in the field from literature, surveys, 
interviews and experiments which builds up a contribution to your findings and 
recommendations.  
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
I think so. Qatar is a rich country and there is currently a huge development in all 
areas, especially in technology, that‟s why I think they would be practicable. 
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost, resources)? 
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I think the only problem is getting people‟s agreement because some might 
complain or get annoyed when some recommendations are implemented, e.g. 
performing phishing audit and adding registration to ipark. 
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
Since recommendations defined for Qatari citizens are based on the factors which 
make Qataris vulnerable to phishing, it is better to pay attention to make sure the 
discovered factors are based on experiments as well as deep research in the area of 
Qatar culture and on previous literature available on what makes people vulnerable 
to phishing.  I think that, as well,citizens‟ recommendation have to be shorter and 
understandable for the normal person.     
Interview 7  
Interviewee: Mr. Peter Wood, Chief of Operations, First Base Technologies, leader in 
providing information security and testing services, UK., interviewed by a structured 
questionnaire sent by e-mail due to inability to arrange a face-to-face interview. Since 
the interviewee has no knowledge on the phishing problem in the State of Qatar, he was 
asked to evaluatonlye the recommendations assigned for citizens and organisation 
officials responsible for ensuring information security (see Sections 8.2 and 8.3). The 
questions were generally associated with reducing the e-mail phishing problem. The 
following are print screens of communication with the company:    
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The above print screen contains the following responses:        
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
Your recommendations for the organisation are thorough and sensible. I have no 
suggestions to improve these. 
 
Your recommendations for users are also very thorough. However I feel that there 
may be too many points for the average person to consume. It may be worthwhile 
consolidating some points to make the list shorter. It would also be valuable to 
include some real examples (perhaps with screenshots?) to help illustrate the points 
you make. 
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
Yes, they are feasible, but only if there is sufficient budget for the organisation to 
fund your approach. We find many organisations are reluctant to spend enough 
money to provide good quality education and awareness, so any advice you can 
offer to your audience to help them gain funding would be welcome. 
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost, resources)? 
As my answer above, I think funding and resources will be the largest obstacle to 
implementing your suggestions. 
 
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
Include real world examples and screenshots to increase the impact and help 
understanding. 
Interview 8 
Date of interview: 19th August 2009 
Duration: About 1 hours 
Interviewee:   M. Al-Kabi, Cultural Attaché of Qatar in the UK   
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think theywill help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
I found them very valuable and useful and they are clear, understandable and 
defined from deep research in the field.   
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
Appendix D 
533 
Yes, they are to some extent.  It depends as well on the availability of resources and 
approval from the Qatar government and responsible organisations in Qatar.  
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost, resources)? 
In every proposed solution there are always some difficulties which might be faced. 
I mentioned earlier there might be some difficulties in terms of resources, approval 
and co-operation.  In addition, there is a problem that Qataris do not prefer reporting 
and documenting things, they prefer reacting more. Also, the difficulties to get these 
recommendations into reality, to measure how they would help in solving e-mail 
phishing problem in Qatar. 
4. Do you have any further suggestion or comments? 
Not really, I find the research valuable and interesting and I think it would be useful 
to get it into action in reality.  
Interview 9 
Date of interview: 27th December 2009 
Duration: Reply by e-mail 28th December 2009 
Interviewee:  J. Williams, Manager Director of HandShaikh Ltd., UK. The company 
provides cross-cultural seminars and consultancy for business with Arabs. He is as well 
a researcher on Gulf culture and author of the book Don't they know it's Friday.  
1. Overall, are the recommendations useful and do you think they will help in reducing 
the risk of e-mail phishing in Qatar? Why? 
They are too confined to Qatar. The problem is worldwide. Qatar could become a 
world leader in the fight against phishing, though. 
2. Are they feasible? Why? 
Education is the ONLY answer. Qataris (and everyone else) need to wake up to the 
problem. 
3. Are there any difficulties which might be experienced if they were implemented 
(e.g. in cost, resources)? 
Qatar could lead the world in this matter. How about al-Jazeera taking up the 
matter? 
4. Do you have any further suggestions or comments? 
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There is no technology to protect you fully from phishing. Your suspicion is your 
only friend. 
De-couple your argument/logic from Qatar and make your thesis more international. 
Or at least more GCC-centric. By looking at citizens‟ recommendations, I found 
they are useful but I still think it is beneficial for other nations, not only Qataris, 
since they are based on the factors which make Qataris vulnerable to phishing and 
those factors are similar to other people not just Qataris. There is no technology to 
protect you fully from phishing. Your suspicion is your only friend. Just be 
suspicious – all the time. Trust no machine. None should trust an e-mail from a 
stranger, and be suspicious of a friend who sends you a bad e-mail because his/her 
email address might be forged. Even the English e-mails use compassion, etc. in 
their messages.  
D5  Interviews with Qatari citizens 
A sample of 30 Qatari e-mail users above 12 were randomly selected to evaluate the 
following proposed recommendations towards assessing people‟s acceptability, and 
feedback on the following recommendations: 
1. Proposals for Qatari citizens 
2. The need for applying an awareness framework, by government and organisation 
officials responsible for ensuring information security to enhance public awareness 
on phishing threat towards reducing the phishing problem in Qatar. 
3. Adding a kind of ID proof such as Visa card, ID number or a type of registration 
process before accessing the free Internet in iparks. 
4. Simulating e-mail phishing penetration test to measure organisation‟s vulnerabilities 
to such threat and to take part in an awareness programme to enhance awarenes of 
phishing. 
5. Setting up some clear and reasonable guidelines to help in defending against 
phishing, bearing in mind that employees should be motivated without intimidating 
them to follow such guidelines. 
6. Adding security level to e-mail account which will not allow the e-mail user to send 
their confidential information (e.g. username and password) to anyone over the 
e-mail. 
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D6  Summary of outcomes of interviews  
1.  The majority of Qatari citizens state the need for applying an effective awareness 
framework to enhance public awareness of the phishing threat, especially through the 
media, towards reducing the phishing problem in Qatar. 
2.  The majority found that adding registration is valuable and necessarily, but it might 
be not accessible for people who do not have mobile phones. A lot say that they will 
still use it even if registration is added because they get used to SMS services and they 
found it fast and effective, especially with their experience with SMS banking services 
were with few seconds of performing any transactions on their bank account they 
receive an SMS to verify the transactions.  
3.  Most disagree on holding penetration tests because it is annoying, create distrust on 
organisation, and they do not like to be watched and audited regularly since this might 
negatively influence on their work performance. 
4. With regard to the need for defining understandable and reasonable guidelines to 
avoid phishing, citizens found it important, However they mentioned that employers 
still define unreasonable guidelines because they think this will enhance their security 
level and sometimes guidelines are forced to follow because they are not realistic. They 
added it is important to motivate employees to follow such guidelines although most 
employers do not pay attention for motivating employees' weather by financial or moral 
support.      
5. About adding security level on e-mail account which will not allow the e-mail user to 
send their confidential information to anyone over the e-mail, some citizens disagree 
and state that they sometimes send their log in detail for their trusted families or friends 
once required. 
6. The majority of citizens found the recommendations defined for them were useful 
towards reducing the risk of phishing but they feel that there may be too many points 
for them to remember and follow. So they suggest shortening them. Also they pointed 
to the need to clarify to them what they should do as well as what they should not. Some 
state that they usually perform such actions without considering that they are incorrect 
and they should avoid them. Some think recommendations need to be illustrated 
sufficiently such as how to detect, react and protect yourself against phishing attacks, 
how you should continuously improve your knowledge of phishing. Therefore, they 
suggest helping by illustrating the points with real phishing incidents, scenarios, 
screenshots and literature, but in the end, keeping them short and precise. 
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Appendix E: Phishing Awareness Programme 
 
E1  Copyright  
1.  Freej characters 
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2.  Finding Nemo 
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E2  E-learning System requirements 
 
To run the game efficiently, basic requirements are essential on both the administrator and 
user workstations. This is explained below:  (Appendix F contains the e-learning files) 
Administrator requirement:    
 - WAMP server: It contains Apache server, PHP and Mysql. PHP version: 5.2.9, Apache 
server 2.2.11, Mysql 5.1.32 
- Flash Mx 2004 or Flash 8 
- Action script 2 is the scripting language used in the development of Flash. 
- Coldfusion (server and language) 
- Microsoft Access 
User requirement:  
-Macromedia Flash player 6 or higher. 
- Internet browser (e.g. Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox) 
- Sound card and speakers 
- Computer with 64M b of RAM or higher 
- Minimum connection speed 56K modem, recommended T1 or higher.   
- Screen resolution 800*600 or higher 
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E3  Description of  Database Tables   
 
Name of Table Description Comments 
tblUsers Stores details of all registered users  
tblAges Stores details of age range 
categories (under 30, under 40,etc.) 
Data from these tables referenced 
via primary key in tblUsers table 
tblEducations Stores details of education levels 
users can select 
tblOccupations Stores details of range of 
occupations users can select 
tblComplevels Stores details of different levels of 
computer ability user can select 
tblPolls Stores all responses to Poll Name of user referenced via 
primary key in tblUsers 
tblQuizzes Stores names of quizzes  
tblQuestions Stores all questions to all quizzes Quiz referenced by primary key in 
tblQuizzes 
tblResponses Stores answers to all quizzes User referenced via primary key in 
tblUsers and question referenced 
via primary key in tblQuestions 
tblAnswers Stores all answers to quizzes and on 
screen responses to user 
Corresponding question 
referenced via primary key in 
tblQuestions 
tblScores Stores user results User referenced via primary key in 
tblUsers and quiz referenced via 
primary key in tblQuizzes 
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E4   Site structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home.cfm 
contact.cfm education.cfm 
Displays either log in screen or menu depending 
on user status 
loginprocess.cfm 
Checks validity of log in 
details, writes to database 
and returns user to 
education.cfm  
registration.cfm 
Contains registration 
form  
processreg.cfm 
Checks validity of registration details, writes to database 
and returns user to education.cfm  
 
quizindex.cfm 
Allows logged in 
user to access 
quizzes 
quiz1.cfm 
Displays quiz 1 
questions  
quiz2.cfm 
Shows quiz 2 
questions  
poll.cfm 
Displays poll 
questions  
Processpoll.cfm 
Checks answers to poll before either 
writing to database or returning user to 
poll.cfm if answers incomplete 
 
presentation.cfm 
posters.cfm 
cartoon.cfm 
Index pages for 
associated material  
Log out 
Quiz3  
Show game 
by directing 
into different 
webpage 
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E5  Game development 
Macromedia MX Flash 2004 is installed on the administrator PC. This becomes the 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) for the game. WAMP Server is installed on the 
administrator PC. WAMP server consists of PHP, MySQL and Apache Server. This allows 
for the whole application to be developed on one machine without the need to upload files 
to a remote server for testing. Once the development is complete, an executable swf file 
(Shockwave file) is created from within the IDE. This is an executable file available to any 
PC that has a Flash player installed. This swf file is uploaded to the web server along with 
the php and mySQL files. A description of the PHP files is shown in the table below. 
File Summary 
db_connect.php This file tests database connectivity. It returns a list of all registered 
users 
game1.php 
 
This file accepts variables from one of the three Flash games. These 
are: game (1, 2 or 3), userID (unique number that identifies which 
user is playing and score (score for completed game). It then 
connects with database and writes these details to games_record table 
along with current date. 
login.php 
 
This file accepts two variables from Flash containing user name and 
password entered at log in stage. Then connects with database and 
checks for user name. If name exists, checks if password is correct. 
Depending on outcome, file returns to Flash two variables showing 
validity of both user name and password (either 'OK' or 'Bad'). Flash 
will only allow user to proceed if both variables have been set to OK. 
File also sends to Flash a variable containing unique ID of user used 
to monitor game play. 
step1.php 
 
This file forms part of registration process. Accepts variable from 
Flash that contains proposed user name. File then connects with 
database and checks if user name has been used previously. Returns 
variable to Flash showing validity of user name (either 'OK' or 
'Bad'). If 'OK' received, Flash moves on to password stage of 
registration 
step2.php 
 
This file continues registration process. Accepts variable from Flash 
containing proposed password. Then connects with database and 
checks if password used previously. Returns variable to Flash 
showing validity of password (either 'OK' or 'Bad'). If 'OK' received , 
Flash moves on to email stage of registration 
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step3.php 
 
This file continues registration process. Accepts variable from Flash 
containing proposed email. Then connects with database and checks 
if email used previously. Returns variable to Flash showing validity 
of email (either 'OK' or 'Bad'). If 'OK' received, Flash invites user to 
sign up 
step4.php When user registers validated user name, password and email are 
sent to this file. File then connects to database and writes details to 
members’ table. Also dynamically adds unique ID for each user and 
then returns this ID to Flash so that it can be used to monitor game 
play. 
 
The MySQL database file keeps records of user’s data. Called phishing, consists of two 
tables, members and games_record. Database Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) is shown 
in the following figure. 
 
 
 
  
 
The members table consist of four fields, the ‘id’ set as (pk) stands for primary key, which 
means it gives each user a unique identifier, also the table keeps records of users’ 
username, password and email in the ‘usr’,‘pw’ and ‘email’ fields, respectively. The 
games_record table consists of five fields. The ‘recordID’ gives each record a unique 
identifier and the ‘id’, specified as (fk) foreign key, creates a relationship with the 
members’ table. This means it is duplicated from the ‘id’ in the members’ table to specify 
the user.  
 
Id (pk) 
usr 
pw 
members 
recordID (pk) 
id (fk) 
gameNo 
 
games_record 
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The other three fields are the ‘gameNo’ which is either game 1, 2 or 3, the ‘score’ and the 
‘date’(see table below).  
Data Dictionary for Phishing database 
Table Members 
Field Data Extra 
Id Integer(11) Auto Increment 
Usr VarChar(50)  
Pw VarChar(50)  
Email VarChar(50)  
 
Table games_record 
Field Data Extra 
Recorded Integer(11) Auto Increment 
Id Integer(11)  
GameNo Integer(11)  
Score Integer(11)  
Date Date  
Once the user is registered in the game, user information will be stored in the members’ 
table and an id will be uniquely assigned for each user. Each time the user plays a game, 
his/her game record will be stored in the games_record table and a recordID will be 
uniquely assigned for the game record.  It is important that the file structure created on the 
administrator PC is exactly replicated on the web server. The user requests the swf file from 
the server (usually by entering the URL into a browser). The swf is then downloaded to the 
user’s PC.  
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While playing the game and while logging in, data are exchanged between the the user’s 
PC and the php files stored on the server (see figure below). The php files then either read 
or write to the mySQL database before returning data to the user’s machine for the swf file 
to use.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
System architecture of the game is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SWF data request 
User 
 
PHP File 
SWF 
Web server 
Administrator 
WAMP 
Server 
Flash 
IDE 
MySQL 
External 
data 
source 
wamp 
www(root) bin 
mysql 
mysql5.1.32 
data 
phishing 
games_record.frm 
games_record.MYD 
games_record.MYI 
members.frm 
members.MYD 
members.MYI 
 
 
 
 
mariam_dev 
 
Mariam_Game_MX_
35.swf php 
db_connect.php 
game1.php 
login.php 
step1.php 
step2.php 
step3.php 
step4.php 
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A screen of the players’ record database is shown in the next figure. 
 
E6  Print screen of e-learning site 
Home page 
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Login page 
 
 
Registration page 
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Educational material 
 
 
Quiz 1 
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Quiz 2 
 
 
Quiz 3 (Game) 
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Presentation 
 
 
Posters  
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Cartoons 
    
Poll 
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Admin website 
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